

**‘DIVIDED WE STAND’.
Emergence And Viability Of Political Regimes In The
Former Soviet Union: The Case Of Hybrid Regimes
In Georgia, Moldova And Ukraine**

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the leadership in the fifteen former republics found themselves challenged by complex processes of independent state- and nation-building. Twenty years later, the political regimes that emerged vary from democracies to autocracies. This dissertation focuses on the grey zone in between the pure types. Conceptualizing hybrid regimes as the ones that combine holding of free and fair, recognized elections, and autocratic governance, it asks the question of what keeps the former viable. This research singles out Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as the countries with hybrid regimes. It shows that the three are highly ethnically heterogeneous and have relatively poor, very low-growing economies. This dissertation argues that these structural conditions are responsible for the actions of the domestic elites, which together with the incentives that the international donors provide the domestic elites with make hybrid regimes permanent. The political polarization is at the core of the explanatory account this dissertation presents. Ethnic divisions, reflected in political polarization are responsible for emergence of regimes with competitive elections. The elites emphasize the divisive issues in their campaigning, while the donors support the already thriving competitive environment. This keeps competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and Ukraine viable. Absence of polarization based on easily inflammable issues results in the lack of competitiveness. However, an absence of divisiveness produces orientation on one vector of donors (the West). The stimulation of reform and praise for achievement in governance that the donors provide keep the non-competitive hybrid regime in Georgia afloat.

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Introduction

Two decades ago, in August of 1991, the Soviet Union peacefully broke up after an attempted coup d'etat, offering the social sciences a unique opportunity to observe a complex set of historical processes unfolding. After belonging to the same state for seven decades, the former Soviet Republics proclaimed independence, held multi-party elections and proceeded to establish political institutions of their choosing. Scientists and political practitioners alike wondered: what type of regimes will emerge in the fifteen republics? Will they all establish democracies and market economies, or will some be more successful than others in achieving this goal? Observers around the globe hoped that the newly independent states would stick to their initial choice of constitutional democratic regimes, now that they had achieved the long-desired independence.

However, what has followed was hardly expected. Some of the countries, such as the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), have managed to build independent democratic regimes under the umbrella of the European Union. Others, like Georgia, have faced, ever since, difficulties in preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine has continuously confronted the difficult challenge of choosing between the EU and Russia as special trade partners. At the time of writing, Ukraine's sovereignty and independence are being challenged by Russia's insistence that it joins the Customs Union.

The external pressures coming from the EU and Russia have greatly affected the decisions made by these countries' domestic elites in the process of forming their

respective political regimes. Today, what we observe is a great variety of regimes in the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics that cover the whole range between full democracies to full autocracies. This dissertation is precisely devoted to the analysis of those regimes that are neither full democracies nor full autocracies and that are widely referred to in the literature as hybrid regimes. Allegedly, hybrid regimes are located in a sort of grey zone located between two clear-cut opposites, i.e. democracies and autocracies. This research wants to answer the following questions: what exactly are hybrid regimes and why do they endure?

Scholars have only recently admitted that the countries of the FSU are not in transition towards democracy (Schedler 2002, Levitsky/Way 2002, Hale 2006) but are rather distinctive types of –by now– relatively stable regimes that combine features of both democracies and autocracies. Several studies have emerged that attempt to conceptualize the so-called grey zone between democracies and autocracies and to explain these regimes' failure to democratize. Despite the increase of rich case studies (McMann 2006, Robertson 2010) and comparative studies that include grey zones from around the world (Levitsky/Way 2010), the FSU countries, with their unique similarities and differences and their puzzling variety of regime outcomes, have not yet been considered as samples for such inquiries.

This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature on hybrid regimes. The analysis is therefore region-specific: it focuses on the FSU republics. Hybrid regimes are conceptualized in contrast with the region's democracies and autocracies. A regime is here defined as a set of institutions that define, on the one hand, the access to state

power and, on the other, the exercise of state power. I argue that hybrid regimes are a mixed between the democratic and authoritarian ways of access to state power and the democratic and authoritarian ways of exercise of state power. Furthermore, I differentiate between two types of hybrid regimes, competitive and non-competitive, each with its own mechanisms of endurance.

I explain the endurance of hybrid regimes as a combination of structural factors and actors' choices, both domestic and international. The structural factors determine whether the hybrid regime that emerges after the break-up of the Soviet Union is a competitive or a non-competitive regime. The main thesis that I present here is that hybrid regimes are stabilized because it is in the interest of domestic elites that the hybrid regime does not move either into an authoritarian or a democratic direction. The reason is that the functioning of a hybrid regime guarantees that the state will receive its necessary financial resources from the international actors (EU, Russia and the USA). This financial support, in turn, gives the domestic political elite the necessary political clout to stay in office and monopolize state power. What mechanisms are at play? According to the argument presented here, the international actors give incentives to domestic elites to incorporate democratic institutions (the EU pressing for free and fair elections, USA emphasizing democratic governance, Russia demanding the control of electoral results) in exchange for their financial help. These states, for structural reasons, need the help provided by donors and, therefore, domestic elites are only too willing to accept the conditions set by donors. At the same time, however, domestic elites want to keep control of state power. The way to achieve both ends simultaneously is by combining democratic institutions with

authoritarian ones: an appearance of democracy combined with authoritarian attitudes and practices.

The thesis is then divided into several sub-theses, depending on whether the hybrid regime is competitive or non-competitive, and on who the principal donors are. Competitive hybrid regimes assume free and fair elections but fail grossly in democratic governance; non-competitive hybrid regimes, in contrast, advance in democratic governance but do not have free and fair elections.

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first and the second chapters are aimed at specifying the dependent variable: political regime types in general and hybrid regimes in particular. The last three chapters are devoted to explaining the persistence of hybrid regimes among FSU countries. The goal of the first chapter is to provide a definition of the concept of political regime and its different forms. Scrutinizing different attempts to study regimes, Chapter 1 frames the conceptual basis for the thesis in three steps. As a first step, this chapter emphasizes a paradigmatic shift in the democratization literature that re-installed the study of regimes at the core of the field. The chapter's second step is to compare approaches to building a concept of regime types from the perspective of autocracy and democracy. The third step is to provide an analytical tool for studying regimes.

The main task that I pursue in the second chapter is to classify the regimes of the FSU countries. The main challenge that I face here is the question of thresholds. Defining

and empirically assessing a regime that is neither a democracy nor an autocracy, but rather something in-between, requires precise rules of delineating these two clear types. The regime indicators that are widely used in the scientific community (Freedom House, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit, among others) do offer thresholds that differentiate the regimes inside the grey zone. However, these indicators and proposed thresholds are not theory-driven and are intended to measure a wide range of regime-related factors. To overcome this difficulty, I use both theoretically and empirically driven thresholds. In addition to the existing indicators, the constitutions of the 15 countries and their laws for regulating political parties are analyzed to enrich the classification.

The third chapter summarizes the existing explanations for the emergence and persistence of pure forms of regimes (democracies and autocracies). It then argues that these explanations cannot account for the persistence of hybrid regimes, a task which Chapter 4 addresses. Building on a set of peculiar structural conditions discussed in Chapter 3 (relative lack of affluence and thriving ethnic heterogeneity), Chapter 4 develops a theoretical argument that identifies the mechanisms through which these structural conditions, together with the behaviour of external donors, give incentives to domestic political actors to maintain the hybrid regime across time. Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses of Chapter 4 empirically.

Using Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as examples, which Chapter 2 identified as hybrid regimes, Chapter 5 addresses the role that political polarization/competitiveness plays as an intervening factor in channeling the way in

which domestic elites in the countries choose either to comply with democratic practices or to retain autocratic ones. Putting the countries with different levels of polarization into a comparative perspective allows singling out the degree of competitiveness as the core variable in the causal mechanism. This mechanism ties together the geo-political choices that the domestic elites make with the campaigning platforms that they choose based on the degree of ethnically-based political polarization. In order to test the hypotheses derived from the argument I compile data on structural and behavioral factors that underpin the degree of polarization in the three countries. I argue that polarization is the result of an overlap (even if not a perfect one) between territorial (i.e. regions inside the state), economic and ethno-linguistic structures, on the one hand, and voting patterns, on the other. The analysis shows how a combination of ethnic identities and regional modernization determine the way the elites are exploiting these territorial patterns in their choices of international orientation (i.e. towards the EU, Russia, or the USA). Zooming in to the electoral geography of the three countries, regional voting patterns are revealed to be at the origin of political polarization. In order to specify the divisive issues that elites use to mobilize voters around the West –EU and USA– or Russia, I use data from the content-analysis of party programs by the Comparative Manifestos Project. I then identify the different incentives that the international donors offer to domestic elites and that help them to stay in power. The analysis also draws on expert interviews conducted during fieldwork in these hybrid regime states.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the results of the research, discusses the general implications of the dissertation and highlights the directions that might

helpfully connect the findings with future research.

The originality of this research lies in its exploration of how structural pre-conditions, together with international conditionality, create a set of incentives in which domestic actors develop certain preferences that lead them to make a hybrid regime permanent. Using analytic narratives and elements of formal modeling, this dissertation shows how the hybrid regime becomes a solution that brings the interests of domestic and foreign actors into equilibrium. As I show here, democratic conditionality by international donors, paradoxically, contributes to perpetuate hybrid regimes.

Chapter 1 Political regimes in the studies of democratization: theories, concepts, typology

In this chapter I develop a framework for conceptualizing and measuring political regimes. By scrutinizing different attempts to study regimes, the chapter frames the conceptual basis for the thesis. Retaining the question that triggers this research, i.e., what kind of political regimes emerged in the FSU countries and what explains their persistence, the goal of this chapter is to build a concept of regimes. To approach to an answer to the first part of the research question, the chapter is designed in three steps. As a first step, it starts with emphasizing a paradigmatic shift in the democratization literature which re-installed the studies of regimes at the core of the field. The chapter proceeds by comparing approaches to build a concept of regimes from the perspective of autocracy and democracy, as the second step. In the third step it prepares an analytical tool to study regimes, borrowing from criteria-based approach. The unit of analysis in the study is political regime, cases – are regime types and the 15 countries are instances. The main intention I pursue with this chapter is to provide theoretical background for empirical classification of political regimes in the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.

1.1. Approaches to conceptualization: a 'rebirth' of the concept of political regimes

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union scholars studying political regimes had concentrated their attention on studying processes that fill the gap between the pure forms of the regimes¹, i.e. the process of transition, democratization, etc. For a while, in the early 90s', the sole attention was focused on such crucial questions as, why some autocracies break down, what are the origins of democratization, how is a given country's transition to democracy progressing and what are the determinants for a successful consolidation of democracy? (Przeworski 1992, Linz/Stepan 1996, O'Donnell 1996).

As time passed, the revival of academic interest to the studies of political regimes was due to two connected developments in democratization scholarship, the first of which is the insight that *democracy is not the only possible end-point of a transition process*. A belief that the mere trajectory of transition heads to democracy is rooted in a common misperception of the fundamental collective study co-edited by O'Donnell and Schmitter 'Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy'. Although, on the one hand, the title clearly states that the general idea is in transition *from autocracy* and, on the other, the authors suggest that transition, an '...interval between one political regime and another' (O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986: 6) may not necessarily lead to democracy, the wishful thinking prevailed. It is true that '[t]he collapse of an undemocratic regime is a necessary condition for the introduction of a new democracy' (Rose et. al. 1998: 4). Yet, the outcome, characterized by

¹ To be precise, the processes that scholars focused on usually connected or intended to connect pure forms of autocracies with pure forms of democracies. Little, if any, attention was given to the fall of democracies since the seminal work of Juan Linz in 1978

uncertainty, is perceived to be highly dependent on elites' behavior and maybe either the establishment of democracy, or of autocracy, or of some type of defective regime which they define as dictablanda – a liberalized authoritarian regime, or democradura – a restrictive illiberal democracy (O'Donnell/Schmitter1986:9). In the early years after the fall of Berlin Wall, transitology as originated by O'Donnell and Schmitter was successfully applied to countries that were known to have completed their transition to democracy. However, in countries where destination of transition remained an open question, the analytic tools of transitology were ill-suited, mainly because they treated democracy as normatively desired goal and failed to positively assess 'rules of the game' that major players relied on. Therefore, the first fundamental departure point for this study is: *if a country liberalizes and moves away from autocracy, it does not mean that it certainly will end up establishing democracy.*

The second development is related to the article of Thomas Carothers 'The End of Transition Paradigm' (Carothers 2002). In a work with a self-evident title, Carothers calls the attention of both academics and practitioners to an analytic capacity of the transition paradigm which became limited with a passing of time. Carothers convincingly argues that empirical cases crash the core assumptions of the paradigm, such that moving away from autocracy does not imply to democracy, or that the countries are well-functioning states. However it is not the paradigm itself, but rather its applicability to certain cases that raises doubts. It should be clear that the 'transition paradigm' should not be applied to the countries, which are not in transition any more, i.e. to those countries in which major actors agree upon 'rules of the game'. Particularly the use of the 'transition paradigm' should be avoided in the cases that are neither democracies, nor autocracies, have stable socio economic links

(Merkel 2004: 33), and in which the decision-making process proceeded over several electoral cycles (Way 2004:143). In other words, there are countries that are not stuck in the transition from one regime to another, but rather, had established hybrid regimes that are stable and persistent. Thus, the second point of departure that the study relies on is: *most of the countries of the Third Wave are not in transition, and not to democracy*. Such governing arrangements, which later became known as hybrid regimes (Karl 1994), invited scholars in democratization field to enter a debate on types of actual political regimes and the ways to conceptualize them. This debate is relevant to the first part of my research question, that is, what types of political regimes emerged in the FSU states?

The two aforementioned advancements shifted attention from the processes that connect two regime types and operate under uncertainty, to the processes that characterize each emergent political regime that functions under certain agreed-upon rules of the game. It stirred up a debate, deeply-rooted in democratization studies, on the use of dichotomous or gradual approaches to conceptualization and measurement of political regimes (Collier/Adcock 1999, Munck/Verkuilen 2002, Coppedge 2002). The pivotal point as summarized by Munck and Snyder (2004) is that the whole enterprise of conceptualizing and measuring political regimes can be narrowed down to the decision of where to place thresholds in order to account for a variety of regimes, and especially for the grey zone. Therefore, two questions that will guide the following discussion are: 1) how to conceptualize political regimes, and, 2) what are the criteria that allow distinguishing between different types of regimes? I.e., how to decide on where to put thresholds?

To proceed with this chapter's task of crafting a concept of regimes that allows for a cross-country comparison within the universe of the FSU states, I show the ways to theorize political regimes from the end of democracy, autocracy and from the position of the grey zone (Goertz 2006: 19).

1.2. Conceptualizing and measuring regimes

In this section I develop the subject of the study in a multi-layered manner. The first layer covers development of the concept of political regimes as a universal tool that assesses variety of emergent governing arrangements. The second layer theorizes two extreme points of democracy and autocracy as well as the continuum in between.

Conceptualization of political regimes is a challenging task: no matter where one starts, whether from democracy, autocracy, or by assessing the grey zone, the choice of a background concept has to be made. According to Adcock and Collier 'background concept... encompasses the constellation of potentially diverse meaning associated with a given concept' and is used to adopt a more specific, systematized concept for the study (Adcock/Collier 2001: 530). This background concept is designed to anchor our understanding of governing arrangements, will serve as a point of reference for this study, and is chosen to be the concept of political regimes.

The second step in the concept formation is to define a working (systematized) concept and to pinpoint its negative pole (Goertz 2006: 35). It is a crucial stage in every concept formation because it allows us to expose our analysis to the whole universe of cases and not only focusing on the positive instances, as well as fruitfully

theorize the continuum in between the two poles (Goertz 2006: 32).

To begin with, the choice of a negative pole is connected with the threshold-setting endeavor². There are several ways in which to approach to this task: in the first, a negative concept of democracy can be logically derived by negation and be called a non-democracy, in which case hybrid regimes end up in this category (figure 1).

Figure 1 Position of hybrid regimes when democracy vs. non-democracy is measured




Figure 1 is a schematic visualization of the discussion above. The two-point scale with two endpoints captures the whole universe of political regimes that are aligned as a continuous variable. Democracy is chosen as a working concept (on the right side) and non-democracy is a negative pole (on the left side). The black vertical line is a threshold which separates the two poles and for schematic reasons its place is chosen to be approximately in the middle between the two poles.


As figure 1 demonstrates, when the working concept is chosen to be democracy, and it is clearly defined what democracy is, hybrid regimes subsequently fall in the same

² In this example I am referring to dichotomization of the working concept, therefore the use of only one threshold is considered.

category as autocracies, i.e. regimes that are clearly in the negative pole.

Alternatively, it is becoming increasingly common to use autocracy (as well as authoritarianism, or dictatorship) as a working concept in studies of political regimes in general or autocracies in particular. In this case, hybrid regimes are likely to mingle in with democracy (figure 2).

Figure 2 Position of hybrid regimes when non-autocracy is a negative pole.



As seen from the figure 2, similar to figure 1, when full scale of political regimes is taken into account, threshold separates the positive pole, autocracy, from the negative pole of non-autocracy with hybrid regimes and democracies belonging to the latter. Here again regimes are assessed on a two-point ordinal scale with two endpoints.

Either way, hybrid regimes are not specified as a distinct category and end up as non-classified, i.e. they are not defined separately and lost within a wider category. Yet, what becomes clear after the two ends are conceptualized, is which cases belong to the pure instances of autocracies or democracies and which fall into the grey zone.

Theorizing of the continuum in between the two poles leads to the debate on how it should be measured at a next level of precision and development of a concept.

Therefore, the study proceeds in the following way: the concept of political regimes is employed to locate different instances along the continuum between democracies and autocracies; concepts of democracy and non-democracy are elaborated to filter out and to fine-grain the grey zone.

1.2.1. The scope of the study: levels of analysis and concept formation

Prior to introducing a discussion on measurement of political regimes, I would like to devote some time and space to outline conceptual hierarchy and structure that underlies the present analysis (Table 1). The unit of analysis, the core entity that the research aims to explain is political regimes. The concept of political regimes anchors in itself crucial parameters that are universal for every form of governing arrangement. It allows to pinpoint different types of political regimes that constitute cases of the study. On this level a specified, case-based working concept is developed. The 15 countries of the FSU are instances, in which this or that type of political regime emerges. This chapter deals with crafting of a conceptual basis for the unit of analysis and develops analytic tools to tap into the cases of different political regimes. The next chapter rests on the concept of political regimes and is devoted to filling the cases with matching instances.


Table 1. Structural components of the thesis

The unit of analysis	Political regimes (background concept)
The case	Type of political regime (working, specified concept)
The instance	A country that belongs to a type

As mentioned above, conceptually, transitology focused on democracy. The scholars used it as a point of reference for the goal to be attained and at the same time the concept of democracy was used to fit a variety of cases that were perceived to be on their way to democracy. This situation led to the phenomenon known as ‘conceptual stretching’, coined by Giovanni Sartori (1970: 57), which indicates that a concept in question is inflated with additional attributes to fit certain otherwise non-suitable empirical examples. To avoid conceptual stretching, Sartori suggests several strategies that can be synthesized into two general advices: 1) in order for a concept to grasp a greater diversity, one should use a more-encompassing concept with fewer defining attributes, i.e. move up the ladder of abstraction (generality) and loose conceptual differentiation; 2) or, if using the initial concept, to give up the scope of empirical diversity.

Table 2 below graphically presents the ladder of generality that hierarchically assembles concepts in the thesis. It shows the overarching concept of regimes, with less attributes and more inclusive in terms of the number of empirical cases, and specified working concepts of regime types - democracy, hybrid regimes and autocracy - with more differentiation and less number of cases.

Table 2. Conceptual hierarchy of the thesis

levels of abstraction	Type of concept	Example	Conceptual intensity
	Overarching concept	Regimes	Less attributes More empirically inclusive
	Working/specified concept	Democracy Hybrid regimes Autocracies	More attributes and specificity Less empirically inclusive

In other words, an overarching, more-encompassing concept of regimes is used as a background that accommodates more specific regime types.

1.2.2. How to measure regimes: approaches to threshold setting

The debate on how to measure regimes can be presented in the following way. The scholars advocating a dichotomous approach (Sartori (1987), Linz (2000), Huntington (1991), Geddes (1999)) claim that regimes are ‘bounded wholes’ and cannot be ‘half-democratic’ at the same time. Their opponents (Bollen/Jackman (1989), Dahl (1989), Coppedge/Reinicke (1990)) suggest that ‘democracy is always a matter of degree’. Assuming that, regimes that occur empirically will sometimes lack one or several characteristics that will prevent them from being called democracies under

dichotomous approach, but will still operate using democratic practices (Collier/Adcock 1999: 537-538). However, it should be made clear that measuring these regimes against dimensions of the concept of democracy is dubious because the essential features are unmeasured and the grey zone is believed to be 'less democratic'.

Yet, the use of gradation is justified when a degree of belonging to one category is measured, i.e., once a country is classified as a democracy, it can be measured as being more or less democratic. This is typical research design for a within-case (or within-regime type) comparison, for example, the case of democracies. However, a large variety of governing arrangements that exists today beg either for conceptualization of regimes, and not of democracies, or autocracies, in order to be measured continuously, or concentrating on one type of regimes and using gradation to judge on more or less belonging to the type. Otherwise, when several regime types are compared a researcher faces a decision of where to place thresholds, i.e., of understanding when the analysis no longer proceeds within the same regime type.

However this 'false dilemma' needs to and can be overcome. I consider Munck, who argues that an m -point ordinal or ratio scale ($m > 0$) with n -endpoints ($0 < n \leq 2$) can be constructed to allow both continuity of the measurement (quantitatively) and rupture points (qualitatively) to set thresholds.

Therefore, I suggest moving one level up the ladder of generality, in Giovanni Sartori's terms and treat political regimes as the unit of analysis and an overarching concept in this study, as was discussed above. These political regimes will be

classified as a trichotomous variable in two steps: the first, uses certain criteria to maintain distinctions between regime types while the second, applies set-theoretic relationships (that constitute the basis of QCA) to filter out the pure types from the grey zone.

Another issue to address before demonstrating examples of conceptualization of political regimes, is an urge to avoid electoral fallacy (Karl 1994, Snyder 2006) while conceptualizing from either end of the spectrum in the universe of political regimes. As many scholars noticed, holding competitive elections even for several electoral cycles does not automatically translate into being a democracy. Therefore very thin, minimalist definitions of political regimes that concentrate only on the way in which rulers get to power also leave the grey zone void of instances. It is true that holding free and fair competitive elections is a crucial ground-level test that defines a regime type. However, elections are necessary but not sufficient feature of democratic rule (Merkel 2004: 38). Yet, other features of a regime guarantee that those elected rule according to the institutionalized rules and this is done through rule of law, respected political rights, and civil liberties.

Therefore, in what follows, I concentrate on conceptualization attempts that are 'thick' in the sense that the authors managed to overcome an electoral fallacy and looked at regimes through more complex lenses.

1.3. Hybrid regimes as subtypes of autocracy

The difficulty of conceptualizing regimes by looking at the authoritarian end was addressed by Linz in his fundamental attempt to create a typology of authoritarian and

totalitarian regimes. As a first step in his conceptualization, Linz uses authoritarian regimes as a systematized concept which he defines as

‘...political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’. (Linz 2000: 159)³

In other words, Linz introduces a three-dimensional concept of authoritarian regimes: limited pluralism, mobilization, and ideologization. Yet, we do not learn whether these dimensions are interconnected; and, if so, in which way. Moreover, it remains unclear whether presence of all three dimensions is necessary or it is sufficient to observe a combination of several of dimensions for a regime to qualify as authoritarian.

On the level of threshold setting, Linz’s work is not a strong example either. Struggling to define totalitarian regimes, he approaches the problem in a classical way by defining the ‘negative pole’ (Goertz 2006: 35). Linz assumes that by knowing what a democracy is and concentrating his attention on the cases that do not share at least one of dimensions of his definition of democracy, he can craft definitions of both totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Democracy, for Linz, is a system that

‘... allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule; a democratic system does this without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preferences by norms requiring the use of force to enforce them’ (Linz 2000: 58).

Nonetheless, what we observe is an absence of correspondence between positive and

³ The original edition is of 1978

negative poles in the concept formation, which is surprising precisely because this is how Linz starts building his analytic framework. Following his logic, the conceptualization strategy, which he outlines in the beginning, begs for an association between dimensions of democracy and authoritarianism (and totalitarianism).

Conceptualization of regimes by Linz can be graphically demonstrated in the following way:

Figure 3. Political regimes according to Linz (1987)



The figure shows the spectrum of regimes behind the main focus of Linz's study. The bold black line indicates a watershed that separates democracies from totalitarianism and authoritarianism. The dotted line that separates totalitarianism from authoritarianism symbolizes its ambiguous place in Linz's study. It is visualized through a three-point ordinal scale with two endpoints.

Consequently, as the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism becomes evident because the two concepts are formed in different theoretical spaces, a distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism appears as ambiguous. As the

study develops, it becomes clear that Linz places authoritarian regimes somewhere between democracy and ideal typical totalitarian regime. He claims that this definition came about while contrasting definitions of both totalitarianism and democracy. However, he does not provide a framework that shows the way in which dimensions of the two concepts merge in together to form a concept of authoritarianism, as well as it is not obvious where authoritarianism ends and totalitarianism begins (Linz 2000:159), i.e., where does a threshold belong?

Juan Linz's approach does not imply that authoritarian regimes fall as hybrid regimes, into a grey zone between democracies and totalitarianism. This rather means that there is no grey zone and no place for a study of hybrid regimes when using Linz's conceptualization as the analytic tool.

The typology that culminates the study enhances the ambiguity of the problems with conceptualization mentioned above. Linz himself admits that the seven types (bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime, organic statism, mobilizational authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies, postindependence mobilizational authoritarian regimes, racial and ethnic "democracies", "defective" and "pretotalitarian" political situations and regimes, posttotalitarian authoritarian regimes) '...are not logically derived from the dimensions of ... [the] concept of authoritarian regimes...', namely mobilization, ideology, limited pluralism, '...but derived largely inductively from an extensive descriptive literature on such regimes, which did not offer a comparative typological conceptualization' (Linz 2000: 179). Nevertheless, he argues that these types do fit the definition and the differences that are in the essence of distinguishing between these types vary along his three


dimensions (Linz 2000: 179).

A more recent attempt to conceptualize hybrid regimes from the perspective of an autocratic end can be found in the work of Levitsky and Way on ‘competitive authoritarianism’ where they point out at the lack of academic attention to ‘... the emergence and persistence of hybrid regimes combining democratic rules and authoritarian government’ (Levitsky/Way 2002: 3). The scholars claim that the most common type of hybrid regimes is competitive authoritarianism as the one in which ‘...formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy’(Levitsky/Way 2002: 51). While the label of their concept implies that it had been derived from the root concept of authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way provide a list of dimensions that are more suitable to define a democracy (Levitsky/Way 2010: 4). The chosen dimensions are: ‘(1) regular elections that are competitive, free and fair; (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association;... (4) the absence of non-elected “tutelary” authorities (such as militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ effective power to govern;... [and] the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition (Levitsky/Way 2010: 5-6).

Although they convincingly demonstrate that political regimes in certain countries do not share more than a conduct of competitive elections with democracies, and resemble pure forms of authoritarianism in the rest of defining features, the way they build a concept is still ‘looking back’ at democracy and not at autocracy as the

background concept. This conceptual mismatch is evident through the claim that Levitsky and Way make that features competitive authoritarianism as ‘..a diminished form of authoritarianism’; but the concept is operationalized in ‘four arenas of democratic contestation’(Levitsky/Way 2002: 52-54). The picture below illustrates this point.

Figure 4. Political regimes according to Levitsky and Way (2002)



The decision on threshold setting is not very clear and seems to be very intuitive for the authors. They argue that competitive authoritarianism falls short of both a full-scale authoritarianism and a full-scale democracy (Levitsky/Way 2002: 53). The watershed between authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism is a sharper one and is drawn on the basis of whether opposition is allowed to participate in elections. However, the yardstick between competitive authoritarianism and democracy is hard to place specifically, due to the operationalization of the concept which is based on dimensions of democracy.

Moreover, such a conceptualization seems to be conducive to answering the question

of why hybrid regimes (Competitive authoritarianism) persist, and is not as suitable when answering why did they emerge, i.e., my research question. For instance, the presence of what they call an ‘uneven level playing field’ can be considered as a result of a hybrid regime emergence, or it can contribute to endurance of a hybrid regime. This means that different logic lies behind the processes of a regime emergence and regime endurance, therefore the working concepts used need to reflect the challenges of a research question. In addition, a level playing field brings challenges in operationalization, making it quite difficult to set a threshold between a reasonably and an unreasonably level playing field. Besides, the existence of a ‘reasonably level playing field’ seems to overlap with dimensions one (regular elections that are competitive) and three (broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association) but this interconnection is not given the necessary attention. Considering the above, the conceptualization suggested by Levitsky and Way, notwithstanding its practical use for the original purpose, is of a limited utility for seeking an explanation of regime emergence.

Autocracies are of a special importance in the studies of regimes. Yet, when the focus of the study is on a wider range of the instances that include instances that institutionalized certain democratic features, the working concept needs to have a more encompassing character.

After showing several approaches to conceptualization of regimes from the autocratic side (Linz, Levitsky/Way), while operationalizing them through dimensions of democracy (Levitsky/Way), I present attempts that utilized the full-scale democratic side as their point of reference for both, conceptualization and operationalization of

political regimes.

1.4. Conceptualizing hybrid regimes from a democratic side

The seminal statement of Francis Fukuyama on the victory of ‘liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (1989: 3) was widely criticized among the students of democratization. However, some of them appreciated the forward-looking endeavor of conceptualizing regimes from a democratic end, taking into account that only approximately one third of the countries of the world (N=151) can be considered as democracies (liberal and electoral 36+32), while another two thirds can be classified as either closed authoritarianism (25) or as hybrid regimes (58).⁴ Besides, many countries established democratic institutions on a paper, joining the vast group of façade democracies.

One of successful conceptualizations of the grey zone from the democratic end is presented in works on defective democracy by Merkel and collaborators. It provides a solution to two contradictory issues in concept formation, namely, how to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture hybrid regimes that emerged, on the one hand, and to avoid conceptual stretching precluding a use of the concept of democracy to the cases that are not democratic by minimal definition, on the other (Collier/Levitsky 1997: 430). They do so by constructing a background concept of embedded democracy. For Merkel, there are two ways of embeddedness: internal, by interconnection of dimensions that compose together a notion of democracy (partial regimes) and external, by providing the functioning conditions to the regime (Merkel

⁴ Based on Schedler 2002, table 2

2004:36). Following this logic, a defective democracy is a diminished subtype of an embedded democracy, which falls short of one or few decisive attributes (partial regimes).

As a diminished subtype the concept of defective democracy ‘...might be seen as having *fewer* defining attributes, with the consequence that they would be *higher* on the level of generality and would therefore provide less rather than more differentiation (Collier/Levitsky 1997: 438, emphasis in the original). But as Collier and Levitsky claim, diminished subtypes of democracy, while indicating that some defining characteristics are missing, specify also the ones that are present, further differentiating among cases. This yields a greater differentiation that is provided by the background concept, and allows placing diminished subtypes on a lower level of generality (as a systematized concept).





Figure 5. The conceptualization of hybrid regimes: defective democracy (based on Merkel 2004)

The partial regimes as the core dimensions of the concept are not simply listed as well as each partial regime is not assumed to have an equal weight in the total sum. The authors claim that a defect in one partial regime may ‘infect’ other dimensions, but the structure of the concept allows to detect precise ‘...location of defects within a democracy’ (Merkel 2004: 43).

However, in terms of threshold setting the concept seems to be suitable only for those

regimes of the grey zone that hold free and fair elections. There is a cluster of regimes that hold elections that are free but not fair and they would fall out of the grey zone if the concept of defective democracy is employed. When Merkel et. al. conceptualize regimes they are looking at defective democracies, assuming that the latter satisfy the minimalist definition of democracy as a political regime ‘...in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1943: 269) or, in other words, ‘...a system in which parties lose elections’ (Przeworski 1991:10). This rule implies that there will be no defect in the partial “electoral regime” and sets a threshold between democracies and autocracies. Therefore, autocracies will not receive any attention if the concept is applied to a larger universe of cases than democracy and the grey zone (Figure 6).

Figure 6. A threshold between democracy and defective democracy (no place for autocracies)



In this part of the chapter I systematized knowledge on conceptualization of political regimes basing on two aspects: 1) the background concept used (democracy, autocracy), and 2) how decisions about thresholds re-align the universe of cases. This analysis is meant to set forth concept formation and bring into light the importance of the threshold-setting endeavor. The next step is to build on this scholarship by crafting a concept of regimes, while keeping in mind the necessity to have a widely-applicable analytic tool to answer the research question of what are the types of regimes that

emerged in the FSU states and which factors brought these regimes to existence. The next section will introduce theoretical foundations for thresholds that separate grey zone from the clear-cut regimes.

1.5. Concept formation

1.5.1. Background concept of political regimes

The notion of political regimes is not as widely contested as the concept of democracy, but despite of a general agreement, students of political regimes differ in the degree of attention they devote to either institutions, formal rules, i.e. procedures (Cardoso 1979, Fishman 1990), or to actors, practices, i.e. behavior (Mann 1993) or to both (Collier/Collier 1991, Linz 1975, Mainwaring 1992, O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986, Schmitter/Karl 1991) (Munck 1996: Appendix). Reconstructing definitions of political regimes, given by mentioned above scholars, Munck was able to synthesize three sets of 'rules of the game' that scholars agree upon: 'the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to the principal governmental positions; the methods of access to such positions; and the rules that are followed in the making publicly binding decisions' (Munck 1996:15). The first set refers to the type of political system – presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarianism, numbers of political parties, electoral formula, etc.; the second, determines whether those in power are elected, (directly by the citizens or by their representatives) or appointed,

while the third set reflects on decision making procedures namely constitutionally prescribed legislative process or rule by decree. Behavioral component of the concept of regimes is regarded by Munck as embedded into the institutionalized rules. According to him, rules shape behavior of political actors. I agree with Munck, whose three-dimensional concept of regimes presents a middle ground between the two approaches I will discuss in a condensed fashion below.

The first one, a minimalist, is an elaboration on Dahl's procedural minimalist concept of democracy by Munck and Snyder (2004). Climbing one step up the ladder of generality (Sartori 1970) they apply two dimensions of contestation and participation not only to measure polyarchies but other regime types as well. Building on Sartori's call for thresholds to be set in the points of discontinuity Munck and Snyder create middle-level categories that cover the grey (or foggy) zone⁵.

A more intensive in description and thicker in the number of dimension approach to study of regimes is taken on by Wheatley (2005). His concept of regimes is a merger of an institutional and elite-centered one by O'Donnell and Schmitter and a 'society-based' by Waldrauch (2000:135). For him, political regime consists of '...three dimensions: a) state structure, specifically the interconnectedness of political elite, b) governance, i.e., state penetration of society, and c) representation, i.e., society's influence over government' (Wheatley 2005: 3). Disaggregating further the three dimensions into eleven sub-dimensions⁶ Wheatley's concept allow, in theory, to

⁵ Munck and Snyder fall short of specifying what kind of middle level categories they actually mean.

⁶ Four features of *political elites*: 1) mechanism of control and subordination within state organizations, 2) adherence to formal rules, 3) concentrated or dispersed power, 4) degree of contestation of power. Four feature of *governance*: 1) arbitrary use of repression to control social forces, 2) use of ideology to legitimize the elites claim to power, 3) state's capacity to provide public goods, 4) state's capacity to provide institutional (legal, economic, etc.) framework. Three

create an extensive typology of regimes. Yet, he omits building a typology and engaging with a challenging exercise of threshold setting while focusing on one country study of Georgia for that matter.

Another rather thick conceptualization of political regimes with a full picture of typology creation is elaborated by Merkel (1999). As a contrast to the discussed above work that concentrated on democracies, both embedded and defective, the focus of this one is on the whole spectrum of regimes, from autocracies to democracies. The idea behind is to enrich the participation-contestation space by introducing a dimension of rule of law and liberal constitution. To do so, Merkel develops ‘...six criteria that help to distinguish different types of political regimes’ (Merkel/Croissant 2000: 32). Political regimes, for Merkel, are interlinked with the idea of political power and are intended to measure 1) legitimization of political power, 2) access to political power, 3) monopoly on political power, 4) structure of political power, 5) claim to political power, 6) exercise of political power (Merkel 1999: 28). He further aggregates these six criteria into a three-dimensional space in such a way that the first two are used to characterize universal suffrage, the second two pinpoint effective monopoly on government by democratically legitimated representatives, and the last two assemble liberal constitution and the rule of law (Merkel/Croissant 2000: 35). Despite the obvious ‘democratic bias’ in the way the three dimensions are labeled, six criteria indeed allow to comparatively assess different political regimes and place them into different cells in a typology.

My background concept of political regimes is standing on two pillars. The first is

features of representation: 1) procedures (elections, voting in referenda), 2) organizations (civil society), 3) informal influence (power-brokers and informal authority) (Wheatly 2005: 4)

Munck's 'rules of the game' and the second is Merkel's criteria of power.

In line with Munck, I regard *political regimes as distinctive combinations of institutions and practices that are established in a certain territorial entity in a given period of time.*

Treating for the time being the number of political actors as a constant⁷, I combine criteria based approach with the partial regimes of embedded democracy to account for a variety of political regimes in the FSU.

1.5.2. Working concept of political regimes: criteria, thresholds, operationalization

Following the definition given in the previous section political regimes are considered through the prism of two fundamental questions: 1) what are the ways in which the rulers get to power? And, 2) what are the ways in which the rulers exercise their power?

For this reason I develop the concept, which consists of four dimensions, that address the questions above. These dimensions are elections, political rights, civil liberties and horizontal accountability. The connection between these dimensions and questions addressed is not straightforward and requires additional attention, as well as the ways in which the four dimensions interconnect in the conceptual space.

⁷ I treat institutions such as type of government, electoral system, etc. as a product or a consequence of a regime type, as they are the matter of permanent re-shaping in the cases of the FSU and require a separate study. For similar argument see Frye 2002, Way 2005.

Figure 7. Interconnection between the four dimensions of a political regime




Figure 7 demonstrates that there are connections that can be traced between elections and political rights, political rights and civil liberties, and between civil liberties and horizontal accountability, and between horizontal accountability and elections. Elections are clearly an answer to the question of how do rulers get to power. However an interconnection between elections and political rights nests together the ways the rulers get to power and the way in which they are ruling. This connection is most vivid through the right to vote in competitive, free and fair elections. As Robert Dahl put it in his seminal work ‘Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition’, ‘[t]he right to vote in free and fair elections... partakes of both dimensions [participation and contestation]. When a regime grants this right to some of its citizens, it moves toward greater public contestation. But the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime’ (Dahl 1971: 4).

To assess the ways in which rulers get to power I concentrate on the most widely accepted and legitimate form of access to power: elections. All of the countries in the so-called third wave of democratization institutionalized elections as the main way in which people delegate their power to certain individuals to represent their interests. This is an ideal-typical situation: the reality is much more complicated, for example,

by direct, straightforward or indirect, complex restrictions on who can vote and how can one get elected. To grasp this complexity, I use a conduct of free and fair elections⁸ as a proxy and construct four theoretical possibilities of electoral outcome presented in the table below.

Table 3. Mode of the conduct of elections

	Fair	Not fair
Free	Democracy, hybrid	Restricted competition (near autocracy)
Not Free		Autocracy

Out of four theoretical possibilities, the table captures three empirically sound situations: democracy and hybrid regimes are characterized by free and fair elections, in these parsimonious terms; in autocracies, elections are neither free, nor fair; a situation, when elections are free but not fair features restrictions on competition and is best described as a near autocracy. The theoretically possible but empirically not quite viable and in a way contradictory situation, in which elections are fair but not free, is not considered further.


Hence, the first threshold to separate autocracies from democracies and hybrids is the conduct of free and fair elections. To imagine access to power in a single-dimensional

⁸ The term 'free and fair elections' became major criteria according to which elections are judged around the world. A composite definition is based on international declarations, agreements, and norms and in the nutshell postulates, that:
'In any State the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the people as expressed in genuine, free and fair elections held at regular intervals on the basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage' (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. *Free and Fair Elections*. Interparliamentary Union. 2006. -iv-)

space, or on a scale, the conduct of elections is a rupture point that splits the two-point ordinal scale (autocracy; hybrid and democracy) with two endpoints (autocracy; democracy), as shown in a figure 8 below.

Based on this criterion regimes can be accurately separated opening a door to analysis of other dimensions and prevent committing an electoral fallacy.

Figure 8. Free and fair elections as the threshold between the grey zone and autocracy



To have a thicker and more encompassing picture of elections, one needs to conduct second test to ensure credibility of electoral process, which is to check how competitive these elections are. Scholars use different indicators to assess competitiveness of elections, for example, by setting (what looks as if at random) 70% of votes cast for one candidate or a party as a cut-off point that indicates lack of competition and manipulation of the elections outcome (Way 2004:147). This indicator, however, is not capturing the situation that occurred in several re-election events that took place after the ‘colored revolutions’ where the popular candidate sometimes received an overwhelming support that exceeded the set-above threshold. Important caveat here is to look at whether it was an incumbent president or party that received the number of vote higher than 70% or whether it was a challenger, in which case the additional information is needed. I will use the raw elections results data

from Database ‘Parties, Elections, and Governments’ of WZB Research Unit: ‘Democracy: Structures, Performance, Challenges’.

To provide for it, I check whether there was a meaningful alternative on the ballot or it was a case of ‘elections without a choice’ (Hermet, Rose, Rouquie 1978), by looking at the voting results as well as at the OSCE pre-election discussion on restriction of participation and candidate’s withdrawal on a demand in favor of the running incumbent. This criterion is interlinked with the dimension of political rights: it shows that the ways to access power and the ways in which the power is exercised are connected vessels; they are indeed a combination of institutions and practices as defined above. Hence, I assume that elections are competitive, if there is at least another candidate/party running and the campaign is assessed to be held in a competitive environment, and non-competitive, if otherwise.

To assess a country’s performance on freedom of political involvement two levels of participation need to be taken into account.

The first is participation by voting, in other words suffrage. It is not surprising that universal suffrage is granted in the majority of the world’s countries and measured by this indicator will not yield a variation between different regime types. Rather, what needs to be considered is whether the right to citizenship was granted to all legal residents at the moment when a country became independent.

The second level is participation through the right to association, one of the fundamental features of a democratic polity, is measured through an ability of a group to organize into a party. For this matter, I consult the constitutions and the laws on

political parties in the countries of interest. Any restrictions specifically on ethnic, religious, regional grounds will result in a polity falling into an autocratic camp. To have a higher reliability measure of this dimension and in order to tap into the grey zone, the BTI scores will be used with the coding scheme available in appendix 2. Thresholds that BTI is suggesting are empirically derived from the ‘cross-boards’ by relative assessments of performance in different countries.

Civil rights are at the core of a regime if it is to be called a based-on-the-rule-of-law democracy. When the rulers guarantee the rights, to put into simple terms, ‘to listen and to be heard’ there is a synergetic effect which is transmitted over to other dimensions of a political regime. The right to express opinion freely and not to be restricted by any means in receiving information provides a control on both, political rights and on horizontal accountability. Expressed mostly through independent media, civil rights ensure that alternative opinions to those in power are heard, i.e. it permits an opposition to get their message through to the electorate. Participation of the opposition, on the other hand, is a necessary condition for competitiveness of electoral process that secures a meaningful alternative on the ballot. For some scholars the relationship between civil rights and the conduct of free, fair and competitive elections is a direct one. McMann, for example, argues that ‘[a]t the polls, independent journalists observe balloting, increasing the likelihood that the right to vote will be protected and that elections will be free and fair’ (McMann 2006: 50). Either way, independent mass media is a guarantor of opposition participation and transparency of electoral process. This, according to Jurgen Habermas, is the function of the open public sphere to provide a critical judgment from the outside of the power-driven sphere (Habermas 1992). Without this interaction between the public

and the rulers we cannot speak of a liberal democracy.

Independent media as one of the manifestations of the public sphere and of observance of civil rights also plays its role in securing horizontal accountability among the branches of power. Often referred to as ‘a watchdog of democracy’ or ‘the fourth branch of power’, mass media serve as built-in mechanisms that control the performance of separation of powers, especially independence of judiciary branch, and informing the domestic and international communities about any irregularities.

To approximate the measurement of civil liberties I use two indicators: the BTI and the one from World Freedom Press country rankings run by Reporters Without Borders to cross-check the restrictions on media. In both cases the experts’ surveys were used to assess the levels of freedom to express opinion, namely the independence of media and strength of civil society groups.

The fourth element in the concept of political regimes is horizontal accountability or, in other words, the rule of law in a strict sense of American tradition of constitutionalism. A famous statement of James Madison published in *Federalist No. 47* indicates a centrality of separation of powers for a political regime as its defining feature: ‘The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny’⁹. However, as many contemporary political theorists notice (see, for example, Taras 1997), on the one hand, this classical definition of three branches of power acting independently

⁹ James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay. *The Federalist Papers*. Penguin Publishers. 1987. First Published 1788.

yet, cooperating and controlling each other within their delineated authority, varies in each of the established democracies of the Northern Hemisphere depending on the necessity to delimit one or another branch of power. On the other hand, adoption and adaptation of this institutionalized practice in some countries presents an absolutely new experience and thus an interesting challenge due to a long tradition of fused powers in the hands of the chief executive – be it a Tsar, a Chan, a Hetman, or a General Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee.

The link between a secured horizontal accountability and the conduct of free and fair elections is of high significance. The competitiveness of elections, under certain conditions, is translated into the competitiveness within the legislative power and between legislative and executive branches of power. This competitive spirit can affect as well the judicial branch through the appointment of judges by the winning side. Similarly, the skewed powers between the three branches, or fused powers in the hands of a chief executive makes electoral victory through fraud a possible scenario. The reason is that even if the opposition contests the official results of the elections in the Supreme Court, but the judges there are on the side with the incumbent – the court's decision is very likely to be in favor of the official (even if fraudulent) results.

To measure horizontal accountability, apart from using the BTI index, I develop additional indicators on two levels: institutional and procedural¹⁰. The straightforward approach to measurement of institutional dimension of horizontal accountability does not yield much diversity as formally most of the countries of the FSU recognize the principle of separation of powers in their constitutions. However, what can shed some

¹⁰ Institutional indicators will look at the formal institutions (constitutions) to assess the principles of separation of powers. Procedural will concentrate on the practices that are assessed by the existing composite indicators by various think-tanks.

light on the practice of the principle is whether there are coalitional vs. appointed by the president cabinets. Coalitional would imply that the legislative branch has certain powers in decision-making and that the president did not curb these powers and turned the parliament into a pure rubber-stamp organ.

The capacity of an incumbent to change rules of the game in order to stay in power is a procedural indicator that determines a degree of horizontal accountability¹¹. The instances considered are referenda to postpone elections, i.e. to change the constitution in order to secure staying in power; referenda, public initiative or constitutional court's rulings that allowed the president to run for the third term. These events allow to distinguish between democracies – where the questions were never on agenda, autocracies, where once initiated were successfully completed, and hybrid regimes, where although initiated were confronted with the pressure from either legislative or judicial branches.

¹¹ The desire of the rulers to prolong their stay in power is not that uncommon in democracies. However, after (re)gaining independence is of particular importance because it meant especially in the first years it meant the political will to stick to the new rules of the game and to show a respect to the newly established institutions

Table 4. Operationalization of political regimes

Questions	Dimensions	Criteria	Indicators	Operationalization
Ways to access the power	Elections	Free and fair Free and unfair Neither free nor fair	OSCE EMO reports	See coding rules in appendix1
		Competitive/ Not competitive -	A meaningful alternative on a ballot/none	Data on elections, OSCE reports
Ways to exercise the power	Political rights	Participation: - by voting - by association	Right to citizenship (RTC) Right to association of group interests	RTC for all legal aliens at the moment of independence +BTI
	Civil rights	Expression of opinions	Free expression of opinion by citizens, organizations and the mass media	BTI+PFI
	Horizontal accountability	Separation of powers	1) Institutional 2) Procedural	1) president's government vs. coalition government 2) prolong term in the office, etc.

After each dimension of the concept is scrutinized and operationalized separately it is time to bring them back together into one concept and pave the way for the cases to fall into the classification. One systematized way to do it, is to use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to build a typology. QCA, usually referred to as a method, has a wider application as a tool for a concept formation and typology building. Using Boolean algebraic tools (0 for absence or non-occurrence; 1 for

presence or occurrence) and applying the foundations of the set theory (membership, or non-membership in a given unit) to various concepts and relations in social science, the method allows by means of using a continuous measures of political regimes to cross-tabulate democracy with autocracy and filter out hybrid regimes at their intersection¹². In other words, by treating hybrid regimes as the ones that combine features from autocracies and democracies, i.e., lying at an intersection of the two ranges of the concept of political regimes developed above, it is possible to single out their position on the conceptual space and place the empirical occurrence of a regime into a democracy, autocracy or a hybrid 'box'.

This can be demonstrated in the picture below, where the scale of democracy is drawn on the y-axis, and of autocracy on the x-axis; both scales return measurements of zero or one. A country receives a score of 1 on democracy scale and the regime that is established is called a democracy, if all of the dimensions in the elaborated above concept of regimes score as 1, and a score of 1 in autocracy if all dimensions score 1 and its respective regime is called an autocracy. The score of zero is assigned otherwise. There will be countries in the sample that will score as one on both scales of democracy and autocracy in certain dimensions and as the picture suggest will be qualified as a hybrid regime.

¹² I am grateful to Charles Ragin for recommending to use the method to operationalize the concept of regimes

Table 5. The universe of political regimes on the scale of democracy and autocracy

1 D E M O C R A C Y 0	Democratic regimes	Hybrid regimes
		Autocratic regimes
	0	1
	AUTOCRACY	

These simultaneous presences on both scales represent the mixed nature of regimes in the sense that features of democracies and of autocracies are combined under one governing arrangement, which initiated this research endeavor.

According to the coding procedures developed in this chapter, the countries will be measured against the suggested indicators and put into one of the corner-spaces of the concept of regime. The picture below shows the concept of political regimes represented in a tabular way. It also shows how the concept of regimes is translated into regime types after operationalization of dimensions.

Table 6. The four types of political regimes

Elections	Political rights	Civil rights	Horizontal accountability	Regime type
Free and fair	Respected	Respected	Respected	Democracy
Free and fair	Restricted	Respected	Respected	Ethnic Democracy
Free and fair	Respected	Respected Restricted	Respected Attempts to fuse powers	Hybrid
Free not fair	Restricted	Restricted	Fusion of powers	Near autocracy
Neither free nor fair	Restricted	Restricted	Fusion of powers	Autocracy

Throughout the study, a political regime is referred to as a *democracy* if access to power is exercised through free and fair elections, political and civil rights are de jure and de facto guaranteed and rulers keep each other accountable through the system of checks and balances. An *autocracy* is a political regime in which elections are held but are neither free nor fair, there are restrictions on political and civil rights and powers are fused in the hands of a president. In *hybrid regimes*, access to power is effectuated through free and fair elections, however there are some irregularities with the civil rights and horizontal accountability. In other words, in hybrid regimes there are elements of both democracies and autocracies that co-exist through several electoral cycles. Ethnic democracy is a certain breed of democracy with restricted access to citizenship and near autocracies are autocratic regimes with no viable alternative on the ballot but where elections are considered to be free of fraud and manipulation.

As one can see, the presented framework allows highlighting the achievements of the scholarship to reach out conceptually to the grey zone while providing its own solution to the challenge. To sum up, crucially important move beyond transitology scholarship sets a stage for assessment of regimes by inserting a typical for a

governing arrangement criteria-based litmus paper with a developed scale to classify political regimes. The designed approach shifted analysis from the study of regime types in particular to the study of regimes in general which enables greater inclusion of empirical cases and a closer fit between the concepts used and the reality observed. In the same vein, the approach looks at the debate on whether a concept should be dichotomized or measured continuously from a different point of relevance by treating the concept of regimes continuously and using thresholds to separate one type of regime from another as in a dichotomous conceptualization.

1.6. Conclusion

This chapter summarized the scholarly debate on conceptualization and measurement of political regimes. It created an analytic framework for empirical assessment of the FSU states, which will be the subject of the next chapter.

Precisely, the concept of political regimes is elaborated as a continuous one, accounting for two poles in the extremes and the grey zone. Combining a criteria-based approach that rests on political power with the concept of embedded democracy, a newly crafted concept of political regimes overcomes a focus solely on democracies and embraces a variety of regimes. Two thresholds are introduced that help distinguish between democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies. The first is the conduct of internationally recognized free and fair elections and it separates democracies and hybrid regimes from autocracies. The second is restricted rule of law, the fusion of powers and curbed media freedoms that set democracies aside from the hybrid regimes and autocracies. This is the theoretical set of thresholds. The latter

will gain more shape and empirical component in the next chapter which will fill each of the regime type with empirical cases.

Chapter 2 Variety of Political Regimes: Empirical Evidence from the States of the Former Soviet Union.

'With challenger Abdullah Abdullah dropping out of November's runoff election, Afghan president Hamid Karzai was effectively reelected to a second term last Monday, evidence, world observers said, that Afghanistan has become a shining beacon of democracy, theocracy, autocracy, and authoritarianism in an otherwise troubled region'.

Afghan Presidential Election: A Celebration Of All Forms Of Government
Democratic, The Onion, November 11, 2009

'Then the hour for the usual election for breakfast having arrived, and there being no opposition, I was duly elected, after which, there being no objections offered, I resigned. Thus I am here'.

Mark Twain, Cannibalism In The Cars, 1868

Various political regimes can take root in the same country. Thus we can believe the satirical example given by The Onion (see above). 'The Afghan scenario', typical for any newly established regime in which rulers come to power through elections that are a manifestation of not only democracy, but of any other form of rule. However, there is an element of truth in every joke. On the one hand, the example of Afghanistan so vividly illustrated in The Onion clearly hints at the existence of regimes that are difficult to be captured, measured, and classified with the existent knowledge and approaches. The same example, on the other hand, shows that there is an empirical case of a regime where media are free and not only provide an alternative to the official opinion but also allows existence of a satirical (cf. the Soviet term 'steb') outlet such as The Onion.

The main task that I pursue with this chapter is to classify regimes that can be empirically found in the FSU states. This task is challenged by the question of

thresholds. Defining and empirically assessing a regime that is neither a democracy nor an autocracy, but rather something else, requires precise rules of delineation from the two clear types. The regime indicators that are widely used in the scientific community (Freedom House, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit, among others) do offer thresholds that differentiate regimes within the grey zone. However, these indicators and proposed thresholds are not theory-driven and are intended to measure a wide range of regime-related factors. Hence, the thresholds become a defining part of the regimes instead of the other way round, i.e. the differences in regimes establish the thresholds. Additionally, when several indicators are applied to the same country 'the Afghan scenario' can be detected: the same country is considered to be a democracy, a hybrid regime, and an autocracy. One can argue that the same country can be placed in a different category by different indicators. Yet, it signals how problematic the blind use of these indicators can be.

To overcome this difficulty, I suggest using both theoretically (as defined in the previous chapter) and empirically driven thresholds based upon a combination of existing indicators and measures. The background concept of political regimes, comprised of four dimensions (elections, political rights, civil liberties, separation of powers), is going to be measured using approximations to the four dimensions by available indicators. In addition to the existing indicators I will analyze the constitutions of the 15 countries and their laws on parties to enrich the classification.

The chapter therefore consists of three sections. The first section discusses briefly the existing indicators and lays out the guidelines for setting thresholds when using these various indicators. The second section scrutinizes elections, which represent the first

crucial distinction between autocratic rule and other regime types. The third section investigates how rulers govern once in power (i.e. the exercise of power) by evaluating the countries' adherence to political and civil rights as well as their separation of powers.

2.1. Indicators and Thresholds

Given the importance of all four dimensions (elections, political rights, civil liberties, rule of law) for determining a regime type, there had been several attempts pursued by the world's renowned research think tanks to measure them. Among them are Freedom House (FH)¹³, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)¹⁴, and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)¹⁵. Indices provided by FH, EIU, and BTI, all based on expert surveys both structured and non-structured, are usually made available in aggregated form. In what follows I briefly discuss each one of them and address the challenges that a researcher faces when using them for a medium-N study similar to the one pursued here.

The Freedom House is probably the most commonly used reference in long N studies mainly because it covers almost all counties (193) and territories (15) in the world since 1972 and measures political rights and civil liberties. After filling out the survey questions, the coders rate a country's guarantee of political rights and civil liberties. The resulting aggregated scores range from 1 (the highest) to 7 (the lowest). The linguistic qualifiers separate the countries (and territories) into three groups, thus

¹³ Freedom House: Freedom in the World. At http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 last accessed on December 16, 2009

¹⁴ Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Country reports. At <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/459.0.html?&L=1> last accessed on December 16, 2009

¹⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008. At <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf> last accessed on December 16, 2009

allowing for the existence of a grey zone. According to FH methodology, scores 1 and 2 imply that a country is 'free' of violations of political and civil rights; the scores of 3 and 4 stand for 'partially free' political setting; scores of 5, 6, and 7 mean that countries are 'not free'.

While capturing very well the situation in the free and non-free sections of the continuum, the grey zone is defined very vaguely by the FH index. Moreover, the two indices are very inclusive and combine several dimensions of the concept developed in this study. The index of political rights, for example, includes 'electoral process' (corresponds to 'elections' in the concept of regimes here) and 'functioning of government' ('rule of law' here) in addition to 'political pluralism and participation'¹⁶. Since there are no disaggregated scores available for the components of the index, its use in medium-N studies requires case knowledge to navigate through the scoring.

Nations in Transit (NIT) is a subdivision of Freedom House that measures regimes and regime performance in the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. According to the NIT methodology¹⁷, scores assigned to each dimension are tied to respective regime types: 'consolidated democracy' scores between 1 and 2.99; 'semiconsolidated democracy' scores between 3 and 3.99; 'transitional or hybrid regimes'¹⁸ score between 4 and 4.99; 'semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes' score between 5 and 5.99; and 'consolidated authoritarian regimes' score between 6 and 7.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) relies on surveys in which experts'

¹⁶ Freedom House. Methodology. At http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 Last accessed on February 9, 2010

¹⁷ Freedom House. Nations in Transit. Methodology. Accessed at <http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/nit2009/methodology.pdf> on January 28, 2010

¹⁸ This thesis is based on the assumption that hybrid regimes are different from the regimes in transition. While this distinction is not shared by the founders of the FH, I nevertheless use it, mainly because the labeling seems to be arbitrary in any case.

opinions include an assessment of both formal and informal institutions and practices.

The codebook suggests the use of linguistic qualifiers that separate scores from 10 (the highest) to 1 (the lowest) into four groups. Thus, operating with the notion of ‘defects’, the scores of 10 and 9 indicate absence of defects; 8, 7, and 6 are assigned when the defects are present and moderate; the scores of 5, 4, and 3 indicate the presence of severe defects, and at an occasion of extreme defects, the scores of 2 and 1 are assigned¹⁹. This is a relatively new indicator and is unfortunately not available for all of the countries in my sample in a disaggregated manner (which corresponds to the dimensions of my concept of regime) until 2008.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) index of political participation is, similar to the BTI, a new index available from 2007 onwards. It assigns scores from 0 to 10 (where 0 is the lowest score and 10 is the highest)²⁰. The scoring in each of the dimensions is directly linked to a regime type (full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes) without giving a profound methodological linkage between the scores and regime outcome.

The best way to shed light on the fuzziness of the grey zone is to use all three indices together for each of the measured dimensions: political rights, civil liberties and horizontal accountability. Despite being methodologically different, the three indices correlate highly on civil rights²¹ and political rights²². When used together, FH shows the trends while the BTI and the EIU are best used to anchor and cross-validate the scores of issues in the problematic grey zone at the years available.

¹⁹ *BTI 2008 Manual for Country Assessments*, At http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Anlagen_BTI_2008/BTI2008_Manual.pdf
Last accessed on December 23, 2009

²⁰ Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008. At <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf> last accessed on December 16, 2009

²¹ The indicators of civil rights correlate even at higher rates than those of political rights: BTI and FH at 0.97, FH and EIU at .91, and EIU and BTI at .92.

²² The three indicators correlate highly: BTI and FH at .96, BTI and EIU at .86, EIU and FH at .81

2.2. Thresholds

The analysis conducted in the previous chapter determined several building blocks for threshold setting. First and foremost, it is electoral conduct that separates autocracies from both democracies and the grey zone. However, determining what separates democracies from the grey zone, thereby identifying the grey zone from both the autocracy and democracy poles, is a more challenging task to complete. As was mentioned earlier, the thresholds suggested by the existing indices do not provide good grounds for classifying regimes into a framework concept of political regimes, as explained in the previous chapter. The use of the existing indices helps capture the two ends in the continuum of regimes and place the variety of cases in between into order, but requires fine-tuning with additional data based on the knowledge of each case to properly place regimes that oscillate between the two ends of the spectrum. It also shows that the placing of thresholds is generally empirically driven and eventually divides countries based on mean values of aggregated dimensions of different concepts of regimes. However, what arises out of combining different indicators is the possibility of inductively constructing thresholds by comparing each country's position as given by EUI, BTI and FH in 2008, a year when the three are available²³, while simultaneously including the theory behind regime conceptualization.

In order to standardize the diverse sources of data and measurements that will be used throughout this chapter in order to analyze countries' performance in each of the four dimensions of a regime, I use the term 'high' to refer to such characteristics as 'complying with standards', 'competitive', 'non-restrictive', 'non-violated', or

²³ This analytic scheme can be applied later a greater reliability, when more data/time points will become available in the future.

‘separated’. The grade ‘low’ is used when the dimensions of a regime are ‘non-competitive’, ‘not in compliance’, ‘severely restricted’, ‘severely/extremely violated’, ‘fused’; and I will grade dimensions as ‘mixed’ when either the descriptions from ‘high’ and ‘low’ merge or when such middle-ground qualifiers as ‘few restrictions’, ‘moderate violations’, ‘struggle’, or ‘fused with some instances’ are used.

In assessing the performance of each of the 15 countries along the four dimensions through the use of the three aforementioned indices (FH, BTI, EUI), the following thresholds are considered.

A country is considered a *democracy* if it satisfies two conditions:

1) using the same index, the country’s performance remains ‘high’ across dimensions
AND

2) (1) holds for all, or the majority of, indices.

Thus a country in which: (a) executives attain power through competitive elections that (b) comply with internationally recognized standards and in which (c) rulers, once in power, do not restrict participation and do not violate civil liberties while, at the same time, (d) rulers are controlled by legislative and judicial powers, is a democracy.

Likewise, a country is considered an *autocracy* if it satisfies two conditions:

1) using the same index, the country’s performance remains ‘low’ across dimensions
AND

2) (1) holds for all, or the majority, of indices.

Hence, a country in which (a) executives assume power through elections that are not competitive and (b) fail to comply with internationally recognized standards, and in which (c) the executive, once in power, engages in restricting participation and violating civil liberties (d) while fusing legislative and judicial powers under the executive's dominant subordination, is an autocracy.

Finally, a country is considered a *hybrid regime* if it satisfies two conditions:

1) using the same measure, the country's performance remains 'mixed' across dimensions AND

2) (1) holds for all, or the majority, of indices.

Consequently, a country in which (a) executives attain power in either competitive or not competitive elections that (b) most of the times comply with internationally recognized standards and (c) in which rulers, once in power, informally restrict participation and moderately violate civil liberties while (d) legislative and judicial branches of power struggle to control the executive, is a hybrid regime.

2.3. Measuring political regimes: getting to power

Historically, the assumption of power involved some form of competition, be it feudal warfare, family rivalry, or a peaceful electoral process. Today, however, elections have evolved as the most widely accepted form. A widely shared explanation of why this is the case is given by the founders and followers of the new institutionalism, who regard elections as a mechanism to minimize transaction costs, a pathway to legitimate rule in the majority of the countries. However, this relatively homogenous way of attaining power becomes less widespread when the conduct of elections is considered. To be precise, some elections are conducted according to the letter of the law while others violate the law and are marred with fraud, and yet are still used to further legitimize the current ruler or his hand-picked successor²⁴. Moreover, elections may either be competitive or non competitive and may vary in the extent to which they follow the rules. This distinction is of special importance for the countries of the FSU, for the reason that I will now consider.

Many of the countries in the sample had their first experience with elections under the USSR²⁵, where the electoral process was lacking in competition. There was usually one candidate on the ballot who, when elected, did not represent the interests of the people but merely conveyed the policies of the Communist Party. This experience was far from competitive, and elections (vybory) were reduced to the merely symbolic act of voting (golosovanie). Despite the fact that competition took place

²⁴ The successor can be picked out of the loyal elites (twice in Russia) or out of one's family circle (Azerbaijan).

²⁵ Elections were held in independent Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russian Empire before these countries became a part of the Soviet Union. Although elections were held to representative organs in the Romanian part of Moldova and in Russian and Austro-Hungarian parts of Ukraine, both examples lack being independent states when contrasted to the earlier mentioned cases.

‘under the carpet’ for the position of being put on the ballot, such a practice has little resemblance to commonly-acknowledged good practices of electoral competition. While mass organizations, unions, societies, meetings of workers and farmers, and other collectives could have invoked their constitutionally-defined right to nominate a candidate, in fact the nomination process was under the tight control of the Communist Party (Beigbeder 1994: 46). Thus, the majority of the fifteen countries under consideration do not have a historically-rooted tradition of free and fair elections. Nevertheless, the first founding elections after the break-up of the Soviet Union, which many scholars cite as exemplifying the emergence of the new political order (Gelman/Elizarov 1999: 31), were mostly free and fair by today’s standards. Such a mix of experiences in the quality of the electoral process enhances our understanding of different political regimes and is a starting point in this analysis.

The following section assesses electoral processes in the fifteen countries of the FSU from a comparative perspective according to three criteria: freedom, fairness, and competitiveness.

2.3.1. The analysis

To evaluate and compare the electoral processes in the fifteen countries that comprise the sample I draw on the reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Elections Observation Mission (OSCE EOM). Election monitoring by international observers, which became the norm in the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, nevertheless has a long history; it dates back to the 1857 monitoring of plebiscites in Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian, British, French, Prussian, Russian,

and Turkish delegates (Beigbeder 1994). This tradition was continued by the United Nations after its creation in 1945 and persisted - albeit unsystematically - throughout the Cold War period. International observation contributed to the emergence of a practice of domestic monitoring of elections by opposition groups. Such a practice of election observation played a part in the mobilization of anti-regime opposition in East Germany and called attention to the spurious nature of elections in the GDR in May 1989 (Fulbrook 1992:14). The self-organized observers mobilized the disenchanted voters to protest against the fraudulent elections results, the scope of the protests grew and six months later the map of Europe underwent major revisions again with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Since then, election monitoring has proliferated to such a degree that today almost every international organization - partisan or non-partisan - has its election-observation unit, usually as part of the democracy promotion effort of the same organization (Carothers 2004: 84).

For the purposes of this investigation, the OSCE has been chosen from among the alternatives for several reasons. First, the OSCE, compared with similar organizations, has one of the more rigorous coding rules for its observers, which can be easily accessed online. Second, the organization has regularly observed elections in the countries of interest since 1991, providing for a uniquely large range of data points: it encompasses all the fifteen cases and most of the elections since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Third, the OSCE reports have been selected over, for example, observation reports of the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) because of the intrinsic nature of the two organizations: while OSCE positions itself

as a non-political organization and, therefore, claims to deliver reports that impartially assess the electoral process, the PACE is a conglomerate of professional politicians that tends to craft its reports according to political considerations to satisfy interested parties²⁶. Finally, the EU, one of the major international political actors who shape policies in the FSU states decides on cooperation with the country contingent based on the OSCE EOM reports²⁷.

More specifically, the OSCE EOM reports cover various aspects of the preparation for elections, such as their administrative and legislative backgrounds, the events on the day of elections and the official results. The reports assess whether and how elections conduct satisfies 'OSCE commitments, universal standards, and other international obligations'²⁸. The OSCE is referring to the so-called Copenhagen principles, criteria adopted by participating parties in the 1990 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the predecessor to the OSCE). The OSCE identifies and describes the challenges to the adherence to these principles, that result in a failure 'to meet the OSCE standards', as follows:

- Attempts to limit competition of parties and candidates, and ultimately their ideas, which may result in diminished possibilities for voters' choices;
- Refusal of registration and/or deregistration of candidates in unclear proceedings with the potential to impose disproportionate sanctions for minor violations;
- Misuse of state administrative resources by incumbents;
- Pressure on the electorate to vote in a specific manner;
- Media bias, particularly with regard to state-controlled media, in favor of incumbents;
- Election administrations whose composition is not sufficiently inclusive to

²⁶ In other words, PACE will tend to give its evaluation of a country's elections based on the strategic interests that the organization has regarding the country in question, giving a higher judgment of electoral process in the countries of interest, than it actually is. This point is elaborated from an interview with an OSCE official, October 2008

²⁷ http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/election_observation/index_en.htm

²⁸ OSCE Elections Observation Handbook. Fifth Edition. Accessed at http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/04/14004_240_en.pdf on June 10th, 2009

- ensure confidence;
- Lack of sufficient voter-registration guidelines and safeguards to prevent abuse;
- Lack of transparency and accountability during the vote count, the tabulation of the vote, and the announcement of results;
- Complaints and appeals procedures that do not always permit a timely and effective redress of complaints;
- Perpetuation of a culture of impunity by failing to hold individuals accountable for election-law violations; and
-
- Lack of sufficient will to rectify identified shortcomings²⁹.

Each of the OSCE reports is the result of six-week-long pre-election monitoring as well as extensive coverage of the day when voting takes place. The monitoring process concludes on the next day after elections with the issuance of a preliminary statement that is based on preliminary results officially announced by the Central Electoral Committee. Yet, what politicians, scholars, practitioners, media and concerned voters usually look for is one key sentence that provides a concise description of the electoral process and the country's governing arrangements. This sentence usually appears toward the beginning of the report and briefly states whether the elections satisfied the above-mentioned standards and obligations and whether there have been improvements or deteriorations compared with the previously-observed elections.

The aforementioned qualifiers fall into two broad categories according to which elections are classified as either complying or failing to comply with the OSCE standards³⁰. These assessment criteria in the first category are measured as follows: 'met standards', 'free of problems', 'in accordance', 'consistent', and 'in line with

²⁹ OSCE webpage, <http://www.osce.org/> Accessed on February 8, 2010.

³⁰ The OSCE standards are not permanently fixed; rather, they are subject to change. The main trigger for modifying them is the ability of rulers to formally comply with the standards while at the same time stealing elections in innovative ways that cannot be detected with the current standards. Therefore, the OSCE is permanently involved in the alteration of the standards to provide a maximum fit between the reality of elections and the rules on paper.

standards'. The second category elections are assessed as: 'fell short', 'did not meet', 'not in accordance', 'failed to comply', 'shortcomings', 'did not comply', 'failed to meet', and 'fell significantly short'. In addition, the observers indicate whether there has been an improvement or deterioration in elections conduct compared with previous elections.

This distinction between elections that are held in compliance and not in compliance clearly separates the cases of fully 'free and fair' elections from 'neither free nor fair' ones as an initial glimpse into the data suggests. Table 7 below places elections that were conducted in the fifteen countries into one of the two categories, by assigning a value of 1 to the elections that complied with the standards, and 0 to the elections that failed to comply. The first row of the table consists of columns numbered 1 through 8, standing for the year of elections that the reports are available, which is provided along with the dates and types of elections in the appendix 4.

Table 7. Elections conduct in the FSU states

Country	El 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Estonia	1	1						
Latvia	1	1	1					
Lithuania	1	1						
Belarus	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Russia	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
Armenia	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Georgia	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Moldova	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Tajikistan	0	0	0					
Turkmenistan	0	0	0					
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0				

The first impression that one gets from observing the table is that in the fifteen countries of the FSU a majority of the elections was found not to have been in compliance with OSCE standards. This table is a fair representation of the dynamics of electoral conduct over the years, and provides a ground to distinguish among three paths of electoral processes. The first path is of *compliance*: it consists of the countries whose elections always complied with the standards, namely, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They appear at the top of the table. The first election reports in Estonia and Latvia called for the removal of restrictions on titular language proficiency and the consideration of the problem of persons without citizenship; and in Lithuania there were hints of a failure to follow the procedures that are prescribed in the law to specify the vote counting. However, after these problems were ratified there was agreement among observers from then on that elections were conducted in compliance with OSCE standards.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, elections in the second group, which includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, were consistently reported as failing to meet the OSCE standards (the bottom of the table). This is the path of *non-compliance*.

The third path (middle of the table) is characterized by *fluctuations* in the assessments of the counties' elections. Elections in these countries either *deteriorated*, as in the cases of Belarus after 1995 and Russia after 2000; or *improved*, as in Ukraine after 2004; or experienced alternation in trajectory, as in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova.

The countries with deteriorating elections and those with improving elections were found to be in compliance/not in compliance with the standards only to receive a completely opposite assessment after the years indicated above. In the remaining countries the OSCE observers concluded that some elections complied and others failed to comply with the standards. In some countries several consecutive elections were found to be in compliance, only to be followed by deteriorating assessment with regard to OSCE standards in the next electoral cycle³¹.

2.3.2. Variety of Irregularities

To shed some light on the murky business of electoral irregularities, I will separately examine two types of irregularities, which correspond to different phases in the electoral process. The first is commonly observed during the campaigning phase, whereas the second takes place on the day of the actual voting.

When those in power engage in considerable campaign irregularities, such as by curbing participatory rights of potential opposition candidates, they often will find it unnecessary to openly steal votes and stuff ballots on election day. Therefore, in many elections where the campaign was reported to have lacked competitiveness, and the political environment in general to have lacked pluralism, fewer irregularities were reported to have occurred at the ballot boxes and during counting. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are cases in point at every election (appendix 5).

³¹ From the OSCE reports database that I had compiled.

Actual voting irregularities usually take place within competitive campaign environment, where the ruling elites have devised schemes of rigging the election through ballot stuffing and during vote counting and tabulation. Several electoral cycles in Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine saw these kinds of fraud.

In some cases, both two types of irregularities are observed during the same election. Such elections are judged to be extremely fraudulent, with attempts both to curb competition and to inflate the vote count (Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia). Sometimes, the driving force of competition may remain very strong despite widespread attempts by the rulers to undermine it. As a result, such rulers need to stuff ballots and influence the vote count in order to ensure their re-election. Therefore, an election may be highly competitive, yet may not comply with OSCE standards, and apart from the necessity to separate irregularities during campaigning from those during voting and vote counting, it seems fruitful to look for the presence of competition even in fraudulent elections.

2.3.3. Alternative on a ballot

The patterns of irregularities discussed above lead to another crucial indicator of the ways in which rulers assume power, namely, the presence of a viable alternative on the ballot. Commonly associated with the presence of a unified opposition that acts as a single force with chances of winning elections, an alternative on a ballot has a different implication to the FSU states. This dimension brings to light competitive elections in regimes that are not considered democratic, and contrasts with regimes holding elections considered free and fair yet lacking a real alternative on the ballot. Competition in a non-competitive setting, and the lack of the former in an

environment where there are no restrictions on contesting, are two modes of hybridization of power access at the core of this analysis³².

To measure competitiveness in terms of presence of a meaningful alternative on the ballot, I use a two-dimensional approach. This approach is based on OSCE reports and on factual voting results in elections in the FSU states from the database 'Parties, Elections and Governments' of the WZB Research Unit 'Democracy: Structures, Challenges, Performances'.

When electoral observers from the OSCE describe the campaigning period and elections as having taken place in a generally competitive, pluralistic environment, elections are concluded to be the result of a contestation. It implies that there was another contestant aside from the incumbent who was able to register for the elections. This contestant had an opportunity to campaign and remained a candidate until and including the election day. Otherwise, when there were major restrictions on participation, whether legal (e.g., constitutional provisions) or illegal (e.g., intimidation and blackmail, or when the major opposition, handpicked by the ruler, runs for office only to withdraw from the race before the voting day), elections are considered non-competitive.

A cross-tabulation of the previously discussed electoral conduct with measures of the competitiveness of the electoral process is presented in appendix 5. As a result, of the 85 elections considered in the sample, approximately one-third (28) was conducted in compliance with the OSCE standards in a competitive setting.

Approximately another third of the elections (32) were held in a non-competitive

³² The two ways of hybridization give are derived from the observer' reports and will be discussed in details in the subsequent chapters.

environment and failed to comply with the OSCE standards.

The results tend towards two opposite corners of the conceptualization space rather than a fairly even distribution. This is due to their representing two typical and intuitively expected outcomes in which elections either comply with the international standards and are competitive, or they are non-competitive and do not meet the standards. However, the reality of the FSU countries generated a common situation with 18 out of 85 elections being competitive, but failing to meet the OSCE standards, as well as two even more puzzling instances of non-competitive elections that satisfied the OSCE standards³³.

Some scholars argue that the 70% threshold of all votes cast for one candidate or a party is an acceptable cut-off point indicating a lack of competition and manipulation of the elections outcome (Way 2004:147). Many instances indicated an absence of competition and a failure to comply with the standards, exhibiting nearly 100% of votes cast for the same candidate. A similar situation occurred during two elections that were not competitive (Georgia 2004 and Kyrgyzstan 2009), yet somehow were considered by the OSCE observers to be in compliance with the standards³⁴. In Kyrgyzstan, as in Georgia, presidential elections followed the rigged parliamentary ones, spurring a mass protest known as the Tulip revolution. The elections were characterized as ‘free of major problems and partially free’ by the OSCE EOM, and the acting president Bakiev received 88,71% of the vote. On the surface, this scenario is very similar to the Georgian one, when a popular leader emerged on the peak of

³³ Dataset from OSCE reports, calculations by the author.

³⁴ Both elections are sometimes justified for the lack of competitiveness by means of post-revolutionary argument: after revolutions occurred in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the nation united in its support for progressive forces. According to this logic, issues that previously divided the population were not at the forefront any longer and the voters united around one candidate. However, this did not work in the case of post-revolutionary Ukraine. For more detailed analysis read chapter 3 and 4 of this piece.

mass protests and then received the overwhelming support of the population, thereby challenging the competitiveness of the electoral process. In Georgia, during the Rose Revolution and in elections immediately thereafter, there was unifying support for the then-aspiring president Saakashvili, as well as a common belief among the elites that he should run for the presidency. In other words, there was no choice on the ballot, and there was widespread acceptance of this situation both among the elites and the masses. The Kyrgyz case is in contrast to the Georgian one, as in Kyrgyzstan a pact dating to the times of the ousted president Bakiev had been made in which the main opposition candidate, Felix Kulov, was forced to withdraw from the presidential race and to accept an appointment as First Vice Prime Minister³⁵. According to observers, this move ‘lessened the degree of electoral competitiveness’³⁶ and, therefore, these elections are viewed as having been ones without a choice or a meaningful alternative on the ballot.

In other words, the 70% threshold seems to be an arbitrary one. In some countries, as discussed above, elections can be competitive, and have an opposition candidate registered and running, but voting and ballot counting is highly marred with fraud. These instances underline the importance of checking for qualitative narratives from relevant reports in evaluating the presence of alternative on a ballot.

Generally speaking, out of fifteen countries in the sample, six can be classified as ‘persistently competitive’ over time: Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine.

In short, the way in which rulers attain power in the Soviet Union successor states is

³⁵ OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report of Presidential Elections in Kyrgyz Republic on July 10, 2005. Warsaw, November 7, 2005, p. 4

³⁶ *ibid*

formally and structurally exercised through elections. These elections, however, have different qualitative values that serve to anchor or bind the political regime.

The multifaceted assessment of elections combining electoral conduct with the presence of alternatives on the ballot allows separating electoral events in the countries, and also within countries, into three groups. The first group includes elections held according to the standards and consistently exhibiting genuine electoral competition. The second group, as another clear case, includes elections that were marred with fraud and persistently lacked competitiveness ever since the founding elections. The third group, the most problematic one, includes two mixed types of electoral events. The first includes elections that were competitive but failed to comply with the OSCE and other international standards. The second is a cluster of elections that, according to all accounts, did not provide for a viable alternative on the ballot, yet were judged to comply with the standards. The table in the appendix 6 demonstrates the division on a country level.

Again, this distribution pattern is consistent with previously observed patterns in this chapter, wherein the same countries take their positions at the extreme corner spaces of the continuous dimension of elections (the Baltic states on the one side, Central Asia and Belarus on the other). In addition, one observes the same countries oscillating in the middle regions (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia).

Hence, elections as the mode of access to political power provided the first baseline for country distribution with regard to the type of polity they had established.

2.4. The Governance

2.4.1. Political rights

Political rights, a dimension highly interlinked with elections, is most fruitfully assessed as popular participation in political life. As discussed in the previous chapter, two major modes of participation are in the focus for the emergent independent countries: the right to vote (to elect) and the right to organize into political parties (to be elected).

The first vector of rights stipulates that a state grants universal suffrage to its adult population, which on the border of the 20th and the 21st centuries is an expected norm of political inclusion in the majority of the world's countries. Yet, what we observed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was followed by the dissolution of three ethno-federations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, was the growing number of people that never changed their place of residence, but were deprived of the right to vote. Apparently, citizenship laws can shed light on the participation, or to be precise, the inclusion into or exclusion from the category of those who are granted universal suffrage.

At first glance, the right to citizenship in almost all of the former republics was granted to everyone who resided in the country at the moment of declaration of independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The prominent exception, however, constituted today's members of the European Union – the Baltic states.

The three countries used the pre-Soviet occupation state as the reference to define who is a citizen, i.e., who belongs to the new country³⁷. In their respective constitutions, the three republics looked back at the constitutions proclaimed in 1918,

³⁷

For a detailed discussion on references to pre-Soviet states see chapter 3

and automatically granted citizenship to those that had it between 1918 and 1940. It should be noted that Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were the most exclusive, with Lithuania being the least exclusive towards those who were citizens during the Soviet period.

Zooming into each of the three countries, the Estonian constitution postulated that citizens are those with citizenship status as of 1940, as well as their direct descendants. Those who came to Estonia afterwards needed to prove at first two, and later six, years of residency in the country for successful naturalization, as well as pass a language test (Jeffries 2004: 133). Therefore, voting in Estonia in national-level elections was the exclusive prerogative of citizens, and to become a citizen was a challenge to almost a third of its population in 1991. Currently, about 8% of Estonia's population is comprised of stateless people who are allowed, by a constitutional provision, to vote in local elections if they have a valid residence card and have resided in the country for more than 5 years³⁸.

In Latvia, 10-year requirements of residency along with the language proficiency exam were used as part of a naturalization process. Although the law was further amended to a degree that facilitated access to citizenship for some groups (those that received general schooling in Latvian) and for others banned access to citizenship (KGB, Russian military pensioners), as in the case of Estonia, these strict rules of naturalization were an obstacle on the way to European Union membership. Nevertheless, the two countries became EU members in 2004, despite the fact that nearly 20% of their populations at the time were comprised of stateless individuals.

³⁸ Number of Grey Passports fall below 100,000. Estonian Public Broadcasting. April 25, 2011. Available at <http://news.err.ee/politics/759a6f74-c555-4f4a-90e4-5f57ad5b921a>

As mentioned above, Lithuania took a mild, integrative road to citizenship. While the Law on Citizenship also required 10 years of residency and written and oral tests to prove language proficiency, it also extended the right to all residents of the Soviet Lithuanian Republic, thus preempting the problem of stateless population faced by Estonia and Latvia.

Hence, only two out of fifteen former Soviet states limited the right to participate with their vote by limiting access to citizenship. Another way in which political rights may be limited is by curbing freedom of association, generally exercised through the formal limitations on the right to organize political parties. There are two common ways to restrict political participation through regulation of party formation:

- 1) an overarching ban on certain grounds for political mobilization as prescribed in constitutions,
- 2) procedural, technical, indirect restrictions as prescribed in the laws governing political parties.

As mentioned above, formal institutions are not considered by students of democratization as a reliable source for the assessment of a political regime. It is commonly perceived to be the case that informal rules play a greater role in determining actors' behavior. Indeed, formal rules, crafted by the rulers are very often ignored or violated by them, but still serve as an initial departure point not only for analysts to assess them, but for rulers as well (Frye 1997). Likewise, when such rules are essentially restrictive of potential opposition participation, they are taken seriously and widely followed. Therefore, to assess the political rights dimension, I use both formal (constitutions) and informal (composed as indexes) types of indicators.

Constitutions

The analysis of the constitutions' texts of all fifteen countries revealed that the first type of restrictions is a common way to curb participation in most of the Central Asian republics. In Kazakhstan³⁹, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan it is forbidden by the constitution to organize parties on an ethnic and religious basis. This measure can be interpreted as, on the one hand, a protection for ethnic minorities, in the sense that majorities are not conveying ethnic or religious programs, but on the other, it hinders the possibilities of ethnic minorities to mobilize against very common cases of ethnic, linguistic, and religious discrimination in a peaceful manner⁴⁰.

In Georgia, in addition to the above-mentioned restrictions, measures are intensified by a ban on the territorial basis for party formation. This fact can be seen as a protectionist move of the Georgian state to prevent further disintegration of the Georgian territories that come with the rise of secessionist movements and imminent war threats from neighboring countries. Precisely, this has been aimed to prevent regional parties (especially from Adjara) to question the central authority and contribute to even deeper disintegration of the country (following separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the civil war in the early 90s').

³⁹ In Kazakhstan during parliamentary elections in 1994 the party 'Lad' (which in Russian stands for 'harmony') was supported largely by ethnic Russians won four seats (Jeffries 2003: 180), the candidates were actually forced to run without party identification on the ballot to prevent association of the party's name with ethnic Russian voters (Kazakhstan country guide 1995. Accessed at <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/kazakhstan/kazakhstan47.html> on December 3, 2009)

⁴⁰ Because of the arbitrary way in which the Soviets drew borders in Central Asia, each of the independent republics ended up with the minority group from the neighboring state (Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, Tajiks in Uzbekistan etc.) (See Tishkov 1997)

Laws Regulating Political Parties

The second way to curb participation is to use constitution as a façade of democratic principles, but meanwhile adopt specific laws restricting participation otherwise granted by constitutions. This contradiction is best exemplified in the case of the law governing political parties in Russia and Kyrgyzstan⁴¹.

In Russia, the law amended under president Putin stipulated a requirement that in order for a party to receive federal registration, it must gather a certain number of signatures in each of the units of the federation. The number of signatures should altogether comprise 200,000 while no more than 10,000 (1/20) should come from the same federal unit. In the multiethnic, multireligious, plurilinguistic landscape of Russia, where minorities concentrate territorially and secessionist conflicts are moving from slow-paced to open war and back again, this restriction is an example of securing the absence of separatist issues in electoral politics. It also is a method of limiting alternatives to the officially- endorsed way of emergence of regional elites, both individual and collective, that are capable of becoming a viable opposition to the Kremlin.

In Kyrgyzstan, the amendments to the law on political parties came after the events known as the Tulip Revolution during which regional divisions of Northern and Southern clans sharpened. As a compromise, a power-sharing arrangement between the clans was reached, and the amendments to the electoral system influenced any further attempt at regional party creation. Thus, since 2007, in addition to the constitutionally-banned organization of parties on an ethnic basis, regional

⁴¹ The Federal Law on Political Parties in Russian Federation 2001, Law on Political Parties in Kyrgyzstan 2007.

mobilization was restricted through a new electoral formula under which a proportional representation system with a 5% threshold was enhanced by the requirement of at least 0.5% of all votes coming from every region.

The two described amendments to the constitutions resulted in single-party rule in both Russia (2007) and Kyrgyzstan (2007).

To reiterate, the constitutionally grounded restrictions on participation, i.e. formal rules, are found in only a few countries. This, however, does neither mean that only these countries violate political participation principles nor that other countries adhere fully to formal rules anchored in their respective constitutions. What it means is that in order to assess the political rights and their violations in practice (and usually informally) we need to turn to the composite indicators compiled by the research think tanks.

Composite Indicators

The table in the appendix 7 summarizes the discussion concerning restrictions on participation rights that are empirically observed in the 15 countries – successor states of the Soviet Union with the score of 1 assigned for the presence of a restriction and 0 for the absence thereof.

The highest scorer is Lithuania, which, as was shown above, had inclusive citizenship laws towards minorities. Russians and Poles make up 6.3% and 6.2% respectively of the population⁴² which even combined together is smaller than the proportion of

⁴² CIA World Factbook based on 2001 census.

Russians in both Estonia and Latvia (25.6% and 29,6% respectively)⁴³. The dispersed and heterogeneous groups of ethnic minorities such that Poles and Russians are, were never perceived as an imminent threat either for out-of-the-system secession claims or for in-system opposition force formation by the elites after Lithuania became independent in 1991 and, therefore, were fully included without a need to prove the loyalty to the new state.

Just the opposite was the situation in Estonia and Latvia, where geographically concentrated and physically numerous Russian and Russian-speaking populations were perceived as a threat to the stateness of the two countries by the majority of the political parties. Especially acute were events in the Narva region in Estonia in 1994, where the local referendum decided on secession from Estonia and union with Russia. State authorities did not recognize the legitimacy of this referendum⁴⁴. The states' reaction, as mentioned before, was a slow accommodation of the stateless people through elaborate naturalization procedures.

This mixed evidence in 'the mid-table zone' presented in table 8 calls for the following solution in threshold-setting endeavors: separating the top, the middle and the bottom of the table based on the agreement or disagreement of the three indicators. Thus, Lithuania, with the highest score, followed by Estonia and Latvia with some restrictive indirect measures on political rights constitute the first group; Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia constitute the second; and the bottom part of the table comprises the third (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

⁴³ CIA World Factbook base on 2000 census for Estonia and 2002 census for Latvia. The figure is higher than the number of stateless people in both Latvia and Estonia because in the course of the passed decades many Russians had integrated.

⁴⁴ For a detailed analysis of Estonian and Latvian cases see David Laitin's work 'Identity in Formation', 1998.

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). In the second group, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia are separated into a distinct group with strong formal restrictions on political rights.

Table 8. Political rights in the FSU: formal and informal restrictions.

No formal or informal restrictions; Indirect restrictions	Few or no formal restrictions; informal restrictions	Formal and informal restrictions	Severe formal and informal restrictions
Lithuania Estonia Latvia	Ukraine Moldova	Kyrgyzstan Georgia Russia Armenia	Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Tajikistan Belarus Uzbekistan Turkmenistan

2.4.2. Civil liberties

The contemporary understanding of civil liberties is related to the First Amendment to the Constitution of the USA, which guarantees ‘...an establishment of religion, or... free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ (Amendment I, The Bill of Rights, ratified effective December 15, 1791).

It postulates guarantees for the freedom of speech, of expression and of assembly. The three bundles of rights are interconnected and are also linked to other dimensions in the concept of political regimes.

In order for the rulers to alternate as a result of competitive elections, there needs to be a guarantee for the freedom of information and expression. A free access to information that is varied and, most importantly, alternative to the state-provided sources, is the key to voters’ preference formation on the principles of pluralism (Dahl 1971: 2-3). In the countries where the population is exposed exclusively to media that

are either owned or controlled by the state⁴⁵, the preference formation in an event of elections is limited to the state-endorsed candidate or party. Plurality of viewpoints and ability of diverse media sources, independent of their ownership and concentration, to transfer information to the population guarantees that there is an alternative on the voting ballot. Hence, to assess the adherence of a country to civil liberties that are formally addressed in the constitutions of each of the 15 countries, one needs to refer to the informal institutions (curbing of media freedoms, etc.) that are best captured by the existing indicators.

The problem arises at the level of aggregation: the measures include several additional questions that go beyond the coverage of the three civil liberties components mentioned above. For example, Freedom House civil liberties index includes, apart from 'freedom of expression and belief' and 'associational and organizational rights', which are a part of the original civil liberties bundle, also 'rule of law' and 'personal autonomy and individual rights', which are intended to be measured separately in this study⁴⁶. Similarly, the Economist Intelligence Unit's civil liberties category, along with questions on freedom of expression, captures additional information on the independence of the judiciary from the state, equality of citizens under law, and the spread of general criminal activity⁴⁷. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index includes questions on freedoms of speech, expression and assembly, but aggregates them into two distinct indices: 'association and assembly rights' and 'freedom of expression' become parts of 'political participation measurement,' while 'civil rights ensured' is

⁴⁵ In this context media ownership by the state as well as control of media by the state are treated as similar restriction on the freedom of information.

⁴⁶ Freedom House: Freedom in the World. Methodology. At http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 last accessed on December 16, 2009

⁴⁷ Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008. At <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf> last accessed on December 16, 2009

used to construct the rule of law measure (along with separation of powers and independence of judiciary)⁴⁸. Yet, scores from 2006 onward are available in disaggregated form, which allows for rearrangement of components and creation of new aggregated measures.

As mentioned before, the FH indicator of civil liberties, despite having the disadvantage of being over-inclusive of different additional dimensions than the ones postulated in The Bill of Rights, is endowed with the advantage of being available from a cross-time comparison. The collection of data since 1974 allows for assessment of trends that are usually employed to generate further hypotheses, which partially explains the popularity of the index. The table in appendix 6 is one such example: it shows 20-year trends in the FSU states in the civil liberties component, while the BTI and the EIU are used to cross-validate the trends in the years they are available (appendix 9).

Precisely, it is Moldova and Armenia that are performing better on the civil rights scale than Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, the higher scores for ‘the oasis of democracy in Central Asia’ – the second name among scholars for Kyrgyzstan – that are assigned by the BTI experts is highly influenced by the ‘Tulip Revolution’ that took place after elections in March 2005. However, according to both indices, Armenia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are holding the positions in the middle of the civil liberties scale. Yet, BTI places Kyrgyzstan and Moldova into a group with moderate irregularities, and Armenia as having severe defects, while FH *persistently* cross-time evaluates

⁴⁸ Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Country reports. At <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/459.0.html?&L=1> last accessed on December 16, 2009

Moldova and Armenia *equally* as ‘partially free’, by giving them the score of 4, while Kyrgyzstan scores 5 (‘not free’) up until 2006, and 4 ever since. This questions the general validity of the thresholds positions.

This cross-check between BTI and FH scorings of the FSU republics reveals two crucial points that determine further distribution of the countries and thus will lay ground for threshold settings.

Firstly, the possible rupture point that is produced by the empirical absence of an instance with a score of 6 in the newly-created BTI score of civil liberties can be attributed to measurement error, particularly when aggregation is in place. The cross-check with FH and EIU indicates that it is hardly a break point (or a rupture point, which separates the scope of violations of civil liberties), particularly with only 15 cases.

Secondly, it is the order the countries take that matters, as well as the persistency with which the tops and bottoms of the table are occupied.

According to the degree of their respective adherence to compliance with civil rights, the countries can be divided into the three following groups. The first one separates the three Baltic countries into one group. The second binds together Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and adds Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, based on the combined outcome of measurement from BTI and FH. Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Belarus belong to the last group of ‘not free’ countries with severely violated civil liberties. The similarly low scores given by both indices to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provide a reason to group them together into the ‘extreme violators’ (table 9).

Table 9. Scope of civil rights violations in the FSU countries

No violations, free	Moderate to severe violations partially free	Severe to extreme violations not free
Estonia Latvia Lithuania	Ukraine Georgia Moldova	Azerbaijan Russia Kazakhstan Tajikistan Belarus
	Armenia Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan Turkmenistan

Table 9 is a foundation for threshold-setting on the aggregated regime level. It is an example of how the use of ready-made indices with recommended thresholds can be fine-tuned to the specific set of countries under consideration.

2.4.3. Separation (fusion) of powers

The last, yet not the least, dimension that constitutes the concept of political regime, to be measured in this part of the chapter, is the degree to which different branches of powers are separated from each other. Being of particular interest and importance in democracies⁴⁹, this element has secured its position in the studies of alternative governing arrangements⁵⁰. While complexity of executive-legislative relationship is common to the studies of variety of democracies, additional emphasis on the independence of the judiciary is a major concern in hybrid regimes and electoral democracies (Levitsky/Way 2002: 55).

Consequently, think tanks responded to the demand for assessment of separation of powers focusing on measuring the independence of judiciary, building their indicators on both formal and informal institutions. As in the case with civil liberties, FH index includes separation of powers into the rule of law sections, which are offered in the aggregated form as a part of the civil liberties (CL) index. The Nation in Transit (NIT) edition of the Freedom House includes only independence of the judiciary in their reports omitting the measurement of separation of powers.

While BTI provides two isolated measurements for separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, there is only one point in time – 2008 – for which the disaggregated data is available. Therefore, scoring results from BTI and NIT are going to be used complementary in order to fine-tune the measurement and threshold setting between different patterns in separation of powers in the FSU countries.

⁴⁹ See Carey and Shugart 1998, Lijphart 1999, Levitsky and Helmke 2006

⁵⁰ On a special form of fusion of powers – an intra-executive conflict patterns in post-Communist countries, see Protsyk 2006

Additionally, in order to examine separation of powers, I will also use data collected from monographic chronologies by Jeffries, which cover the period from the re-instalment of independence in the FSU republics until 2003-2004⁵¹. I will base the assessment on two factors: attempts of executives to either prolong their stay in power or to expand their authority (powers) while in power. These simple models of one-time interactions between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of power, while articulating single instances, can be treated as a general pattern of interactions due to the pivotal meaning of the issues at stake, as well as showing how interconnected are formal and informal institutions in this domain. Furthermore, I will build on secondary evidence of data collected from OSCE Elections Observations Mission reports, namely on qualifiers that convey improvement or deterioration of the electoral process depending on whether elections are to the executive or to the legislative branch.

To begin with, BTI scoring is taken as a starting point for assessing both the level of separation of powers and the degree of independence of the judicial branch (the table is provided in the appendix 10). The alignment of the 15 countries on both indicators repeats that of the civil liberties. The Baltic states are leading in their scores, followed by what seems to be unrealistically high scores for Ukraine, which in BTI terms is interpreted to have moderate defects in these two domains. This scoring contradicts the factual data and an established opinion among experts that there is a dependency in court rulings on the will of the executive branch, especially at the level of regional

⁵¹ Jeffries 2003, Jeffries 2004.

and district courts⁵².

As in the case with civil liberties, the middle position in the table is occupied by Moldova, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan all rotating positions depending on the indicator we are looking at. Thus, for instance, Kyrgyzstan has moderate defects in separation of powers and severe defects in the sphere of independence of the judiciary, while Moldova is severely ‘defective’, in BTI terms, on independence of judiciary and moderately ‘defective’ on separation of powers. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan all have severe fusion among branches of power, whereas Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan present an extreme fusion of powers. In many cases, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova, the scores given to independence of the judiciary are higher than the ones assigned to separation of powers; this implies that the dependence of the judiciary is a part of the problem of fusion of powers, reflected also in the fusion between executive and legislative. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan, the lower scores for independence of the judiciary compared to the joint indicator on separation of powers points to problems in the field of the judiciary that seem, however, not to affect the combined scoring on separation of powers. This situation appears counterintuitive, and thus once more undermines the overall reliability of BTI measurements and calls for a cross-check with the more inclusive (in terms of additional dimensions that are not considered in separation of powers) FH Nations in Transit (NIT) indicators. An advantage of using FH, however, is, as already previously mentioned, its availability for a cross-time analysis (appendix 11).

⁵² Interview with experts at European Commission Mission to Ukraine, November 2008

Accordingly, the NIT scoring pattern gives better justice to Ukraine⁵³ and its acknowledged poor and corrupt performance of the court system by assigning scores between 4,25 and 4,75, both qualifying as ‘not free’.

Another peculiarity that the NIT reveals is a long-run tendency towards an evaporation of precisely the grey zone, i.e. an absence of the scores 3 and 4 after 2003. This tendency speaks for the major difficulties and challenges that almost all of the FSU countries face with building an independent judicial system: scoring above 4 is a manifestation of severe problems in separation of powers in the majority of the FSU states. Such a scoring gap of two degrees, which can hardly be attributed to a measurement error, provides a basis for setting a threshold and divides the sample into two groups.

The first group, which includes the three Baltic states, has an independent judicial branch, but little if anything can be inferred about the relationship between executive and legislative from the NIT index.

The remaining 12 countries, that display variation in the levels of independence of the judiciary running from 4.25 to 7, comprise the second group.

While it strikes as a very narrow choice to base a decision about regime type relying exclusively on the NIT scores of independence of the judiciary, the verbal qualifiers can be adopted as yardsticks that separate degrees of independence of the judiciary. Thus, assuming the qualifiers suggested by the FH NIT reports, the 15 countries in the

⁵³ The European Commission Mission to Ukraine in its final report on implementation of ENP required reforms concluded that ‘...no or only limited progress was made with respect to judicial reform and anti-corruption measures’. The report pertained to 2009 but this judgment summarized the reforms since the independence in 1991. At ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_524_en.pdf

sample can be divided into 4 groups: independent judiciary, judiciary that struggles to maintain independence, judiciary with a restrained ability to act independently, and subordinated judiciary (table 10).

Table 10. Independence of the judiciary by Freedom House Nations in Transit for the FSU states.

	2005-2008
Judiciary is independent 1-1.99	Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia
Judiciary struggles to maintain independence 4-4.99	Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
Restrained ability of judiciary to act independently of executive 5-5.99	Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan
Subordination of judiciary to regime 6-7	Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

The table above shows how the fifteen countries in the sample are distributed along the four levels of one aspect in separation of powers, namely, the independence of judiciary. A closer look at the verbal qualifiers fails to reveal much of substance to differentiate on the matter of independence of the judiciary between restrained ability and subordinated judiciary. Even in the cases where the ability of the judiciary to act independently is restrained there might be a potential for the former to act independently. Incidentally, this potential is not observed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan due to the absence of commitment to substantial reform of the judicial system. This reform is systematically advised by International Advocacy groups and assessed in the Judicial Reform Index (JRI)⁵⁴.

The JRI is comprised of 30 criteria that are designed to assess the reform process by giving negative, positive or neutral grades to each of the categories. While scores are

⁵⁴ EurasiaNet Human Rights. Rights Advocates Strive to Promote Judicial Independence in Armenia, by Emil Danielyan, December 3, 2004. Accessed at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav031204.shtml> on February, 4, 2010

not available for all 15 countries of the FSU, and the timing of reports is not the same for the countries, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, when assessed in 2002, delivered 18 and 19 negative grades respectively out of 30 categories⁵⁵. These numbers show the extent to which the judiciary calls for reform in order to be considered independent. One such example is a constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary by the president in the Armenian constitution, which raised questions about the interpretation of independence as such and allowed the president to exercise control without violating the constitution⁵⁶. This example once again emphasises the difficulty to differentiate between non-existent and highly restrictive independence of judiciary.

The notion of struggle that the judicial branch experiences in maintaining its independence implies that in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, in everyday practice, instances in which the judicial branch acts independently and instances when it is clearly dependent of the will of the executive are intertwined. More evidence is delivered from the set of data that I draw upon in order to emphasise the mixed character of the separation of powers: the instances of the executive's will to change the formal rules of the game. Two types of practices, the will of the chief executive to stay in power longer than constitutionally permitted, and linked with it, the desire to expand powers, usually are exercised at the expense of other branches.

The practices I am referring to are the ones that most closely approximate the way horizontal accountability could be effectively measured, even though profound data collection is a matter of a larger endeavor. Yet, the simultaneity in which the 15 countries under consideration started their shaping of institutional arrangements,

⁵⁵ *ibid*

⁵⁶ This provision was amended in the new version of Armenian constitution in 2005. Source: JRI

adopting their constitutions and then amending them later, allows for a systematic comparison of the existing amendments.

Thus, while working on creating country profiles in order to conceptualize and measure regimes, what appeared striking to me were similarities in the attempts to change the rules of the game in almost all of the countries, mainly intended to allow the incumbent to stay in power. Such instances included: referenda to expand presidential powers; referenda to postpone elections; referenda, public initiative or a constitutional court's rulings that allowed the president to run for the third term. It is important to highlight that such procedures were usually initiated by the first presidents in the countries where there was no turnover in power, that is, where the first presidents and the last heads of Republican Supreme Soviets were the same people. However, in the occasion of alternation of power, where the first incumbents were peacefully replaced by the challengers through elections, as it happened in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, ironically, it was a president elected in a competitive setting who was attempting to curb potential competition by, first, lifting the term limit and, second, expanding the executive's authority.

These attempts to change constitutional settings were successful in the majority of the Central Asian countries and in Belarus (marked with a '+' sign in brackets in appendix 12). These referenda delivered overwhelming support for the incumbent and any changes suggested by him.

In Baltic states prolongation of the chief executive's term of office was never an issue, and elites followed initial constitutional arrangements after agreeing upon them.

However, in five out of fifteen countries, namely in Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, such referenda and public initiatives (despite originating in the same way as in the examples discussed above from Central Asia and Belarus) fell short of being turned into constitutional amendments⁵⁷. This pattern serves as relevant evidence that an executive was constrained, in the cases of initiated but failed amendment procedures, by either legislative or judicial branches of power and was unable to bypass the latter's decision. Such incidents wherein the chief executive curbs the powers of other branches often keep a fragile balance in powers intact. These instances reciprocate a verbal qualifier of FH NIT 'judiciary struggles to maintain independence' by emphasizing strivings that the branches of power have in certain countries in order to pursue their goals. Moreover, the prolongation of mandates by lifting the two-term limits, as well as power-expanding referenda, are further proof that presidents in settings where formal rules are perceived not to matter put an effort into legitimizing their rule through referenda. This also indicates, as in the case with political rights, that constitutions do matter as reflections of interplay between the formal and informal rules, in which informal rules are employed to alter the formal.

The tables below present the distribution of cases according to the ability of the incumbents to introduce changes of an empowering nature.

Table 11. Attempts to expand presidential powers

Expended powers: Successful	Kyrgyzstan 97 Georgia 96	Belarus 95 Armenia 96 Azerbaijan 96
Expanded powers: Failed	Moldova 97 Ukraine 96	

⁵⁷ I will turn to the reasons of why this is the case in chapters 4-5.

Table 12. Attempts to prolong presidential term

Referenda on term prolongation/3 rd : Successful		Belarus 2004 Kazakhstan 96 Kyrgyzstan 2006-2007 Tajikistan 2000 Turkmenistan 94 Uzbekistan 2002
Referenda on term prolongation/3 rd : Failed	Ukraine 2000	

The procedures that lead –or fail to lead– to the changes in the constitutions are naturally divided by timing in two cycles according to the type of changes that is introduced. The first cycle started right after the constitutions were adopted in the majority of the countries (93-96) and involved questions of expanding presidential powers (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine) and postponing elections (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan). The second cycle started when the presidents approached the expiration of their terms in power, which were constitutionally limited in most cases to two consecutive terms. In most of the countries under consideration there was no experience of peaceful electoral turnover of power. Because of this, the rulers grew deeply rooted into the system making the stakes of the loss of power raise considerably, both politically and economically. Therefore, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where this question became evident during the first cycle of constitutional change (in 1996 and 1994 respectively), in other cases it was during the second cycle of referenda to prolong the rulers' term in office when it was set into motion in the beginning of the 21st century.

The following supplementary data contributes to understand the distribution of the countries according to their adherence to the separation of powers principle: one that they all endorse in their constitutions but fail to exercise in practice. While coding elections from the OSCE election monitoring reports, an interesting pattern was

revealed. In some countries (Armenia 1998-1999, Azerbaijan 2003-2005, 2006, Belarus 2008, Kazakhstan 1999, Kyrgyzstan 2000), the OSCE reported '*improvements*' in the conduct of parliamentary elections as compared to the preceding presidential ones, as well as the '*deterioration of electoral process*' if presidential elections followed parliamentary ones (Azerbaijan 1998-2000, Belarus 2000-2001, 2004-2006, Kazakhstan 2004-2005, Tajikistan 2005-2006). Such an improvement or deterioration may be due to the fact that the excessive powers that presidents possess generate higher stakes over presidential elections, and consequently the legislature turns into a mere façade institution. Therefore, parliamentary elections do not require much interference by the rulers specifically on the election day and thus result in a better assessment scores given by observers when they follow the presidential elections.

The table below summarizes the discussion and measurement of separation of powers that was pursued in this section. It divides the 15 countries into four categories: the first, following the separation of powers that is constitutionally stipulated. The second unites cases that have a permanent struggle between the branches of power that not always ends with the victory of the rule of law. The third refers to the cases that at certain points in time possessed a potential for the exercise of the separation of powers but which, with the course of the time, were subdued to the will of a powerful president. The fourth is the case of fusion of powers in the hands of the executive.

Table 13. Separation of powers in the FSU states (2009)

Divided		'struggle'		Fused with some instances	Fused
Estonia	Latvia	Georgia	Moldova	Armenia	Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan
Lithuania		Ukraine		Russia	Tajikistan Turkmenistan
				Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan

2.5. Political Regimes in the FSU: classification

The thresholds, defined at the beginning of this chapter, provided a ground for definitions of three types of political regimes: democratic, autocratic and hybrid regimes. Yet, considering the individual country tables displayed in Appendix 13, political regimes in the 15 FSU countries exhibit four configurations. Democratic regimes, with the overwhelming majority of 'high' values, were established in the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia and Latvia, which struggle with enfranchising their respective stateless populations, have a mixed value recorded for the dimension of political rights.

Clearly autocratic regimes are established in six countries with four out of them concentrated in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. 'Low' values were assigned in almost all of the dimensions except for Azerbaijan which received a mixed score for the competitive environment in which some of its elections were held.

Hybrid regimes with the majority of 'mixed' values emerged in three countries: Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. If the scores indicating 'low' performance were assigned in the case of hybrid regimes, it was most likely to be due to the separation of powers dimension of the political regime.

The three countries that are left – Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – combine values of ‘low’ with the values of ‘mixed’, with 'low' outweighing 'mixed' by a measure 8 to 4. They constitute a group that is clearly moving in an autocratic direction after exhibiting some potential for democratization (the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan or Yeltsin-era Russia) and will be classified as ‘near-autocracy’. The crucial substantial difference between ‘near-autocracies’ and ‘hybrid regimes’ is in the competitive way in which rulers come to power in the latter.

2.6. Conclusion

The main task of this chapter was to classify regimes. The greatest challenge attached to this task is in setting appropriate thresholds. Instead of using the existing recommendations offered by the different indices, the solution suggested here is empirically driven and based upon a combination of existing indicators and measures. The background concept of political regimes, comprised of four dimensions (elections, political rights, civil liberties, separation of powers), was measured using proxies available from BTI, FH, and EUI. In addition to the exiting indicators the classification was enriched by comparative analysis of constitutions and constitutional amendments, laws on parties and country-specific knowledge.

Thus, comparing countries’ performance and ratings allowed us to classify the universe of 15 cases into democracies, hybrid regimes, near-autocracies, and autocracies. This classification adds value to the existing knowledge that the Baltic states are democratic and the majority of Central Asia is autocratic by way of

specifying the grey zone. It is precisely the conduct of internationally recognized free and fair elections together with the inability of the presidents to put into force the initially desired constitutional amendments (while the separation of powers is weak and civil rights are not guaranteed) what strikes as peculiar to the grey zone. This will be discussed in the next chapters which will provide an explanatory account of the emergence and persistence of the grey zone.

Chapter 3 Structural Determinants of Political Regime Outcomes In The FSU: Towards An All-Encompassing Explanation

Belarus, currently landlocked and trying to wriggle out from under Russia's thumb, would benefit greatly from exposure to the Nordic region, whose influence played a big role in helping the Baltics shed their Soviet legacy. So it should move northwards to the Baltic, taking the place of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Redrawing the map. The Economist. April 29th, 2010

The diversity in regime outcomes discovered in the previous chapter begs the questions how did it come about and why does it persist? Precisely, what factors cause some countries to establish democracies, while others autocracies or hybrid regimes? This chapter, through explanatory accounts, sheds light on the emergence and persistence of pure forms of regimes. It will emphasize the unexplained void of hybrid regimes, which the next chapter will address.

Two lines of reasoning underlie the majority of explanatory accounts of regime outcomes produced by democratization scholarship: the first emphasizes the similarities in the initial conditions, the second, the differences. The Republics in the USSR were known to be both, similar and different with the respect to their starting conditions that were supposed to either ease or impede their transition to democracy. The similarity was assumed to stem from belonging to the homogenous Soviet Union. The difference was assumed to stem from pre-Soviet states or entities.

The literature that has emphasized the first claim, showing that some institutional conditions were indeed similar, also makes the case that other rapidly changing behavioral factors during the years of transition mattered more (O'Donnell/Schmitter

1986, Przeworski 1992). Other works emphasize that the conditions in the republics at the moment of the Soviet collapse were not as similar as one might think, for countries that belonged to the same state, and show that the pre-Soviet conditions were also very different (Luong (2000, 2002) Darden/Gzymala-Busse (2006), (Pop-Eleches (2007)).

The regime outcomes, therefore, were believed to be different if the pre-Soviet legacies were more relevant than the Soviet ones, and similar if the Soviet legacies had overridden the pre-Soviet during the transition.

Empirically, however, as was shown in the previous chapter, regimes emerging from the Soviet Union vary from democracies to autocracies with everything in the middle. Needless to say this does not suggest pre-Soviet differences mattered more than the Soviet homogenizing effect, precisely because the former fail to provide a well-grounded explanation of the hybrid regimes. Indeed, both, the literature regarding different regime outcomes as a result of differences in Soviet and pre-Soviet structures, and the literature regarding it as the result of external conditions and human agency successfully explain the clear-cut cases, i.e., democracies and autocracies. Yet, they leave hybrid regimes unexplained, as this chapter will demonstrate. It will begin by providing a larger scope of comparison by including the countries of the former Yugoslavia and will proceed by giving accounts of Soviet and pre-Soviet similarities and differences. Concentrating on such structural factors as legacies of modernization and ethnic composition and parliamentary polarization the prospects for explanation of hybrid regimes will be shown.

3.1.The Scope of Similarities and Differences

The regimes that emerged in the countries of the former Soviet Union are highly dissimilar. Three groups can be classified: democracies, hybrid regimes and near- and full autocracies. To make a case for a larger comparison with other multinational states and to see whether the similarity logic works, I use the Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH NIT) composite score to measure regimes in the world. The FH NIT classifies countries into nearly every possible regime category. The scores vary from 1.93 (Estonia) to 6.93 (Turkmenistan). Thus, several of the fifteen countries are classified as ‘consolidated democracies’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) which I called *democracies* in the previous chapter; others are ‘transitional governments or hybrid regimes’ (Ukraine, Georgia) or *hybrid regimes* as classified in the previous chapter; Moldova and Armenia are regarded as a ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’ or hybrid and *near-autocracies* according to the previous chapter; all the remaining countries are classified as ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’ by FH or as my classification had it *(near-)autocracies and autocracies* (Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan).

Yet, if we follow the similarity logic, one would not expect such differentiation. After the fifteen countries jointly constituted the Soviet Union, they should exhibit similarities at their starting points of departure - the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, belonging to the Union for many decades produced similar Soviet identities, revival of nationalism as a stronghold for the emergence of opposition, same state structures and policies, which are assumed to be highly dependent on the Soviet legacies. The similarity account leads one to expect the convergence in regime outcomes two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

According to this logic, belonging to the same state for many decades, especially to such a state as the Soviet Union that featured administrative-command and a planned economy, can be expected to reduce disparities in economic development and bring the constituent republics to the same level of modernization. The processes of elite formation were the same in the Baltic States as they were in Central Asia, and centralized from the Kremlin. At the moment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fifteen countries featured similar state institutions that were initially created top down from Moscow to secure hierarchical control and subordination.

The homogenizing effect of belonging to the Soviet Union, as some scholars have noted, is not fully washed away by the emerging regimes following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Jones Luong 2002: 99). Another reason to consider the similarity logic is because it seems to be valid for the countries that constituted Yugoslavia.

Using this historical parallel as a point of reference, Yugoslavia, a multinational country with comparable levels of ethnic-, linguistic-, religious- heterogeneity as the ones observed in the former republics of the Soviet Union, displays rather high levels of homogeneity in their respective political regimes. To be precise, twenty years after the initial disintegration processes began, the Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH NIT) composite regime, scores vary from 1.93 (Slovenia) to 3.86 (Macedonia). Almost all of the recognized countries of the Former Yugoslavia are, therefore, classified as ‘semi-consolidated democracies’.⁵⁸ The only exception is Bosnia,

⁵⁸ Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2009. Accessed at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485> on February 24, 2010

classified as a 'transitional government or hybrid regime' with the score of 4.18⁵⁹.

These examples show that similar political regimes emerged in the successor states of Yugoslavia. Additionally, regimes in the former Yugoslavia are clustered around consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies, leaving the space of 'consolidated authoritarian regime' void. In other words, previous experience of belonging to the same state, in other cases than the Soviet Union, is associated with similar regime outcomes in their respective successor states.

Taking into account historical analogies and similar Soviet pasts, this research acknowledges that the fifteen countries of the FSU were facing the same challenges to independent state-building, and shared, in this respect, a departure point at the moment of dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, to account for the diversity of regime outcomes one needs to move beyond recognizing the similarity of starting conditions, while focusing on the Soviet and pre-Soviet dissimilarity.

The fifteen Soviet Republics were at different stages of economic development, had different experiences with statehood, and developed their respective state bureaucracies to a different degree prior to being integrated into the USSR. Accordingly, the fifteen countries or entities were at different levels of modernity and it is not surprising that they started from different positions once they (re-)gained their independence. In this sense, pre-Soviet legacies had overridden the Soviet experiences and the former republics started institutionally at the same point where they were left prior to being incorporated into the Soviet Union. The diversity logic takes us to the

⁵⁹ Another notorious exception is Kosovo, classified as an 'Internationally-Administered Area' with the overall regime score of 5.11. Accessed at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485> on February 24, 2010.

following hypotheses: if the newly emergent fifteen countries were in different starting points at the time when they (re)-established independence, it is expected that they exhibit diversity in their regimes which took roots twenty years into independent statehood.

In what follows I will discuss the pivotal theories that were applied for three decades in the Third Wave of democratization literature and will draw attention to unexplained voids of hybrid regimes. The majority of theories are successful in explaining the extremes, i.e. in providing an all-encompassing account of why democracies emerged in economically advanced and historically privileged Baltic states, or why autocracies prevailed in rent-seeking, oil-rich Central Asian countries. The gray zone despite being accepted to exist and thrive, until recently, did not receive attention it deserves⁶⁰. Hence, the task of this part of inquiry is to use the argument from the literature and empirical evidence to highlight the weak spots and to consider, if possible, fine-tuning for the hybrid regimes.

3.2. Structural Determinants of Regime Outcomes: Modernization, Ethnic Heterogeneity, Polarization

3.2.1. Modernization theory

When modernization theory is applied to find answers to questions in regime studies, it assumes that 'all good things go together'. As the major studies of classical modernization theorists Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Stein Rokkan (1973),

⁶⁰ Works of Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way and Valery Bunce constitute an exception.

Barrington Moore (1966) demonstrate, the more affluent, the more educated, the more experienced with statehood and nationhood, the more secular the country is, the greater are the chances that it is going to establish a democratic political regime. The subsequent amount of scholarly work that emerged in the aftermath developed series of hypotheses that tested modernization theory, and confirmed the association that exists between higher levels of development of a society and emergence of democracy in this country. The famous postulate by Seymour Martin Lipset engraved in minds of scholars during the Third Wave of democratization reads: 'The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1959: 75). Later, Przeworski and Limongi in their seminal essay titled 'Modernization: Theory and Facts' managed to empirically derive a threshold for democratic sustainability: when GDP per capita equals 6,000 USD democracy is never going to break down (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 159).

Yet, it proves more difficult to provide an explanation of why it happens to be the case that more developed societies prefer to be ruled by the rulers selected through competitive elections and are governed according to the rule of law⁶¹.

These theories and hypotheses are usually tested on a larger sample of countries than intended in this study. The statistically significant relationship, established on a universe of all of the countries of the world, fades away when tested on a sample of only fifteen cases. Indeed, operationalized by standard indicators as GDP per capita, literacy rates, etc. fail to be confirmed for the FSU states, mainly due to high levels of modernization that the fifteen countries achieved while being a part of the Soviet Union (table 1). A striking example is the absence of sound variation among the 15

⁶¹ A notable exception are works of Dahl (1971), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Tilly (2007), Frye (2010)

states in literacy rates at the onset of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 (table 14). The picture is even less clear with level of economic development: on the one hand, the most developed Baltic states (measured by GDP/capita) are democracies and, according to Przeworski and Limongi, are going to remain democratic. But on the other hand, as mentioned above, hybrid regimes are on average less affluent than autocracies. In studies that rely on use of statistics and mean values the u-shaped curve would be used to model this relationship. Although hybrid regimes are not on the same continuum as democracies and autocracies due to the mixed features of the two, relative 'poverty' of these governing arrangements discerns hybrid regimes from other forms of rule and will be considered in the analysis below.

Table 14. Selected indicators of socio-economic development (GDP/capita⁶², literacy rate⁶³)

	GDP per capita		literacy rate	
	1991	2009	1990	2007
Democracies	5947.67	11661.54		
Estonia	6114	13509.1	96	99.8
Latvia	5359	10700.91	96	99.8
Lithuania	6370	10774.62	96	99.7
Hybrid rule	2139.67	2176.47		
Georgia	2954	2495.63	93	100
Moldova	1093	1495.98	95	99.2
Ukraine	2372	2537.8	95	99.7
Near autocracies	2445	4134.47		
Russia	5610	8873.61	94	99.5
Kyrgyzstan	617	872	93	99.3
Armenia	1108	2658.05	93	99.5
Autocracies	1589	3691.29		
Azerbaijan	1703	4863.81	93	99.5
Belarus	2740	5121.79	95	99.7
Kazakhstan	2753	6875.5	93	99.6
Tajikistan	718	705	93	99.6
Turkmenistan	1178	3488.81	93	99.5
Uzbekistan	442	1093.27	93	96.9

If we consider the growth data by comparing the level of development at the moment of the break-up of the USSR with that of 2009, a different picture evolves which will help to explain the persistence of hybrid rule. First of all, while democracies, autocracies and near-autocracies on average almost doubled their GDP/capita; the growth of on average only 40 USD can be seen in the hybrid regimes. It means that a relatively low level of economic development, as I will later demonstrate, becomes the result and not the origin of hybrid rule. Secondly, it also highlights that the need

⁶² IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2009. Accessed at <http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28> on April 7, 2010, in current prices in US dollars, estimates. Mean values for each of the groups of the regimes is shown in bold. The data for 1991 is taken from The Real Historical Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita in Baseline Regions in billions of 2005 dollars, accessed on January 12, 2010

⁶³ UNDP Human Development Reports. HDI Report 1993. Accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1993_en_indicators1.pdf on April 12, 2010. And <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/89.html> on November 30, 2010. According to UNDP HDI, adult literacy rate is calculated as a percentage of population aged 15 years and over.

for international aid is not diminishing and is likely to remain persistent in hybrid regimes⁶⁴.

3.2.2.Legacies of modernization

As demonstrated above, a straightforward glimpse into data on modernization does not provide an anchor to build an explanation of why fifteen countries had established particular regimes. This led scholars to look into the tendencies that dominated indicators of socio-economic development in the past to avoid causal proximity (Kitschelt 2003: fn1). A number of scholarly works thrived, raising questions about the role that legacies of prior modernization could have played in determining regime outcomes in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Pop-Eleches, for example, asks whether it mattered who was the major modernizing agent, the Soviet Union, or the state that preceded the formation of the union (Pop-Eleches 2007). In their joint effort to explain the persistence of communist parties (unreformed communist parties as a precondition for an absence of democratizing tendencies) after the fall of the Communism in Eurasia, Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse argue that ‘...precommunist schooling, which formed and fostered nationalist ideas... led to the delegitimation of communist rule’ (Darden/Grzymala-Busse 2006: 84). They found support for the hypothesis that ‘the communist exit is more likely to occur in the countries where literacy preceded the onset of communism’ by performing simple OSL regression on 28 cases of the former communist block (ibid: 90).

Likewise, making more use of their data, pre-Soviet literacy proves to be a good predictor of democratic and autocratic regime outcomes: democracies are established

⁶⁴ Although the data shows that the autocracies on average displayed a greater potential for being aid-seekers, it is the willingness to cooperate with international donors and their particular demands that will count for a need in support and aid-seeking by the domestic elites. This will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

in the countries that were highly literate (over 77%) prior to being integrated into the Soviet Union. Countries with very low literacy rates before they became Soviet republics (4-42%) established autocracies. Hybrid regimes and near-autocracies present an evidence with blurred and overlapping boundaries, with a variation from 46% to 65% in the former and from 12% to 56% in the latter. To assess change in literacy in each of the fifteen former Soviet Republics and to systematize evidence from several sources, I introduce the concept of a '*modernizing agent*' and an *index of change*.

There are two possible modernizing agents that are taken into consideration here: the Soviet state and the pre-Soviet state. The pre-Soviet state existed in almost a half of the countries in the sample (table 15 below), however it is hard to believe that those countries that maintained independent statehood for around eighteen months benefited from pre-Soviet modernization.

The role of a state, either Soviet or pre-Soviet, as a modernizing agent is better assessed through literacy than by means of assessing economic development because it reveals the states' attempts at creating a common identity: it is a more stable characteristic than the creation of, for example, a middle class in the countries where it was wiped out through property nationalization and repressions. Mass education is the channel for transmission of ideology, of a shared identity and views on history (Gellner 1983). Similarly, mass schooling can be a channel for diffusion of Soviet ideology. Looking back at what Darden and Grzymala-Busse have shown the legitimization of the Soviet rule was undermined where diffusion of mass literacy preceded accommodation into the Soviet Union. In this case the pre-Soviet state was

the modernizing agent. Consequently, where the Soviet Union was the modernizing agent in a multifaceted way of creating the first state and bringing mass literacy (even if it was not in the national language), an authoritarian governing arrangement is viewed as a viable option for the newly independent republics, especially when the state is delivering on crucial public services.

The index is calculated in the third column of the table ... below by subtracting the value of the pre-Soviet literacy rate from that of the 1990⁶⁵. In other words,

$$\text{Change} = \text{Soviet literacy rate (1990)} - \text{pre-Soviet literacy rate.}$$

Theoretically, the index of change varies from 100, if the pre-Soviet literacy was equal to 0 and the Soviet literacy rate was absolute 100, to -100, if the pre-Soviet literacy rate was at the level of 100 and decreased to 0 during the Soviet period. The second scenario is addressed here only as a theoretical possibility, as the majority of the countries receive positive values.

The Soviet Union is considered to be the sole modernizing agent, if the index of change takes a value between 75 and 100. It means that during the years of the Soviet rule the increase in literacy rate was more than 75%.

If the index of change takes a value between 25 and 0 it suggests that the pre-Soviet state was the major modernizing agent. An increase in mass literacy that was experienced during the years spent by a country as a part of the Soviet Union is less

⁶⁵ Darden and Grzymala-Busse provide different measurements for Western and Eastern Ukraine; I used the mean value of the two. As the two data-sets on literacy use different bases, the change in literacy rates is a rough estimate, which however shows general trends in the spread of mass literacy. The negative value of change for Estonia may be partially due to the measurement error.

than 25%.

If the value of the index falls somewhere between 25 and 75 it can be inferred that the countries encountered different modernizing agents that had an impact on the spread of the mass literacy. The authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union legitimized itself through the modernization benefits that it had yielded to the respective republics. The leadership in autocratic countries, predominantly of Central Asia, associated their position with the Soviets, while the masses enjoyed a steep rising learning curve in relation to literacy rates and relied on Soviet-educated local intelligentsia in building historical myths (Brown 2009: 550-551).

The legacies argument seems to work rather smoothly for clear-cut regimes: 40 years interruption of independent statehood in the Baltic states yields confirmation to the modernizing agent hypothesis. Absence of any experience with statehood and nationhood, other than Soviet, also provides confirmation of the connection between the Soviet Union as the sole modernizing agent and the establishment of authoritarian regime. The cases in between, or the hybrid regimes call for a specification of this theory, because intuitively, seventy years of Communist rule is a break too long and the eighteen months of independent statehood is a period too short to carry those memories and loyalties through literacy. There must be an intrusion into the process of revival of “grandmothers' memories and experiences” by elites for this causal chain to work, for example, a claim by new national elites of existing continuity between pre- and post-Soviet statehoods.

Table 15. Legacies of modernization⁶⁶

	pre-Soviet literacy ⁶⁷	literacy 1990 ⁶⁸	change in literacy rates	Independent state/length	Pre-Soviet elections	Modernizing agent
Democracies						
Estonia	99	96	-3	22 years	yes	pre-Soviet
Latvia	93	96	3	22 years	yes	pre-Soviet
Lithuania	77	96	19	22 years	yes	pre-Soviet
Hybrid rule						
Georgia	65	93	28	18 months	yes	both
Moldova	46	95	49	0	Romanian	both
Ukraine	61,5	95	33,5	18 months	no	both
Near autocracies						
Russia	44	94	50	24 months	yes	both
Kyrgyzstan	12	93	81	0	no	Soviet
Armenia	56	93	37	18 months	yes	both
Autocracies						
Azerbaijan	20	93	73	22 months	yes	Soviet
Belarus	42	95	53	6 months	no	Soviet
Kazakhstan	18	93	75	0	no	Soviet
Tajikistan	4	93	89	0	no	Soviet
Turkmenistan	10	93	83	0	no	Soviet
Uzbekistan	11	93	82	0	no	Soviet

There is, however, an association that we find between the modernizing agent and the regime type. The causal mechanism, suggested by Darden and Gzymala-Busse does not seem to work without an additional promotional push from the current elites to revive the histories and bring “grandmothers' memories” back. This point is crucial for the investigation that will follow, as it allows combining structures and actors' decisions in the following way: structures (legacies of historical experiences, in this case), pave certain ways for actors to use them in order to reach their goals (usually to win the office and to hold on to power). A political regime that emerges in a country

⁶⁶ The data in columns 'change in literacy rates', 'independent state/length', 'pre-Soviet elections', and 'modernizing agent' are collected and calculated by the author

⁶⁷ Darden, Keith/Grzymala-Busse, Anna The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse. World Politics 59, 2006. Appendix 1

⁶⁸ UNDP Human Development Reports. HDI Report 1993. Accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1993_en_indicators1.pdf on April 12, 2010

is to a certain extent a result of this kind of interaction.

The data also show, that modernization stems from both pre-Soviet and Soviet experience in the Soviet Union successor states. Hence, this structural factor accounts for both, producing similarities as well as differences in regime outcomes. As suggested in the beginning of this chapter, the countries joined the Soviet Union with different levels of development. The policies in the Soviet Union with some variation emphasized socio-economic convergence (*sblizhenie*), exercised through, among others, prospects of career advancements (Jones, E./Grupp F.W. 1984: 172)⁶⁹.

These policies aimed to homogenize different socio-economic factors in the Republics, and clearly succeeded, where mass literacy is concerned. However, as some data suggests, the initial divergence in the levels of economic development and ethnic fractionalization had been deepened. The next step will assess another structural factor – the ethnic makeup of the FSU successor states in its ability to shed light on emergence and persistence of hybrid regimes, with regard to similarities and differences that Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies had produced.

3.3. Ethnic make-up and regimes

Ethnicity, regarded as a structure, or its manifestation as an action in the form of ethnic mobilization, conflict or civil war had for a long time been considered to play a key role in the studies of political regimes. Dating back to John Stuart Mill who, according to Robert Dahl's interpretation urged that if a country has a representative government, its territorial boundaries and those of a national identity should coincide (Dahl 1971: 108). In other words the more homogenous a country's identity is, the

⁶⁹ The finding of the Sovietologists Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp also showed that ethnic equalization was more successful during the times of economic prosperity and deteriorated during the stagnation of the early 80s.

better are the chances for democratic institutions to emerge and prosper.

Ethnic diversity complicates establishing democratic rule by creating obstacles to reaching a compromise (Lipset/Rokkan, Lijphardt, Dahl, Linz/Stepan). This claim is neither surprising, nor counterintuitive: irreconcilable differences between ethnicities, and frozen societal mobility make compromise and consensus building about the 'rules of the game' difficult to achieve especially at an early stage of democratization. Moreover, those groups which experience (or perceive) an exclusion may engage in violent protest that can grow into an interethnic conflict followed by claims to secede, thus, delaying prospects for emergence of any regime, and democracy in particular. Consequently, the practices that authorities sometimes use to suppress ethnic uprising allow the assumption that an autocratic form of rule emerged (Linz/Stepan 1996: 27).

However, as some studies have shown, a systematic evidence for the ethnic homogeneity – democracy hypothesis is absent. For instance, as the study by M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig shows, tested on the post-communist region, the hypotheses do not provide empirical evidence that ethnic diversity impedes the emergence of democracy. On the contrary, the challenges it creates may be conducive to a compromise and the establishment of democratic institutions (Fish/Kroenig 2006: 838).

Methodologically, the studies are pre-determined to rely on statistical analysis, while approximating a country's ethnic makeup by such crude indicators as ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). The problem with using ELF is that the data from Soviet ethnographers is used to calculate it. At its core are the estimates of the likelihood that

two people chosen at random will belong to different ethnic groups⁷⁰. However, apart from forcing us to believe in a complete absence of fluidity since 1965 (i.e. integration, assimilation, etc.), the indicator remains insensitive to the kind of division that exists (ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial)⁷¹. Either of the factors can be plugged into a formula (the Herfindahl's concentration index) and deliver completely different results. The advantages of using it concentrate around its availability for the majority of the countries that exist in the world and encompass a vast range of ethnic groups, in addition to being easily accessible.

An attempt to overcome some of these problems was undertaken by Alberto Alesina and his collaborators⁷². They separated the ethnic, linguistic and religious dividing lines and calculated indices for the majority of the groups in the world. Their data for the FSU with a calculated average for all of the divisive cleavages along with the size of the largest is displayed in the table 16 below.

When ELF is used in cross-country comparisons with a larger number of countries in the sample, it sometimes gives leverage for explaining certain social phenomena. For the fifteen FSU countries the amount of inference that could be drawn from the index is scarce. As table... below demonstrates, the countries that are classified as democracies and autocracies display an approximately similar average fractionalization index, created from the combined scores of ethnic, linguistic and religious divides (0.47 and 0.41 respectively). Countries with hybrid regimes have the highest heterogeneity scores, which average to 0.54. From this it does not directly follow that the clear-cut regimes are associated with lower levels of ethnic divisions:

⁷⁰ Philip G. Roeder. 2001. "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985." February 16. <<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>>.

⁷¹ Latin D., Posner D. The Implication of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices APSA-CP: The Comparative Politics Newsletter 12 (Winter 2001)

⁷² Alesina et. al. Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, pp. 155 -194, 2003

the average scores are relatively high, the number of cases is rather small and the individual country scores vary from 0.35 to 0.57 in democracies and from 0.24 to 0.62 in autocracies. This alerts us, however, to take a closer look to what is happening in hybrid regimes and what are the ways in which ethnic heterogeneity contributes to keeping hybrid regimes afloat. In part, possibly, through formation of national identities that was created during the first experiences with statehood and, to some extent, through polarization of the population, which is reflected in divisions of their parliaments.

A similar tendency is in place when ethnicity, religion or language differences are considered⁷³, namely, hybrid regimes are slightly more heterogeneous than democracies or autocracies.

Table 16 Ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the FSU states

country	ELF (ave)	ELF ethnic	Size of the major ethnic group, %
Estonia	0.5	0.5	67.9
Latvia	0.57	0.58	57.7
Lithuania	0.35	0.32	83.4
Demo Ave	0.47	0.47	69.67
Georgia	0.54	0.49	83.8
Moldova	0.56	0.55	78.2
Ukraine	0.52	0.47	77.8
Hyb Ave	0.54	0.5	79.93
Armenia	0.24	0.12	97.9
Azerbaijan	0.3	0.2	90.6
Belarus	0.47	0.32	81.2
Kazakhstan	0.62	0.61	56.4
Kyrgyzstan	0.57	0.67	64.7
Russia	0.31	0.24	79.8
Tajikistan	0.47	0.51	79.9
Turkmenistan	0.34	0.39	85
Uzbekistan	0.35	0.41	80
Auto Ave	0.41	0.39	79.5

⁷³ The table below includes only data on ethnicity, but the trend holds for linguistic and religious divides.

As with the levels of modernization, ethnic divisions were at different levels in republics at the time when they joined the Soviet Union. The differences existed, but not to the extent that they could be found at the end of the USSR's existence⁷⁴. Unlike with modernization, the Soviet Union, in this case, did not act as a homogenizer: the Soviet policies of forced and economically supported voluntary resettlement of the Soviet populace had deepened and diversified any ethnicity-related divisions that existed prior to formation of the USSR.

To sum up, so far this chapter has considered modernization theory and ethnic heterogeneity as structural conditions in explaining regime outcomes. Modernization theory proved to shed some light on why democracies and autocracies emerge and endure. Pre-Soviet experiences and absence thereof proved vital in highlighting the differences that brought about autocracies and democracies. Hybrid regimes are to some extent more ethnically diverse than democracies and autocracies, and less affluent than the two. Yet, mere association does not give us a reason why it is so. It can be the pattern in modernization and industrialization, which reinforces certain regional differences in the countries, such as ethnic composition, that can shed the light on hybrid regimes and will be tapped into in the next chapters. The implication of ethnic diversity as seen in the voting patterns and potential for polarization of societies is considered in the next section.

3.4. Political polarization and regimes

The thesis that links political polarization with regime outcomes is not new to

⁷⁴ Unfortunately, there is no systematic data available to compare degrees of ethnic heterogeneity prior to joining the Soviet Union disaggregated to the republics' level. But the intensity of forced and voluntary resettling and reshuffling of the people's indicates that an increase in heterogeneity levels can be expected.

political scientists. Robert Dahl argues that 'confronted by severe polarization, competitive regimes are prone to collapse, to coup d'etat, to civil war' (Dahl 1971: 105).

Largely agreeing with Dahl, Giovanni Sartori perceives party polarization as a cause of a democratic regime breakdown. Sartori convincingly argues, that a loss of voters' support for parties with central positions on ideological left-right continuum to the parties in the extremes produces dysfunctional regimes that lead to constitutional breakdowns of democratic systems (Sartori 1976: 136). Following this logic, when a society is split into two groups that are representing ideological extremes, emergence of a democratic system is highly unlikely. Convergence of different groups of elites and masses over vital issues, such as who are the people, what is the nation, what geopolitical orientation is maintained, etc. creates an ideological center and leaves such issues as economic policies and system of government up to debates and compromise conducive to the emergence of democracy. However, the effect that polarization has on other types of regimes is not explored. The two scholars treat competitiveness of a regime as a given and a defining characteristic of a regime. For the majority of the FSU states, there is a long way in their institution-building processes to go before elections are always competitive. Hence, while polarization has a possibility to facilitate a break-down of a democratic regime, it also facilitates competitiveness of elections.

The way to approach this is through tapping into what issues the parties or leaders in the FSU states compete on and how polarizing they are for the population.

The recently evolving literature on this matter includes an approach from political

economy by Timothy Frye in which he looks at the sources of economic growth in the FSU countries (Frye 2002) as well as at how connections between national identity and reform operate through endogenous polarization (Frye 2010). In these studies Frye argues that polarization in the short run produces policy volatility, which raises risks and therefore reduces investors' inclinations to commit. In the long run, these policies swings produce stalemates, modeled in the form of a 'War of Attrition' game that occurs in a legislative chamber, and hinder economic growth (Frye 2002: 313). Other scholars (Sasse) regard the stalemate produced by divisions as a road to stability and even democratization (2010: 100)

Polarization does not necessarily have to be based on the issues of political economy, but can incorporate the sharpest divisive points for the newly independent states, for example questions of nation-building, such as, borders, language policy, geopolitical partnership, security block status, etc. Similarly, politicians use these rival issues as a relatively easy way to mobilize civilians' support at the time of elections (Sasse 2010: 99). Yet, it does not follow that politicians will stick to their campaign promises. Nor is there an interest in crafting a 'centrist' position on divisive issues, which means to lose a support base from the two poles and brings about the necessity to create a new one. Hence, this polarization is essential for keeping elections competitive.

To validate his argument Frye defines a country as having a polarized political system when '...at least 20 % of seats [is] held by a traditional ex-communist (anticommunist) party when the executive is held by an anticommunist (ex-communist) in a given year' (Frye 2002: 318, fn. 28). The actual polarization vital for a political system is not captured by this approach, because the ex-communist-

anticommunist divide is not of vital salience in the majority of the FSU countries. Precisely, it is ethnic, regional, or linguistic identity rather than ideological identity, which mobilizes the voters and, thus, underpins polarization of the population and their representatives in the FSU states and ensures competitiveness of elections.

However in some cases, where ethnicity and other related identities were artificially depoliticized by disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, quasi-class identities evolved that brought about the convergence of elites on the issues of nation-building, language policies, and geopolitical orientation (Pettai 1997: 21).

To check for polarization in the parliaments of the FSU states I suggest looking at the composition of legislative chambers starting with the first founding elections and compare the data with the assessment of competitiveness that is provided by elections observers, coded in the previous chapter⁷⁵.

To operationalize polarization I adopt the approach suggested by Pelizzo and Babones (Pelizzo/Babones 2007). The argument that drives their operationalization is grounded in Sartori's claim on vitality of the center with which I introduced this section. To measure polarization, Pelizzo and Babones propose the following formula:

$$(\text{left vote} + \text{right vote}) - \text{center}^{76}$$

⁷⁵ In the next chapters I will be testing parties' positions on the divisive issues for hybrid regimes based on the Comparative Manifesto Project. Unfortunately, the data is not available to run the analysis for all of the fifteen countries.

⁷⁶ Adapted from Pelizzo/Babones 2007: 56

The index takes values from -100 to 100, where -100 indicates a perfect concentration, and 100 – a perfect polarization with a variation in between. This way, the index captures the presence and size of the center and contrasts it against the joint forces of the two ends on the right and the left (Appendix 14, 15).

If left, right or center are not present, the index stands for the relationship between the other two major forces in the country. This is the way the formula is amended to assess competitiveness of presidential elections, especially in the second round (Appendix 16).

The left and the right in the FSU states are neither classical ones, nor are they extreme. They represent the two different opinions on several issues that the population mobilizes around. The issue is not in the sharpness of their position, but how essential compromise is on these matters as well as the absence of the center.

Although, as Pelizzo and Babones note in their work the real range of polarization scores in the countries of Western Europe they looked at is smaller than theoretically possible, the data from the FSU states offer the opposite results. In Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the parliaments are completely concentrated with the polarization score of -100, i.e. and absolute concentration. This score is tightly followed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan with the very low polarization scores that range between -80 and -100. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia demonstrate a greater scope of variation in their respective polarization scores. Kyrgyzstan, for instance, moved from a relatively concentrated parliament with the score of -70 to a more polarized one with the score of -1.67 after the recent outburst of violence resulted in changes in the electoral formula and allowed for a party system based on regional loyalties to evolve. In Armenia and Russia, the parliament moved

from being more to less polarized (from -21.6 to 74.81 in the former and from 46.22 to -48.44 in the latter) with crystallization of a one-party system in Russia and pluralization of pro-incumbent parties in Armenia. Despite being economically blockaded by two of its neighbours – Azerbaijan and Turkey since 1994 and supported by Russia ⁷⁷ party cleavage around economic issues failed to emerge. Nevertheless, voters' mobilization in recent presidential elections around the issue of the future of Nagorno-Karabakh namely, whether to preserve the status quo, to give concessions to Azerbaijan or to pursue the road to independence⁷⁸ which involves redistribution of economic powers between the centre and periphery demonstrates a potential for more polarization in the future.

The political systems in the three Baltic states show low polarization. Especially, Lithuania, with scores varying in different years between -48.94 and -33.33 and in Estonia and Latvia, where disenfranchisement of Russian minorities that comprised in the early 90s 30% to 40% of the total population contributed greatly to convergence of elites on issues of nationhood and geopolitical orientation thus aligning parties along classical socio-economic cleavage lines (Pettai 1997: 21-22).

Highly polarized systems are found in the hybrid regimes of Moldova, and Ukraine. The nature and the origin of polarization spurs from ethnicity, language and regional differences that are largely rooted in identities and experiences with nationhood in the pre-Soviet period which are relatively easy to mobilize. According to Frye '[p]otential transfers of political power are often decisive moments in polarized political systems because all groups expect great swings in economic policy. Losers can quickly

⁷⁷ Out of Armenia, Something New? Economist, February 21, 2008

⁷⁸ Conflict overshadows Armenia Polls, BBC, February 18, 2008, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7250235.stm>, last accessed on August 5, 2008

become winners and vice versa' (Frye 2002: 315). This picture captures to a great degree the electoral hybrid regimes of Moldova and Ukraine. Emphasising the crucial role elections play in such a setting as a mechanism to gain power, and given that the stakes of holding power are very high, policy-making inside the electoral cycle is less concerned with institutionalizing 'good governance' but rather how not to lose voters' support in the next round of contestation sometimes sliding to populist moves⁷⁹. This is evident from the recent scandal with the former Prime Minister of Ukraine being held under investigation for the misuse of Kyoto funds of the environmental ministry to pay pensions in a populist move prior to elections in 2009⁸⁰.

In Georgia, which has approximately the same score on ethno-linguistic fractionalization as Moldova and Ukraine⁸¹, ethnic conflicts and civil wars in the early 90s that led to emergence of two break-away regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), put any attempts made by political elites to question Georgian borders, nationhood, or language on a footing with committing political suicide⁸². The war with Russia that followed in August 2008 confirmed the unity of the population on the question, despite the loss of territories, but produced divisions on the way in which the President handled the conflict. This issue became very divisive and mobilized protesters on the streets in April of 2009⁸³, but due to restricted media access of the

⁷⁹ A recent example from Ukraine features Yulia Tymoshenko's move to compensate the savings lost in the early 90s which left Ukraine with the highest inflation rates in Europe (around 30%). ('A Political Soap-Opera, Continued' Economist, May 29, 2008 and 'Inflation In the Near East' Economist, July 13, 2008)

⁸⁰ Ukraine ex-PM Tymoshenko charged with misusing funds. BBC Europe, December 20, 2010. Accessed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12042561> on December 29, 2010

⁸¹ ELF for Georgia is 0.54, Moldova 0.56, Ukraine 0.52, taken from Alesina et. al. Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8, pp. 155 -194, 2003

⁸² Interview with a country expert, February 2008

⁸³ Georgia Protests Enter Fifth Day. BBC, April 13, 2009. At <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7996970.stm>

opposition, the chances are low to bring it into the parliament⁸⁴. For now, parties took positions mainly on economic cleavage, dividing elites and masses between more liberal supporters of economic reforms (usually young, Western educated people), and those who advocated more state interference into the economy along with provision of social benefits to those economically defeated by transition, war, structural unemployment and other social malaise.

This political polarization in hybrid regimes, crafted along different cleavages would not be possible without autonomous economic centers of power or simply without independent from one another economic resources. These centers of power can create a challenge to the central state, undermine state capacity and democratization (Tilly 2007), but once entrenched into a party system these centers *become the state*, or two quasi-states competing with each other. This accounts for elections to be, first and foremost, competitive in hybrid regimes. *Hence, polarization is crucial to the endurance of hybrid regimes: on the one hand it stalemates reforms while on the other, produces competition.*

Concentration and convergence of elites in the countries with no prior experience with nationhood and where economic powers are merged with the political power of the centre, autocracies are most likely to emerge. In the cases where leaders changed one or more times (Azerbaijan, Belarus) or stayed the same since the break-up of the Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) there seems to be a consistent policy-making process. Neither ethnicity, nor economic based cleavages

⁸⁴ In his talk at Harriman Institute, Columbia University, Irakli Alasania emphasized that Georgian society is highly polarized, but outside of the parliament.

gained saliency providing incumbents with an easy task to impose coherent and consistent autocratic institutions and practices. For example, ethnically divided Kazakhstan witnessed from the very beginning little political mobilization based on ethnicity, first, because many Russians preferred an exit strategy and immigrated (Laitin 1998) and second, because they had little financial support back then to confront the incumbent's party: despite the Russian population comprising around 40%, the Lad (Harmony Slavic) Party (backed by ethnic Russians) won four seats out of 177 in the general elections of March 7th 1994 (Jeffries 2003: 180).

3.5. Conclusion

Notwithstanding the ability of structural factors that were considered in this chapter to explain why in certain countries of the FSU clear-cut regimes emerged, the grey zone continuously questions the validity of these theories. Rendering a confirmation of the hypothesis on the strength of initial differences, Soviet modernization contributed to a convergence, and ethnic policies to a divergence of the regimes. While during the 20 years of independence economies in democracies and autocracies grew, legacies of the past revealed themselves in the paths that the countries took. However, the answer is not so straightforward for hybrid regimes. Such regimes stick out as being persistently poor, highly heterogeneous and polarized to varying degrees – the three aspects that will underlie the formation of an explanatory account of the endurance of hybrid regimes in subsequent chapters. Divisions in societies reflected in the political polarization of the parliaments on the issues of nationhood, and geopolitical orientation are placed at the core of the emergence of hybrid regimes. These divisions can be of different origins but need to be supported by autonomous economic sources for elections to be competitive.

Chapter 4 Explaining post-Soviet hybrid regimes

'So you destroy a country because it's not competitive. What kind of reason is that?'

'It's the best reason, Misha. Nowadays, if you don't have natural resources, you need USAID. You need the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.... If only we could get on America's top-ten list and score big like Jordan or Egypt.'

Absurdistan, Gary Shteyngart. Random House, 2006

The reason which Mr. Nanabragov, the newly-established dictator of Absurdistan is referring to is fairly simple: there is a need in a resource-less (imaginary) former Soviet Republic, and this need is going to be satisfied by the foreign aid. Yet, it does not look as simple for the protagonist Misha, the Western-educated, America-loving son of the 1 238th richest man in Russia. The following chapter is devoted to bringing this 'simple reasoning' of the elites in the FSU countries to the surface.

The goal that I pursue in this chapter is to fill in an unexplained void in terms of the persistent nature of hybrid regimes. My theoretical argument states that the permanence of hybrid regimes through time (instead of the expected transition to either democracy or autocracy) is due to the incentives generated by an external conditionality to hold free and fair elections, as well as an internal power struggle and the will to remain in power in the settings with different degrees of polarization. Building on a set of peculiar structural conditions discovered in the previous chapter (relative lack of affluence and thriving ethnic heterogeneity), this chapter develops theoretical account that bridges the former together with the next chapter, which will concentrate on supplying empirical evidence. Therefore, the originality of this research is in finding out how structural pre-conditions, discussed in the previous chapter, together with international conditionality (to be introduced in this chapter),

create a set of incentives in which actors develop certain preferences that lead them to make a hybrid regime permanent.

Using analytic narratives and elements of formal modeling this chapter will show how hybrid regimes become a solution, which brings the interests of domestic and foreign actors into equilibrium. The model will demonstrate how structures shape actors' preferences, and how the latter enable the persistency of hybrid regimes. I will begin by introducing the premise of the study as a set of hypotheses that help us to test the theory in the next chapter. The hypotheses focus on different levels of polarization and the roles of various international actors. Therefore, I proceed by giving a detailed account of a variety of international influences that are actively involved with the countries in question. After specifying the international donors' interests and the countries' need for aid, I move on to suggesting a rationale by which the rulers in the countries operate and a mechanism that connects together structural preconditions and actors' strategic behavior. Specifically, how different degrees of polarization transform into competitiveness or non-competitiveness of elections and different degrees of performance in reform of governance in hybrid regimes, while assessing the strategies of the international aid-providers and elites as the aid-seekers.

4.1. The Premise of the Study: Internal Polarization and External Support

An answer to the question of why so many countries maintained hybrid regimes for over a decade was not possible during the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two decades later, the amount of scholarly work has flourished addressing different aspects of hybrid regimes, from the processes specific to such regimes, such as, patterns of mobilization protests (Robertson 2010) to their general evolutionary trends around the world (Levitsky/Way 2010). However, the permanence of hybrid regimes, when they are traditionally expected to become either democratic or autocratic in the context of the FSU states is not addressed. This chapter is devoted to providing a theoretical framework to help better understand the endurance of hybrid regimes in the former Soviet Union states. This framework includes specification of preferences of domestic and international actors contingent upon the degree of voters' polarization.

As the next step in formulating an explanatory account of hybrid regime viability, I summarize the following set of hypotheses, thereby condensing the scarce knowledge available about the grey zone as shown in the course of this study. Relying on what we know so far about polarization in the former Soviet Union from the works of Frey (2002, 2010) which demonstrate how the former impedes reform as well as about identity – related behavior in hybrid regimes (Way 2005, Hale, 2005) I use these hypotheses as a guideline in formulating the causal mechanism and test them in the following chapter.

H1: Hybrid regimes emerge and endure in

(a) the polarized countries;

(b) where various international interests collide

Despite a conventional thinking that aid from different sources will bring more prosperity and consequently, more democracy (Lipset 1959, Limongi/Przeworski 2000), I suggest that it does not hold. As the previous chapter had demonstrated, countries with hybrid regimes do not prosper and remain in a grey zone for decades. This finding partially confirms the general pattern that political economist Brollo and his collaborators had established in connection to the windfall (foreign aid) government revenues⁸⁵: '...an increase in resources available to a government leads to an increase in corruption of the incumbent (a moral hazard effect). This happens because, with a larger budget size, the incumbent has more room to grab political rents without disappointing rational but imperfectly informed voters' (Brollo et.al 2010: 2). Moreover, the ideas of mercantilism that prevailed economic policies of the majority of the FSU governments during the first years of independence gave a way to a variety of different ideas that framed the choices of cooperation with international institutions (Darden 2009: 309). An account of donors, which I am going to provide below, will show how different donors pursue different and sometimes contradictory interests, which stalemates the progress while reinforcing polarization and competitiveness of a regime.

⁸⁵ Economists define revenues as windfall, if a country either experiences a sudden discovery of oil or gas, or there is an increase in the world market price of the resources that the country is well endowed with, or if a country is a recipient of large a scope and amount of foreign aid (Van der Ploeg, Venables 2009: 2)

H2: Hybrid regimes are viable in non- or low-polarized countries with a unified strategic interest

This hypotheses puts into a test the relationship between the unity of elites and masses about their geopolitical orientation which draws international support for promoting the donor's interests and the pace of reform of governance. While it is expected that the consensus of elites brings full reforms instead of partial ones (Hellman 1998, Frye 2002), a hybrid regime with pronounced flaws in electoral flaws and achievements in the reforms of governance emerges and endures. Electoralism in regime studies assumes that electoral conduct is the major yardstick, against which the regimes are assessed by international community (Levitsky/Way 2010). However, in some hybrid regimes reforms in rule of law and other spheres of governance are valued higher than quality of electoral process, which as going to be shown later, depends on the strategies of donors.

H3: Incentives of international actors are prone to promote more competitiveness in already polarized regimes and more reform in non-polarized regimes

This hypothesis challenges the accepted democracy promotion claims and moves beyond the debate between rationalists and normativists (for ex. Schimmelfenning/Sedelmeier 2005, March/Olsen 1996). It does not take for granted that the international donors are interested in establishing a democratic regime. Instead, it suggests putting through a test the interests that international actors pursue and the incentives that they provide for cooperation with the domestic elites, as well as the strategies that the latter pursue to benefit from this cooperation.

Building on what we know about hybrid regimes, we can easily pinpoint an existing gap between elections and so-called governance, i.e. between the way the rulers get to power and the way they govern once there. This new phenomena, discussed in a greater detail in previous chapters, is not only the gap between the formal and informal institutions, observed by scholars during the Third Wave of democratization (Lauth 2000, Schedler 2002, Helmke/Levitsky 2006). Rather, it is a controversy between two major questions that are guiding this research from the beginning: how to get to power and how to rule once in office?

Thus, the essence of hybrid regimes is in mixing the ways of attaining power, from democracies and autocracies, and combining the ways to govern from these two regime types. Precisely, as shown in previous chapters, free and fair elections (as in democracies) are combined with an absence of independent judiciary and some restrictions on civil rights (as in autocracies). Or, alternatively, elections may bear significant flaws, but the countries achievements in reforms of governance and rule of law are convincingly suggesting a pursuit of a democratic path.

Specific requirements from international observers (that ensure international recognition of elections) are relatively easy and fast for the competing elites to learn and to comply with what is expected, and they guarantee that ways of taking power are in accordance with democracy. At the same time, a country-specific institutionalization of the rule of law, political rights and civil liberties requires a lot of time, and every attempt on the side of international actors to aid the learning process can be interpreted as an interference in domestic affairs⁸⁶. Therefore,

⁸⁶ I draw this point upon a conversation with a EU Commission Delegation official in Ukraine,

domestic elites and international actors regard as mutually beneficial acting separately but in a way cooperating in keeping elections recognizable. To develop an argument based on this standpoint, we need to theorize and discern between the donors that are available to the countries as well as to accentuate the need for aid that the countries in question have.

4.2. International Actors and Regime Outcomes

The role of international actors in the context of regime and democratization studies went through a revision since the fall of Berlin Wall: at the dawn of the Third Wave of democratization scholars believed that regime change and democratic institutionalization is a product of solely domestic actors (O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986). This short-lived 'domestic-international' debate exhausted itself with the Enlargement talks of the European Union (EU) with the former Warsaw pact countries seen as a form of a swap of economic benefits (from the membership) for democratic governance (condition for the membership) (Huntington 1991: 85-88). Notwithstanding the obvious success of the EU as a promoter of democracy in the aforementioned countries, the scope of the countries, which it has engaged with, stayed limited. Until today, only the Baltic states received membership, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are participants of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and observers note the rising role of Russia in using soft cultural and economic powers in '...diffusion of certain ideas and norms' throughout the FSU and in Central Asia in particular (Jackson: 2010). Accepting as a starting point that the EU indeed contributed to the emergence of democracy in the

countries, elites of which were in agreement on the European choice for their countries from the first days of re-established independence (Jeffries 2004), this section in a concise manner addresses some of the strategies that international actors play that may affect regime outcomes.

And yet again, nothing is puzzling about the role that the EU conditionality, proximity and legacies played in the Baltic countries, as well as the role that negatively-perceived Soviet legacies played in the speedy transition to democracies in those countries. Similarly, modernization by the Soviet state, in a broad sense of bringing the experience of statehood, bureaucratic institutions, industrialization, urbanization, literacy etc. and dependence on Russian products and markets in the majority of the Central Asian countries, helps to understand the 'seamless transition' from Communism and, broadly, from one type of autocracy to another (Brown 2009: 550). But, what are the roles that Russia and the West (the EU, the OSCE, the USA) are playing in the countries in the grey zone and whether these roles are shedding light on the persistence of either autocracies or democracies is less straightforward.

Levitsky and Way have approached the 'proximity to the West concept' of Jeffrey Kopstein and David A. Reilly⁸⁷, by assessing the actual 'Western leverage' that the EU and the US exercise over countries that strive to become democracies⁸⁸. What drives this investigation, in particular, is the questionable intentions of the Western donors and of the elites in the majority of the FSU countries to democratize the countries, as opposed to keep the status quo, or even to de-democratize. The next section is going

⁸⁷ Kopstein, Jeffrey/Reilly, David A. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World. *World Politics*, Volume 53, Number 1, October 2000, pp. 1-37

⁸⁸ Levitsky/Way Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2010. p. 24

to look into the preferences of domestic and foreign actors, not normatively assumed, but empirically derived from their actions, to formulate a theoretical explanatory account of the persistency of hybrid regimes.

4.2.1. International Aid: Donors and Recipients

International environment and geographical location determine to a large extent the set of foreign actors that have interests in countries. After the Soviet Union broke up, almost half of the former Soviet Republics, and particularly, the three countries with hybrid regimes, as defined by this study, – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, - found themselves in the buffer zone bordering Russia⁸⁹ on one side and the NATO frontier and the EU on the other and, hence, often attract, conflicted interests. Broadly defined here as Russia and the West, these two international players set conditions for further cooperation with the countries in question.

To pursue these interests international actors offer countries in the buffer zone 'rewards for cooperation' as well as 'punishments for deviations'. The countries find themselves in need of support and aid and thus, develop strategies that ensure that their needs are met. The section below articulates interests/needs through preferences of both types of international actors as well as of the domestic elites in the subject countries.

4.2.2. Interests of International Actors

An array of interests that the West pursues in the region of the FSU primarily concerns maintenance of peace and security at their borders, or at the borders of their strategic partners (the NATO members), prospective markets, and loyal governments

⁸⁹ Russia from this point on moves from being treated as a former Soviet Republic to be regarded as an international player.

in those neighboring countries. As the last two decades have demonstrated, democracy promotion efforts go hand in hand, if not uniquely channel, aid flows, which begs the question: Why is the West interested in having democratic neighbors? A commonly accepted answer stands on a quasi-law in international relations, according to which democracies very rarely go into war with each other⁹⁰. Hence, establishing a democracy is a subordinated goal, a side-effect of a security-building effort.

The Western appeal is not entirely foreign to the former Russian Empire: the debate of whether the state and the political system of Russia proper and its subjects should be built according to the Western values of democracies or whether Russia should follow its own way and come up with its particular type of democracy. This debate, known as the one between *Zapadniki* ('Westernizers' from the Russian word *Zapad*, the West) and the *Slavyanofily* (Slavophiles, Russian nationalists) that started in the middle of the 18th century continues to shape Russia's if no longer domestic, then beyond any doubt its foreign policies, as well as the domestic and foreign policies of its former territories.

The incentives that the West uses to promote cooperation are based on the prospects of peace, security and economic prosperity that accompanied post-WWII European democracies and the US.

Hence, the countries of the West, acting through their major funding agencies offer to provide financial support for governance in exchange for guarantees of peace and

⁹⁰ Starr, Harvey Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Community. *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 29, no. 2, 1992 pp. 207-213

some sort of democratic reforms. The conduct of free and fair competitive elections (or as Levitsky and Way call it an 'electoralist' strategy⁹¹) is one of the essential reform steps and priority areas as well as a requirement for further funding. Because elections happen regularly and are therefore more predictable and available for international observers to assess than various kinds of reforms that go through a long implementation phase and assessment of some of them requires waiting for long periods of time, the former moved to the forefront of assessment of democracy promotion efforts. Moreover, recommendations that are delivered on legislative or judicial reforms are oftentimes regarded as an attempt to interfere with domestic affairs.

What are, correspondingly, Russia's interests? They are intrinsically similar to the ones of the West: peace and security; favorable market conditions and cooperative governments in the neighboring countries. This also calls for keeping NATO further away from its borders. Russia's arguments are based on highlighting the common history that dates many centuries back and has its supporters in the former Soviet Republics. Thus, Russia offers energy resources below market prices, direct subsidies, markets for imports coming from other countries, lucrative contracts for the neighboring businessmen (Jackson 2010: 108) as well as a promise of peace and security to be provided in exchange for, among other conditions, bases for its troops to be stationed in the FSU countries. In return it expects the aid-recipients to be loyal to Russian foreign policy and interests, as well as deter from seeking other alliances with military organizations. Russian government is not concerned with electoral

⁹¹ Levitsky/Way Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2010. p. 42

conduct, as long as the candidate that is endorsed wins office⁹².

To understand why the international actors are capable to influence the strategies of elites in the countries of the FSU, it is essential to look at the depth of urgency in support that the countries display.

4.2.3. The Scope of Needs and Aid-seeking by the FSU states

In order for the international players to have leverage over the FSU countries, the latter must have a basic need in certain types of resources that cooperation with foreign powers yields. Levitsky and Way in their extensive study of leverage and linkage hybrid regimes focus mainly on the democracy promotional effort of the West in relation to the geographic proximity and the size of the population (2010: 24). The scholars treat the willingness to seek aid from the international community as conditioned on these factors, while it is the contingency and type of economy and society as well as the scope of the required reform that determines how much aid the country will be seeking.

As was shown in the previous chapter, when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the majority of the Republics were at a relatively low level of development, institutionally unreformed and industrially backwards to survive independently and to build a new country on their own. The lack of experience and difficulties associated with reforming or adapting the Soviet legislative framework and policies to rapidly changing socio-economic environment contributed to republics' remaining poor and

⁹² Russian former president and now the Prime-Minister Putin has a tradition of naming a favorite in every presidential or legislative race that takes place in the FSU countries, with the exception of the Baltic states. During the presidential election of 2004 in Ukraine Putin congratulated his preferred candidate Victor Yanukovich ahead of the announced results and the standstill that followed as a part of the Orange Revolution. This set a lukewarm tone for the next five years of his opponent's ruling in a relationship between Ukraine and Russia.

un-reformed for some years and later decades. Even the Baltic states would not pass the aforementioned empirically established threshold of democratic sustainability of GDP per capita of 6,000 USD (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 159). But the first years of independence set them on the track of reforms, with the help of clear prospects of EU membership and rules on how to join the EU (Jeffries 2004: 137). This confirms the accounts of rationalists in international relations theory, by which the logic of consequentiality is reflected in conditionality or 'a reinforcement by reward' (Schimmelfenning/Sedelmeier 2004). When a clear membership prospect was at stake both the EU was more demanding on the delivery of reforms and each of the Baltic states was determined to show progress on each of the required policies.

The economic conditions in well-to-moderately endowed with energy resources Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and to some extent Uzbekistan improved with the growth of the commodity prices in the late 90s' and set them on a path of economic independence and a way for their rulers to stay in power independently of the type of regimes and demands of the international community.

The economies and societies of the remaining FSU republics were in a dramatic need of aid at the onset of their independent statehood and, as the GDP per capita data confirms, remain in short supply of resources. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine became the major aid-seekers and their political regimes turned into an arena for the international actors to cooperate and/or compete.

To assess interactions between the aid-givers and the aid-seekers and to build an

argument that links together the actions of domestic and foreign actors and the emergence and the persistence of hybrid regimes I suggest investigating the role that the European Union through the European Neighborhood Policy (the ENP) and the US through its foreign aid funding agency US AID play in the process. Below, I shall discuss which dimension of a regime, ways to attain power (elections) or the ways to rule (governance), is each of the major actors particularly after in the context of the FSU states.

4.2.4. The EU: The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

Unlike the Copenhagen Criteria that set the requirements for candidates for accession to comply with before enlargement talks begin, the ENP offers to ‘neighbors’⁹³ ‘...a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)’⁹⁴. The universal strategy common for all of ‘neighbors’ is concerned with providing ‘...support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance...’ which includes the obligation from the countries to ensure that elections are free and fair. Precisely, the mechanisms of cooperation are stated in the Action Plan⁹⁵ as well as in country-specific strategies that from the standpoint of the EU deserve crucial attention, such as ‘...social and economic development, including actions to alleviate the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe...’ for Belarus, ‘...regulatory reform and administrative capacity building...’ for Moldova, or ‘...support for peaceful settlement of ... internal

⁹³ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

⁹⁴ Official web page of European Neighborhood Policy, at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm last accessed on August 7, 2008

⁹⁵ All of the ‘neighbors’ have adopted their respective Action Plans with the exception of Belarus. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_belarus_en.htm last accessed on August 7, 2008

conflicts...' in Georgia⁹⁶. The logic of appropriateness can be seen as the guiding theory under these conditions for cooperation, according to which the actor's behavior is driven by institutionalized rules that are considered normal and appropriate (March and Olsen 1996: 252). Hence, the EU expects its neighbors to adhere to the 'common values' out of mere finding them 'normal'. Yet, the reasoning may run much deeper than the debate between the rationalists (conditionality) and normativists (norms): it can be that the promotion of democracy is not at the core of the interests of the EU in its neighbors and that other interests guide the outreach effort.

Notwithstanding the claims made by the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, that '... membership is not indispensable as a lever for reform... in areas including press freedom, energy and trade'⁹⁷, the ENP is a constant target for critics both from scholars and practitioners, supporters of the rationalist logic of consequentiality. For them, the only way that the EU can influence the pace of reforms in the target countries is by offering a membership agreement as a *consequence* of the achievements in reforms. Scholars argue, that 'mixed messages' (Beichelt 2007) result in 'partial reforms' (Frye 2002), which is never enough for 'the neighbors' to secure either the establishment of a democratic regime or accession agreement. Observers note that '[b]y mixing up apples and pears it helps put off the enlargement debate' – implying a disagreement within the member-states on the possibilities of the

⁹⁶ Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_belarus_en.htm
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf

⁹⁷ Europe's Neighbors Feel Positive Effect, by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Financial Times, September 7, 2007, accessed at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31ff2d2c-5cdb-11dc-9cc9-0000779fd2ac.html> on August 7, 2008

future enlargement⁹⁸. Besides, the elites in the ENP targeted countries are interested in receiving aid⁹⁹, given that the Action Plan is a manageable one and does not call for major policy changes.

The conduct of free and fair elections is indicated to be in the priority area for the majority of the 'neighbors' and is assessed by the OSCE EOM standards¹⁰⁰. Complying with the standards is a part of the learning process that elites in the countries are engaged in, they know what to expect from the observers and try to comply with those rules, without conducting major reforms¹⁰¹.

These matters contribute to a situation when the EU knows it will not offer the membership, therefore, does not really control the pace of reforms. At the same time elites in the countries are aware that membership is not at stake any time soon, but there are immediate gains in cooperation, without actually having to deliver reforms. Hence, the EU promotes not democracy and reform, but rather a 'let things not get worse', a situation close to preserving the status quo. The domestic elites also favor this situation because it means that they do not need to engage in a series of reforms, but can as well focus on preserving the status quo or not letting the situation deteriorate.

Elections, however, remain the major yardstick against which the countries'

⁹⁸ Europe's funk over its neighbors, Financial Times, September 4, 2007, accessed at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/165f5234-5b1b-11dc-8c32-0000779fd2ac.html> on August 7, 2008

⁹⁹ In the period between 2007 and 2010 Armenia had received 98.4, Azerbaijan 92, Belarus 20, Georgia 120.4, Moldova 209.7 and Ukraine 494 million Euro respectively.

¹⁰⁰ The EU provides assistance to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in monitoring free elections and developing national electoral and human rights institutions in new democracies. (Source: *The EU's Relations With The OSCE*. Last accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/organisations/osce/index_en.htm on January 27, 2011)

¹⁰¹ For instance, observers are persistently drawing attention to poor quality of voting lists in Ukraine and Georgia. The costs of systematizing and maintaining lists are high, especially in Ukraine with its number of eligible voters rounding around 35 million, but there is an option to secure funding specifically for implementation of this project. The manipulations with lists are less visible and hard to register. Therefore, the elites are hiding behind a lack of political will to secure a more visible and fair conduct of elections. (from an interview with an official from one of the observation missions in October 2008).

performance is assessed and further support is allocated. To demonstrate the 'aid for elections' link a recent example from Belarus is in order. After another violent episode of dealing with his electoral opponents and their supporters, but still trying to maintain the facade of fair elections president Lukashenka deprived his country of the support of the West at least for some years to come. As Ministers of Foreign Affairs of some of the EU countries had announced, '...prospects of money from the West to save a deteriorating economic situation have in all probability gone up in smoke. Investors will be wary of a country that has so spectacularly shown its contempt for the law'¹⁰². Moreover, it means the necessity for a rapprochement with Russia after a recent 'gas row' that the two countries went through: indeed, Russia had offered \$4 124 bln in subsidies for duty-free oil¹⁰³.

Hence, the conditions that the EU is putting on the non-member countries of the FSU include first and foremost the conduct of free and fair elections. Secondly, the donor is looking at some level of performance in reforms, from the judiciary to harmonization of trade regulations. Security issues are of a lesser concern for the ENP, as all of the countries that are members of the EU and share borders with the FSU states are also members of NATO, which is more profoundly engaged with the issue. The scheme of aid is the following: achievements in elections in exchange for funds to be used on other spheres. The until recently popular idea of equating the EU with democracy promotion efforts hardly holds for the FSU states, as it is not democracy which is at stake, but support of already existing democratic elements in exchange for additional funding.

¹⁰² Lukashenko The Loser. OpEd By Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle for *The New York Times*, December 23, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24iht-edbildt24.html?_r=2

¹⁰³ Belarus To Get \$4.124 Bln in Subsidies – Putin. Rianovosti, January 20, 2011 at
<http://en.rian.ru/business/20110120/162224399.html>

4.2.5. The USA (USAID)

The US, despite being separated by thousands of nautical miles from the majority of the FSU states, assigns a particular importance to the area. As a pragmatic actor it is interested in assuring security and economic interests of the country itself and of its partners¹⁰⁴. Hence it operates through two channels: military security, which is provided through NATO and civil/economic security through USAID.

USAID was created in 1961 to separate military assistance from non-military, and to promote security and development in the parts of the world where the US has economic and security related interests¹⁰⁵. In 50 years of its activity it became the major civilian foreign aid provider in the world¹⁰⁶.

When the Soviet Union broke up the USAID showed a deep commitment to the FSU states and has allocated since then '...roughly \$8.2 billion in grants for economic and technical assistance to the region... to facilitate [the countries'] transition to democracy and free market economies...'¹⁰⁷.

The amount of money that USAID spends is very persuasive and generous, however the conditionality that they use is related to the level of performance of the countries competing for the same pool of funds in '...undertaking economic and political reform, whether they are following international standards of human rights, whether they are adhering to international treaties, and whether they are denying support to

¹⁰⁴ Mark P. Lagon. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the UA and the International Community. *Council on Foreign Affairs*. Markets and Democracy Brief, February 2011, p.1

¹⁰⁵ US AID History Summary. Accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidthist.html on Januray 28, 2011

¹⁰⁶ United States Is The Largest Donor of Foreign Aid, Report Says. America.gov, May 24, 2007. Accessed at <http://www.america.gov/st/develop-english/2007/May/20070524165115zjsredna0.2997553.html> on January 28, 2011

¹⁰⁷ The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 2

terrorists.'¹⁰⁸ The approach is neither 'electoralist', nor focused on promoting democracy. The funding from the USAID from the very beginning of cooperation was largely associated with the governance sector and provided strong support to governments' initiatives and reforms. The support to the non-governmental sector as well as to opposition parties at the times of elections became visible after the wave of Colored Revolutions rolled through some of the FSU states¹⁰⁹. However, the funding is not conditioned on the conduct of free and fair elections, and is granted to support the countries' achievements in tax code legislation drafting or reforms in pension system. It seems also that a breach of the security alliance with the US (as was the case with Ukraine when it was charged with selling the Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq in 2002 in violation of the US sanctions¹¹⁰) results in freezing of funding while the infringement of media freedom, political rights, or electoral fraud did not provoke such measures.

Thus, various accomplishments in governance can result in continuation of support despite the failure to ensure the conduct of free and fair elections. In the menu of conditions that USAID offers, elections are not the major focus. Rather, the conduct of reforms, as well as support of the US security interests dominate the support programs.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid p. 10

¹⁰⁹ Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, became a part of a continuous effort to ensure free and fair elections by USAID and its sub-program for Elections and Political Process in the Office of Democracy and Governance. Source: *Elections and Political Process Program. Office of Democracy and Governance*. Accessed at www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/cent.../pdf/dg932-002.pdf on January 29, 2011

¹¹⁰ The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 12

4.2.6. Russia as an international actor

Ever since Boris Yeltzin stepped back from the power in 2000 and Vladimir Putin being set in charge, the Russian political regime started to move in authoritarian direction which was combined with a growing state capacity (Tilly 2007). Renationalization of the energy sector is an encompassing example to illustrate both tendencies. Combined with a favorable world market conjuncture for energy commodity prices (a windfall revenue), Russian energy policy as an instrument of its foreign policy became a successful tool of *reinforcement by reward*. The increase in gas prices, cuts in gas supplies are widely expected moves whenever a country intends to leave ‘Moscow's orbit’¹¹¹. However, this is the strategy best characterized as post-colored-revolutions syndrome, prior to which Russia was trying softer mechanisms of influence such as forming regional alliances with other FSU states. A good example is an initiative to create a United Economic Space that came from Russia in September 2003. The original idea is to create a free trade zone between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine under the umbrella of the Russian ruble as a common currency was rejected by both Kazakhstan and Ukraine as an attempt ‘...to reestablish “a soft empire”’ and therefore was restricted only to free trade and customs union and continued development (Blagov 2003).

Russia also uses military stations in the FSU states, a legacy of the Soviet Army, to pursue its security interests. In return for keeping the foreign army on their now sovereign territories, the FSU countries are rewarded with discounted energy prices, and other favorable conditions to conduct business with Russia. The requirements that Russia imposes on the countries are largely related to Russia's economic and

¹¹¹ Russia ready to cut off gas supplies to Belarus, Georgia, Financial Times, December 14, 2007, accessed at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bc3e259c-8b17-11db-8940-0000779e2340.html> on August 7, 2008

international security, and gives less attention to elections and governance.

Russia does not expect countries in the FSU to hold free and fair elections: as long as the endorsed candidate that agrees to cooperate further with the Russian government on economy and security wins, elections are recognized as valid. Below is an example of how special institutions (indirect soft power) are created to guarantee Russia's exercise hard economic power directly. One such institution is CIS Election Monitoring Organization created as a response to the OSCE Elections Observation Mission (OSCE EOM) that is enlarging its engagement in Monitoring of elections in the region. Albeit the two missions declare their commitment to similar principles of observing and reporting electoral processes, comparing the reports of the CIS EMO with the coded previously OSCE EOM yields in 100% of instances contradictory reports¹¹². Namely, whenever the OSCE would label elections as 'neither free nor fair', the CIS would categorize them as 'free, fair, and democratic'. Some examples worth mentioning are elections that preceded the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Orange Revolution in Ukraine, all of elections in Belarus since 2001, in Kazakhstan since 2004, in Russia since 2003, in Uzbekistan since 2004. All of these events were assessed with negative connotations by the OSCE and with positive ones by the CIS. Not only does it indicate the utilization of different notions of democracy and what constitutes free and fair elections, but at the same time the desire of Russia to diffuse its own values and norms of democracy by assuring autocratic leaders of their legitimacy in the eyes of Russia and CIS. Besides, the gist is not only in Russia's support for rigged elections (Jackson 2010), but in support of incumbents in the cases of Central Asian states, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, i.e. Russian allies, and in

¹¹² Commonwealth of Independent States . Accessed at <http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=20> on August 5, 2008

support for the opposition in Georgia¹¹³.

To sum up, the interests that international actors pursue in the FSU region can be narrowed down to a menu of conditions that refer to the conduct of elections, reforms in the governance sphere and security issues. Russia and the US are concerned with the security (including economic security) and forming/maintaining strategic partnerships and alliances, more than with the conduct of elections. In fact, Russia is not at all interested in reforms in the FSU countries, and any conduct of elections is acceptable, as long as the 'chosen', cooperative candidate wins. The EU focuses on elections (through cooperation and financial support to the OSCE) and conditions its further support of governance on electoral conduct. The international actors are not that much focused on promotion of democracy, but rather on peace and stability. The strategies Russia and the West pursue and the incentives that they create are oftentimes conflicted.

¹¹³ Russia Protests Irregularities in Georgian Vote. January 2008. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org

4.3. Hybrid regimes: a well – supported space

As previous chapters have shown, hybrid regimes in the FSU come in two forms: competitive and non-competitive. In competitive, the way to power for the rulers is paved through free and fair elections that are conducted in a competitive environment. Non-competitive regimes also hold free and fair elections, recognized by international observers, but the campaign lacks general competitiveness. The two types are connected to and, as will be argued in the course of this study, are a result of a *polarization*, or the lack of thereof, that penetrate the societies.

To understand the differences between the two kinds of hybrid regimes, I will first highlight the similarities. Precisely, both types of regimes hold elections that are acknowledged by international observers as free and fair, as a democratic part of the mixture. To reiterate, I attribute this feature to both 1) clarity from the standpoint of international observers as to what qualifies as a free and fair election, and 2) comprehensibility from the standpoint of the elites, due to the learning process in the last decade during which the rulers familiarized themselves with the “dos” and “don'ts” of how to get elections positively 'certified' by the international community in general and the key observer – the OSCE, in particular. The reason why elites in the camps of both, the incumbent and a challenger look forward to this 'certification' is that it opens a channel to external financial resources, after international observers confirm the winner in free and fair elections as a legitimate one. The two share problems in the domains of governance, especially in the rule of law sphere.

At this point, similarities start producing differences: free and fair elections can be

held in competitive or non-competitive environments, depending on how polarized the voters are. These differences stem from the ways that rulers attain power (elections) and penetrate how the rulers rule (governance).

In competitive hybrid regimes, elites know that campaigns, voting and election results will be contested. High levels of polarization in the society secure the intensity of a campaign. As in democracies, there is an uncertainty about the results until the moment they are announced. Sometimes, however, unlike in democracies, this uncertainty stretches out into the post-announcement of the results because it is unclear whether the defeated camp is going to accept the results and the winner as a legitimate ruler. (This situation travels beyond the countries of the FSU and is widely observed in post-conflict societies in Africa, as the elections in December 2010 in Côte d'Ivoire have shown).

Being aware of this, elites in power do not invest as much time and resources in judiciary reform or crafting of new social or economic policies as they do in changing of electoral formulas, the scope of presidential (chief executives') powers, or other institutions that allow them to win in the next electoral cycle. For them, the less rule of law is exercised in the country, the greater the chances of winning the competition in the next round, as well as the more corruption in the country, the better the chances to stay in power.

For the rulers, reforms are costly: not only do they bear the actual cost in monetary equivalent into policy research and implementation (usually sponsored by the Western donors), but also risk being punished at the electoral urn for performing certain

reforms or leaving a portion of their constituency worse-off¹¹⁴. This voter reaction to reform, in the form of punishing the implementer (incumbent) first via popular ratings and later at the polling booth, is common also in democratic societies (especially in polarized ones)¹¹⁵. The populace of both democratic and non-democratic societies reacts in the same way to similar actions of politicians, which contributes to the greater debate on political culture as a negative attestation to some cultures being more democratic than the others. The motivation and legitimization of the leaders, however, differs in democracies from that in hybrid regimes. In democracies, leaders understand that they will lose elections at some point, their tenure is limited and they even stand a chance to be voted out if not acting in the interests of the voters. Elites are accountable to their voters and their legitimacy is domestic. In hybrid regimes, leaders also use elections as a way to legitimize their rule but they largely rely on international observers to legitimize their claim to power and thus be eligible to receive foreign aid to support reforms and economy.

Indeed, operating under an assumption that rulers' preference is to stay in power, the point of the crucial challenge comes during elections. International recognition and legitimization of elections as free and fair transforms into another preference that the rulers in hybrid regimes have: to make sure that the funds to support economy are

¹¹⁴ Ukraine's borrowing history with the IMF demonstrates this point: right after being elected as the president in 2010 Victor Yanukovich and his government agreed to a package of pension reform in return for the funding to fix the country's balance of payment problems since the high inflation crisis in 2008. By February 2011 non of the required steps had been done, but the country is in the need for next tranche, as parliamentary elections are approaching. But exactly because the country had entered the new campaign cycle, analysts predict that no reforms will be conducted before the actual elections (See Pavel Korduban, Ukraine Struggles to Secure Next IMF Tranche. *Jamestown Foundation*, Vol. 8, Issue 28).

¹¹⁵ For example, in the United States, President Obama's rating of popular support suffered after he implemented the stimulus package in 2009. As James Surowiecki of *The New Yorker* put it quoting from Prof. Jonathan Baron, '...who studies the role of psychology in public policy,... if you take actions and things go wrong, you're often held more responsible than if you do nothing, even when the failure to act would lead to a disastrous outcome'. The observer concludes, that '... when Rome is burning, trying to put out the fire may cost you more than just sitting by and fiddling'. James Surowiecki Second Helpings. *The New Yorker* September 20, 2010, p. 52

coming from the outside (given the general level of various resource and/or market dependency and relatively low level of affluence). The major donor, be it the European Union or Russia, has to approve of the conduct of the elections (in the case of the former) or the outcome of elections (in the case of the latter), as shown above, to secure further support of the state.

While in competitive hybrid regimes free and fair elections are held in a highly combative atmosphere, in their non-competitive counterparts elections are considered to be free and fair, but there is no real competitor to the major (incumbent) candidate (or party). Non-competitive hybrid regimes are produced by a strong agreement among the population and elites on their long-term geopolitical commitment to their allies, which has a long history and dates back to the years of the first independent state. Elites and masses converge on major state- and nationhood issues and polarize on the ones that do not reach the parliaments. The material support from the country's foreign allies that such a strategy renders, is a basis to keep elections acknowledged, although devoid of rivalry, at a cost of oppressing alternative opinions in media, and using force against the demonstrators. Besides, these windfall revenues in the form of foreign aid tend to produce even more corruption than there was before (Brollo et.al. 2010). Knowing that there is no cleavage dividing the population, if there is an uprising, it usually means the end for the ruler. If there is a revolution, the former leader becomes an outcast – flees, is exiled, etc. as under autocracies. In competitive regimes, the former leader and/or his team have a chance to become re-involved in the political system by pacts with other political figures, becoming a head of an opposition party or movement, or heading an NGO. Often these leaders can nearly count on being able to mount a comeback, due to their preexisting pacts with other

political figures. In other words, it is a winner-take-all situation in non-competitive hybrid regimes as opposed to the possibilities for a comeback or shared arrangements in the case of competitive hybrid regimes.

4.4. The Argument

In order to explain the endurance of hybrid regimes, one needs to envision the two goals pursued by their rulers:

- 1) to hold office and to stay in power at all cost (Geddes 1999: 129)
- 2) to ensure that elections are free and fair.

The first of the two goals is not unique for hybrid regimes: the rulers in democracies are also seeking to stay in power. The second goal, however, discerns elites' motivation: in democracies it is to secure legitimacy, while in hybrid regimes elites aspire to receive external support to keep the country afloat.

From the position of hybrid regimes the two goals are incompatible. This is because alternation of power is what elections are meant to deliver. In addition, a tenured time of a chief executive in the office is limited to two consecutive terms in the majority of countries. In such an ambivalent situation, in order to reach both goals, the rulers are involved in activities that go beyond a fair campaign and involve moderate to gross interference into the natural course of elections. This becomes possible because there is a gap between what is expected for elections to be recognized and what can be done to ensure that a certain candidate wins.

If the environment is generally very competitive, and the ruler estimates the risks of losing as high, he or she engages in undercover bribery. However, knowing well what observers will be looking at and for, there is a high chance that elections are recognized as free, fair and competitive. In polarized societies, this may also involve abstention from serious reforms which can lead to the loss of constituencies.

The pursuit of two goals simultaneously is costly and requires resources. Assuming that a country is distributing its national product and foreign aid between the dimensions of its political regime, committing to two goals at the same time means that there will be resources withdrawn from other places where they are needed. This hinders development of democratic governance and entrenches the hybridity.

Let us assume that the leadership needs a certain amount of funds dedicated to maintenance of a hybrid regime. These funds are distributed between elections and governance. The funds are compiled from the domestic and international sources.

The domestic financial support is limited by the un-reformed economy, ambiguous tax codes, shadow businesses and is more or less constant. The way to increase funds for regime maintenance is to ensure an increasing or at least consistent influx of foreign assistance, in the form of investments, credits, assistance and aid. The elite's preference is to maximize funding for a regime by maximizing its foreign component, because to reform the country is a very costly enterprise given the countries' low levels of economic and institutional development and also raises the probability of losing elections. In its turn, the foreign aid is provided in exchange for recognized free and fair elections or for achievements in reform in the governance component. It is indeed, as scholars have argued, foreign aid as a windfall revenue, which is not fully earned, taxed, accounted for, creates opportunities for incumbents to enrich themselves without disappointing their voters (Brollo 2010: 39).

Hence to maximize international support, rulers need to ensure acknowledgment of elections, by either providing their own financial support to the elections component

or by maximizing the reforms in the governance unit. Thus, funding of a hybrid regime as a whole is a product of maximizing funding of elections and/or governance in order to maximize the influx of foreign aid.

In polarized societies, there is always a way to make elections competitive. This is beneficial for elites trying to stay in power, as they know that elections will be competitive and the heated campaign will be positively acknowledged in the international community. This is also beneficial for the challenger, as he knows that there is a chance of winning, especially when one knows the rules of the game and plays according to them (fraud, voters lists manipulation, bribery, etc.). Both, the incumbent and the challenger are keen on manipulating campaign and elections, however it is the incumbent who has an access to 'administrative resource' and is usually watched with more precision than the challenger. They both usually come from the same set of actors who were previously involved with the incumbents' government¹¹⁶. The challenger's job is to blow the whistle after his camp already commits the fraud as well. Moreover, if the challenger loses, there is a relatively new tendency to question the results of elections by bringing the supporters to the streets, filing complaints to Supreme Courts and demanding a recount of the votes (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005, 2009, Moldova 2009).

Elites are confident about the support that the polarized population will vest in them;

¹¹⁶ For example, In Moldova, Marian Lupu, the challenger to the Communist Party, was prior a member of the party and a speaker of the parliament. Victor Yuschenko, served as a Prime Minister under Kuchma. The future challenger to pro-government party in Georgia, Irakli Alasania had served in several key positions under President Mikheil Saakashvili, which include, among others, acting as the President's Special Representative to Georgian-Abkhaz talks and becoming the Georgia's UN envoy Alasania had served as the adviser to the President of Georgia on the Abkhaz conflict resolution issues, effective March 17, 2006 (See Irakli Alasania – Biography at <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20101>).

this is because identities associated with the competing camps are deeply rooted in historical consciousness. They are cultural legacies - commonly understood, easily inflamed and revived to mobilize voters' support. However, because fraud becomes a part of the game, both incumbent and challenger engage in rigging elections and corrupting their results, with whatever resources available to them.

In low-polarized hybrid regimes, it is easier to keep elections under control on the actual elections day, by oppressing the opposition and its access to media. However, the observers' report will capture that. What elites can provide to the donors instead is reform achievements in governance.

Another point is that it is costly to maintain such a situation where a presence of some democratic institutions, imperfect competition, and autocratic governing practices coexist¹¹⁷. Yet, it is even more costly to deviate to either democracy or to autocracy. To go to autocracy will mean repressing and oppressing half of a country's population in polarized regimes and maybe the same amount in low-polarized, where the level of opposition mass mobilization on the streets usually exceed the level of opposition mobilization in the parliaments. The problem is that there will be people on the streets and negative assessment from the international community, resulting in sanctions and cuts in aid, credits, and contracts. In a democracy, a political figure is not able to use the judicial system for his/her own benefit. In addition, he/she risks being held accountable by the voters and faces the possibility of losing elections since he/she cannot 'grease the wheels' through bribery and other forms of corruption (hiring a

¹¹⁷ David A. Lake, Matthew A. Baum *The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services* Comparative Political Studies 2001 vol. 34 No 6 pp. 587-62

good lawyer is usually a more expensive affair than bribing a judge). To act democratically will also mean to conduct reforms as well as to risk losing elections.

With this ambivalent situation the domestic elites figured out a way to keep the best of the two worlds: a two-faced Janus vis-a-vis both their population and international donors. Moreover, the donors become the nurturers of hybrid regimes without providing incentives to democratize.

4.4.1. Causal Mechanism

The forces that set a causal mechanism in motion are the following:

A high cost of holding a hybrid regime together (pursuing the two ambivalent strategies) reinforces a lack of affluence and reform in the countries. Inability of the latter to produce its own resources, the countries defer to international donors' help. Donors give help to reward progress (or a status quo, i.e. absence of deterioration) in the sphere of elections or the governance, depending on which of the dimensions of a regimes are less costly to keep according to the required standards, elections (in the case of a polarized system), or governance (when there is a convergence in low-polarized countries).

Thus ethnically polarized countries, with ethnic sentiment being channeled through an institutionalized party system, receive help from several donors or are voted out. Reforming economic and social policies raises risks of losing the elections. Where there is no or low polarization grounded in ethnicity, there is a reliance on just one donor and political parties are competing on mainly economic and social policies. Here, reforms are the only way to prove to the outside donors that the country is

committed to cooperation.


Hence, in polarized systems, treating elections as a pivotal point, the rulers invest time, efforts and resources to make sure that they either stay in power themselves, or by leaving a successor, or by ensuring that their respective party secures a majority in the legislative branch. Because pursuing both strategies means paying the cost of each one, the total cost raises significantly.

In a more encompassing picture of a political regime, seen as an aggregate of the ways by which the rulers attain power and of the methods by which they govern, their strategy concentrates on elections at the cost of downplaying or, as in happens in some cases, ignoring the governance domain. This is a scenario in which elections are competitive in polarized societies and the task of remaining in power in a free and fair competitive setting is a more challenging and costly task. As discussed before, competitiveness of elections is a function of an ethnolinguistic fractionalization, polarization of political system and gravitating towards one or another geopolitical pole, that follow. These are countries, in which tensions are an integral part of their national identity since the first modern state had been established on their territory; competitiveness is entrenched into the way this country functions. The ruling elites know that there always is going to be a competitor and the results of elections are always uncertain. It is beneficial for them as they do not need to fake competitiveness, by creating a puppet opposition and can only focus on satisfying the observers' search for clues on free and fair elections conduct. There is also no need to bridge the identity gap and aim at building a civic nation, as it will put an end to competitiveness. The common nation-building project does not bring as much

political credit as do polarization and divisions. Hence, to keep the regimes functioning, elections recognizable and each side on the polarized continuum accountable, elites will continue invest into what divides electorate.

Elites also do not see much added value in controlling civil rights and liberties. They also do not need to subjugate all the media available in the country in order to win elections. They know that media outlets owned by their major financial donors in the country will bring the necessary point across to their supporters. It also gives a positive acclaim from the side of international observers on media freedom and multiple sources of media ownership. Besides as the recent study conducted by Pop-Eleches and Robertson on information and elections show, subjugating all the media and letting it be revealed during elections ruins the chances of an incumbent to stay in power (Pop-Eleches/Robertson 2011: 25). Figure 9 below demonstrates the forces that keep hybrid regimes afloat in polarized societies.

Figure 9 Hybrid regimes: mechanism under high polarization




If elections take place in a non-competitive setting, it is not necessary for the ruling elites to engage in the stealing of elections on the actual day, but rather only on pleasing their donors, thus ensuring external legitimacy. However under such circumstances, elites involve in greater violations of the ways they govern, to make sure that when the voters head to the polling stations, they 'vote' for and not 'elect' out of series of options. This includes oppression of opposition, constraining the right to assembly, both on the streets and in the parliaments and restraining media freedom.

However, if the population and the elites agree on their foreign policy and geopolitical alliance with a foreign supporter, it brings more resources and benefits to the elites and to some parts of the population and implies a permanent reform process. These resources (financial, professional skills, knowledge, etc.) are usually captured by the think-tanks that assess courses of reforms and give such countries higher evaluation scores. Besides, elites do not need to re-allocate money from the 'democratic institution-building and reforms' to bribes in order to secure the victory for their

candidate, as is done in competitive regimes with mixed geopolitical orientation. Figure 10 below demonstrates the forces that provide for viability of non- or low-polarized hybrid regimes.

Figure 10. Hybrid regimes, low polarization



Either scenario is more costly to maintain, than just the oppression or just the free competition. But it does not mean that these regimes are fragile: it means that less services will be provided and hybrid regimes will remain less affluent than the clear-cut regimes.

The explanation that I put forward here has two sides: a demand-driven pillar and a supply-driven pillar; both pillars are from the point of view of the elites.

The demand side is resources that elites are going to receive if their elections are recognized. The supply side is the voter's support that the elites are going to receive if they properly problematize and emphasize the ethnic differences, entrenched in legacies of statehood and nationhood and channeled through geopolitical orientation.

The next chapter will provide empirical support for the argument.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter aimed at delivering an explanatory account of persistency of hybrid regimes in the former Soviet Union states. It argued that ambivalent preference of elites to stay in power and to keep elections recognizable internationally is the driving force behind the persistence. Polarization of the population helps to keep election competitive and thus recognizable. The absence of polarization, however keeps the reform process flowing persistently. Both contribute to receiving of international aid in different forms, which is used on keeping the hybrid regimes in place.

Chapter 5 Empirical evidence: interaction between the domestic and foreign actors

A tender calf sucks from two cows

A Ukrainian Folk Proverb

This chapter provides empirical evidence in support of the thesis here defended that explains the persistence of hybrid regimes in the FSU states. Using Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as examples that were singled out as hybrid regimes in chapter 2, this chapter discusses how domestic power struggles and internationally-provided incentives created opportunities for elites to perpetuate the hybrid regime. I address the role that political polarization played as an intervening factor in channeling the way in which domestic elites in the countries chose either to comply with democratic practices or to retain autocratic ones.

In order to test the hypotheses derived from the argument I compile data on structural and behavioral factors that underpin the degree of polarization in the three countries. Here, polarization is the result of an overlap (even if not a perfect one) between regions inside the state, the state's economic, linguistic and ethnic structure and its voting patterns.

I begin by demonstrating how ethnic identities and regional modernization together anchor the political participation of the masses, as well as how elites are exploiting these patterns in their choices of international orientation. Zooming into the electoral geography of the three countries, I look for regional voting patterns to better understand the origins of polarization. To proceed, I specify the divisive issues that

elites use to mobilize voters by analyzing party programs from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 1987, 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994, 2007) with regard to how parties align in their preferences towards the West or Russia.

Given that the majority of such issues are in part related to the international orientation which the elites and the population support and aim to follow, I will look at the kind of incentives that international donors offer to elites that help them to stay in power (win elections, secure financial support). I show the amount of aid that the countries receive for specific achievements in their regimes' dimensions building on the levels of aid seeking in each country, as were assessed in the previous chapter.

Consequently, in the last part of this chapter I scrutinize the support for elections and reforms, which the international donors provide in different hybrid regimes of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

5.1. Cleavage structure in hybrid regimes of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova

The analysis of socio-economic structures in the FSU presented in previous chapters revealed several patterns in hybrid regimes that are calling for additional exploration. Particularly, of interest is the combination of relatively high ethnic heterogeneity and relatively low level of economic development and growth. This is consistent with cross-country findings of Alesina et.al. (2003) where they attribute this combination to the high probability of ethnic conflict and war that slow down both growth and development (155-156). It also supports the findings of Timothy Frye (2010), where he shows that polarization slows down reforms. However, the specific regional constellation of the structure of industrial production and ethnic composition is set to

reinforce or to weaken mass polarization, competitiveness of elections, divisions in the parliaments, economic dependency on a single industry. In other words the ethnic and economic differences reinforce each other.

5.1.1. Ukraine

These cleavages are very strongly reinforced in Ukraine, whereby the industrialized Eastern part along with higher levels of urbanization is providing a larger number of voters in their constituencies¹¹⁸. Here, electoral geography plays an important role in the argument. As electoral data systematized by regions in Ukraine (see appendix 17) shows, there is a clear regional division in voters' support for the parties. The voters in Eastern, Southern, and Central¹¹⁹ regions supported the Communist Party in 2002, and the Party of the Regions from 2006 onwards. This 'switch' does not appear to be a drastic one under a closer examination: the Party of the Regions institutionalized the transition of the former CP of the USSR members, 'Red Directors' and other high-ranked administrative officials from the Communist party of Ukraine which had been persistently losing its constituencies (see Colton 2011).

Industrialization provided potential ethnic entrepreneurs with economic resources vital for the mobilization of voters (Tilly 2007). Economic liberalization and

¹¹⁸ The East and Center dominate the country demographically, with the West being inhabited by 20% of the population and the South by just 15% (see Colton 2001:15). The Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine that traditionally support pro-Russian candidates and parties voted in the 2010 presidential elections in the following numbers: Crimea 1 049 591, Dnipropetrovska 1 840 682, Donetska 2692815, Zaporizska 1 023 624, Luganska 1 391 438, Odeska 1 171 349, Kharkivska 1 059 246. The Western regions voted in much smaller numbers, supporting a pro-Western candidate: Volynska 600 853, Ivano-Frankivska 823 292, Rivnenska 642 081, Ternopilska 678 403, Khmelnytska 767 646. The total number of those who voted is 25493529. Data is available on the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011>.

¹¹⁹ Recently scholars (Sasse 2010, Colton 2011) agree that the commonly used in the Western media image of Ukraine as to be divided into just Eastern and Western is a simplification used for propagandist purposes. They are increasingly using the traditional macro-regions (East, Center, South and West) that every Ukrainian learns at school and by watching the mere weather forecasts on the television. I am using macro-regions here as well.

privatization after the countries became independent created owners from the former chief managers of industrial enterprises with strong links to Russia (due to the commonly shared Soviet market). Widely subsidized mining and heavy industries, with a loop for tax evasions and in particular VAT manipulations enriched higher management of industrial plants: as observers argue, '...the government uses its state monopolies to subsidize heavy industry, mostly owned by Ukraine's richest citizens¹²⁰'. The South of the country apart from being industrialized and urbanized is bordered by the Black Sea, harboring major seaports and terminals (Odessa, Illichevsk, Nikolaev, Kherson). Transit and transportation industries were a part of the common Soviet market as a trade gate with the outside world. Ukraine inherited some of the trading partners (60% of the transit comes from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan¹²¹) but also remained highly linked with Russian producers. These links contribute to support of pro-Russian sentiments and parties.

The industrially developed South and East of the country¹²² contributed to the emergence of political parties and presidential candidates that rely on ethnic, territorial or linguistic appeal. This appeal is based on identity, which defines the Europe (the West) as 'the other' (Protsyk 2008: 4).

In Western Ukraine agricultural production prevails in less urbanized mountainous regions. Belonging partially to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and partially to Poland before being incorporated into the Soviet Union, the regions are the strongholds of support for Ukrainian identity, language and becoming a part of the European Union –

¹²⁰ Natalya Kravchuk. 'Public subsidies go to richest private firms'. *Kyiv Post*, June 18, 2009 at <https://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/43628/>

¹²¹ Grigori Gerenstein. Ukraine Sea Ports Jan. Throughput on +10.5%. *Dow Jones Newswires*. February 9, 2011. At <http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/02/09/ukraine-sea-ports-jan-throughput-year-m-tons/>

¹²² Donetsk, Dnipropetrovska, Luganska and Kharkivska regions are the industrial strongholds of the country and happen to be Russian-speaking regions (see appendix 17)

an umbrella that holds nation-states together. The political elites that represented the country on the national level at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were rarely from the Western regions, creating 'under-representation sentiments' (Wolczuk 2001). Geographic concentration combined with prior exclusion of the Ukrainians is favorable conditions for ethnic voting: this makes it relatively easy for ethnic entrepreneurs to build on both anti-Russian sentiments and the so-called 'perpetual complex of national inferiority'.

The financial support for the candidates comes from the newly-emerging businessmen, who otherwise do not have a chance to get into power. Their businesses are already built through an access to European credits, and may benefit more if the policies towards European integration are chosen¹²³. However, once in power, these businessmen (for example, Petro Poroshenko's cross-industrial assets) are swinging to whichever partners are providing better conditions, (which is usually Russia) and ethnic ideology does not matter that much. Indeed, even after the relationship with Russia reversed its course in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Russia remains the major trading partner¹²⁴.

As the electoral data shows, support for parties with 'pro-Western' appeal comes predominantly from the regions that are geographically situated in the West of the country and in Kyiv. There is, however, some variation in support: first, the swinging of the voters from one pro-Western party to another, as happened in both 2006 and 2007 when Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) got a hold of the voters that supported Victor Yuschenko in 2002; and second, the swing of Central regions from supporting

¹²³ See Wolczuk (2006) in which she argues that business elites 'infiltrated' political parties and are interested in the European integration only as it benefits their interests

¹²⁴ Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine. <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>, tables further in the text

the Communists to voting for BYT.

In 2006 the two pro-Western parties BYT and Our Ukraine received 22.29% and 13.95% of voter's support respectively, which together was just enough to beat the pro-Russian Party of the Regions (32.14%)¹²⁵. It is clear that without the predominant support from all the Western regions and from the Central regions there the East of the country the chances to defeat the pro-Russian party with a support base concentrated in the East and the South, are low¹²⁶.

5.1.2. Georgia

There are no evident geopolitically defined cleavages in Georgia that are linking together the structure of economy, ethnicity and voting (see Appendix 18). Despite some regional differences, and strong regional identities (Ajara, Guria, Samegrelo, Svaneti, Kakheti, etc.), there has not been found any systematic evidence on ethnic voting (Nodia/Scholtbach 2006, George 2009). Two notable exceptions are worth mentioning: the first is a persistent pro-incumbent (president or party) support that the ethnic Armenians that live in Samtskhe-Javakheti¹²⁷ provide in every elections since 1991 as well as the ethnic Azeri from Kvemo Kartli¹²⁸. And second, a high, yet not an

¹²⁵ The coalition-building talks that followed are not of the concern here.

¹²⁶ The swinging base of the Central regions in Ukraine is noted to correlate with the swinging between Russian and Ukrainian 'languages of use' that is common for its population (see Dominique Arel, "La face cachée de la Révolution Orange: l'Ukraine en négation face à son problème régional," *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 37 (December 2006): 3; see also www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20RECEO%202006.pdf.

¹²⁷ The single administrative region Samtskhhe-Javakheti is composed of two regions Samtskhke with an administrative center in Akhaltsikhe (around 50% of Armenians), and Javakheti with centers in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda (about 90-95% population is Armenian). Kvemo Kartli with the center in Marneuli, Dmanisi, Bolnisi, Gardabani densely populated by the Azeri provides the highest support to the incumbent president and the ruling party. (Interview with the experts, Tbilisi, October 2008)

¹²⁸ Central electoral commission of Georgia. At <http://www.cec.gov.ge/>

overwhelming, support for opposition parties in the capital city of Tbilisi as demonstrated in electoral geography tables in the Appendix 18. With an absence of a coherent explanatory account on why it is so, some speculations suggest that the first is due to 'leave us alone to do our business, do not force Georgian culture through education on us, allow us to use remittances from the kin-states (Armenia, Azerbaijan) such as money, schoolbooks, etc. – and in return, we will support you at the ballot box'¹²⁹. In the case of Tbilisi, education seems to play the key role: critical thinking skills acquired in various education institutions in the West, as well as an access to various media outlets is favorable to the mobilization efforts by the opposition, known to cater a narrow circle of intellectuals¹³⁰.

The de-facto loss of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the civil war in the early 1990s, excluded any ethnic-based mobilization for party formation. The loss of territories also homogenized population ethnically¹³¹, leaving Abkhazians and Ossetians outside of the demos and, therefore, the voters.

Moreover, the structure of industrial production in the regions did not create rent-seeking, regional oligarchic owners out of former directors that could compete with the center for the control over the whole country¹³². A unified structure of economy,

¹²⁹ Interviews with country experts. Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2008.

¹³⁰ This point is often emphasized as the persistent failure of opposition parties in Georgia: even the nationalist revival movement in the 80s was initiated by the dissidents and intellectuals, the fact which is used to describe the loss of a broader appeal later on by Zurab Kostava and Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Interestingly enough, regional identity has a precedent of nurturing support for politicians in Georgia: Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Mingrelian, had his largest support base in Mingrelian region, and even after his death has an appeal among some of the region's population.

¹³¹ According to the census data in 1989 Georgians constitutes 70.7% of the country's population, and 83.2% in 2002.

¹³² An exception is the Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, whose personal connections with the former President Eduard Shevardnadze, open pro-Russian stance, and local business involvements put him at odds with the new President Saakashvili. Abashidze's continuous claims to power in the region put the country on the verge of yet another secession conflict, but did not have enough support to

with tourism and agricultural production prevailing, provided for a more unified distribution of the population among regions than in Ukraine. Tbilisi remains the center of attraction for the money and power and this concentration makes it difficult for an opposition party with a regional base to derive resources (Dahl 1971, Tilly 2007). The party cleavages and alignments are likely to evolve around economy, but so far, as was discussed in the previous chapter, mobilization from the streets does not reach the parliament in large numbers. In those cases when some of opposition party members make it to the parliament, they are too weak to change the course of political development.

The Rose Revolution brought to power Mikheil Saakashvili, who introduced a vivid anti-Russian rhetoric and guaranteed a full-endorsement and support from the West, while simultaneously, '...Georgia opened its doors to Russian capital, which has continued to flow despite the embargo on Georgian exports that Russia initiated in spring 2006'¹³³. This is crucial evidence for the argument of this thesis: due to the size of the Russian economy and the history of a common market, doing business with Russia is hardly avoidable. The situation changed dramatically and understandably after the war in August of 2008, with Ukraine, Turkey and Azerbaijan emerging as the top trade partners by April, 2011. But prior to the war, with there being no Russian minorities or pro-Russian electorate to rely on for political support, the pro-Western geopolitical orientation card was played. Economically, as long as and as far as possible the business is done with both the West and Russia, i.e., 'the two cows are sucked from' as the Ukrainian proverb suggests.

compete at the national level.

¹³³ Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 2008

5.1.3. Moldova

In Moldova the cleavage lines of regionalism, industrial production and ethnic composition resemble those of both Ukraine and Georgia. This is not contradictory, but complementary: nationalist movements prior to the breakdown of the Soviet Union took root in all three countries; in Georgia and in Moldova they resulted in ethnic conflict and in the loss of territories. Yet, even after losing control over the breakaway Tiraspol, Moldova ended up with an ethnically diverse population (around 75% of the population are Moldovans), the majority of which is best described as the Russian-speaking population (see appendix 19 for the census data). Similar to Ukraine, the Russian-speakers reside in urbanized, industrialized areas. 'Pluralism by default' – the term used by Lucan Way to describe competitiveness of elections in Moldova - is a term equally suitable to Ukraine (Way 2002).

As with Ukrainian regional disparity in the structure of economy, Transdnistria, which composed 12.5% of Moldovan territory and 15% of its population, contributed around 40% to GDP, producing almost 90% of electric power of the former Soviet Republic¹³⁴. This territorial division and industrial production created an alternative power center (Tilly 2007) in Tiraspol by which oligarchic business owners controlled the area. Similarly to Georgia, on the wave of nationalist revival movement, and intensified by the natural border by the river and, even to a greater extent, by the presence of the Russian army, Chisinau lost control over the region. Hence after the secession, the remaining 87.5% of the country's territory turned out to be highly

¹³⁴ Republic of Moldova 2004, Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion and Statement by the Executive Director for the Republic of Moldova. Accessed at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0548.pdf>. p. 6

agricultural¹³⁵.

Thus within the de-facto controlled territory in Moldova, Moldovan and Russian identities are mobilized, while interests of both Russia and the West, and in particular the EU, are strong. The European factor grew stronger since Romania became the EU member in 2007. Moldova held three elections in the course of one and a half years (April 2009 – November 2010): one scheduled in April 2009 triggered mass protests and what became known as the Twitter revolution, early elections in July 2009 and another early elections of November 2010, after each parliament failed to elect the president¹³⁶. One of the reasons that it proves very challenging to choose a president by a much divided parliament brings us back to one of the features used to classify political regimes in chapter 2: failed attempts of the chief executive to change the constitution. Not only does it prove difficult to gather a constitutional majority of 60% of 101 legislative bodies to alter the basic law in a polarized society, but also pass any other decision with such a high threshold.

As electoral geography in appendix 19 suggests Moldovan voters choose to support parties based on a different principle than regional, ethnic or linguistic loyalties. That being said, however, the regions where the Communist Party (CP) of Moldova failed to gain the majority of votes were rural areas with predominantly (over 90%) Moldovan population.

Hence, the territorial concentration of ethnic groups (Russian-speaking population in

¹³⁵ СССР: После распада/ Под общ. Ред. Маргания СПб Высшая Школа Экономики, Экономикс 2007 p. 364

¹³⁶ All the three elections followed the new administrative division of the country, there is data that can shed light on regionalism in voter's choices.

the Eastern and the Southern Ukraine, Armenians and Azeri in Georgia) is reflected in electoral geography. Knowing this in the case of Ukraine elites will place emphasis on it and mobilize the voters using ethnic appeal. In the case of Moldova, knowing how persistently competitive elections are and how persistently polarized the parliaments are we should expect parties to use both pro-Russian and pro European rhetoric in their campaigning. Given the electoral geography in Georgia, the cleavage in the population is not reflected in the party system, and there is no polarization that can be detected from the voters' choices. The pro-Western appeal should then be dominating campaigns.

In order to measure the degree of political polarization in the country concerning whether foreign policy priorities should be pro-West or pro-Russia –which in turn depends on the electoral geography of the country – I am going to measure the positions of parties along the geopolitical-orientation-of –foreign-policy dimension (or Russia-West dimension). It is a way to approach the polarization of the society from the angle of the elites' desire to amplify divisions to ensure both competitiveness of elections and the likelihood to win them. As the argument suggests, polarization is beneficial for elites that seek cooperation with different donors. Assuming that in order to mobilize population around these divisive issues, the parties will devote some of their campaigning space to the latter, I will examine party programs to determine the sharpness of the divide.

5.2. Geopolitical choices from the party programs' perspective

Many scholars point to the different degrees of saliency of the cleavages and their reflections in the geopolitical inclinations in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, and use the voting data to confirm their claims. The actual voting does show us how the voters form their preferences. However, what I am interested to see with this inquiry is how the elites form their preferences about what voters will support, given the ethnic makeup and economic conditions of their countries. The party programs reveal this best. In addition to seeing how the elites are mobilizing the voters, we can trace the relations that the domestic elites have with the ideas of forming strategic partnerships with the major international actors.

The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) analyzes the sentences (or quasi-sentences) of party manifestos which are coded into 56 categories from a wide range of socio-economic, cultural and political issues (Volkens 2001). The dataset calculates the percentage of sentences dedicated to each of the 56 categories (saliency scores). The majority of the issue categories are crafted in a way that include two opposing views on the same issue: for example, 'Russia/USSR/CIS: positive' and 'Russia/USSR/CIS: negative'. Because of the way the categories are constructed, it is possible to determine party positions on the issues as a whole by creating a positional scale.

To calculate the saliency and the positions that parties in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine took in their respective electoral manifestos on issues related to their international orientation, I need first to create an 'International Orientation' issue

dimension differentiating the party programs devoted to pro-Russian issues and those dedicated to pro-Western ones¹³⁷.

5.2.1. Choice of the categories

Out of 56 categories in the CMP database, I chose eight categories on the pro-Russian side and eleven on the pro-Western part of the scale (their precise definition is provided in table 17 below). I expect the pro-Western side to be more pronounced because of this. However, it makes sense to keep all the possible reference to either Russia or the West on a scale because it will capture the full picture that the party programs offer.

Table 17. Categories on the international orientation scale (the number corresponds to the code number of the category in the dataset)

Pro-Russia	Pro-West
110 European Community/Union: Negative	108 European Community/Union: Positive
602 National Way of Life: Negative	601 National Way of Life: Positive
604 Traditional Morality: Negative	603 Traditional Morality: Positive
607 Multiculturalism: Positive	608 Multiculturalism: Negative
1011 Russia/USSR/CIS: Positive	1012 Western States: Positive
1022 Western States: Negative	1021 Russia/USSR/CIS: Negative
2023 Lax Citizenship	1031 Russian Army: Negative
6012 Rebuilding the USSR	1032 Independence: Positive
	1033 Rights of Nations; Positive
	2022 Restrictive Citizenship
	6013 National Security

¹³⁷ I borrow from Kligemann et. al. (2001: 21) on creating the Left-Right dimension and build on Alonso/Fonseca (2011: 8) Immigration issue dimension.

There are several principles that guided the selection of categories. The first and most intuitive is to group those categories that mention Russia positively together on the side of pro-Russia (such as 1011), and combine those that mention the West positively on the pro-West end of the scale (108, 1012). Second, I assume that parties which use the pro-Russian appeal are also building on the connections to the USSR and multiculturalism that the nostalgic population associates with (607, 6012) as well as the negative mentioning of nationalism, traditionalism, exclusiveness and independence (602, 604, 2023). I expect that parties embarking on the pro-Western platform in the FSU are both nationalistic (601, 603, 1032, 1033, 6013), monoculturalist (608) and exclusive (2022). While some scholars believed that the European integration brings parties with nationalist-populist appeal to oppose the EU (Mudde 2007: 159), others suggest that a pro-EU platform can attract ethno-nationalist parties (De Winter, Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 484), especially in the countries of the Eastern Europe after the latest accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Bustikova 2009: 223). On the other hand, I suspect that nationalist parties in the FSU are trying to capture those voters 'revolting' against the Soviet (or Russian Slavic brotherhood) internationalism and multiculturalism by opting for the European internationalism. For them, the Soviet Union was 'the prison of nations'¹³⁸ while they hope that the EU is the union which lets the nations thrive. In their nationalism, pro-Western parties are also restrictive in their citizenship laws which, until recently, go along the restrictive citizenship and naturalization laws in some of the EU member states¹³⁹.

¹³⁸ The term actually first used in the Soviet propaganda to refer to the Tsarist Russian. It was later picked up in the nationalist rhetoric of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his followers as a part of 'Georgia for Georgians. Soviet Union – the prison of nations' campaign.

¹³⁹ The EU as a part of accession requirements in 2004 pressured Estonia and Latvia to loosen requirements for naturalization and citizenship for their ethnic Russian persons without citizenship. During the accession negotiation talks this also flashed back on Germany and its very rigid

Third, as the scale goes from support for Russia to support for the West, I assume that negative references to the West count for support of a pro-Russian position (110, 1022). And vice versa, negative mentions of Russia (1021, 1031) suggest support for the West.

5.2.2. The analysis of party programs: scale, positions

To borrow the Left-Right scale by Klingemann and collaborators '...the scale is made up by adding percentage references to the categories grouped as...' pro-Russia and pro-West '... and subtracting the sum of the...' pro-Russia '...percentages from the sum of the...' pro-West '...percentages' (Klingemann et. at. 2001: 21).

If we imagine the Russia-West (RW) scale, it runs from the extreme point R (parties that take only pro-Russia position) to the extreme point W (those parties that take only pro-Western positions).

Scoring 100% on pro-Russia or pro-West issues is theoretically possible but empirically very unlikely. It would mean that a particular manifesto is dedicated exclusively to pro-Russia or pro-Western sets of issues and to nothing else.

Secondly, I turn to determining the saliency of the RW dimension in parties' manifestos. The relevance that international orientation issues have in the manifestos of the country's parties, put together in the table 5 below puts Georgia beneath Moldova and Ukraine (the latter two have almost identical mean values), emphasizing lower degree of average saliency of the pro-Russia vs. pro-West line. Out of the

naturalization law, which resulted in a reform of 1999.

sample of 96 party manifestos the saliency varies from 0 to on average 45.16¹⁴⁰.

The data in table 18 tells us that international orientation issues are more salient in Moldova and Ukraine than in Georgia on average. However, the range of saliency scores tells us that parties in Ukraine are much more diverse in the relevance they give to international orientation issues, either because the same party changes a lot between elections or because parties are different among themselves: with this level of aggregation we cannot tell which of the two alternatives is true.

Table 18. International orientation saliency scale summary

Country	Number of observations/ party programs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Georgia	37	7.94	5.45	0	23.33
Moldova	14	13.44	4.12	0	22.03
Ukraine	45	13.43	9.35	0	43.47
Total	96	11.31	7.83	0	43.47

To determine where each party stands in each election on the issues and towards which end of the scale each of them scores, we need to define an R-W position. The formula used to define the pro-Russia-pro-West position on the R-W scale is built by adding up all the pro-Russian categories and subtracting from it the sum of the pro-Western categories:

¹⁴⁰ The score is in the category 'Constitutionalism' which makes sense because the sample contains elections that took place before the countries adopted their respective constitutions and the constitutional debates were a part of campaigning. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were relatively late, compared to the rest of the FSU states, to adopt their constitutions in 1995, 1994, and 1996 respectively.

$$\text{International Orientation Position} = (\text{pro-Russia}) - (\text{pro-West}).$$

This scale ranges from -100%, when all sentences are dedicated to pro-West to +100%, when all sentences are dedicated to pro-Russia.

Table 19. International orientation: R-W positions summary

Country	Number of observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Georgia	37	6.01	4.9	-1.27	23.33
Moldova	14	5.43	8.72	-21.42	13.22
Ukraine	45	5.68	10.52	-34.29	36.71
Total	96	5.77	8.41	-34.29	36.71

Table 19 synthesizes the average scores of positions that parties, aggregated at a country level, take. The mean values in the three countries over time are approximately the same. Georgia has the lowest standard deviation and its values oscillate towards one end with the positive values, which indicates an overwhelming attention given to the pro-Western agenda.

Both Ukraine and Moldova again perform in a similar way, with Moldova on average leaning towards the pro-Russian agenda, and party programs in Ukraine being almost equally devoted to the two sides.

The number of observations consists of four elections in Georgia and Moldova, and five in Ukraine, but it is obvious that the number of parties is much lower in Moldova,

a parliamentary republic since the reform of 1996 and the parliament is elected by the system of political representation (PR). This confirms the claim made by Robert Moser (1999) on the joint effect of PR and parliamentary system of government to institutionalize party system and to reduce the effective number of parties in the post-Communist European countries.

Regardless of there being 96 manifestos in the sample and 12 elections, the major challenge is to find continuity in each party's dedication to the issue of international orientation and the position that it assumes between at least two elections. Parties enter the political arena and leave it, transform, merge, making the one-to-one comparison not possible (this is what happens in Georgia). Another problem is that at the time of running this analysis the dataset was not entirely up to date: in the case of Moldova there is a delay in coding of the last three elections (April 2009, July 2009, November 2010), which is unfortunate, because there is a potential of a well-pronounced party positions continuity. Particularly interesting will be to track the change in the positions of the Communist Party, the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Party that took place after Romania joined the EU. The same goes for Georgia, where the coding of the 2008 elections is still in the making.

There is, however, data for all of the elections that took place in Ukraine and this is what I am going to look at in the next step.

Table 20 below brings together the position on the RW scale that the three major parties in Ukraine chose to take in their programs. There is a general tendency to emphasize the pro-Western agenda in all three parties (hence the positive sign). However, Our Ukraine, as the longest standing party, went from being somewhat pro-

Western in 2002 to much more pro-Western in 2006 to reducing its emphasis on the issues into half. The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko was rather high on the pro-Western side of the scale and increased the emphasis in the next elections. The party has the 'strongest' among other pro-Western position. The biggest shift in the position comes from the Party of Regions: just within one year it had swung from taking a pro-Russian stance to a pro-Western one, even overrunning its rival Victor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine.

Table 20. Positions of parties in parliamentary elections in Ukraine (2002-2007) on the Geopolitical Orientation dimension

Party	2002	2006	2007
Our Ukraine (NU)	2.97	10.92	5.98
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BUT)		9.52	12.62
Party of Regions (PR)		-3.92	8.99

These tendencies reflect in general the campaigning, with the Party of Regions hiring an American spin doctor, Paul J. Manafort, as a campaign advisor and reaching out to pro-West oriented voters, while keeping his solid base in the East (Sussman/Krader 2008). Also, the tendencies contradict the view, traditionally used by the western scholarship and media, on purely pro-Western and pro-Russian positions among the elites. Similarly, Yulia Tymoshenko had embraced more pro-Western stance and on regional level won over several Western regions – the strong-hold of supporters of then president Victor Yushchenko and his party Our Ukraine. The latter, facing the waning support and perceived in the East and the South of the country as a nationalist, pro-NATO and anti-Russia¹⁴¹, reduced the pro-Western emphasis in his party's program.

¹⁴¹ Taras Kuzio. Inferiority complexes of Baloha, Yushchenko led them to each other. Op-Ed. Kyiv Post. February 5, 2009

As the party programs data is available by each year of elections, we can assess the dynamics of average saliency of the issues, depth of cleavages and whether any sort of reforms or campaign promises were achieved and the issue lost its saliency with time. To do so, I compare the average values party positions take on the issues, i.e. how much time is devoted to Russia or the West (figure 1).

The years of parliamentary elections on the x-axis are of the first, second, third and the fourth for each country¹⁴².

Figure 11. Average positions on the geopolitical orientation scale




Figure 11 demonstrates that on average the agenda is predominately pro-Western, as the election-points lie in the positive side of the position scale, which can also be attributed to the way the scale was created with more variables on the Western scale. Taking this into account, Moldovan parties in 1992 were on average slightly more prone to take pro-Russian positions then into pro-Western. Over time, however, the

¹⁴² Elections years: (1) Georgia 1992, Moldova 1994, Ukraine 1994; (2) Georgia 1995, Moldova 1998, Ukraine 1998; (3) Georgia 1999, Moldova 2001, Ukraine 2002; (4) Georgia 2004, Moldova 2005, Ukraine 2006

parties in Moldova, on average grew drastically pro-Western. Georgian parties' pro-Western stance grows steadily and persistently. In Ukraine there is an average shift between more pro-Western stance to more pro-Russian from 1998 to 2002, with pro-Western position winning on average by 2006.

This tells us that the issues on the Russia-West scale are not fading, especially for Moldova and Ukraine, which calibrate between the two, while Georgian parties showing persistent growth in emphasizing pro-Western agenda. Moreover, the extremes in Moldova and Ukraine are continuously reinforced not only by the existing socio-economic divisions in the societies but also by the will or inability of the politicians to deliver on their campaign promises. One such example is the language policy in both Moldova and Ukraine. In the constitutions of the two competitive hybrid regimes Moldovan and Ukrainian respectively are declared as the only state languages. However, since the constitutions were adopted in 1994 and 1996 respectively, the status of the Russian language as the second state language is the matter of heated debates during the campaigns and occupy substantial part in the party programs (as the scores on the Russian side of the scale had shown). Without being reflected in a language policy reforms, the claim remains to be a campaign promise for over than a decade¹⁴³. One can argue, that the agreement to keep just one state language was a result of a compromise that was reached during the relatively long and time-consuming process of constitution-making (Wolczuk 2001) and it needs time and the right 'constitutional moment' (Ackerman 1998) to come for the second language to receive a state status.

¹⁴³ Vladimir Socor. Moldova's Political Landscape on the Eve of General Elections: Part Three. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 54, March 20, 2009

5.3. Competitive hybrid regimes: Moldova Ukraine

Additionally, as was mentioned before, constitutions in divided societies become extremely rigid: to reach the required two thirds of the votes proves to be close to impossible. In Ukraine, it took five years to accept the new constitution; the compromise was very hard to be reached on many questions, language and the state structure (a federation or a unitary state) being among the hottest issues (Wolczuk 2001). It took president's will to lock the door of the parliament from the outside for the constitution to be voted on in the early morning hours of June 28th 1996 with 315 votes for (only 15 more than was required). The attempts to change the constitution that were initiated in 2000 by president Kuchma failed (as was shown in chapter 2) precisely due to the polarization of the society. There needed to be mass protests on the streets during the Orange Revolution for then-President Kuchma to include the constitutional changes into the pact that settled the situation.

In similar vein, Moldova's the constitution first adopted in 1994. In response to the governing crisis it was amended in 2000 introducing the indirect presidential elections thus transforming Moldova to parliamentary republic. And an attempt to change the constitution via referendum in 2010 had also failed.

Not surprisingly scholars had been showing an interest in the language policy and linguistic identities as predictors for voting behavior in Ukraine (see Arel 2006, Sasse 2010, Colton 2011). Timothy Colton provides an account of ecological inference, in which language of use is singled out as the best and strongest predictor of the votes in the last two presidential elections (Colton 2011: 19). Thus, bridging this divide, i.e. constitutionally anchoring the second state language, would deprive the Party of the Regions in the case of Ukraine and the Social-Democrat Party of Moldova or the

Centrist Union of one of the major mobilization tools, and is also a very challenging task to complete. Hence polarization is a connecting node in the mechanism, which keeps hybrid regimes in place (H1) and the appeal to both donors matters in keeping the system afloat.

5.4. Non-competitive hybrid regime of Georgia

The non-polarized and non-competitive hybrid regime in Georgia is hypothesized to be a result of a single-donor orientation track that the country's elites and masses set themselves on. Despite there being a long history of intensive cooperation between Georgia and Russia, the relationship between the two countries in the period since the break-up of the Soviet Union took an upsetting turn in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution and reached its low in the war of August 2008. When President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003, he had vowed to preserve Georgian territorial integrity according to the borders of 1921 (when the country was absorbed into the Soviet Union), which meant keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia under control of Tbilisi. However, the growing support of the two separatist regions by Russia (whose government had facilitated acquirement of the Russian citizenship and claimed that the support is aimed at its citizens) contributed to a growing anti-Russian rhetoric in Tbilisi¹⁴⁴. The West, and the US in particular, had always shown a deep interest in Georgia and supported various programs through USAID as well as was supporting Georgia's application to the NATO. These two factors resulted in a unified orientation of the elites and the masses on the Western countries and donors, thus uniting the people against the common threat, and leaving those, who support Russia in the

¹⁴⁴ Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 2008

separatist republics unable to exercise their support politically on Georgian national level¹⁴⁵. This meant oftentimes the loss of economic benefits and opportunities from doing business with Russia and, hence, resulted in orientation on just one side of possible donors – the West.

This relationship between Georgia and the West was mutual: as scholars and practitioners would agree, Mikheil Saakashvili embarked on fast paced reforms, which left many unsatisfied within the country, but guaranteed good reviews from the Western democracies¹⁴⁶. High visible achievements guaranteed further support by the latter and resulted in the turning of a blind eye on other un-democratic tendencies¹⁴⁷. Paradoxically, this ambiguous situation of a reformed governance and limited competitiveness (i.e. hybrid regime) is perpetuated by the donors, whose goals are to promote democracy in Georgia.

Thus, the rest of the chapter will be devoted to discovering what actually are the targets of support from the donors and how it affects the perpetuation of hybrid regimes.

¹⁴⁵ They are deprived of the right to vote in Georgian elections by their local government. For Tbilisi this means a loss of jurisdiction over the territories, as of today elections are held only on what is referred to as Georgia proper.

¹⁴⁶ The World Bank's Doing Business Report for 2006 registered the country on the top of the former Soviet Union states, the top ten performer and the country that made the biggest jump in a single year in the ranking from 112th place to 37th. At <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/GEORGIAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21042336~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:301746,00.html>

¹⁴⁷ Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 2008

5.5. International donors' support of hybrid regimes

The third hypothesis used to test the argument connects the incentives that the international donors create to the response of the domestic elites, i.e. whether they choose to promote more free and fair elections or reforms of governance.


One case is hybrid regimes with high polarization in Moldova and Ukraine. As I have shown in the previous chapters, the two countries hold elections that are competitive and generally positively ratified by the observers. The interests of both Russia and the West resonate on the elites' level and find support in the masses due to the ethnic composition and the will of the elites to revive the memories of the past. Their intentions to do so are 'profit-maximizing', i.e. to be reelected to office and to keep elections recognizable by the international donors?.

Another case is of non-polarized Georgia, with a unified vision of the West as the major donor and supporter. The elites know that they can achieve maximum benefits if they show achievements in reforms, i.e. to comply with the donors' recommendations in the governance arena and ignoring and thus bypassing the recommendations on elections and political participation.

Elections were identified as the time of a crucial challenge that the elites and masses in the countries are exposed to. However, to see a complete picture I will consider the scope and type of incentives and punishments that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine received from the Western donors and Russia during each electoral cycle (i.e. both preceding and following elections).

Figure 12 below grasps trends of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to the countries by the Western donors that the World Bank collects and publishes annually¹⁴⁸.

Figure 12. Total aid provided to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (1990-2009)



There is an overall growing trend in Moldova with a slight decrease in 2003 and 2004 and a substantial decrease in 2009. A more fluctuating tendency in aid-flows took shape Georgia, with the upward tendency until 1996, and downward till 2000, with another low point in 2003 and growing ever since to double after the war with Russia in 2008. An extremely fluctuating aid-flow seen in Ukraine – partially explained by *the Kolchuga* scandal – a charge that Ukraine sold radar systems to Iraq in 2002 in violation of the US sanctions¹⁴⁹ and *the Kuchmagate* (the tape scandal after the murder of an independent journalist) that caused the freeze in USAID funding after 2003. The support resumed and grew, to only reach the pick levels of 1992, and 1999 by 2008.

In relation to elections, the downward tendency in the Western support of Moldova may be due to fraud that happened during elections in April of 2009. In Georgia, the

¹⁴⁸ The World Bank at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/299947-1266002444164/index.html>

¹⁴⁹ The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 12

downward tendency during president Shevarnadze's rule could be in part attributed to the mixing donor strategies that Georgia played, by accepting aid and conditionality from both Russia and the West. In Ukraine, after parliamentary elections of 2002 and 2006, and 2007 there seems to be a cut in the Western support, probably related to each new parliament and government attempts to renegotiate the conditions of cooperation with Russian and the West, i.e. maneuvering in the 'two-vector'¹⁵⁰ approach.

Given these general trends, what is worth pursuing here is more specific international financial support to enhance either competitiveness of elections or reform and benefits as well as sanctions (or just non benefits), associated with it.

The support for elections comes usually from Western donors, with special grants allocated by both USAID through the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and the European Union through the European Commission. While in the case of Moldova the intention is to support transparency at the national level elections, with the European Commission offering a 3 million Euro grant to assist free and fair elections in 2009 (to help Moldova to comply with the ENP Action Plan to hold free and fair elections)¹⁵¹ and Eurasia Foundation providing \$ 400 000 in 2004 for the same purpose¹⁵², in Georgia the focus is on the local elections. A grant to increase transparency in the local elections in 2010 was awarded by the U.S. Government, totaling \$ 450,000¹⁵³. Moldova's elections were competitive and relatively fair throughout its history as an independent country, and these grants may be more

¹⁵⁰ The term is credited to president Kuchma in his approach to the country's foreign policy.

¹⁵¹ European Neighborhood Policy. http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=18324&id_type=1

¹⁵² USAID. Eurasia Foundation. <http://www.eurasia.org/publications/news/view.aspx?ID=19>

¹⁵³ US Embassy in Georgia. <http://georgia.usembassy.gov/programs-and-events/embassy-news-2010/ambassador-bass-presents-ifes-grants-april-21.html>

beneficial if directed to reform the judiciary system. Georgia however needs a greater support in letting the opposition parties and candidates to be heard during the campaigns for the national level elections and would benefit greatly from such an assistance.

One aspect that was brought up in every conversation and united the otherwise diverse opinions of different experts in Moldova and Ukraine is the need for reform of the administrative system in general and of the judiciary in particular. The interviewees cited the inadequacy of the judiciary as the major impediment to any other reforms (social policies, political, economic), thus prioritizing this feature of a political regime over its outcomes¹⁵⁴. The Georgian experts had mentioned a need in further reforms of the judiciary, but praised the government highly for visible accomplishments (reforming the police force, the court system and fighting corruption¹⁵⁵) during the first term of president Saakashvili, achieved clearly with the donor's aid¹⁵⁶.

The various voices of my interviewees are validated by the *Judiciary Reform Index* (JRI) assigned by the American Bar Association (ABA) project¹⁵⁷. Out of 30 factors (merged into six groups: quality, education and diversity; judicial powers; financial resources; structural safeguards, accountability and transparency; efficiency) that are assessed as either negative, neutral or positive in Georgia between 2005 and 2008 the

¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the backwardness of Soviet-style state administrations in ministries in Moldova and Ukraine stroke as very similar, with senior computer-illiterate staff occupying key positions. In contrast in Georgia the ministerial administrative work is computerized and is run by young staff.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with the Council of Europe representative in Tbilisi in 2008.

¹⁵⁶ One expert from the Council of Europe admitted, to demonstrate the progress that Georgian state made in fighting crime, that when his tenure started in the early 90s, it was dangerous to even go out on the streets after dark.

¹⁵⁷ Judiciary Reform Index available from the American Bar Association at http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/judicial_reform_index.shtml

number of negative categories was reduced from 15 (a half) to 6. The net improvement (from neutral to positive) was observed in 4 categories, with most of the progress occurring in the spheres of accountability and transparency, structural safeguards and efficiency. The same index for Moldova compared between 2007 and 2009 revealed 12 negative categories in the former and 9 in the latter, with only one case of net improvement. Although the index for Ukraine is available only for one year 2005 and thus does not provide for a comparison, it is worth mentioning that as in Georgia in 2005 there are 15 categories assessed as negative, out of which all of the categories in the financial resources group were negative.

Indeed, judiciary reform has been an ongoing process in Georgia: supported by the USAID since 1995, later sponsored by the World Bank between 1999 and 2006. In 2011 additional 'Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project' (JILEP) was launched which 'is a four-year \$19.3 million program that focuses on areas critical to justice: 1) judicial institutions; 2) civil society support; 3) legal education; and 4) commercial law' - by the USAID through Eurasia Foundation¹⁵⁸. Thus, the reform of the judiciary was brought to the attention of international donors since the 90s in Georgia, whereas in Moldova it was only in 2011 that the EU began conditioning its aid on the conduct of judicial reform in order to proceed with the association agreement and free trade agreement¹⁵⁹. As for Ukraine, the special project to promote Rule of Law was launched by the USAID in 2006¹⁶⁰. Although the reform of the judiciary is prioritized as a major step to be completed in any further cooperation with the EU, there is no commitment from the domestic elites to reform and there is no

¹⁵⁸ USAID Georgia. <http://georgia.usaid.gov/news/usaid-news/2011/02/24/723>

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/eu-says-moldova-aid-depends-on-judicial-reform>

¹⁶⁰ US Embassy in Ukraine. <http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/usaid-judicial.html>

further funding to be conditioned on the conduct of this reform¹⁶¹.

One should, however, keep in mind that all three countries are defined as rather weak states according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) scores¹⁶², which means that the states' monopoly over political participation is not full and in the context of the FSU states means that opposition can emerge and thrive (Tilly 2007). But in Georgia strong ethnically inflamed issues are absent from within its (de-facto controlled) territory, in order for opposition groups to emerge around them. And, unlike in Ukraine and Moldova, the judiciary reform involves subjugating the existing judges to cooperate with the state, so changing the constitution becomes a less challenging task. Whereas in Ukraine and in Moldova there is a tension rooted in ethnic and regional cleavages, which makes it hard for the central power to unify its policy and reform, as there is a potential of disobedience in the 'other' regions¹⁶³. Hence, it is easier to reform in Georgia, because there is no opposition in the parliament that can block decisions. Hence, the polarization of society penetrates political system as a whole: from population, to political parties, to judicial system, to foreign policies.

The Russian government does not engage in giving recommendations on the countries' electoral conduct and is satisfied as long as its favorite endorsed candidate

¹⁶¹ Some analysts had been noticing that by the end of the ENP in 2010 Ukraine complied with only 4 out of 60 reform priorities (Evhenia Sleptsova: Shedding Light on the ongoing EU-Moldova Trade Liberalization. Eastern Partnership Community. January 27, 2011. At <http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/shedding-light-ongoing-eu-moldova-trade-liberalisation>

¹⁶² The BTI scale goes from 0 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). In 2008 the BTI for the item 'Monopoly on use of force' assigned Georgia with 4, Moldova with 3 and Ukraine with 7.

¹⁶³ A good example is the decision of Donetsk Regional Court ruling illegal the bestowing of the Hero of Ukraine title to the controversial leader of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Stepan Bandera, which was later appealed against by the President.

wins. The interests that Russia pursues in the FSU countries are that of economic security and hence fall into a category of governance. Indeed, by offering certain benefits Russia may influence the course and the pace of the reform process. This happens mainly when interests of the West and Russia collide, for instance in creating free trade zones and sharing market spaces. This has been happening particularly in the last decade, i.e. since Russia regained its power from a beneficial energy market conjuncture and aimed to keep its former monopolist position in the markets of the FSU states. To maintain this position, Russia can raise gas prices to what is claimed to be market prices (i.e. withdraw subsidies) as a punishment, or threaten to build a customs 'border' across what was used to be a common market. Because Russia remains the major trade partner of the FSU states, this may prevent its neighbors from seeking other markets¹⁶⁴.

Unquestionably, the EU Free Trade and Association Agreements are the major instruments by which the countries that are seeking cooperation are assessed and included into further integration process. The process of synchronizing the legislature is very time-intensive but the free trade union is part of the origins of the EU and is therefore the first step in any association¹⁶⁵. Moreover, trade association agreements with the EU and the Customs Union are mutually exclusive¹⁶⁶, because of the

¹⁶⁴ Russia also punishes governments of FSU states by banning its products from its markets, as had been the case with Georgian wine and mineral water after the Rose revolution (at this time any other support of Georgia had stopped), Moldovan wine in 2006, as well as Ukrainian dairy products the same year.

¹⁶⁵ According to experts from the European Commission Mission to Ukraine, it was a very hard task to bring the legislature in accordance, because despite there being a political will on the part of the government (headed at that moment by Yuliya Tymoshenko) the opposition in the parliament (the Party of the Regions) was blocking or largely hindering the process. The major challenge was the legislature accompanying agricultural market, because being highly subsidized, it crossed interests of many in the ruling elites. (from interview on October 30, 2008, Kyiv, Ukraine).

¹⁶⁶ Pavel Korduban for Eurasia Daily Monitor March 30, 2011—Volume 8, Issue 62 The Jamestown

individual multiple regulations that each of the Unions carry. This means that the countries have to make a choice, the 'two-vector' strategy results in deadlocks, absence of reforms and the perpetuation of a hybrid regime.

The threat that the Russian government puts forward involves creating a 'trade border' to protect its market from EU products. And it is a real one for Ukraine, which is relying heavily on exporting its goods to Russia. Other benefits (for Ukraine) than keeping its current markets are not clear: the 30% discount on gas prices were already guaranteed in return to the renewal of the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea which was due to expire in 2017 for 25 more years¹⁶⁷. Besides, being a part of the Customs Union from its conception and evolution from the Common Economic Space, Belarus was not saved from the gas row over prices in 2007 and 2010¹⁶⁸. The EU is also interested in its neighboring Ukrainian and Moldovan markets. However in Ukraine¹⁶⁹, for instance, the talks initiated in 2008 are not moving much forward: the common market dependence on Russia and the far-stretched promise of a possible close association with the EU is void of any immediate benefits. Ukrainian elites calculate that the funding from the West will be continuously provided basing their judgment on the growing trend in the aid supply.

To demonstrate the point on the 'swinging' interests that Ukrainian politicians have towards both the EU and Russia, the figure 13 captures the volume of trade between

Foundation

¹⁶⁷ <http://www.eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Russia-Grants-Ukraine-Gas-Discount-In-Return-For-Fleet-Lease-Extension>

¹⁶⁸ Russia-Belarus gas row leaves bitter aftertaste. EuroActive.

<http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/russia-belarus-gas-row-leaves-bitter-aftertaste-news-495592>

¹⁶⁹ In this paper I address only the case case of Ukraine as the one mostly affected by both integration into the European and Russian markets.

Ukraine and Russia. If the export from Ukraine remains more or less stable, the import of Russian goods follows the political cycle pretty well.




Figure 13. Trade volume between Ukraine and Russia (2006-2011)

The decline during the rule of the 'Orange' governments and president Victor Yushchenko, followed by a sharp increase by the end of his term in the office associated with the power transfer to the current pro-Russian president Victor Yanukovich indicate how much is at stake for Russia if Ukraine does not join the Customs Union. As of 2011, the volume of imports from Russia on the Ukrainian market is over 50%¹⁷⁰, losing it would harm both countries. This also shows that Ukraine has a valuable stake in considering joining the Customs Union. The same is not however true for Moldova, which is much more heavily integrated into the European market with estimated over 50% of trade is with the EU and less than 20% with Russia¹⁷¹. And as of late, Moldova is embarking steadily on the European integration track, leaving the "two-vector" approach to relations with the West and Russia in the past. If the integration with the Western markets continues, the challenge will come at the next round of elections, when the parties with the continuous pro-Russian appeal will have to mobilize its voters.

¹⁷⁰ Ukrainian State Department of Statistics at <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

¹⁷¹ Andrew Wilson. Moldova: Europe's poorest pawn? July 29, 2009. At (http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_wilson_moldova_elections/)

Putting the three hybrid regimes with their different degrees of competitiveness into comparison allowed the discernment of polarization of the population and elites as the major factor that channels historical and ethno-linguistic differences into elections and to confirm the first hypothesis. It also helped to distill different patterns of support (reform-oriented or elections-oriented) that international actors provide and domestic actors choose to cooperate on (as suggested by the first and second hypotheses). Entrenching competitiveness in the case of Moldova and Ukraine and reforms in Georgia are the two models that sustain hybrid regimes and help them endure, thereby confirming the third hypothesis. The analysis revealed that economic ties with Russia matter, and it is a way in which Soviet legacies are playing their part in keeping hybrid regimes together.

5.6. Conclusion

To sum up, the evidence collected in this chapter emphasizes a continuous effort by both the EU and the US to assist the conduct of the judicial reform in Georgia since the time that the country started its recovery from the civil war in the onset of independence in the early 90s. However, the pace of support of elections to be free and fair is not of the concern to the donors, and it is only the local elections that are the focus. Knowing this, domestic elites pursue reforms without attending to the quality of electoral conduct. Absence of polarization and competitiveness results in persistent non-competitive reform-oriented hybrid regime.

In the case of Moldova, despite high polarization and competitiveness the persistent

domination of the 'nominal' Communists in the parliament alarmed the EU and the US to support the conduct of free and fair elections after 2005. Yet, only by 2011 the completion of judicial reform became a condition to ensure further funding from the EU. Domestic elites' expectation of competitive recognizable elections allows them to continue benefiting from the outside support without reforming other domains of the regime.

In Ukraine, support for judicial reform is only nominal, elections are always competitive and the external support growing, elites are willingly exploiting the historical divide of the population to keep elections recognizable. Moreover, the idea of gaining support from both Russia and the West prevents domestic elites from executing reforms, but provides issues to reinforce competitiveness in the up-coming electoral cycles.

Conclusion

The twentieth anniversary of independent statehood in the fifteen FSU states is a fitting opportunity to assess the political regimes that have emerged in this region, now that enough time has passed for these countries to establish the 'rules of the game' and to put those rules through a real life test. This dissertation has aimed to characterized the mixed regimes that emerged in the FSU countries and to identify the factors that keep them in place.

Analyzing all fifteen countries under the same framework has allowed me to discern more clearly the nature of hybrid regimes, the specific forms that combine features of democracies (in how power is attained through elections) and autocracy (in how a more coercive use of state power is employed in governing). It has offered an explanatory account with political polarization at the core of the causal mechanism. In hybrid regimes the domestic elites rely on divisions among the electorate to make sure elections are recognized as democratically meaningful. Because agreeing on reforms is a challenge in a divided parliament, elections become the sole democratic feature of the hybrid regime. The degree of polarization inside a polity, in turn a reflection of the competitiveness of elections, is picked up by the international donors as the signal of fair elections and is a key to their further support of elections and aid-provision. This is the scenario for the competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and Ukraine, where the promotion of contestation is prioritized over the rule of law.

When polarization is low, the elites find it relatively manageable to implement reforms, in particular in the sphere of the rule of law. The achievements in reforms become the beacon of democracy for international donors. When elections are

persistently non-competitive and not fair, as the case of Georgia has demonstrated, international observers ratify elections as free and fair as a praise for achievements in reforms. Thus, the two processes –one elections-driven, another reform-driven– are at the center of the interactions between domestic elites and international actors that contribute to make hybrid regimes a stable equilibrium.

The dissertation makes a contribution to democratization scholarship by differentiating between competitive and non-competitive hybrid regimes and links together the choices of international and domestic players.

This narrow set of findings allows us to suggest a broader range of implications. First, the international legitimacy of elections, unlike in democracies, is a key factor to the continuous functioning of hybrid regimes. Elections are the major criterion by which countries are assessed on their regime performance, and further aid is usually conditioned on internationally ratified conduct. The domestic legitimacy of the newly-elected rulers is preceded by the international authorization. This puts a great deal of pressure on the reports that international observers provide. The problem with the observation guidelines is that they are available to the running elites and they can try to comply to the required minimum degree in order to keep their elections recognized as free and fair. Moreover, as it was shown that elections in non-comparative settings could be recognized, the decision becomes a political one, and a better assessment is given in return for a promise of a strategic alliance. This contributes to the ongoing debate in international relations on the kind of aid and conditionality that international organizations and donors should provide, and what its ultimate role should be.

Secondly, the dissertation revives the question of the value of Soviet legacies by showing the importance of pre-Soviet and Soviet legacies alike. The Soviet legacies were taken for granted by the students of democratization and attention shifted to the pre-Soviet ones. The pre-Soviet legacies ('the memories of grandmothers') need a political will to be revived, while the Soviet legacies are in the memories of the current generations of voters and not always as negative ones. The interaction between the two contributes to the political polarization of hybrid regimes.

Thirdly, in connection to the previous one: Russia matters. This serves as a reminder to those who think that if a country within the scope of Russia's interests declares its intention to follow a European choice, that Russian strategic and economic interests will disappear. In the FSU region, Russian interests are of particular importance, due to these states' history of belonging to the common Soviet market with Russia inheriting the vast part of it. When a country proclaims the Western vector in its geopolitical orientation and an intention to join the European market, it means that the old foreign trade connections with Russia will need to be revised and eventually abandoned. In the case of Ukraine, for example, Russia is its largest trade partner and, as Chapter 5 has demonstrated, remains so independently of the course the Ukrainian leadership takes with Russia. Even when the interests of Russia are not articulated in the state's policies and anti-Russian rhetoric is used, the interests do not disappear and the countries continue doing their business with Russia, as was shown in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, Russia is important to the West as well. As each of the 'gas wars' with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia has shown, the EU and Russia remain committed to their contracts and to their partnership, leaving the 'transit' countries to solve their issues with Russia bi-laterally. This is the role that the internal

political polarization plays in international politics.

Lastly, this dissertation has helped to identify the following directions for future research:

- National electoral geography in Ukraine has revealed that there are regions in the center that swing, and that there are regions in the South and in the West where one party or another wins only by a slight margin. It means that there is strong competition going on within each region. While the city mayors are elected to their positions, it would be interesting to know their party affiliation and whether it always coincides with how the region votes. Taking polarization one level down from the national one would complete the picture on the degree of electoral competitiveness in the country.
- The argument should be tested on an expanded number of cases, especially on those in post-colonial Asia and Africa, where ethnic divisions and aid-seeking are high, and where there are also special ties to the former colonies.
- The rigidity of constitutions in polarized societies would be an interesting subject to research and to expand the sample. The questions that arise are: How often are constitutions actually amended, and are these amendments accompanied by revolution-like events in these countries?

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Constitution of Estonia 1992
Constitution of Georgia 1995
Constitution of Kazakhstan 1995
Constitution of Kyrgyzstan 1993
Constitution of Latvia 1992
Constitution of Lithuania 1992
Constitution of Moldova 1994
Constitution of Russia 1993
Constitution of Tajikistan 1994
Constitution of Turkmenistan 1992
Constitution of Ukraine 1996

Constitution of Uzbekistan 1992
OSCE
UNDP
IMF
ENP
USAID
World Bank
European Commission Missions to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Freedom House
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
The Economist Intelligence Unit
CIA World Factbook
Judicial Reform Index
EurasiaNet
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Central Electoral Committee of Moldova
Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Elections coding scheme

Reports used: in all of the cases OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Elections Observation Mission's final reports.

There are two dimensions according to which elections were coded. The first reflects the general description of electoral process using broadly speaking two groups of qualifiers, which place countries, either in a group 'in compliance' or 'not in compliance' with internationally recognized democratic standards. The score of 0 is assigned when elections are 'in compliance', 1 is assigned when qualified as 'not in compliance'.

General characteristic	In compliance , (generally and mostly free) improvement, closer to standards, some shortcomings, met standards, free of problems, in accordance, consistent, in line with standards (0)	Not in compliance , fell short, did not meet, not in accordance, failed to comply, shortcomings, did not comply, failed to meet, fell significantly short (1)
Elections	Armenia 95, Armenia 99, Belarus 94, Belarus 95, Georgia 04, Georgia 04, Georgia 06, Kyrgyzstan 95, Kyrgyzstan 05, Moldova 96, Moldova 98, Moldova 01, Moldova 03, Russia 93, Russia 96, Russia 99, Russia 00, Ukraine 94, Ukraine 06	Armenia 96, Armenia 98, Armenia 03, Armenia 03, Azerbaijan 95, Azerbaijan 98, Azerbaijan 00, Azerbaijan 03, Azerbaijan 05, Belarus 00, Belarus 01, Belarus 04, Belarus 06, Georgia 99, Georgia 00, Georgia 03, Kazakhstan 94, Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 04, Kazakhstan 05, Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 05, Moldova 2005, Moldova 2007, Russia 03, Russia 04, Tajikistan 00, Tajikistan 05, Tajikistan 06, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 98, Ukraine 99, Ukraine 02, Ukraine 04, Uzbekistan 99, Uzbekistan 04

The second dimension represents the degree of violations that occurred during the campaign period, on election day and in the aftermath of elections in the following

fields: dependence of Central Electoral Committee on executive, restrictions on registration of opposition candidates, restrictions on freedom to campaign and on use of media, problems with voter lists, ballot stuffing, deterioration during vote count, voter fraud, violence during elections and after. Scores from 1 to 5 are assigned, the higher score indicating the greater violations. The following coding rules are used: (the qualifiers are taken from the OSCE reports terminology)

1 – minor problems mainly concerned with organizational aspects

2 – major problems mainly concerned with organizational aspects and with elections legislative environment

Appendix 2

BTI scoreboard indicators: 10 – the highest, 1 – the lowest; *1-6 (0 violated), 7 (0,5 some violation, but generally respected) 8-10 (1 respected)*

Political rights: To what extent can political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?

Civil rights: To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?

Horizontal accountability: Is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?

Appendix 3

Referenda to change rules of the game (expand powers/prolong tenure in the office)

		Democracy	Hybrid	Autocracy
Initiated/attempted	Succeeded			+
	Failed		+	
Not initiated/attempted		+		

Appendix 4

Years of elections in the FSU, assessed by the OSCE

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

1	1995	parliamentary	1	1995	parliamentary	1	1994	presidential
2	1996	presidential	2	1998	presidential	2	1995	parliamentary
3	1998	presidential	3	2000	parliamentary	3	2000	parliamentary
4	1999	parliamentary	4	2003	presidential	4	2001	presidential
5	2003	presidential	5	2005	parliamentary	5	2004	parliamentary
6	2003	parliamentary	6	2006	parliamentary	6	2006	presidential
7	2007	parliamentary	7	2008	presidential	7	2008	parliamentary
8	2008	presidential						

Estonia

Georgia

Kazakhstan

1	1999	parliamentary	1	1999	parliamentary	1	1994	parliamentary
2	2007	parliamentary	2	2000	presidential	2	1999	presidential
			3	2003	parliamentary	3	1999	parliamentary
			4	2004	presidential	4	2004	parliamentary
			5	2004	presidential	5	2005	presidential
			6	2006	local	6	2007	parliamentary
			7	2008	presidential			
			8	2008	parliamentary			

Kyrgyzstan

1	1995	presidential
2	2000	parliamentary
3	2000	presidential
4	2005	parliamentary
5	2005	presidential
6	2007	parliamentary
7	2009	presidential

Latvia

1	1998	parliamentary
2	2002	parliamentary
3	2006	parliamentary

Lithuania

1	1996	presidential
2	2009	parliamentary

Moldova

1	1996	presidential
2	1998	parliamentary
3	2001	parliamentary
4	2003	local
5	2005	parliamentary
6	2007	local
7	2009	parliamentary
8	2009	parliamentary

Russia

1	1993	parliamentary
2	1996	presidential
3	1999	parliamentary
4	2000	presidential
5	2003	parliamentary
6	2004	presidential
7	2007	parliamentary
8	2008	presidential

Tajikistan

1	2000	parliamentary
2	2005	parliamentary
3	2006	presidential

Turkmenistan

1	1999	parliamentary
2	2004	parliamentary
3	2007	presidential

Ukraine

1	1998	parliamentary
2	1999	presidential
3	2002	parliamentary
4	2004	presidential
5	2006	parliamentary
6	2007	parliamentary

Uzbekistan

1	1999	parliamentary
2	2004	presidential
3	2007	parliamentary

Appendix 5. Conduct of elections in the FSU 1991-2011: competitive and non-competitive¹⁷²

	Competitive	Not competitive
In compliance	Armenia 95, Armenia 99, Armenia 08, Belarus 94, Belarus 95, Estonia 99, Estonia 07, Georgia 04, Georgia 08, Kyrgyzstan 95, Kyrgyzstan 05, Latvia 98, Latvia 02, Latvia 06, Latvia 10, Lithuania 96, Lithuania 09, Moldova 96, Moldova 98, Moldova 01, Moldova 03, Moldova 09, Moldova 10, Russia 96, Russia 99, Russia 00, Ukraine 94, Ukraine 06, Ukraine 07, Ukraine 10 (N=30)	Georgia 04, Kyrgyzstan 10 (N=2)
Not in compliance	Armenia 96, Armenia 98, Armenia 03, Armenia 03, Azerbaijan 95, Azerbaijan 2000, Azerbaijan 2003, Georgia 99, Georgia 00, Georgia 03, Georgia 08, Moldova 2005, Moldova 2007, Moldova 09, Ukraine 98, Ukraine 99, Ukraine 02, Ukraine 04 (N=18)	Azerbaijan 98, Azerbaijan 2005, Azerbaijan 2006, Azerbaijan 2008, Azerbaijan 2010, Belarus 00, Belarus 01, Belarus 04, Belarus 06, Belarus 08, Belarus 10, Kazakhstan 94, Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 04, Kazakhstan 05, Kazakhstan 07, Kazakhstan 11, Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 05, Kyrgyzstan 07, Russia 03, Russia 04, Russia 07, Tajikistan 00, Tajikistan 05, Tajikistan 06, Tajikistan 2010, Turkmenistan 04, Turkmenistan 07, Uzbekistan 99, Uzbekistan 04, Uzbekistan 07, Uzbekistan 10 (N=35)

¹⁷²

Source: Dataset compiled based on OSCE reports. Available at osce.org

Appendix 6. Conduct of elections in the FSU: competitive, mixed and non-competitive¹⁷³.

Country	Compliance and competitiveness (years)	Mixed nature of elections conducted (years)		Non-compliance and non-competitiveness (years)
		Competitive/not in compliance	Not competitive/in compliance	
Estonia	1999-2007			
Latvia	1998-2010			
Lithuania	1996-2009			
Armenia	1995, 1999, 2008	1996, 1998, 2003, 2003		
Moldova	1996, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2009, 2010	2005, 2007, 2009		
Ukraine	1994, 2006, 2007, 2010	1998, 1999, 2002, 2004		
Georgia	2004, 2008	1999, 2000, 2003, 2008	2004	
Belarus	1994, 1995			2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010
Russia	1996, 1999, 2000			2003, 2004, 2007
Kyrgyzstan	1995, 2005		2010	2000, 2000, 2005, 2007
Azerbaijan		1995, 2000, 2003		1998, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010
Kazakhstan				1994-2011
Tajikistan				2000-2010
Turkmenistan				2004-2007
Uzbekistan				1999-2010

¹⁷³

Source: Dataset compiled based on OSCE reports. Available at osce.org

Appendix 7. Formal and informal restriction of political rights in the FSU.

Country	Restrictions of political rights			BTI score	EIU	FH PR
	Right to participate/ /citizenship	Right to association (in constitution and/or laws on parties) on ethnic, religious, regional grounds	Total formal restrictions	2008	2008	2008
Lithuania	0	0	0	10	6.11	1
Estonia	1	0	1	9.3	5	1
Latvia	1	0	1	9.3	6.11	2
Ukraine	0	0	0	7.6	5.56	3
Georgia	0	1	1	7.6	4.44	4
Moldova	0	0	0	7	6.11	3
Kyrgyzstan	0	1	1	6.3	3.89	5
Armenia	0	0	0	5.3	3.89	5
Russia	0	1	1	5	5.56	6
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	4.3	3.33	6
Kazakhstan	0	1	1	4	2.78	6
Belarus	0	0	0	3	3.33	7
Tajikistan	0	0	0	3.3	2.22	6
Uzbekistan	0	1	1	2.3	2.22	7
Turkmenistan	0	1	1	1.3	2.22	7

Appendix 8. Civil rights measured by BTI, FH, EIU

Country	BTI Freedom of Expression	BTI Civil Rights Ensured	Average Civil Liberties	FH CL 2008	EIU 2008
Estonia	10	10	10	1	8.82
Lithuania	10	10	10	1	9.12
Latvia	10	9	9.5	1	9.12
Ukraine	8	8	8	2	7.94
Georgia	7	7	7	4	6.47
Kyrgyzstan	7	7	7	4	5.29
Moldova	7	7	7	4	7.94
Armenia	4	6	5	4	5.88
Azerbaijan	4	6	5	5	5
Russia	4	5	4.5	5	5
Kazakhstan	4	4	4	5	5.29
Tajikistan	4	4	4	5	1.18
Belarus	3	2	2.5	6	3.53
Uzbekistan	2	2	2	7	0.59
Turkmenistan	1	1	1	7	0.59

Appendix 9. Freedom House civil liberties measures 1991-2008

	1991 -92	1992 -93	1993 -94	1994 -95	1995 -96	1996 -97	1997 -98	1998 -99	1999 - 2000	2000- 2001	2001 - 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Estonia	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
Lithuania	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Latvia	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Ukraine	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
Georgia	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	4
Kyrgyzstan	4	2	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
Moldova	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Armenia	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Azerbaijan	5	5	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Russia	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Kazakhstan	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Tajikistan	3	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
Belarus	4	3	4	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Uzbekistan	5	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7
Turkmenistan	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

Appendix 10. BTI scores of the FSU states on separation of powers and independent judiciary

Country	BTI separation of powers ¹⁷⁴	BTI Independent Judiciary ¹⁷⁵
Estonia	10	10
Lithuania	10	9
Latvia	10	8
Ukraine	7	7
Kyrgyzstan	6	4
Georgia	5	5
Moldova	5	6
Armenia	4	4
Azerbaijan	4	4
Russia	4	4
Kazakhstan	3	4
Tajikistan	3	3
Belarus	2	4
Turkmenistan	2	3
Uzbekistan	2	3

Appendix 11. Freedom House Nations in Transit independence of judiciary 2000-2008.

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Estonia	2	2	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,5	1,5	1,5	1,5
Lithuania	2	1,75	2	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,5	1,75	1,75
Latvia	2	2	2	2,25	2	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75
Ukraine	4,5	4,5	4,75	4,5	4,75	4,25	4,25	4,5	4,75
Kyrgyzstan	5	5,25	5,25	5,5	5,5	5,5	5,5	5,5	6
Georgia	4	4	4,25	4,5	4,5	5	4,75	4,75	4,75
Moldova	4	4	4	4,5	4,5	4,75	4,5	4,5	4,5
Armenia	5	5	5	5	5	5,25	5	5	5,25
Azerbaijan	5,5	5,25	5,25	5,25	5,5	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75
Russia	4,25	4,5	4,75	4,5	4,75	5,25	5,25	5,25	5,25
Kazakhstan	5,5	5,75	6	6,25	6,25	6,25	6,25	6,25	6,25
Tajikistan	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	6

¹⁷⁴ The question that the country coder is asked is: To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)? (BTI Manual, 2010, p.12 at <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/>)

¹⁷⁵ Here the question is: To what extent does an independent judiciary exist? (BTI Manual, 2010, p.21 at <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/>)

Belarus	6,5	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75
Turkmenistan	6,75	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Uzbekistan	6,5	6,5	6,5	6,5	6,5	6,25	6,75	6,75	6,75

Appendix 12. Constitutional changes in the FSU states 1993-2004¹⁷⁶

Country –year of adoption of constitution (Source: Fish 2006)	Referendum to expand chief executive's powers (brought into effect)	Parliament's function is ambiguous (president rules by decree)	Referendum on postponing elections/early elections	Referendum/public initiative/CC ruling on prolonging term in office/allowing to stand for the 3 rd term
Belarus 94	+ (+) (95)	+ (97)		++ (2004)
Moldova 94	+ (-) (99-00)			
Ukraine 96	+ (-) (95)			+ (-) (2004)
Russia 93		+ (2000)		+(-) (?)
Armenia 95	+ (+) (95)			
Azerbaijan 95	+ (+) (95)	+ (02)		
Georgia 95	+(no ref) (93)			
Kazakhstan 93		+ (95)	+ (95)	+ (98)
Kyrgyzstan 93	+ (+) (96)		+	+ (+) (98)
Tajikistan 94				+ (99)+ (03)
Turkmenistan 92				+(94) + (+) (99)
Uzbekistan 92			+ (95)	+ (02)
Estonia				
Latvia				
Lithuania				

¹⁷⁶

Sources: data collected by the author from Jamestown Foundations archives.

Appendix 13. Combined measures of political regimes

Estonia					Latvia					Lithuania				
	additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI
elections	high				elections	high				elections	high			
political rights	mixed	high	high	high	political rights	mixed	high	high	high	political rights	high	high	high	high
civil liberties	high	high	high	high	civil liberties	high	high	high	high	civil liberties	high	high	high	high
separation of powers	high	high	high		separation of powers	high	high	high		separation of powers	high	high	high	
Turkmenistan					Uzbekistan					Tajikistan				
	additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI
elections	low				elections	low				elections	low			
political rights	low	low	low	low	political rights	low	low	low	low	political rights	low	low	low	low
civil liberties	low	low	low	low	civil liberties	low	low	low	low	civil liberties	low	low	low	low
separation of powers	low	low	low		separation of powers	low	low	low		separation of powers	low	low	low	

Belarus					Kazakhstan					Azerbaijan				
	additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI
elections	low				elections	low				elections	mixed			
political rights	low	low	low	low	political rights	low	low	low	low	political rights	low	low	low	low
civil liberties	low	low	low	low	civil liberties	low	low	low	low	civil liberties	low	low	low	low
separation of powers	low	low	low		separation of powers	low	low	low		separation of powers	low	low	low	
Russia					Kyrgyzstan					Armenia				
	additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI
elections	mixed				elections	low				elections	low			
political rights	low	low	mixed	mixed	political rights	low	low	mixed	low	political rights	low	low	low	low
civil liberties	low	low	low	low	civil liberties	low	low	mixed	mixed	civil liberties	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed
separation of powers	mixed	low	low		separation of powers	mixed	low	mixed		separation of powers	low	low	low	

Georgia					Ukraine						Moldova			
	additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI		additional	FH	BTI	EUI
elections	mixed				elections	mixed					elections	low		
political rights	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed	political rights	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed		political rights	mixed	mixed	mixed
civil liberties	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed	civil liberties	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed		civil liberties	mixed	mixed	mixed
separation of powers	low	low	low		separation of powers	mixed	low	mixed			separation of powers	mixed	low	low

Appendix 14

Recipes to calculate polarization in parliaments: (left+right) - center

Armenia

1999: (Communists + Dashnak (ARF)) – Unity

2003: Justice Alliance – (Republican Party)

2007: Heritage – (Republican Party + Prosperous Armenia + Armenian Revolutionary Federation)

Azerbaijan

1995: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party

2000, 2001: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party

2005: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party

2010: – New Azerbaijan Party

Belarus

1995: no legal quorum

2000: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents)

2004: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents)

2008: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents)

Estonia

1992: Fatherland Alliance – Popular Front/Center Party

1995: Republican and Conservative Party – Estonian Central Coalition

1999: Pro Patria – Estonian Center Party

2003: Pro Patria – Estonian Center Party

2009: Pro Patria and Res Publica – Estonian Center Party

Georgia

1995: National Democratic Party – Citizen's Union

1999: Democratic Union Revival of Georgia - Citizen's Union

2004: Rightist Opposition – National Movement

2008: Joint Opposition – United National Movement

Kazakhstan

2004: - (OTAN+ Agrarian+ Independents)

2007: - OTAN

Kyrgyzstan

2007: Communist Party- Ak Zhol

2010: (Ata Zhurt + Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK))

Latvia

1993: (National Harmony + Latvian National Independent Movement) - Latvian Way

1995: (Socialist Party + Latvian National Independent Movement) – Democratic Party Saimnieks

1998: (Latvian Socialist Democratic Workers' Party + For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK) – People's Party
2002: (For Human Rights in United Latvia + For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK) – People's Party
2006: (For Human Rights in United Latvia + Coalition of Latvia's First Party) – Greens and Farmers+ People's Party
2010: (Center Harmony + National Alliance (LNNK)) – Unity + Greens and Farmers

Lithuania

1992: Lithuanian National Union – Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania
1996: (Social Democratic Party + Lithuanian National Union) – Homeland Union
2000: (Lithuanian Peasants Popular Union + Young Lithuania) – Social Democratic Coalition
2004: - (Labor Party + Brasauskas/Paulauskas Coalition + Peasants Party)
2008: Social Democrats – (Homeland+ National Resurrection+ Liberals)

Moldova

1994: (Socialist Union(L) + Peasants and Intellectuals Block(R) + Christian Democratic People's Party (R)) – Democratic Agrarian Party
1998: (Communist Party + Electoral Block Democratic Convention) – Electoral Block Democratic and Prosperous Moldova
2001: (Communist Party + Christian Democratic Party) – Braghis Allians
2005: (Communist Party + Christian Democratic Party) – Democratic Moldova Block
2009: (Communist Party + Liberal Party) – Liberal Democratic Party
2009: (Communist Party + Liberal Party) – Liberal Democratic Party
2010: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party) – Democratic Party

Russia

1993: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Russia's Democratic Choice
1995: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Our Home Russia
1999: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Unity
2003: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – United Russia
2007: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – United Russia

Tajikistan

2005: - People's Democratic Party
2010: (Communist Party + Islamic Renaissance Party) – People's Democratic Party

Turkmenistan

2004: - (Democratic Party of Turkmenistan)

Ukraine

1994: (Communist Party + Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists(R) + Rukh(R)) – Independents

1998: (Communist Party + Rukh) – Independents
 2002: (Communist Party + Our Ukraine) – For United Ukraine
 2006: (Communist Party + BUT(R) + Our Ukraine (R)) – Party of the Regions
 2007: (Communist Party + BUT(R) + Our Ukraine (R)) – Party of the Regions

Uzbekistan

2009 – 2010: - (Liberal Democratic Party+People's Democratic Party+ National Revival Democratic Party+ Justica Social Democratic Party)

Appendix 15 Polarization in parliaments

	Left	Right	Center	polarization index
Armenia 99	12.1	8	41.7	-21.6
Armenia 03		8.396947	30.53435	-22.1374
Armenia 07		5.343511	80.15267	-74.8092
Azerbaijan 95		2.4	95.16	-92.76
Azerbaijan 2000, 2001		1.6	60	-58.4
Azerbaijan 05		4	44.8	-40.8
Azerbaijan 10		2.4	96	-93.6
Belarus 2000			100	-100
Belarus 2004				-100
Belarus 2008		6.363636	93.63636	-87.2727
Estonia 92		28.71	14.85	13.86
Estonia 95		4.95	40.59	-35.64
Estonia 99		17.82	27.72	-9.9
Estonia 03		6.93	27.72	-20.79
Estonia 07		18.81	28.71	-9.9
Georgia 95		13.42	38.96	-25.54
Georgia 99		25.63	42.7	-17.07
Georgia 04		10	90	-80
Georgia 08		11.333333	79.333333	-68
Kazakhstan 99			0	-75.32
Kazakhstan 04			92.20779	-92.2078
Kazakhstan 07			100	-100
Kyrgyzstan 07	8.889		78.88889	-70
Kyrgyzstan 10	21.67		23.333333	-1.66667
Latvia 93	13	15	36	-8
Latvia 95	5	8	18	-5
Latvia 98	14	17	24	7
Latvia 02	25	7	20	12
Latvia 06	6	10	41	-25
Latvia 2010	29	8	55	-18

Lithuania 92		2.836879	51.77305	-48.9362
Lithuania 96	8.511	2.836879	49.64539	-38.2979
Lithuania 00	2.837	0.70922	49.64539	-46.0993
Lithuania 04			18	-18
Lithuania 08		17.7305	51.06383	-33.3333
Moldova 94	26.92	19.23	53.85	-7.7
Moldova 98	39.6	25.74	23.75	41.59
Moldova 01	70.29	10.89	18.81	62.37
Moldova 05	55.44	10.89	33.66	32.67
Moldova 09	59.41	14.85	14.85	59.41
Moldova 09	47.52	14.85	17.82	44.55
Moldova 10	41.58	31.68	14.85149	58.40851
Russia 93	14.41	26.57	18.01	22.97
Russia 95	44	22.22	20	46.22
Russia 99	29.77	7.55	16.44	20.88
Russia 03	8.88	8	26.66	-9.78
Russia 07	12.67	8.888889	70	-48.4444
Tajikistan 05			0	-77.7
Tajikistan 10	3.17	3.17	87.3	-80.96
Turkmenistan 04				-100
Ukraine 94	10.8	3.2	48.2	-34.2
Ukraine 98	43.53	14.22	19	38.75
Ukraine 02	26.22	31.1	32.7	24.62
Ukraine 06	4.6	46.6	41.3	9.9
Ukraine 07	6	50	38.8	17.2
Uzbekistan 09-10				-100

Appendix 16 Presidential elections

					Alternation	
Armenia 96	Ter-Petrosian	51.75	Manoukian	41.29	1	10.46
Armenia 98	Kocharian	56	Demirchian	44	1	12
Armenia 03	Kocharian	67.25	Demirchian	32.48	0	34.77
Armenia 08					1	0
Azerbaijan 98	Aliiev	76.1	Mamedov	11.6	0	64.5
Azerbaijan 03	Aliiev son Ilham	76.84	Isa Gambar	13.97	0	62.87
Azerbaijan 08	Ilham Aliiev	87	Igbal Aghazade	2.83	0	84.17
Belarus 94	Lukashenka	80.1	Kebich	14.2	1	65.9
Belarus 2001	Lukashenka	75.65	Goncharik	15.65	0	60
Belarus 2006	Lukashenka	82.6	Milinkevich	6	0	76.6
Belarus 2010	Lukashenka					0
Georgia 95	Shevarnadze	74.3	Patiashevili (former communist secretary)	19.3	0	55
Georgia 00	Shevarnadze	80.4	Patiashevili (former communist secretary)	16.6	0	63.8
Georgia 04	Saakashvili	96.24	Sashiashevili	1.87	1	94.37
Georgia 08	Saakashvili	52.21	Gachechiladze	25.26	0	26.95
Kazakhstan 99	Nazarbaev	81.75	Abdildin	12.08	0	69.67
Kazakhstan 05	Nazarbaev	91.15	Tuyakbai	6.61	0	84.54
Kyrgyzstan 00	Akaev	74.5	Tekebaev	13.5	0	61
Kyrgyzstan 05	Bakiev	88.71	Bakir uulu	3.93	0	84.78
Lithuania 93	Brazauskas	60				60
Lithuania 97-98	Adamkus	50.31	Paulauskas	49.69	1	0.62
Lithuania 02-03	Paskas	54.91	Adamkus	45.09	1	9.82
Lithuania 04	Adamkus	52.6	Prunskiene	47.4	1	5.2
Lithuania 09	Dalia Grybauskaite	69.08	Algirdas Butkevicius	11.83	1	57.25
Moldova 96	Lucinschi	54	Snegur	46	1	8
Russia 96	Yeltsin	53.8	Zyuganov	40.3	0	13.5
Russia 00	Putin	52.94	Zyuganov	29.21	0	23.73
Russia 04	Putin	71.31	Kharitonov	13.69	0	57.62
Russia 08	Medvedev	70.28	Zyuganov	17.72	0	52.56
Tajikistan 06	Rahmonov	79.3	Boboev	6.2	0	73.1
Turkmenistan 07	Berdimuhammedov	89.23	Atajukow	3.23	n/a	86
Ukraine 94	Kuchma	52.15	Kravchuk	45.06	1	7.09
Ukraine 99	Kuchma	56.25	Simonenko	37.8	0	18.45
Ukraine 04	Yuschenko	51.99	Yanukovich	44.2	1	7.79
Ukraine 10	Yanukovich	48.95	Timoshenko	45.47	1	3.48
Uzbekistan 00	Islam Karimov	91.9	Jalolov	4.1	0	87.8
Uzbekistan 07	Islam Karimov	90.77	Asliddin Rustamov	3.27	0	87.5

Appendix 17 Ukrainian electoral geography (Source: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/>)

2002		
Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	For United Ukraine (pre-PoR)	Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E)	Donetska (E)	Volynska (W)
Luganska (E)		Lvivska (W)
Dnipropetrovska (E)		Zakarpatska (W)
Kirovigradska C		Rivnenska (W)
Mykolaivska (S)		Ternopilska (W)
Odesska (S)		Khmelnitska (W)
Khersonska (S)		Ivano-Frankivska (W)
Zaporizska C		Chernivetska (W)
Crimea (S)		Zhytomyrska C
Sevastopil (S)		Vinnitska C
Chernigivska C		Kyivska C
		Cherkasska C
		Kyiv C
		Sumska C
2006		
Party of the Regions (PoR)	Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc (BUT)	Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E)	Volynska (W)	Zakarpatska (W)
Luganska (E)	Rivnenska (W)	Ivano-Frankivska (W)
Dnipropetrovska (E)	Ternopilska (W)	Lvivska (W)
Mykolaivska (S)	Khmelnitska (W)	
Odesska (S)	Chernivetska (W)	
Khersonska (S)	Zhytomyrska C	
Zaporizska C	Vinnitska C	
Crimea (S)	Kyivska C	
Donetska (E)	Cherkasska C	
Sevastopil (S)	Kyiv C	
	Kirovigradska C	
	Poltavska C	
	Sumska C	
	Chernigivska C	
2007		
Party of the Regions (PoR)	Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc (BUT)	Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E)	Volynska (W)	Zakarpatska (W)
Luganska (E)	Rivnenska (W)	
Dnipropetrovska (E)	Ternopilska (W)	
Mykolaivska (S)	Khmelnitska (W)	
Odesska (S)	Chernivetska (W)	
Khersonska (S)	Zhytomyrska C	
Zaporizska C	Vinnitska C	
Crimea (S)	Kyivska C	
Donetska (E)	Cherkasska C	
Sevastopil (S)	Kyiv	
	Kirovigradska C	
	Poltavska C	
	Sumska C	
	Chernigivska C	
	Ivano-Frankivska (W)	
	Lvivska (W)	

Appendix 18 Georgian political geography (Source: Electoral Geography. Georgia. At <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/ru/category/countries/g/georgia>)

	Democratic Revivle 2004 Union	"Right Opposition, Industrialists , Novas"	Labourist (Labourist Party of Georgia	National Movement- Democrats
Tbilisi	1.95%	8.66%	10.72%	62.49%
Kakheti	1.02%	8.27%	6.58%	78.55%
Kvemo Kartli	0.74%	6.67%	5.41%	77.96%
Mtskheta-Mtianeti	1.48%	10.54%	22.31%	58.34%
Shida Kartli	1.17%	8.42%	5.91%	78.78%
Samtskhe-Javakheti	0.96%	7.08%	3.65%	81.10%
Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svaneti	1.64%	14.52%	5.36%	68.63%
Imereti	1.27%	11.12%	4.81%	73.66%
Guria	2.33%	12.16%	3.90%	68.65%
Samegrelo and Upper Svaneti	0.83%	6.32%	4.17%	68.40%
Ajara	56.64%	2.16%	1.19%	37.83%

	Republican 2008 Party	Labor Party	United National Movement	Joint Oppositi on	Christian- Democratic Movement
Tbilisi	4.51%	10.58%	42.14%	31.70%	7.10%
Kakheti	3.94%	7.03%	64.08%	14.23%	8.18%
Kvemo Kartli	2.37%	4.90%	73.10%	11.82%	5.87%
Mtskheta-Mtianeti	4.49%	19.42%	60.32%	9.58%	4.35%
Shida Kartli	3.19%	8.18%	73.02%	8.98%	4.89%
Samtskhe- Javakheti	1.75%	4.05%	81.28%	6.24%	4.63%
Racha-Lechkhumi and Lower Svaneti	5.63%	5.09%	61.39%	18.26%	5.18%
Imereti	5.33%	6.96%	55.49%	15.24%	12.89%
Guria	4.10%	3.56%	60.29%	15.74%	12.03%
Samegrelo and Upper Svaneti	2.13%	4.36%	61.94%	17.68%	10.05%
Ajara	5.34%	4.68%	62.06%	14.50%	10.66%

Appendix 19 Moldovan electoral geography (Sources: April 2009, July 2009, 2010
Electoral Geography. Moldova. At
<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/ru/category/countries/m/moldova>, Census data
from 2004)

July 2009	PCRM	AMN	PL	PLDM	PDM
Chisinau	38.34%	6.19%	24.40%	17.82%	10.57%
Balti	58.16%	2.87%	7.64%	12.82%	15.60%
Anenii Noi	47.58%	4.98%	15.16%	17.44%	11.31%
Basarabeasca	52.05%	7.59%	5.50%	13.25%	10.49%
Briceni	56.57%	7.45%	7.37%	9.77%	15.00%
Cahul	38.36%	7.69%	15.89%	23.52%	10.66%
Cantemir	40.81%	9.79%	11.04%	24.93%	10.07%
Calarasi	32.10%	16.35%	19.71%	17.59%	10.02%
Causeni	43.08%	18.01%	12.45%	12.14%	8.84%
Cimislia	43.98%	10.50%	9.33%	16.51%	16.10%
Criuleni	32.93%	11.56%	20.64%	16.79%	13.69%
Donduseni	58.94%	3.91%	5.57%	10.08%	14.16%
Drochia	49.69%	5.13%	8.57%	16.22%	16.28%
Dubasari	67.92%	4.55%	7.51%	8.55%	8.68%
Edinet	57.29%	6.98%	4.82%	8.15%	18.34%
Falesti	74.40%	2.07%	3.69%	8.21%	8.23%
Floresti	54.65%	4.91%	4.88%	17.43%	15.07%
Glodeni	47.72%	7.59%	8.43%	18.90%	13.44%
Hincesti	34.94%	5.49%	14.15%	25.52%	16.83%
Ialoveni	25.02%	11.81%	23.16%	24.79%	11.91%
Leova	34.80%	10.89%	9.27%	12.89%	12.13%
Nisporeni	27.74%	15.51%	24.42%	23.33%	5.66%
Ocnita	65.92%	3.81%	3.67%	9.00%	14.72%
Orhei	29.51%	7.95%	18.74%	20.78%	16.93%
Rezina	47.42%	5.23%	11.00%	20.04%	11.74%
Riscani	50.86%	6.66%	8.89%	13.50%	16.01%
Singerei	43.43%	6.18%	9.36%	16.97%	20.09%
Soroca	49.19%	9.77%	8.22%	13.76%	15.76%
Straseni	32.38%	11.15%	21.85%	18.12%	12.10%
Soldanesti	43.88%	14.38%	7.54%	13.67%	13.59%
Stefan Voda	35.86%	8.47%	13.81%	22.71%	8.45%
Taraclia	80.70%	1.93%	1.20%	2.97%	10.05%
Telenesti	31.93%	12.98%	11.78%	26.09%	12.64%
Ungheni	46.68%	7.56%	12.96%	14.52%	13.51%
UTA Gagauzia	77.78%	3.73%	0.43%	1.28%	5.88%

2010	PDM	PL	PCRM	PLDM	Moldovans	Ukrainians	Russians	Gagauzians
Chisinau	8.18%	16.04%	40.20%	28.44%	481,626 67.62%	58,945 8.28%	99,149 13.92%	6,446 0.91%
Balti	13.70%	4.93%	56.90%	18.33%	66,877 52.43%	30,288 23.74%	24,526 19.23%	243 0.19%
Anenii Noi	10.21%	7.63%	44.11%	31.04%	68,761 84.15%	6,526 7.99%	4,135 5.06%	235 0.29%
Basarabeasca	12.88%	2.67%	50.21%	25.57%	20,218 69.77%	1,948 6.72%	2,568 8.86%	2,220 7.66%
Briceni	21.21%	4.30%	47.25%	17.44%	55,123 70.65%	19,939 25.55%	2,061 2.64%	59 0.08%
Cahul	11.65%	9.03%	37.77%	33.05%	91,001 76.32%	7,842 6.58%	7,702 6.46%	3,665 3.07%
Cantemir	12.00%	7.76%	34.36%	34.80%	52,986 88.31%	969 1.61%	710 1.18%	519 0.86%
Calarasi	12.31%	16.24%	25.81%	35.85%	69,190 92.16%	2,799 3.73%	947 1.26%	54 0.07%
Causeni	12.12%	6.43%	41.17%	32.13%	79,432 87.66%	2,469 2.72%	3,839 4.24%	653 0.72%
Cimislia	15.44%	6.97%	38.91%	33.67%	52,972 86.95%	3,376 5.54%	2,371 3.89%	278 0.46%
Criuleni	11.28%	11.05%	33.77%	33.30%	67,046 92.79%	2,692 3.73%	1,008 1.40%	49 0.07%
Donduseni	14.32%	4.26%	53.99%	19.59%	37,302 80.32%	5,893 12.69%	2,714 5.84%	31 0.07%
Drochia	13.83%	4.21%	44.58%	28.21%	74,369 85.39%	9,849 11.31%	1,641 1.88%	44 0.05%
Dubasari	9.10%	5.52%	62.34%	16.29%	32,652 95.99%	521 1.53%	611 1.80%	45 0.13%

Edinet	21.62%	3.72%	52.54%	12.80%	58,749 72.18%	16,084 19.76%	5,084 6.25%	143 0.18%
Falesti	15.81%	3.72%	47.59%	25.82%	75,863 83.99%	10,711 11.86%	3,064 3.39%	39 0.04%
Floresti	17.25%	4.16%	47.60%	23.11%	75,797 84.79%	8,023 8.98%	4,633 5.18%	45 0.05%
Glodeni	17.03%	4.37%	43.64%	24.63%	46,317 75.96%	11,918 19.55%	1,693 2.78%	32 0.05%
Hincesti	13.73%	6.84%	23.24%	50.96%	108,189 90.34%	6,218 5.19%	1,463 1.22%	99 0.08%
Ialoveni	11.11%	16.36%	23.49%	42.11%	91,379 93.53%	1,117 1.14%	1,112 1.14%	95 0.10%
Leova	18.81%	5.18%	35.80%	28.72%	43,673 85.54%	1,245 2.44%	1,167 2.29%	432 0.85%
Nisporeni	18.78%	14.98%	19.00%	37.21%	60,774 93.61%	223 0.34%	339 0.52%	17 0.03%
Ocnita	16.24%	2.75%	60.11%	12.81%	32,491 57.50%	17,351 30.70%	2,764 4.89%	79 0.14%
Orhei	17.04%	9.82%	24.22%	37.48%	100,469 86.41%	4,520 3.89%	2,216 1.91%	113 0.10%
Rezina	14.67%	7.73%	39.40%	27.81%	44,721 92.97%	1,691 3.52%	1,093 2.27%	34 0.07%
Riscani	14.26%	5.84%	47.73%	23.24%	50,391 72.55%	15,632 22.51%	1,726 2.49%	60 0.09%
Singerei	19.23%	5.40%	38.33%	28.66%	74,139 85.07%	8,456 9.70%	3,029 3.48%	47 0.05%
Soroca	14.58%	5.84%	45.42%	22.36%	84,728 89.20%	4,752 5%	2,601 2.74%	53 0.06%
Straseni	11.29%	12.55%	26.42%	41.15%	83,368 93.78%	985 1.11%	1,576 1.77%	70 0.08%

Soldanesti	12.50%	6.22%	40.93%	31.75%	40,354 95.56%	1,055 2.50%	376 0.89%	9 0.02%
Stefan Voda	11.52%	7.46%	33.03%	38.79%	65,318 92.53%	2,182 3.09%	1,918 2.72%	64 0.09%
Taraclia	11.12%	1.10%	69.80%	6.18%	5,980 13.86%	2,646 6.13%	2,139 4.96%	3,587 8.31%
Telenesti	14.49%	7.76%	22.42%	49.14%	67,309 95.98%	879 1.25%	537 0.77%	16 0.02%
Ungheni	14.70%	7.05%	42.35%	26.27%	97,805 88.48%	7,743 7%	2,766 2.50%	90 0.08%
UTA Gagauzia	15.67%	0.52%	59.99%	6.28%	7,481 4.81%	4,919 3.16%	5,941 3.82%	127,835 82.13%