On 20 January 1996 1,132,235 Palestinians, registered as eligible voters, they were able to vote at any one of 1696 polling stations distributed between the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. The aim was to elect 88 PLC members from 676 candidates who had nominated themselves. Nearly half of the eligible voters were women, whereas only 22 of the candidates were (3.25%).

Al Bilad on 3 January & the London-Based of Al Hayat on 19 January 1996.

Region

No. of Polling Stations

No. of Candidates

No. of Voters

West Bank

1198

374

665,603

Gaza Strip

498

302

347,632

Total

1696

676

1,132,235

In the West Bank the polling stations, candidates and voters were distributed among the eleven constituencies in the following way;

Source: Al Bilad & El Nihar on 20 January 1996.

The Constituency

No. of Polling Stations

No. of Candidates

No. of Voters

Jerusalem

163

54

76,000

Jericho

22

6

12,737

Bethlehem

88

33

54,534

Jenin

145

37

82,850

Hebron

230

72

131,983

Ramallah

162

46

78,076

Silfeet

34

11

18,890

Tubas

25

12

15,972

Tulkarm

99

37

56,101

Qalqilya

54

12

27,270

Nablus

175

54

111,020

Total

1198

374

665,603

As far as the Gaza Strip is concerned, the polling stations, candidates and voters were distributed among the five constituencies in the following way

Source: Ibid.

The Constituency

No. of Polling Stations

No. of Candidates

No. of Voters

Jabalia

82

67

60,436

Gaza

183

92

120,483

Deir El Balah

72

50

54,538

Khan Younis

106

66

69,472

Rafah

55

27

42,703

Total

498

302

347,632

When the elections took place, at least sixteen parties and movements participated, the most important of which were Fatah with 77 candidates, Palestinian People's Party with 26 candidates, FIDA with 11 candidates, the National Democratic Coalition with 5 candidates, and 503 candidates run the elections as independents. Approximately, 87% of the registered voters in Gaza Strip had actually voted, while only 73% of the registered voters in West Bank (including East Jerusalem), voted.

Figures from the official Webpage of PLC <http://www.pal-plc.org>

In contrast to the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians of the West Bank had enjoyed this right under both the Jordanian rule and the Israeli occupation. In April 1950, around 175,000 of West Bank’s Palestinians participated in the first legislative elections which held after the annexation of West Bank to Jordan (see chapter II, P. 68). In October 1956 further tens of thousands of these Palestinians participated in the legislative elections which held at that time (see chapter II, P. 70). After the Israeli occupation of West Bank in 1967, these Palestinians were allowed to practice their right of political participation through the local elections of 1972 and 1976 (see chapter II, Pp. 80-81, 88-90). Because of this history of relative democratic freedom the West Bank Palestinians were not as hungry for their right to vote as their Gaza Strip counterparts. This is why, as it seems, the turnout was lower in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip which follows a long historical precedent.

Despite this, West Bankers were represented in the council more than Gazans, with 51 seats went to them as against to 37 seats went to Gazans.

Ibid.

Political Affiliation

Number of Seats

Fatah

50

Independent close to Fatah

21

National Independent

15

FIDA

1

National Democratic Coalition

1

The seeds of Fatah’s dominance over PLC were sown by the Palestinian electoral law, which stipulated, as we have seen above, the majority system instead of proportional representation, and divided WBGS into sixteen constituencies. In so doing the law left little chance for small factions and parties which enjoy little in the way of a national following to be represented in the council. In October 1995, three months prior to the elections, all Palestinian parties and factions (including PFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others) enjoyed a national following ranged between 0.1 and 10.7%, compared to more than 41% for Fatah.

JMCC’s Poll No.10 online <http://www.jmcc.org>

But it should be emphasized that these factions' and parties' boycott of the elections was not merely due to the structure of the electoral law, but it was in principle due to their opposition to the Oslo process, and what might be derived from such a process, including the elections. On 16 January 1996, just four days before the elections, Hamas declared that the elections should be boycotted because it; “represented the legitimisation of Oslo process, was to take place under the shadow of occupation through which the Israelis maintained control over all aspects of Palestinian liberty, and failed to take into account the Palestinian refugee population in the Diaspora”. Within two days of Hamas making their position public Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP all concurred and published pamphlets to this effect.

In fact, rounds of negotiations were held between the PA and these parties, with Hamas in particular, in Cairo during December 1995 with the aim of convincing Hamas, which took the leading role in the opposition, to change its position. In these negotiations, the PA showed readiness to enable Hamas to take part in the government institutions within the context of the Oslo process. But this position was rejected by Hamas which considered itself unbound by the terms of Oslo, and which also refused to dissolve its military apparatus. This fact left the negotiations between the two sides unproductive, and therefore, Hamas declared boycott for the elections. For these rounds of negotiations see Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 23 December 1995. And for the position of these parties on the elections see Al Nihar on 17 & 19 January 1996.

Despite their principle opposition for Oslo process, the position of these parties toward the electoral law gained the support of some foreign institutions concerned with democratic process, including the International Commission of Jurists, which called on the PA to change the electoral law by introducing a proportional representation system. According to one international foreign observer “...90 percent of the abuses in the elections occurred well before the election itself and took place in full public view.”

Robinson, op.cit., P.196.

Clearly, the majority representation system stipulated by electoral law paved the way for these abuses to take place. Usually, such a system is appropriate for an ideologically and socially homogenous community. However, in the case of an ideologically and socially heterogeneous community, like the Palestinian one, then the most appropriate system is proportional representation. Only this system guarantees the representation of various ideologies and groups in state institutions.

The implementation of a system like the majority representation system, therefore, facilitates the representation of only the dominant ideology or social group, in this case the Fatah party, and the exclusion of other parties and factions from the government institutions. This was to give Arafat- who won the presidency of PA with more than 88% of the votes as apposed to 9.5% of votes for Samiha Khalil, one of the opponents of the Oslo accords, and ran for the presidency alongside Arafat-

Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 22 January & Palestine Report. Vol. 1, no.35, January 24, 1996.

In addition to this problem was the division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into sixteen constituencies. Given the tribal nature of the Palestinian society, this division promoted a tribal or familial fanaticismparticularly in the constituencies dominated by big families such as in Khan Younis where families like Al Aga, Al Farah, Al Astal, Barbakh, and Al Masri (among the ayan) enjoyed historical status.

For example, during the elections one of these families sought to impose their own candidate through illegal means. This happened when relatives of Zakaria Al Aga (who ran the elections on Fatah ticket and won only 800 votes) discovered Al Aga's failure in the elections. In reaction, they sought to replace the ballot box with forged ballots so that he would win. This action provoked the family of Barbakh whose candidate won 7,000 votes, and was placed second after Abdel Al Karim Abu Saleh (who ran the elections on Fatah ticket, and won the highest number of votes estimated at 8,000). Though, legally speaking, Barbakh was the one who should be announced winner, the victor list excluded Barbakh to list Al-Aga instead. Clashes, accordingly, broke out between the members of Barbakh family and the Palestinian police, and left six of Barbakh family wounded.

See Al Bilad on 22 January 1996.

A similar incident occurred in Ramallah constituency when Mustafa El Barghuti, who ran for election on the People's Party ticket was announced as winner, but after about half an hour, the victors’ list was amended to list Marwan El Barghuti (running for election on the Fatah ticket), instead of Mustafa.

Lamis Andoni. “The Palestinian Elections: moving toward Democracy for one-Party Rule”. In Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol XXV, no.3 (Spring 1996), Pp.14-15.

More importantly, it showed that the action of some Palestinians remained guided by principles other than rational ones. The absence of rational-based action among some Palestinians would have negative impacts over the prospects of advancing complete free and fair elections. This problem was not confined only to the electors, but extended to include the candidates, some of whom arrived to the polling stations in the elections days with the intention of influencing the decision of the electors.

Al Nihar on 21 January 1996.

Parallel to these problems was the hostile attitude that the Israeli authorities adopted towards the election. This was most evident in Occupied East Jerusalem and took on a number of different forms. The Israeli authorities prevented the candidates from putting up posters or advertisements on cars. They further restricted the candidates’ capacity to reach the electorate by only allowing them to hold public meeting in certain places.

Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 14 January, & Al Nihar on 15 January 1996.

Despite these problems, the elections had been described by Carl Lidbom, head of the European Union election observers, as “largely fair” and “accurately reflect<ing> the aspirations of the Palestinian voters”.

Palestine Report. Vo. 1, no.35, January 24, 1996.

The inauguration of the Council raised great hopes and expectations among Palestinians. Mohammoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) declared that “the elected Council is five minutes away from the announcement of independence, and the Council will declare independence during its three-year term”.

Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 22 January 1996 & Ibid.

The Standing Order established the PLC’s internal procedures and structure as well as the mechanisms of legislation, accountability, and monitoring. Article 16 provided for the Council’s annual term, starting in March of every year, and divided it into two periods, each lasting for six months. Article 18 specified the attendance of an absolute majority (half the council members plus one) as pre-condition for regarding any session as legal.

The Council sessions were to be alternated between West Bank and Gaza Strip, and two branches for the council were established so that the problem of closure, which denied several West Bank PLC members right to attend the inaugural session in Gaza, is overlapped. See Palestine Report. Vol.2, No.31, January 17, 1997.

Articles 2 & 4 stipulated that at the beginning of each term the council re-elect its “Office Commission” comprised of the council speaker, the speaker’s first and second deputies, and the council secretary-general. The Commission was empowered to supervise all the administrative, financial, legal, information, and public relations issues. More importantly, it was charged with following up the implementation of Council resolutions (Article 11).

The head of the Commission (the Council speaker) is held to represent the Council, and to preside over its sessions. At the inaugural session Nahid Munir El Rayes and Mitri Abu Aita were elected the speaker’s first and second deputy respectively; Rawhi Fatoh was elected the Council’s Secretary-General.

The Council Speaker as well as his two deputies and the secretary general were affiliated with Fatah. Qrieh was elected for Jerusalem constituency, while El Rayes, Abu Aita, Fatoh, were elected for Gaza, Bethlehem, and Rafah constituencies, respectively. See Palestine Report. Vol. 1, No.42, March 15, 1996.

Article 48 of the council’s Standing Order identified two kinds of committees; permanent committees and ad-hoc committees (formed for a specific purpose and terminated upon the conclusion of their work). According to the same article, 11 permanent committees were set up: the Jerusalem affairs committee, the land and settlement committee, the refugees affairs committee, the political committee, the legal committee, the budget and financial affairs committee, the economic committee, the interior committee, the education and social affairs committee, the monitoring and human rights committee, and the Council’s affairs committee.

Any member of the PLC is eligible to nominate themselves for any committees. Usually, the nomination for these committees takes place at the beginning of each term of the PLC. The Council Office Commission, whose members are denied the right to nominate themselves for these committees, is the body which supervises the process of elections for these committees, before presenting the final list of nominees to the Council for final approval (Articles 49 & 51).

The Standing Order also laid down the procedure of legislation, monitoring, and accountability. Articles 65 & 66 stipulated that either the Cabinet or PLC members might propose a draft law, two readings of which would be required. In most circumstances both the relevant and legal committees of the council have the right to review a draft law passed by either the Cabinet or PLC members. Upon the approval of the draft law by these committees, it is presented to council members for first reading approval. An absolute majority is needed to approve the law in its first reading (Art. 69).

Once the draft law is approved at the first reading, it is passed back to both the relevant and legal committees for further possible comments, before being presented to PLC members for second reading approval. If the draft law is approved at the second reading, it is passed to the PLC speaker, who, on behalf of the council, passes it to the PA President for ratification or comments (Art. 70). By virtue of article 71, the President has thirty days to comment or ratify draft laws. If the thirty days passed without word from the President, a draft law is considered in force and formally becomes a law that bounds every Palestinian in the autonomous areas. The PLC’s mechanism of legislation is illustrated in the accompanying diagram.

At the level of monitoring and accountability, article 15 of the Standing Order empowered the PLC to extend/withdraw confidence in the cabinet or in any minister. Article 74 gave the Council the power to approve the PA’s annual budget, and obliged the PA to present the next year’s budget for the PLC two months before the end of the fiscal year. Furthermore, article 75 enabled every member in the PLC to question any minister over any issue of concern, and to call these ministers to testify at the Council sessions.

The PLC’s Standing Order thus set the necessary norms upon which any democratic relation between the executive and legislative body rested. Through these norms, the Standing Order sought to strengthen the principles of accountability and transparency, and more importantly, to transfer to the PLC much of the power that is concentrated in the hands of the PA, in particular in Arafat’s hands. From the council’s point of view, as the preamble of the Standing Order makes clear, this is a pre-condition for building a democratic Palestinian state and achieving independence. The PLC thus considered itself to be engaged in battles on two fronts; the defence of democracy and the struggle for Palestinian national rights.

Toward this end, over the first four years of its inception (March 1996-March 2000/ the last term before the outbreak of the current intifada) the PLC held dozens of sessions and its committees convened vast numbers of meetings producing scores of reports, resolutions, and laws. In the first two years after its inception, for example, the PLC held no fewer than 30 sessions and its committees held around 260 meetings resulting in 72 reports, 92 resolutions, and 35 laws in different political, economic, legal, and social fields.

Palestine Report. Vol. 4, no.38, March 13,1998.

Among the most important laws approved by the PLC over its first four years were the basic law or constitution for the interim period, the law of judiciary, and the NGOs law. The developments concerning these laws, and the means by which these laws were approved by the PLC might serve as empirical evidence to assess the type of relation that developed between the PLC and the PA during the first four years after the PLC’s inception.

A most vital and urgent task of the PLC was the draft of a constitution or basic law for the interim period. Article 3 of the electoral law stipulated that the PLC should, as soon as it was inaugurated, draft a basic law that organizes the relations among the three authorities on the one side, and the relation of these authorities to the people on the other side. Toward this end, the PLC in its session no. 19 of the second term which held in Ramallah on 17 September 1997 approved the law at the second reading and passed it to Arafat for ratification or comment as provided by Article 70 of the PLC’s Standing Order.

Minutes of session no.19 of the second term.

Once again Arafat failed to comment on or ratify the draft law within the due legal period, and from then until the outbreak of the current intifada in September 2000, the law remained blocked, so that Palestinians of the autonomous areas continued to lack constitutional recourse. Arafat’s refusal to ratify the basic law implied his opposition to the principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law, since this principle was the most notable feature of the law that formed up to seven chapters with 112 articles.

The English Text of the Basic Law is cited on <http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?Docld=790&CategoryId=10>

Article 5 structured the governing system as “a democratic parliamentary system based on political and party pluralism.... The government shall be responsible to the president and to the Palestinian legislative council.” Article 6 equalized the status of all Palestinians before the law; “the principle of the rule of law shall be the basis of government in Palestine. All authorities, powers, agencies, institutions and individuals shall be subject to law”. Article 9 lodged great stress on the principle of the rule of law when it considered “all Palestinians...equal under the law and judiciary, without discrimination because of race, sex, colour, religion, political views, or disability.”

Articles 10-33 emphasized basic human rights including civil, political, economic, and social rights: the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of belief and the performance of religious rituals, the right to fair trial, the right to appeal, the prohibition of torture, the right to freedom of movement, the right to proper medical treatment, the right to housing, the right to work, the right to education, the right to political participation, and so forth. While Articles 43-48 asserted the council’s main tasks of legislating, monitoring/accounting to the PA, and approving the PA’s annual budget, article 54 (2) enabled the council speaker to assume the powers and duties of president in case of the president’s absence for 60 days, during which free elections would be held for a new president.

The power and authority of the PLC was balanced by that of the President. Article 55, for example, placed the Palestinian security forces under Presidential command. Furthermore, articles 57-65 & 100 enabled the President to propose, ratify, and promulgate laws, to issue decisions and decrees that have the power of laws, to enjoy the right to pardon or to commute sentence, to appoint a cabinet not exceeding 19 ministers, to appoint the PA’s representatives to foreign countries and international organizations, and to declare a state of emergency without PLC approval for a period not to exceed one month, after which the approval of two thirds of PLC members is required. A self-standing chapter (Articles 88-100) was devoted to judicial authority, asserting the principle of rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.

In short, Arafat seemed unwilling to tolerate any body rivalling his authority even if that body was democratically elected and, like the PLC, expressing the will of the people. Frustrated with Arafat’s position on the basic law, Haider Abdel El Shafi resigned from the PLC on 28 September 1997, protesting what he described as Arafat’s underestimation of the PLC role and his blocking of democracy: “My resignation came as a result of objective considerations and of contemplation as to our concerns and problems.... It is obligatory that the relationship of the Council with the president and his executive apparatus be one of coordination and cooperation on a constitutional basis organized by a basic law for the ratification of which we are still waiting.”

Al Quds on 17 October, 1997 & Abdel Shafi’s letter titled “in the name of Duty and Honesty”, first appeared in Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 17 December 1997. An English translation of the same letter is cited in Palestine Report. Vol. 4, no.29, January 2, 1998.

The basic law was but one sample of the many laws that had been approved by the PLC and remained awaiting Arafat’s ratification. Ra’fat El Najar, a PLC member, confirmed to me that 70-75 laws had waited Arafat ratification since PLC inauguration in 1996 up until 2000.

Interview on 7 October 2004.

Fully aware of this, the majority of the 78 PLC members who attended the eighth session of the PLC in Ramallah in the period of 23-25 June 1998 approved the law of judiciary in the first reading.

Minutes of the eight session of PLC third term, Al Quds on 25 June, and Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 26 June 1998.

Arafat’s refusal to ratify the basic law, as well as others including the law of judiciary, prompted the PLC member Ziad Abu Amr to describe the PLC as “institution to draft laws...without capacity to pressure the PA to comply with these laws”.

Interview on 9 May 1998.

Once again, Arafat refused to ratify the law within the due legal period and, more importantly, rejected article 4 of the law that empowered the Ministry of Justice to licence any NGO in the PA’s autonomous areas. Arafat demanded the Ministry of Interior be empowered with this right. Arafat’s demand was rejected by the PLC in its fifth session of the forth term on 22 May 1999. Instead, the PLC insisted the Ministry of Justice act as the point of reference for any NGO. The PLC's position enjoyed the support of Palestinian NGOs, for whom contribution to PLC’s version of the law was significant during the meeting held between NGOs representatives and members of the PLC’s political committee in Al-Bireh and Ramallah on 20 July 1998 (the meeting being held to discuss the first reading of the law).

Nevertheless, and in a surprising fashion the debate over the law was settled when Ahmed Qrieh (better known as Abu Ala’) announced during a special session convened on 12August 1999 by the PLC to discuss the PA’s 1999 budget that the law would incorporate Arafat's comments regarding force. However Qrieh, by then the PLC’s Speaker, claimed that the voting on Arafat's comments which had taken place during the 22 May session was insufficient; only 37 members out of the 50 who attended that session had vetoed the comments, making the vote unsuccessful for lack of the necessary absolute majority (half of the 88 PLC members + 1) stipulated in article 71 of the PLC’s Standing Order.

While Qrieh’s claim was correct from a legal point of view, it was also correct in that there was in fact no absolute majority present to accept the comments of Arafat. The time and the manner in which Qrieh made his announcement reflected this fact. Kamal al-Shrafi, who headed the PLC’s Monitoring Committee, pointed out that Qrieh’s announcement occurred “while members were leaving the hall at the end of the session...no one was paying attention”. Mawaia El Masri, a PLC member, confirmed al-Shrafi's observation by adding that “what happened evidences the partnership that had developed between PA and the council speaker and other members”.

Interview on 20 August 1999.

The partnership between the PA and some members of PLC was necessary for Arafat to implement his system of neopatrimonial. As we have seen in chapter III (Pp. 161-174) the success of this system is reliant on the absence of any prescribed legal norms that might restrains the patron’s action. In our case the prescribed legal norms were the Basic Law, the law of Judiciary, and the PLC version of the NGOs law. The blockage of the basic law meant that Arafat was free from any constraints over his action. While the blockage of the law of judiciary meant that there was no independent judiciary, and thus, the abrogation of the central pillar of the rule of law. Furthermore, the enactment of the NGOs law according to Arafat version meant that Arafat had personal supervision and control over the work of these institutions since he was the one who held the interior profile. All of this would enable Arafat to:

1. Rule by law instead of the rule of law. In the later case all citizens are treated as equal before law, while in the former case the law is selectively invoked and implemented according to Arafat’s own interests. In such circumstances Arafat’s clique or ‘clients’ benefit the most, since they can stand above the law, and thereby enjoy enormous privileges.
   

2. The previously mentioned situation encourages a social conflict in which various social groups engage in stiff competition to gain the patronage of the patron (or Arafat) since this is the only way to enjoy access to power and wealth. Consequently, the patron can remain the centre of gravity, and the one who ultimately controls the strings of the game. But because the sustainability of this system remains reliant on the ability of the patron to control the public fund, and to control the decision with regards to its distribution, Arafat and his authority, as we will see in the next section, abrogated PLC’s attempts to regulate the decision making process with regards to how the budgets are presented and approved.

According to article 74 of PLC’s Standing Order the Cabinet is legally obliged to present the next year’s budget to PLC two months before the end of the fiscal year.

On 3 August 1998, Arafat ratified the so called “the law of Public finance”. Article 3 of the law obliged the cabinet to present the next year’s budget to PLC two months before the end of the fiscal year. In case the budget, for one reason or other, had not been approved by PLC, then Minister of Finance is empowered to spend at rate of around 8% (1/12) of previous year’s monthly expenditure for up to three months (art. 4). See Al Waqaea’, op.cit., no. 25, 5^th year, 24/9/1998.

February 1997 during which a threat to pass non-confidence motion if the budget was not presented within two weeks, was made.

Al Hayat Al Jadeeda & Al Quds on 5 February 1997.

In early March, PLC convened the session scheduled to pass a motion of non-confidence in the Cabinet after the later failed to pass the budget by the set deadline. But no vote to withdraw confidence took place after Qrieh, PLC speaker, informed PLC members that he received a letter from Ahmed Abdel El Rahaman, Secretary General of the Cabinet, asking for further time slot to pass the budget. Dawood Al Zir, the secretary of budget and financial affairs committee, considered the letter an “indicator of the Cabinet’s manipulation and underestimation of PLC’s role...

Al Ayyam on 7 March 1997.

The PLC’s Standing Order obliges the committee to report the PLC over the budget, so that PLC could decide whether to approve/disapprove it. Toward this end, the committee convened a meeting for its members on 23 March after which a report on the budget was presented to PLC.

Ibid, on 24 March 1997.

In addition, the committee highlighted the revenue of the semi-monopolies- like the Palestinian Company for Trade Services (Cement Company), the Palestinian Development & Investment Company, the Petroleum General Commission, and Tobacco Commission. In this connection, the committee asserted that the revenue of these monopolies was not connected to the central auditing system of ministry of finance according to the law,

Extraction of the committee report is cited in Palestine Report. Vol. 3, no.1, June 13, 1997.

The approval of the PLC for the 1997’s budget, notwithstanding the budget’s deficits highlighted by the financial affairs committee, might be justified since the 1997’s budget was the first to be debated between PLC and PA, and therefore the PLC might seek to avoid confrontation with the PA, in the hope that it (Cabinet) would respect the due legal time and not committee the same mistakes in presenting the 1998’s budget. But the developments concerning the 1998’s budget showed that the ministry of finance had neither corrected the deficit of the 1997’s budget, nor the Cabinet respected the due legal time for the presentation of the budget.

In a similar fashion to 1997’s budget, the Cabinet passed the 1998 budget to PLC in March 1998, five months after it was legally due.

Minutes of the third session of PLC third term on 30 March 1998.

On 14 June, the PLC convened its scheduled session. But in a similar fashion of 1997’s budget, PLC speaker informed PLC members that he received a letter from Arafat asking for further time slot, and promising a Cabinet reshuffle at the end of June. Accordingly, PLC refrained from passing motion of non-confidence in the Cabinet waiting the promised reshuffle. Though the promised reshuffle was not announced before August, PLC, after being informed by Al Kruz that the Cabinet approved most of the committee amendments but not those related to the semi-monopolies, approved the budget on 29 June with majority of 37, 22 objections, and 6 abstentions.

Arabic News on I July 1998. Internet English edition <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily7day/980701/1998970118.html>

PLC’s approval of 1998’s budget, and its failure to adopt any serious measure against PA’s disregard of the legal norms, encouraged the Cabinet, once again, not to respects these norms, and to pass 1999’s budget on 5 April 1999, six months after it was legally due.

Al Ayyam, Al Quds, Al Hayat Al Jadeeda, on 6 April 1999

In a report presented to PLC on 21 April, al-Shu’abyi criticized the high rate of the PA’s operational expenses (e.g., postage, phones, business travel, utilities and printing, and so forth), and the irrational appointments in the Palestinian bureaucracy which, according to him, were very harm to PA treasury, and denied important ministries like health, and education, the sufficient fund to supply people with proper health, and education services. Consequently, he called PA to rationalize the bureaucracy through enacting a civil service law, and to connect the revenue of the semi-monopolies to the central auditing system of ministry of finance according to the law.

Al Quds on 22 April 1999.

Al-Shu’abyi’s criticisms of the budget forced the Cabinet to amend some of the budget’s items through allocating further NIS 2 million (about US$ 500,000) to the ministry of health, and cutting some NIS 36 million (about US$ 9 million) from the operational expenses.

Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 15 July 1999 & Palestine Report. Vol. 6, no.8, August 11, 1999.

In November, upon a various meetings held with representatives of PA apparatuses including the ministry of finance, al-Shu’abyi confirmed to PLC, during a session held to discuss the extent of the Cabinet commitment to the proposed amendments, that the Cabinet failed to implement any of the proposed amendments, and consequently, he recommended, in a report presented to the PLC speaker Qrieh, to pass motion of non- confidence in the Cabinet.

Ibid on 27 October & Al Ayyam on 15 November 1999.

The developments concerning the budgets of the first three years (1997, 1998, 1999), and the budget of the forth year (2000) which was passed to PLC in January 2000, three months after it was legally due,

Ibid on 27 January 2000.

Continuously, PLC members blame PA for blocking democratic transformation and stifling the rule of law. Youssef Abu Safiah, a PLC member, described the relation of PLC with PA as “abnormal....since most of PLC resolutions, and some of its laws, had not been implemented....it is well known that there is always competition between the executive and legislative authority...in the Palestinian situation PA is seeking to marginalize the PLC”.

Interview on 7 May 1998.

The failure of PLC to pressure the PA to comply with its Standing Order, and to enact the basic law and other laws, was not only due to PA’s underestimation of democratic principles, but also to PLC’s structure and its failure to build strong ties with its constituencies. While the former factor (PLC’s structure) left PLC missing the will to adopt any serious measure against PA’s regular underestimation of democratic principles, the later factor (its failure to build strong ties with its constituencies) left it as a victim to PA’s manipulations. Similar to any legislature, the PLC was franchised right to hold the executive body accountable by means of motions of no-confidence, ad-hoc committees of inquiry, and other methods of monitoring. But the problem of PLC in this respects is that it is neither structurally nor culturally able to effectively use such methods.

At the head of PLC stood the Fatah affiliated Qrieh as speaker, and Rohi Fatoh as secretary. Both men are considered as loyalists to Arafat, and were elected speaker and secretary respectively for four consecutive years. The other two members of PLC Office Commission were either a Fatah-affiliated or close to Fatah. During the first term, for example, Nahid El Rayes (a Fatah affiliated PLC member) and Mitri Abu Aita (independent close to Fatah) were elected the first and second deputies of the speaker respectively.

Palestine Report. Vol 1, no.42, March 15, 1996.

As far as the political affiliation of PLC members is concerned, most of PLC members, as we have seen, are affiliated with Fatah or close to Fatah. Furthermore, all the Palestinian factions and parties that might challenge Arafat’s policy and rule (like PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and so on) had not been represented in the PLC after they boycotted the elections. This fact, according to Abu Safiah, left the structure of PLC as “[a] one-party structure...and consequently, PLC lacked a well organized bloc of opposition.”

Interview on 7 May 1998.

However, the fact that PLC is dominated by Fatah affiliated members does not imply an organized bloc of support for PA or Arafat. In the words of Hanan Ashrawi, who ran the elections as independent and won the highest number of votes after Qrieh for Jerusalem constituency, “everybody who is in the council is not really part of the opposition in the sense that they are against the peace process. Those in the traditional opposition did not participate in the election. So what you have are different degrees of agreement and different perspectives and approaches...”

Palestine Report. Vol.2, no.31, January 17, 1997.

On 8-9 May 1996, for example, PLC held stormy session in Rafah south of Gaza strip, addressing the day-to-day problems of Palestinians. Among the issues which were discussed were Hamas’ prisoners in PA’s various detention centers. At that session the PLC adopted a resolution calling PA to release these prisoners and others.

Ibid., Vo.1, no.50, May 17, 1996.

When Arafat presented his Cabinet to PLC in June 1996, Marwan Kanafi, former advisor of Arafat who was elected for Gaza constituency on Fatah ticket, protested PA’s disregard of PLC’s resolutions, and attacked Arafat by accusing him of breaking the electoral law stipulating 80% of cabinet ministers from PLC. Only 60% of the ministers in Arafat’s 1996 Cabinet were PLC members.

Ibid., Vol.2, No.2, June 13, 1996.

The debate around the 1996’s Cabinet might reveal important fact about PLC’s structure. Although some PLC members might stand as opponents for PA’s disregard of the democratic principles and legal norms, these members remain missing the support and backing of their colleagues in the council. Most of these colleagues, who prefer not to go in direct confrontation with Arafat, refrain from supporting any serious measure against PA like the passing of motion of non-confidence. Abed Rabu Abu Uwn, a PLC member, estimates the number of these colleagues at 53 out of 84 PLC members (three PLC members died, and one resigned “Haider Abdel El Shafi”). This means that no less than 63% of the PLC members are considered, in the words of Abu Awn, “Arafat loyalists and clients”.

Interview. On 6 October 2004.

The PLC member Nabil Amr, for instance, ruled out Arafat’s failure to ratify the basic law as indicator of his disregard of democratic principles. In his view, Arafat failed to ratify the law “because the law dealt with issues that are of dispute with Israel”.

Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 31 December 1997.

This fact was accompanied with the rise of networks of interests between some other PLC members and PA officials. These networks of interests were the logical outcome of a PA deliberated policy sought to block the media reports on PLC activities. Due to this policy, people were very little aware over PLC achievements and activities, and consequently, their attitude toward PLC was a negative one. The voice of Palestine, the official Radio of PA, is the only media station that is permitted to cover PLC sessions.

Palestine Report. Vol.2, no.31, 17 January 1997.

Even when PLC seeks to work out its own media station so that general public became fully aware over its activities and achievements, its endeavours in this regards are abrogated. In 1997, for instance, the PLC, with financial support from USAID (United States Agency for International Development), established its own Television Station in Al Quds Education University to broadcast its sessions and activities. No less than six sessions of PLC were aired, before the broadcasts being jammed off by the Palestinian Broadcasting Company (PBC), the official T.V of PA. Following this, Dawood Kuttab, a Palestinian with American citizenship who was entrusted to run the station, was detained by the Palestinian security forces for a week before being released upon American intervention.

Palestine Report. Vol. 2, no.49, May 16, 1997 & Jerusalem Post on 26 & 28 May 1997.

Being unaware over what PLC is, and what PLC’s major tasks are, general public pressured PLC members to play intermediary role between them and policy/law implementation officials, including bureaucracy’s officials. PLC members, seeking to recruit public support for their “battle” with PA, welcomed this role, and consequently, their tasks were confined, in some occasions, to assist public and their relatives in finding job in a given ministry, or to facilitate these public/relatives’ contact with a given ministry or public institution. As the PLC member Rawia El Shawa pointed out; “People weak awareness over the role of PLC...forced PLC to play other roles alongside its roles of legislation, accountability, and monitoring”.

Interview on 24 April 1998.

Similar to any legislature the PLC owned enjoyed the methods that would enable it to hold the executive body accountable, and to set limits on it’s transgressions. These methods were institutionalized by PLC’s Standing Order, and basic law. Among these methods were the questions, the ad-hoc committees of inquiry, and motion of non-confidence. Over first four years of it’s inception, the PLC directed hundreds of questions to ministers, security officials, and other policy/law implementation officials on different issues related to the operations of their ministries and services provided to people. During the second term, for instance, the PLC directed around 183 questions to these officials.

Palestine Report. Vol. 4, no.38, March 13, 1998.

In some occasions, PLC went further and directed questions to policy/law implementation officials over issues related to misuse of power and corruption. But these questions remained a matter of parliamentary practice without being followed by effective measures punishing those who were said to be involved in misuse of power and corruption.

On 23 January 1997, for instance, the PLC questioned the minister of supply Abdel Aziz Shaheen over the so called “the flour scandal”, in which Shaheen alongside the minister of finance were said to be involved in a scheme led to the selling of 5,000 tons of expired flour to public. Though Shaheen testified before PLC at that session, he refrained from attending another session scheduled for further discussion over the same issue. No measure was taken against Shaheen or the minister of finance, despite the assertion of some PLC members, like Kamal al Shrafi, head of the monitoring committee, that “an amount of the flour was donated to our people and we are interested to know where that mount went. Did the money go to the PA or to pockets of some officials”?

Palestine Report. Vol.2, No.33, January 24, 1997.

In the same token, the PLC formed several ad-hoc committees of inquiry over issues related to misuse of power and corruption. But the findings and resolutions of these committees remained unimplemented, either due to PLC’s failure to follow up these findings and resolutions, or to PA’s underestimation of these resolutions. Of particular concern in this regard is the PLC ad-hoc committee which was formed in 1997 to investigate corruption and misuse of power in various PA ministries and apparatus. The committee was inspired by the 600 pages report of General Monitoring Commission (GMC) which pointed out that some US$ 323 million-almost 40% of PA’s 1996 budget- were misused and mismanaged by PA’s politicians and senior officials.

Jerusalem Post on 25 May 1997.

On 31 May 1997, the committee initiated its investigation. In it’s investigation, the committee was assisted by sub-committees set up for the purpose of carrying out field investigation in all ministries and public institutions mentioned by GMC report, and gathering the necessary documents and reports that might serve the committee in it’s investigation. In addition, the committee sent at least 40 letters for all the ministers and public officials who were said to be involved in corruption and misuse of power by GMC’s report, asking them to testify before it. Some of these ministers and officials had testified before the committee, and other refused. Among these ministers was Nabil Sha’ath, minister of Planning and International Cooperation, who was interrogated for about six hours by the committee.

According to the committee member Youssef Abu Safiah in Interview on 26 May 1998.

On 29 July, the committee reported its findings to PLC. In its report, the committee asserted that some ministers, in particular to Nabil Sha’ath, Ali Qawasmeh, minister of Transportation, and Jamil El Tarafi, minister of Civil Affairs, were involved in misuse of power and corruption. Consequently, it called Arafat to dismiss these minister and others suspected of corruption, and to form new Cabinet from “technocratic and qualified professionals”.

Excerpts of the committee report are cited on Palestine Report. Vol.3, no.8, August 1, 1997.

Furthermore, the committee highlighted the institutional weakness of PA as far as PA’s financial system is concerned. In this regards, it mentioned to the ministry of finance’s lack of well defined procedure with respect to public expenditure. In addition, the committee criticized the involvement of some PA officials in trade activities in violation for the law. In this respects, it shed light on the semi-monopolies that operate outside PA’s regular budget, and demanded to subjecting the revenue of these monopolies to the central auditing system of ministry of finance.

Ibid., Vol.3, no.9, August 8, 1997.

The findings of the committee were the hardest blow for PA’s ministers and officials, most of who refused to deal with them, asserting them “lies” and far from reality. Due to the ministers opposition of the findings, Arafat called PLC to set up another committee to review the findings of the former one, and to invite all ministers opposing the findings of the first committee to justify themselves before the new committee. Accordingly, a committee of nine PLC members was set up, and held various rounds of hearing with all the concerned ministers. According to El Krunz, and Abu Safiah, who joint the new committee, these rounds of hearings left little doubt among the committee’s members that those ministers had been involved in misuse of power and corruption.

Interview with Youssef Abu Safiah on 26 June, and Sa’di El Krunz on 15 July 1998.

Following the two PLC ad-hoc committee findings, PLC convened various meetings with Arafat pressuring for fundamental reform. Arafat, who promised a Cabinet reshuffle, was in a serious stalemate when some sixteen ministers of his Cabinet preceded the promised reshuffle, and announced resignation in December 1997.

Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 31 December 1997.

Corruption and misuse of power for Arafat, therefore, are a matter of mistakes that might take place in any government. Though Arafat’s view might be correct, it is incorrect that those accused of corruption and misuse of power should be not punished. Arafat’s Cabinet of 5 August 1998 implied the contrary.

See the presidential decree no.2 for the year 1998 concerning the Cabinet in Al Waqaea’, op.cit., no.26, 5^th year, 26/11/1998.

Furthermore, and in clear violation for article 65 of the Basic law stipulating that “the Cabinet shall comprise of Ministers not to exceed Nineteen Ministers...,” Arafat stepped up the ministerial positions from 23 to 31. New seven ministers were added, most notable were Sa’di El Krunz, who chaired PLC’s committee to investigate corruption, and Youssef Abu Safiah, member of the same committee. Moreover, two of his most critics were fired; Abdel El Jawad Salah, who was demoted from minister of Agriculture to minister without Portfolio, and therefore, refused to join the new Cabinet; and Hanan Ashrawi, who turned the post of minister of Tourism down. Simply Arafat bought off the allegiance of the most active members of PLC committee to investigate corruption (El Krunz and Abu Safiah), and release himself from the pressure of those who are committed to real reform (Saleh and Ahsrawi).

When PLC, in a special session held in Ramallah on 5-9 August 1998, and attended by 86 members, approved the Cabinet with a majority of 55 members, 28 in opposition, and 3 abstentions,

Minutes of PLC’s Third Term, in particular Minutes of the Special session held in Ramallah on 5-9 August, 1998.

In fact, here lies the tragedy of Palestinians. It is true that PA’s policies are blocking the democratic transformation in Palestine. But this does not imply that PLC members were very committed to democratic transformation. In fact the contrary was the case. For instance, around 49 PLC members, according to Ra’fat El Najar, committed not to vote in favour of the ministers who were charged by misuse of power. These members did so during a private meeting of PLC members convened just few days before the scheduled date of the PLC session which passed motion of confidence in Arafat cabinet. However, and in a surprising fashion, at least 25 out of the 49 PLC members failed to meet their commitments and voted in favour of Arafat’s cabinet.

Ra’fat El Najar, Interview on 7 October 2004.

Consequently, the crisis of democratic transformation in Palestine is not only related to PA’s failure to respect the democratic norms, but extended to include the failure of PLC members to respect these norms including the basic law which stipulates, for instance, the Cabinet with 19 Ministers not 31 as the PLC-approved Cabinet showed. In approving the Cabinet, PLC, therefore, was participating in an equal footing with PA in disregarding these norms, and confiscating the right of Palestinians to have legitimate political institutions. As El Najar pointed to the German Neue Zürcher Zeitung “how could anyone expect the Rais (Arafat) to take this body seriously...when it does not even implement it’s own decisions and the motion of censure?.”

Neue Zürcher Zeitung on 22/23 April 2000. Internet English edition <http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/background2000/background0004/bg000422g...>

Furthermore, in approving the Cabinet the PLC was unwilling to response to people’s wishes and demands. At least 38% of Palestinians believed that the PLC should not pass vote of confidence in the Cabinet, as against 31% who believed the opposite. In addition, 33% of them believed that the new Cabinet will increase corruption in various PA apparatus, as against 23% who believed the opposite. Moreover, 32% supported the resignation of Ashrawi and Saleh as against 26% who opposed it.

See JMCC’s Poll no.28, August 1998. Online <http://www.jmcc.org>

More importantly, the approval of the Cabinet meant the release of PA from any constraints imposed on it by what Jose’ Maravall and Adam Przeworski call “horizontal mechanisms”

Jose’ Mar’ia Maravall & Adam Przeworski (ed.,). Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, P.9.

The assault took place while these members, alongside human rights activists, journalists, and others, were assembling before the house of a Hamas activist escaped a Preventive Security Forces detention centre in Jericho. The assembly was protesting a siege imposed on the family of this activist by the preventive security forces. While PLC members were protesting against this measure, a number of West Bank preventive security forces attacked them. These members were; Abed Rabu Abu Uwn (elected for Rafah constituency), Jamal El Hindi (elected for Jenin constituency), Suleiman El Roumi (elected for Rafah constituency), Ahmad El Batish (elected for Jerusalem constituency), and Hassan Abdel El Qader (elected for Jerusalem constituency).

Interview with Abed Rabu Abu Uwn, a PLC member, 6 October 2004.

However, from PLC’s point of view, the attack was an unprecedented event, and clear underestimation of its members’ immunity. Consequently, PLC held special session in Ramallah on 30 August in which a committee to investigation the event was set up.

Palestine Report. Vol. 5, no.12, September 4, 1998.

The committee meetings with the mentioned security officials had, as it seems, bore no fruit since, following these meetings, the case was brought before a Military court to decide on the issue. Ironically, the court treated the assaulted PLC members on equal footing with those who were accused of the attack, and summoned both parties to show up. Having heard the testimonies of both parties, the court was said to adopt some measures against those involved in the attack but not against the head of West Bank preventive security forces Jibril Al Rajub who commands these forces.

Ibid.

As Abu Awn himself pointed out; “in the aftermath of the attack, I was called by Arafat for a meeting with him…During our meeting I told him what happened. Arafat in turn promised to punish Al Rajub. But unfortunately, no measure was taken against Al Rajub, and the findings of the PLC committees which called for trying him were to no vein”.

Interview with Abed Rabu Abu Uwn, a PLC member, 6 October 2004.

Despite it’s failure, over the first three terms (March 1996-March 1999), to enact a constitution (the Basic Law), and other important laws like the law of judiciary, and to hold the PA accountable, the PLC remained (at least theoretically speaking), representing the public will, and therefore, was a legitimate body. But from 4 May 1999 onwards, PLC was no longer enjoying this privilege. As Article III of Oslo II stipulated, PLC and the president of the executive authority should be elected for the transitional or the interim period that elapses on 4 May 1999. Article II of the Palestinian electoral law reaffirmed the mandate of both PLC and the president of PA for a period no exceeds the interim period.

Consequently, the Oslo process and the electoral law, according to which the PLC was elected, confined PLC’s mandate to the interim period. The main problem is that; both Oslo process as well as the electoral law had not hinted what should be done after the elapse of this period. In other words, it was not clear whether Palestinians should hold new elections, or whether new bodies would replace the interim period-created bodies like the PLC.

This legal dilemma resulted mainly from Oslo process’ assumption stipulating that by 4 May 1999, negotiations over the third status issues (Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, international relations, and others) would be concluded with agreement ensuring the implementation of the UN security council resolutions of 242, 338, and consequently, with a Palestinian state with new political institutions and constitution. Therefore, it seems that both Palestinian and Israeli negotiator were guided by this assumption, and thus, were unaware over other possible scenarios like the elapse of the interim period without an agreement over the final status issues.

The elapse of the interim period without Palestinian state on WBGS promoted serious legal questions as far as the future and legitimacy of the interim period-created institutions are concerned. On 20 April 1999, the political committee of PLC announced the termination of these institutions’ mandate, and called for new presidential and parliamentary elections on 4 May, 1999.

Palestine Report. Vol. 5, no.43, April 30, 1999.

The call of the political committee and Kanafi for new elections sought to renew PLC’s mandate and legitimacy. But their demand in this regards was missing the support of PLC itself which failed to make any single move toward new legislative and presidential elections.

The full text of PLC’s statement is cited on Palestine Report. Vol. 5, no.43, April 30, 1999.

With this failure, coupled with it’s loss of the main source of it’s legitimacy (the people), the PLC started attaching itself to PA as the only source of it’s legitimacy. The way the PLC turned against it’s members who signed the “The Statement of Twenty” in November 1999 might be the best example that shows not only how PLC had attached itself to PA, but also how some of PLC members became looking for other institutional formula far from PLC to express their discontent and frustration with PA’s policies.

On 27 November 1999, eight PLC members

These members are: Abdel El Jawad Saleh, Fakhri Turkman, Mawaia El Masri, Husam Khader, Hassan Khrisha, Ali Abu Reesh, Rawia El Shawa, Ra’fat El Najar. See Palestine Report. Vol. 6, no.24, December 1, 1999.

Following this statement, PA security forces initiated a large-scale wave of arrest against those who signed it including; Abdel El Sattar Qassim, a professor of political science at Al Najah University of Nablus, Dr.Yasser Abu Safiah from Nablus, Adel Samara, a professor of Economics in Ramallah, Dr. Abdel El Rahim Kittani from Tulkarm, and Ahmed Qatamesh, national public figure, and the one who survived the longest ever under Israeli administrative detention. Furthermore, a house arrest was imposed on Bassam El Shaka, Nablus’s ex-mayor.

Law’s Press Release on 28 November 1999 & Al Quds Al Arabi on 29 November 1999.

On 28 November, PLC held a stormy session in Gaza to discuss the measures that should be taken against these members. The session concluded with a manifesto describing the statement as “attempt to drag Palestinians into civil war”, and threatened to leave immunity over PLC members who signed it if they did not retreat their accusation, and apologize for Arafat.

Al Quds Al Arabi on 2 December 1999.

Ironically enough, the “Statement of Twenty” had only reaffirmed what had been stated in GMC report, and the report of PLC’s committee to investigate corruption in 1997. Both reports were approved by the PLC, and the latter one was drafted by PLC members. Consequently, there was no reason for PLC to condemn the statement unless it turned against itself and against it’s committees that constitute the building blocks of its institutional identity as a legislature. Actually this happened. Once the PLC condemned the “Statement of Twenty”, it condemned the report of its committee to investigate corruption, and any other report and resolutions calling for the rationalization of the Palestinian public institutions.

Providing this, one will have little doubt over the failure of PLC committee (which was formed on 24 December 1999 to investigate the attack on Saleh,

Al Ayyam on 31 December 1999.

However, it seems unlikely that those accused of the attack were brought before justice since Khrisha statement was made after around nine months of the attack, and therefore, if this long period passed without bringing those accused of the attack before justice, when one should expect this will happen? Even if those accused of the attack were brought before justice, are they the only party which is to be held responsible on the attack or there are other parties like their commanders, and head of Intelligence in Jericho? Whether those parties involved in the attack were brought before justice or not, the occurrence of the attack, which was the second in kind, displayed further PLC’s failure to protect its members and to preserve their immunity. PLC’s failure to do so culminates a long series of failures accumulated over the first four years of its inception.

Over these years, PLC failed to enact a constitution that governs the relation of the ruling authorities from one side, and the relation of these authorities with people from the other side. PLC’s failure in this regards went in parallel to its failure to bound PA with the legal procedure of handling the annual budgets, and implementing hundreds of its resolutions.

Although the PLC enjoyed the tools that would enable it to hold PA accountable, the PLC, as it seems, lacked the will to use these tools. Mawaia El Masri pointed out that “the PLC did not use the motion of non-confidence in any session of the first four terms (1996-2000)...a matter which confirms its lack of will to do so”.

Interview on 20 August 2000.

PLC’s approval of Arafat’s Cabinet of 1998 might be the most telling illustration of PLC’s crisis in this respect. In spite of the fact that the Cabinet included the ministers who were charged with corruption by the 1997 PLC committee to investigate corruption, the PLC, surprisingly bowed for PA’s wishes and approved the Cabinet. This fact encouraged PA to escalate it’s violation of the legal norms. The escalation of PA’s violation of the legal norms was very evident when PA’s security forces attacked PLC members in August 1998.

With the elapse of the interim period, and the failure of PLC to force the PA to hold new legislative and presidential elections, PLC’s identity as elected legislature that represents public will have collapsed. Consequently, the PLC had no options but to attach itself to PA as its main source of power, and therefore, to become client for PA. This was clear when PLC threatened to leave immunity on its members who signed the statement of twenty, though the statement was not more than a re-affirmation of what had been stated in the report of the PA-created GMC, and the followed report of PLC committee to investigate corruption.

Accordingly, when Abdel El Jawad Saleh was attacked by the General Intelligence Forces in December 1999, PLC’s chance to hold those who were accused of the attack accountable was very weak. Because of this and other things, the PLC member Ra’fat El Najar did not hesitate to declare in April 2000 that “the situation in the Palestine Legislative Council is even worse than anyone could imagine”.

Neue Zürcher Zeitung on 22/23 April 2000, op.cit.,