AGAINST STATE NEUTRALITY: RAZ, RAWLS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERFECTIONISMIan Jennings112345678910112111213142.115162.2171819202122232425262.3272829303132333435362.4372.4.1383940412.4.2424344452.4.34647484950512.5523525354553.156573.1.158596061626364653.1.266676869707172737475767778798081823.23.2.1838485868788893.2.29091929394953.2.39697989910010110210310410510610710810941091101111121131144.11151161174.1.11181191201211221231241251261271281291304.1.21314.1.31321331341351361371381391401411421431441451461471481491501511521531541551561571581591601611621634.1.41644.1.51651661671681691705170171172173174175176BIBLIOGRAPHY 177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198deInhaltsverzeichnisHilfeHumboldt-Universität-zu-Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I AGAINST STATE NEUTRALITY:<br/>RAZ, RAWLS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERFECTIONISMDissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. Phil.eingereicht von Ian Jennings Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt und Prof. Dr. R Jay Wallace Datum der Promotion: 17.07.2009Inhaltsverzeichnis

  • 1 INTRODUCTION 

  • 2 FORMULATING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE NEUTRALITY

    • 2.1 Rival conceptions of the good 

    • 2.2 The range of the neutrality principle: comprehensive or narrow

    • 2.3 The range of the neutrality principle: only coercive promotion of the good?

    • 2.4  Favouring a conception of the good 

      • 2.4.1 Neutrality as neutrality of aim 

      • 2.4.2 Neutrality as neutrality of justification 

      • 2.4.3 Neutrality as neutrality of effect 

    • 2.5 Conclusion

  • 3 DEFENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE NEUTRALITY

    • 3.1 A neutral justification for the principle of state neutrality?

      • 3.1.1 Ackerman’s ecumenical strategy

      • 3.1.2 Rawls’s ecumenical strategy

    • 3.2 Non-neutral justifications of the principle of state neutrality

      • 3.2.1 The first highway: Realism about the corrosiveness of power

      • 3.2.2 The third highway (1): Promoting autonomy as a ground for the principle of state neutrality 

      • 3.2.3 The third highway (2): Respecting autonomy as a ground for the principle of state neutrality 

  • 4 DEFENDING LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM

    • 4.1 Raz’s defence of perfectionism

      • 4.1.1 Raz’s case for the permissibility of perfectionism 

      • 4.1.2 The necessity of perfectionism: Raz’s fundamental premises

      • 4.1.3 Well-being and autonomy 

      • 4.1.4 The justification of authority

      • 4.1.5 Raz’s collectivism

  • 5 CONCLUSION

  • BIBLIOGRAPHY