Humboldt-Universität-zu-Berlin,

Philosophische Fakultät I

AGAINST STATE NEUTRALITY:
RAZ, RAWLS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERFECTIONISM

Dissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. Phil.

eingereicht von Ian   Jennings

Gutachter:
1. Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt und
2. Prof. Dr. R Jay Wallace

Datum der Promotion: 17.07.2009

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• 1 INTRODUCTION 
• 2 FORMULATING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE NEUTRALITY
  • 2.1 Rival conceptions of the good 
  • 2.2 The range of the neutrality principle: comprehensive or narrow
  • 2.3 The range of the neutrality principle: only coercive promotion of the good?
  • 2.4  Favouring a conception of the good 
    • 2.4.1 Neutrality as neutrality of aim 
    • 2.4.2 Neutrality as neutrality of justification 
    • 2.4.3 Neutrality as neutrality of effect 
  • 2.5 Conclusion
• 3 DEFENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE NEUTRALITY
  • 3.1 A neutral justification for the principle of state neutrality?
    • 3.1.1 Ackerman’s ecumenical strategy
    • 3.1.2 Rawls’s ecumenical strategy
  • 3.2 Non-neutral justifications of the principle of state neutrality
    • 3.2.1 The first highway: Realism about the corrosiveness of power
    • 3.2.2 The third highway (1): Promoting autonomy as a ground for the principle of state neutrality 
    • 3.2.3 The third highway (2): Respecting autonomy as a ground for the principle of state neutrality 
• 4 DEFENDING LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM
  • 4.1 Raz’s defence of perfectionism
    • 4.1.1 Raz’s case for the permissibility of perfectionism 
    • 4.1.2 The necessity of perfectionism: Raz’s fundamental premises
    • 4.1.3 Well-being and autonomy 
    • 4.1.4 The justification of authority
    • 4.1.5 Raz’s collectivism
• 5 CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY