D Practical section: Feysen101 Busana Muslim - Reconciling the global-local dilemma by means of understanding cultural peculiarities

Summary Orientation to practical applicability of research is important, specifically with the objective of making the cultural insights on consumer behaviour and marketing (which were researched in the framework of the integrative, multidimensional analytical diagram of intercultural marketing) available. The purpose of this case-study is firstly to explain by means of example which solutions globally-operating companies in foreign cultural contexts have at their disposal to diffuse the dilemma between global marketing strategies and local consumer behaviour, and secondly to demonstrate how a company can successfully confront changes in intercultural practices (outer ring of the structuralist model of culture) i.e. how it can exploit changed consumer needs to its advantage. The case-study reveals how a company - in this case Unilever Indonesia - can continue to be relevant for local consumers in a changed cultural environment, (the outer layer of the structuralist model of culture) via local adaptation of a global brand and its product portfolio. The case-study makes clear that companies need not refrain from the seemingly uncontrollable element “culture” in the marketing environment, but should embrace culture elements in the sense of intercultural marketing in order to optimize company success, provided the company has the necessary expertise at its disposal to assess the cultural environment in the respective target markets. The case-study shows that the knowledge gleaned from the integrative multidimensional analytical diagram on the respective society or group and its culture (step 1) can not replace a differentiated knowledge of the practices, the outer rings of the structuralist model of culture (step 2). This second step will now be taken on the basis of this field study.

D.1  Course of action


After having presented and discussed the analytical diagram which deals with the inner layer of culture (structuralist model of culture), the analysis of the Indonesian market sphere will be resumed, in which the three outer rings or layers of the structuralist model of culture, practices (symbols, heroes and rituals) will be examined more closely with the aid of this case-study. This is necessary as alone knowledge of the country-specific orientations is inadequate to implement successful intercultural marketing strategies. The reason for this is that although the orientations provide important insights into the cultural and social environment of a market, into how consumers generally deal in society, and how they must be addressed from an advertising viewpoint, the analytical diagram reveals neither information concerning respective trends in the target country nor product or market preferences which, in addition, underlie short term changes. Intercultural marketing strategists have to develop short to mid term strategies to win new consumers profitably and competitively after having analyzed and internalized certain consumer attitudes and behavioural patterns. The figure (D-1) explains this interlocked procedure.

Figure D-1 Procedure overview (Part C and D)

It can be confirmed that step 1 has been completed for Indonesia. In the course of this practical section, the social mixture (life world of consumers) will be analyzed in step 2 before step 3 will focus on the product developed by Unilever and its market launch. In step 1 the orientations were analyzed, and how the respective bias of the orientation influences consumer behaviour, and how marketing should react to it were also analyzed. In step 2 how practices changed over time will be analyzed via the re-Islamization example. How a company can react to such changes in practices will be shown in step 3 in the Sunsilk case-study.

D.2 Social mixture102 – Part of the “practices” and source for intercultural marketing

D.2.1  Preliminary remarks


The following chapter serves as an introduction to the social mixture with which Unilever Indonesia is confronted. The term “social mixture“ represents practices - symbols, heroes, rituals - (the outer layer of the structuralist model of culture). This starting position led the concern to develop a new product within the Sunsilk global brand range. Case studies normally do not commence with a detailed presentation of the local social and cultural situation. However, since this work aims to demonstrate a novel approach which embraces the understanding of foreign cultural aspects, the cultural factors will be dealt with properly. Moreover, these cultural factors are the springboard of Unilever’s strategy. Besides culturally pertinent insights, this work also reveals the following: while culture helps to understand a society’s consumer behaviour (as outlined in the analytical diagram), the reverse is true as well: observation of a society’s consumer behaviour illuminates aspects of culture. In the case of Indonesia, the transformation of clothing behavioural trends (which provides conclusions concerning behaviour in the analytical diagram) among Muslim Indonesians will be analyzed in the context of re-Islamization.

D.2.2 Re-Islamization in Indonesia and its ramifications on consumers

D.2.2.1  The new Islamic middle class: The target group of the Unilever Group

The social groups, often known as “The New Rich in Asia“, “bourgeoisie“, or “middle class“, which have benefited from the process of economic transformation in many parts of Asia, and thus expanding in scope, have aroused the interest of various scientific disciplines since the 1990s (for example: Becker, Rüland, Werz 1999; Gerke 1995; Gerke 2000; Gerke and Evers 1999; Horstmann 1997; Robison 1995; Sen and Stivens 1998; Robison and Goodman 1996; Chua 2000, 2003; Loh 1998; Pinches 1999; Tanter and Young 1990). What is conspicuous is the focus of many of these works, namely their preoccupation with how this social group finds a way to create a lifestyle and a stratum-specific identity with the aim of distancing itself from other social groups. One of these methods is the consumption of goods, the use and display of which are designed to manifest lifestyles and to invent identities.


In the 1990s the Indonesian population found themselves in the midst of radical transformation processes, caused by high economic growth and its accompanying changes (employment structure, level of urbanization) (Wie 2002: 194-242). For the first time the proportion of the population in the primary sector fell to below 50%, whereas employment in the especially profitable secondary sector rose rapidly (Robison 1996: 79) as a result of direct foreign investment. This created wealth was apparent outside the economy, e.g. in the construction of luxurious apartment buildings (Appendix 1, Figure 253-285) and huge shopping centres (Appendix 1, Figure 288-297) (Dewanto und Uning 2003: 52-53), as well as the registration figures of motorbikes and automobiles (Robison 1996: 80). Owing to the economic upturn and the induced social metamorphosis, in the 1990s various means of creating an identity had emerged, which, owing to the economic, political and social crises in Indonesia underlay a further transformation, which endowed religion and its symbolism a greater role in the construction of identity and process of distinguishing oneself from others.

In 2006, almost a decade after the end of the Soeharto regime and the induction of democratization and liberalization of the country, it can be observed that Unilever’s target group is the members of the new Indonesian middle class. This middle class was partly robbed of its material wealth as a result of the Asian crisis; it relies heavily on religion and no longer shows its belonging to a social level exclusively through western consumer goods, fashion and brands. This transformation in evaluative behaviour, and the need for extreme piety, do not exclude the profane world of consumption, media and advertising. Even globally-operating companies, so often accused of myopia when it comes to cultural differences, respond to this increased piety among the Indonesian middle class with Islam-customized products and advertising campaigns. An analysis of lifestyles in the new Indonesian middle class and its comparison in the course of time, enable crucial societal diagnostic statements to be made which intercultural marketing can fall back on when deciding on strategies.

Globalization, the Asian crisis and its repercussions on the Indonesian middle class


Diverse globalization processes have influenced the Indonesian middle class and its life planning since the mid-nineties and culminated with the 1997-98 crisis (for example: Anata 2000: 3-27; Schwarz 1999: 49-70). On the one hand, market internationalization and increased domestic local competition in Indonesia led to transfer of production to cheaper countries such as Vietnam and China (Nguyen und Richter 2003: 1-14). Furthermore the foreign direct investment (FDI) which had improved the employment situation waned significantly (Trinh 2005: 2-38). Pressure on Indonesian working class society increased and rapidly escalating unemployment in the well-educated middle class led to crises. Booth (2000: 147) explains:

“… the middle-classes in urban areas had taken the brunt of the crisis, and that young, relatively well-educated workers had suffered far greater income declines than the least educated and poorest workers in rural areas.” (Booth 2000: 147)


Booth (2000: 154) continues: “By mid 1998, it was frequently being asserted that krismon was primarily a crisis affecting urban Java, …, the outer Islands … were actually benefiting from the effects of massive Rupiah devaluation“. The often university-educated middle class did not have the option of returning to their villages and looking for agricultural employment, as did the less well-educated migrant labourers who had become unemployed in the crisis (Jellinek 1999: 2, 6). Jellinek (1999: 2) resumes: “While the lower middle classes in Depok103 are unable to feed their children, rubbish recyclers are still able to feed themselves and save money to send back to their children in the village”. She adds: “Their advantage is that they have a foot in the city and a foot in the village” (Jellinek 1999: 6).

Furthermore the general worldwide interconnectedness of institutions, countries, companies and individuals via information and communication technology leads to social alienation due to resulting dependence and acceleration of social exchange (Beck 1997: 61-114). During the crisis, the new middle class realized increasing volatility of circumstances due to social, political und economic events which were difficult to predict. Besides the increasing uncertainty, the Asian crisis destroyed the financial basis of the new middle class (Manning and van Diermen 2000: 143-144). Jellinek (1999: 6) explains: “The middle classes who have lost their jobs in advertising agencies and mega-malls are copying the survival strategies of the poor”. In the end the former winners of globalization, i.e. the members of the middle class, became victims of globalization. They were robbed of their material clout. Jellinek (1999: 2) adds: “Good solid houses, once stocked with consumer goods, are now empty. Most possessions have been sold“.

In this new fragile social and economically volatile situation which disillusioned the middle class, the Muslim members in it lent heavily on religion, which increasingly became an identity indicator of the new middle class (Heryanto 1999: 173-176), a phenomenon which was avidly followed by the Indonesian press. Heryanto (1999: 175) reports the following:


“Collective prayers, Ramadan-dining in fancy restaurants and Islamic education among top business executives, state bureaucrats, rock singers, movie stars and other celebrities have become regular cover stories in today’s media industry.” (Heryanto 1999: 175)

The Asian crisis, with its accompanying scarcity of material means necessary for consumption, led to the middle class turning increasingly to other symbols (outer layer of the structuralist model of culture). The community spirit, constructed as a result of consumption, disappeared since consumer goods had to be sold owing to a shortage of money, and were not able to be replaced. The symbols of belongingness (consumer goods) which had previously been affordable, ceased to be so for the new middle class. The marginalized middle class tries to inoculate itself via an idealized lifestyle against social transformation processes with the aid of religion. Evers (1991: 99) points out that religious renaissance is often a mechanism to reduce the fears provoked as a result of the social and economic pressure and distress originating in modernization.


Crisis experience and religious renaissance

Religious adherents aim to avoid or conquer crises (risks, dangers) whenever they arise. Riesebrodt (2001: 47) sums it up thus: “Crises pose a major impetus to carry out religious work” („Krisen stellen einen wesentlichen Antrieb religiöser Arbeit dar”, translation by author). Here it implies less natural catastrophes or physical human breakdowns: rather it means social relationship crises or identity crises (Riesebrodt 2001: 42). The urge for significance and sense of purpose on the part of mankind is abundantly apparent in times of crisis, the breakdown of social, moral and cognitive structures, and when people are confronted with their helplessness and impotence, as was the case in the multidimensional 1998 crisis in Indonesia. Indonesia has suffered a great deal of disillusionment with democratic liberty since the fall of the Soeharto regime. Furthermore, in politics, characters with integrity are scarce, and that is why those with charisma are extremely popular, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar (Diederich 2003: 53).

Religious armoury allows coping with life’s disappointments in an unknown, modern, pluralistic world, when everyday control is removed and thus, supra-human power is required. As in many countries, a renaissance of Islam is perceivable in Indonesia as well (Evers und Siddique 1993: 1; Hefner 1998: 1-40; Rahardjo 1992: 248-273; Schreiner 2001: 157-179; Stauth 1996: 7-9; Ufen 2004: 15-21). Ende (1983: 6) explains that since the seventies, a process of re-Islamization has been observable in social, cultural and political regards. Houben points out that (2003: 162-164): “… Islam became more publicly visible and articulate as the societies of Southeast Asia went through an era of rapid modernization.” Modernization did not, as originally expected, lead to a decline in religion. Evers and Siddique (1993: 1) elaborate:


“Social scientists long assumed that religion would fall victim to the process of rationalization and modernization… Evidence against these interpretations is the dramatic development of religious and primordial movements world-wide.” (Evers and Siddique 1993: 1)

The reverting to Islam had already set in owing to political motives in the early 1990s (Houben 2003: 164), i.e. long before the Asian crisis in 1998. The crisis did, however, accelerate the trend. A reverting to Islam nowadays is not apparent in religious circles; rather it leads to a change in lifestyle on the part of Muslims within the new middle class. Islam today appears to play a far greater role in many areas of life. Additionally, a renaissance of ethnic identity is generally perceivable in Indonesia (Hoon 2004: 13).


The new middle class, with its lifestyle and consumerism habits imported from the west and from industrialized East Asia, changed evermore in the direction of Islam and has extended to date to a lifestyle based on consumption. As early as in the 1980s, interest in Islamic teaching in Indonesia was spreading, since the Soeharto regime saw itself required to co-operate increasingly with Muslims in order to stabilize its own power (Houben 2003: 158-159; Dahm 1999: 248). With the introduction of a parliamentary democracy and the founding of Islamic parties and organizations after Soeharto stood down, Islam has become a significant political power (Ufen 2001: 181).

Repercussions of Re-Islamization on the target group’s consumer behaviour

This change to Islamization is not only visible in religious or political life but also in everyday consumption. For example goods which respect Islamic instructions are being bought more (Halal food) or Islamic services are being enlisted (Islamic Banking). Furthermore, the demand for goods which reflect and document one’s own (partly new) religious piety is on the rise. Here, short life cycle consumer goods are meant such as special shampoos for women observing Islamic clothing regulations (Appendix 1, Figure 239-253) or the so-called Mecca cola (Appendix 1, Figure 23) (which is placed in opposition to American Coke) or alcohol-free beer intended for Muslims (Appendix 1, Figure 16). Furthermore, technological products such as mobile phones equipped with software specially designed for Muslims, and which, for example, have prayer reminder tones or electronic compasses, are enjoying great popularity. Architects who design shopping centres or residential complexes also include Arabic stylistic elements. (Appendix 1, Figure 292). Even consumerism (conspicuous consumption) and the often extremely wasteful pseudo-Islamic behaviour of the Indonesian elite (for example van Leeuwen 1997: 339-359) are rather justified with the virtue of “ibadah“ (love, humility to God in the sense of embellishment of the world for example via consumption (MP, interview December 2004).


Re-Islamization or reverting to Islam is, however, especially apparent in choice of clothing (Champagne 2004: 14-23). The “jilbab” (Indonesian name for the Islamic veil worn by women) is a case in point. It has spawned a whole fashion industry since the reverting to or revival of Islam. Champagne (2004: 15) explains: “The jilbab, the most visible part of a complete Muslim outfit, is a relatively recent phenomenon in Indonesia“. This phenomenon will shortly be elaborated on in light of product development at Unilever Indonesia.

The Jilbab: initiating link to product development

Stereotypical images of Muslim women covered from head to toe in black have been replaced in Indonesia by images of fashionable ladies clad in bright, opulent colours. In Indonesia, Islamic clothing is considered by the new middle class to be chic (Appendix 1, Figure 239-252). Indonesian women, especially members of the new middle class are starting to choose to complement their apparel by wearing a veil or a tunic (Champagne 2004: 15; Kompas 2004: 56). The afore-mentioned, however, is colourful, in vogue and frequently very figure-hugging. Many expensive stores (for example Pasaraya Grande, Blok M)104 reserve whole departments for fashionable, Muslim-evocative clothing, and many boutiques (for example Butik Labello) offer a wide range of veils and matching clothes (Appendix 1, Figure 239-252), which are celebrated as le dernier cri thanks to fashion magazines such as “Noor“105 and “Ummi“106 (Handayani und Soelaeman 2005: 18). “Islamic dress has gone upper-class“, Champagne emphasizes (2004: 17). Headscarves made by renowned Indonesian designers usually cost from Rp800,000 to Rp1.8 million (from circa €80 onto €180)107 (Handayani und Soelaeman 2005: 18).


Figure D-2 Islamization trends in product development

Although Indonesians opt for a relatively liberal form of Islamic clothing regulations, more and more women are wearing veils, even if tailored to local peculiarities and preferences (Raleigh 2004: 1-12; HP, interview December 2004; RS, interview December 2004). The same applies to men, with Islamic-looking, often decorative tunics becoming ever more popular, even if worn mostly during Ramadan, and being considered as hip since they are even worn by “MTV Indonesia” hosts. Wearing Islamic clothing is a new development and had negative connotations associated with the stigma of militant opposition during the Soeharto regime. The veil in particular was seen by city dwellers as old-fashioned, antiquated and linked to rural living at that time. Soeharto tried to have dominion over the influence of Islam in a multitude of respects. Clothing was paid particular attention as was the veil, which was mentally associated with the Iran revolution and which became a symbol of local Indonesian resistance to the Soeharto regime (AS, interview December 2004). Furthermore wearing a Jilbab was forbidden in public service or schools till the 1990s although it was of course seen as a religious symbol. This ban was only lifted when Soeharto, at the beginning of the 1990s started to co-operate with Muslims, with a view to stabilizing his own power (Houben 2003: 164). Soeharto even began to manipulate religious symbols, forms and ceremonies. For one, Soeharto attempted to confront the problem of a too small power-base, and secondly to confront growing criticism, which was the reason behind his pursuit of closer contact with Islamic clerics (Dahm 1999: 248; Houben 2003: 158) Houben (2003: 158) explains:


“Around 1990, a turnaround in state policy occurred, and against the opposition from army circles, Soeharto began to court Islam to strengthen his own power base”. (Houben 2003: 158)

Furthermore, at the beginning of the 1990s Soeharto and his family gave the impression of having converted themselves into a religious, pious Muslim family, participating in Islamic rituals and ceremonies. At its peak, this façade included the first family making the pilgrimage to Mecca, which was observed with keen interest by the media and the Indonesian people.

After the pilgrimage to Mecca, Soeharto’s eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut) in particular, took to wearing a kind of headscarf in public. This headscarf, which served as a kind of loose veil, contributed to the veil’s status as a fashion item. Her decision to wear a Jilbab became a role model for the entire nation (Champagne 2004: 19). Indigenous fashion designers108 as well as the textile industry took the lead from Tutut’s style. Some of the veils or headscarves manufactured by the local fashion industry were only affordable to the country’s elite owing to their being decorated with pearls and diamonds (MP, interview December 2004). It is notable that this fashion trend originated in Indonesia where local producers manufacture the clothes. High demand on the part of the new middle class led, however, to mass production of veils imitating the Indonesian designers’ luxurious versions (MP, interview December 2004).


The Indonesian Jilbab increasingly became an integral part of Indonesian clothing, and an absolute must. It must be noted here, however, that the Jilbab that became popular in Indonesia was a colourful, often bejewelled veil, and not the sombre, black, conservative Arabic equivalent (the “Jubbah“). Firstly, the latter was associated with Saudi Arabia, and secondly with the migrant work force, with which the new Indonesian middle class did not want to be associated. Another form of the Indonesian veil is the “Jilbab gaul“ or the “hip Jilbab“, which is far removed from the idea of veiling for religious reasons. The aforementioned veils are eye-catching, colourful and sometimes transparent scarves, which can be worn as a kind of hat. In this way, a kind of selective adaptation took place, which can, in this context, be described as hybridization. Yamashita, Din and Eades (1997: 5) explain:

“In the present era of globalization we observe that translocal phenomena have been developing in almost every dimension of our lives and have resulted in the ‘creolization’ or ‘hybridization’ of culture’ ...” (Yamashita, Din and Eades 1997: 5)


The Islamic veil entered the fashion arsenal of many Indonesian women in its local, hybrid adapted form. More and more women are today deciding to choose to wear veils, even though the reasons for doing so are not always religious, but often fashion-motivated. Amrih Widodo explains that the contemporary Islamic Jilbab has become a symbol of lifestyle, and part of the consumerism trend, through which one’s own identity can be constructed as a result of purchasing (Champagne 2004: 18). She adds:

“They are part of the consumerist trend of defining or displaying one’s identity though what one buys or wears; they reflect a desire to express religious identity while also being cosmopolitan and modern.” (Champagne 2004: 19)


Those women who purchase one would like to express their religious identity with the aid of the Jilbab, but at the same time want to express their fashion sense and their pertaining to a social stratum. The veil thus becomes the expression of taste and class, but however loses religious significance. The decision to wear a veil is situation-dependent, i.e. it is discretionary and elective rather than being mandatory, and depends on what the wearer wishes to present (AS, interview November 2004).

Figure D-3 Examples of “Feysen Busana Muslim”

The increasing trend to veil doubtless reflects a reverting to Islam. Without it, the trend would never have come about. The decision to be veil-clad is, however, for many women a question of the desire to express religion, fashion and, in Indonesia, lifestyle too. It is both a symbol of differentiation and religion. Additionally, Indonesian women show three disparate directions with their clothing: to Indonesia, the west and the Arabic world (MP, interview December 2004). This new way of dressing enables women to experiment and to create a new hybrid identity in a country in which Islamic clothing was long considered to be antiquated and backward.


The use of the veil, observance of religious symbols and the pilgrimage to Mecca are powerful means by which Indonesians present their authenticity as Muslims. It can also be understood as an experimental way of dealing with one’s own modern identity. It becomes clear that global transformation processes do not produce exclusively culturally homogenous consequences, but instead they produce very locally influenced results (selective adaptation) and lead to the phenomenon of glocalization. Additionally, it becomes apparent that over time, symbols and modes of distinction alter, but not necessarily the pronounced need in Indonesian society to distance oneself from other social groups or strata (status and power orientation).

The following figure (D-4) will summarize the previous statements and will clarify them pictorially. The core of the structuralist model of culture (shaded black), i.e. the values or value orientations, comprises two orientations deemed significant in the Indonesian context which determine Indonesian cultural and consumer behaviour definitively. These are the status and power orientation. The noticeably high score on both orientations leads to status-conscious behaviour, in which the need to set oneself apart from others dominates. This need has proven constant over time. The means by which one can be set apart from others is reflected in the structuralist model of culture in the three rings shaded white (practices), but are, however, unstable (variable) over time. Two examples (shaded grey in the diagram) show this clearly. In the 1980s and early 1990s this need to be distanced from other social strata was expressed primarily via consumption of western products and brands. Over time, however, this trend changed. The end of the Soeharto regime and the entry into the multi-dimensional crisis situation in 1998 meant that intensified religious symbols, even in the form of consumer goods, were used to satisfy the need to be distanced from others. Intercultural marketing has to absorb these trends and translate them into the development of worlds of products and brands in order to operate successfully.

Figure D-4 Orientations and practices over the course of time (1)


The second model processed in this context is the following. It is to be read clockwise and starts at the top left with practices. It is a recapitulation, included for reasons of simplification and completion.

Figure D-5 Orientations and practices over the course of time (2)

D.2.2.2 End of the theoretical introduction and transition to the corporate reaction to the Re-Islamization trend in Indonesia

As demonstrated, the veil has come to play a greater role in modern Indonesian society for a multitude of reasons. For personal care product manufacturers such as Procter & Gamble or the Unilever Group which market their goods under the names of global umbrella brands, this can lead to threats and opportunities in the market. Threats arise because wearing a veil leads to less consumption of shampoo and hair products, since hair under the cover of the veil is less exposed to the public, or is simply not visible. This fact could lead to heavy turnover losses for shampoo manufacturers, if, for example, the female population reduced its daily use of shampoo to two or three times a week. Generally, Indonesians wash their hair at least twice per day because of the heat and pollution. A change in the usage frequency would cause shampoo sales to be more than halved immediately, which in a volume market such as Indonesia, would lead to massive losses. Shampoos offered to date would no longer be able to satisfy the needs of the consumers, who could demand shampoos with other stronger conditioning ingredients since they were wearing veils. In this case, loss of market and turnover share would be the result, too. A further threat could be the growing feeling in society that Islamic or Islamic-leaning products should be bought from manufacturers who appear to respect Islam, religion and the culture of the market and not from manufacturers considered to be foreign and un-Islamic. A company with an un-Islamic profile would have to face great loss of image, which in turn would lead to market share and turnover loss. The aforementioned threats are also to be seen as opportunities or challenges. Thus, a shampoo specially designed for veiled women’s needs could be a unique selling proposition (USP). Furthermore, the creator of a shampoo like this would be the first to offer a shampoo of this kind worldwide, and the concept developed in Indonesia could be transferred to many other countries where veiled women influence everyday life. Even the image of the company and the brand name under which such a product was operated would develop, and the image of a company reacting to local, social trends would arise (increased credibility).

D.3 Case-study


Summary The extensive presentation of the case-study was conceived for its application and use in classroom as an example for developing strategies upon changed practices on the one hand, and on the other hand, to use the case study to investigate the company’s reaction to the 1997-98 crisis on the basis of given questions. These questions and further references are provided on the enclosed DVD. (Images in this section, courtesy of Unilever).

“Unilever’s deep roots in local cultures and markets around the world are our parallel inheritance and the foundation of our future growth. We will bring our wealth of knowledge and international expertise to the service of local consumers – a truly multi-local multinational.” (Unilever Malaysia)

D.3.1  Setting the context


Since the 1990s many western multinationals have been faced with the prospect of overcapacity in their home territories, a fact which has prompted various large corporations to diversify their investment portfolio away from their saturated home markets toward the establishment of operations in the developing economies of the Asia-Pacific region, notably in Southeast Asia. Developing and emerging markets (D&E) present huge opportunities as 95 percent of the increase of the world population will take place in the developing world and at the same time population stagnation or receding will occur in industrialized countries, which leads to the fact that by 2010 nearly 90 percent of the world population will live in developing and emerging markets where the combined purchasing power will exceed that of the developing world. The rising per capita incomes give disproportionate growth in per capita consumption to companies operating successfully in these markets. The following figure109 (D-6) highlights these important findings.

Figure D-6 Opportunities in D&E markets

Owing to these developments, FMCG companies are increasingly reaching out to people living on low incomes around the world. Adidas (Thailand), for example, is striving to expand the customer base of its football products in Thailand by offering a wider range of products with entry-level prices as low as 200 Baht for a football jersey.110 Perceived as distributors of premium sports products, the majority of Adidas’ customers in Thailand are middle- to high-income earners, living in major cities. The company, however, wants its products to be affordable for all groups of income earners. The Adidas example shows that many companies do not target merely the urbane elite any more, but rather offer the majority of the population a range of goods at affordable prices, which can reach the furthest-flung corner by using its own channels of distribution with a customized product and brand portfolio. The result is an increase in the worldwide consumer base for fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) companies, and an increased use of branded goods by people living in poverty. This customer base is also described as “low-income consumers” by C.K. Prahalad (2004). He sets out a strong case for the potential of companies to expand markets in poor countries and contends in his book “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” that people living in poverty want, and have a right to share in, the types of basic product that are widely available in developed countries. People living in poverty with little disposable income also want to have high-quality personal-care products, clean clothes, and safe food. This point of view was refuted for a long time since aid organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) considered advertising in developing countries wasteful and advised against the purchase of branded goods. This point of view has since changed.111 Precisely these multinationals are the ones which can produce much more efficient, environmentally-friendly and safer products, such as foodstuffs for example, and owing to economies of scale can offer consumer goods more cheaply, which in turn improves the living conditions of the native population. The principal reason why aid organizations and NGO’s are less critical of global concerns is that they create long-term employment and have a long underestimated economic impact, for example with their contribution to financing the national budget in the form of tax payments. Shortly the economic situation in Indonesia which Unilever and other companies confront will be elaborated on.

D.3.2 The market environment


During the early 1990s, the Indonesian economy experienced annual GDP growth of 7-8 percent, due to a large influx of foreign capital and improved relationships with the West. Investments in the early 1990s supported growth and capacity expansion, but came to an abrupt end in 1997. The financial crisis began in June 1997 when the Indonesian Rupiah plummeted in value, and many banks were forced to close. One in every five jobs in the country disappeared. The private sector was immediately placed under great financial pressure, and many firms ceased trading because they could not cope with 80 percent devaluation against the US Dollar and a period of interest rates in excess of 100 percent. Some international companies left Indonesia owing to the deteriorating situation (for example, Wal-Mart). Per capita GDP in Indonesia fell by 59 percent in US$ terms, from US$1,140 in 1997 to US$470 in 1998 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003) and around 14 percent in terms of real GDP per head. Average income per head did not return to 1996 levels until 2003. What started as a monetary crisis quickly turned into a much more serious economic, social and political crisis. In just two years, the levels of poverty in the country returned to those of the 1960s. Riots broke out in Jakarta in May 1998 and quickly spread to other regions of the country in May 1998. President Soeharto stepped down after 32 years of rule and an era of great political upheaval set in, which did not always lead to a stable situation in the eyes of the investors. Over time, the Indonesian economy and political situation have, however, stabilised. Consumer demand in the country has helped sustain domestic economic activity since the onset of the crisis. Consumption is responsible for 80 per cent of the economic growth in Indonesia, a figure which is only surpassed by the avid American consumers, comparing the consumption segments of national GDPs on a world-wide basis. Now the protagonists of this case-study will be examined in greater depth.

D.3.3 Unilever: the global player

D.3.3.1  Introduction

Unilever is one of the world’s leading suppliers of fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) across foods, home and personal product categories and includes a portfolio of some of the world’s best known and most loved brands. Unilever’s worldwide mission is to “add vitality to life”, “to meet everyday needs for nutrition, hygiene, and personal care, with brands that “help people feel good, look good, and get more out of life”.112 A Fortune 500113 multinational company with worldwide turnover of US$48.4 billion, Unilever has manufacturing operations in around 100 countries and sales in around 50 more, and it employs some 234,000 people. Over the last 20 years, the company’s share price has significantly outperformed the main market indices.114 By 2003, Unilever was one of the leading companies in the manufacture and marketing of food, home, and personal-care products, with some 400 brands.

Figure D-7 Unilever’s mission


The company has extensive experience of working in economies with low-income consumers and its enormous diversity of products has historically served people’s everyday needs. In 2005 its business could be broken down into three categories: foods, detergents, and personal care products. Food brands include such well-know names as Lipton, Knorr, Hellman’s, Bertolli, Magnum, Cornetto, Flora/Becel, Rama, Blue Band and Iglo/Birds Eye/Findus. Home and personal-care brands include Dove, Rexona, Lux, Omo, Surf, Domestos, Pond’s, Signal, and Sunsilk. Besides these global brands, Unilever’s portfolio includes many locally important brands.

Figure D-8 Some of Unilever’s brands

Unilever like other FMCG companies focuses on developing and emerging markets, where, owing to high population growth and sky-rocketing growth figures, important markets are springing up. Rising per capita income gives disproportionate growth in per capita consumption for Unilever categories. Already 35 percent of Unilever turnover is in developing and emerging markets where it has a long-established presence. The introduction of products, brands and certain ranges is targeted at different income levels in the respective countries and is strongly localized accordingly (this strategy is similar to the suggested strategy of differentiated standardization put forward in this thesis). The following figure (D-9) summarises Unilever’s viewpoint concerning developing and emerging markets.


Figure D-9 Unilever in D&E markets

By using improved distribution systems and with the possibility (for example in Indonesia, after the liberalization of the economy as a result of the demise of the Soeharto regime), to distribute its own products even as a foreign company (which obviates the need for cost-creating intermediaries), Unilever has managed in almost every region to expand its presence. Thus, Unilever can even be found in many very remote parts of Southern Kalimantan (own observation, March 2004). Additionally, some important Unilever projects in Indonesia can be mentioned at this juncture. Unilever Indonesia tries to empower Indonesians to found their own business, or to work for Unilever as a sales person by issuing micro-credits. This can take the form of buying a bicycle from Unilever, which is specially designed for them to pedal their wares throughout the neighbourhood in an economic and environmentally friendly manner with the help of Unilever credits. Furthermore, Unilever almost exclusively employs local management who has an intimate knowledge of the local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. Drivers of Unilever’s growth in developing and emerging markets are affordability and consumer intimacy. This means that Unilever products are available in various packaging sizes, and are thus affordable to almost every member of Indonesian society. Thus shampoos and washing liquid are offered in sachets enabling every Indonesian to purchase high quality products cheaply whenever the product is required. The personal care market is the priority for growth, as emerging markets are less fragmented, lower private labels penetration is evident and strong personal connections and emotional connections between consumers and their brands can be established. The main competitors in this market are: Procter & Gamble115, Kao116, L’Oreal117, and Beiersdorf118.

The different brands of the Unilever concern are managed from different countries. Lux, for example, is managed from Sao Paulo, Brazil. Global responsibility for a brand (seen in the Lux example) (Figure D-10) enables certain processes such as product improvement to be transferred quickly to every production site and to markets. Furthermore, the managers responsible for a brand on a country level always have a central contact person when it comes to local issues concerning product innovation or marketing. The objective is to devolve as much power and to give as much freedom as possible to the local people in charge, since they know the market intimately, but not to neglect global synergy effects. This approach meets the differentiated standardization strategy as favoured in this thesis. In the case of Unilever, this strategy has frequently led to success.


Figure D-10 Lux and Lifebuoy and their local executions

In this sense, the company bears witness to the fact that a strong corporate identity can go with cultural sensitivity. Unilever describes itself as a “multi-local multinational“, which highlights the corporate strategy, i.e. to emphasize the local element. This “multi-local” strategy is embedded in the history of the company founded in 1930 when Margarine Unie of the Netherlands and Lever Brothers of the UK merged. Unilever is often described by outsiders as an international or multinational company, but never as a global concern, since the decentralized corporate strategy prevents all markets from being supplied with standardised products and brands. The company believes that a local view is often necessary, especially when it comes to food. The people closest to each market have the power to make decisions and can therefore respond quickly to local trends and needs. Hence, Unilever has become more responsive to local differences than many of its more centralized competitors, such as Procter & Gamble. The following figure (D-11) will highlight additional elements of its global commitment.

Figure D-11 Geographic reach and turnover


Table D-1 Worldwide Unilever turnover in million US$





Home and Personal Care










Unilever Group turnover





The noticeable fall in turnover between 2001 and 2004 was attributable to the sale of some parts of the company and brands (divestment).

D.3.4 Unilever in Asia

Unilever’s success story in Asia started with the set up of Hindustan Lever119 in India in 1931 and Unilever Malaysia’s120 set up in 1947. Investment was made relatively late (in 1995) in Vietnam121 where it operates five manufacturing sites and exploits local transportation means such as cycles, and boats122 for distribution in remote areas. Since its operation in Indonesia, (founded in 1933) Unilever’s brands have developed a very strong local presence and have gained market leadership in many categories where they compete. The key factor for this success seems to be a deep understanding of the Asian markets where Unilever studies local habits, beliefs and aspirations to create local products. Local brands such as “Royco”, “Bango”, and “Sariwangi” are seen as local jewel brands as a result of their high awareness and consumer loyalty. The toothpaste brand “Signal” is number 1 or 2 in 29 countries, including Indonesia where it is market leader. Moreover, Indonesia can be considered not only as an important market, but also as a manufacturing country for countless Unilever products in Southeast Asia. In this context Niall Fitzgerald, the global chairman of the group, stated after a meeting with President Megawati Sukarnoputri, that Indonesia is designated by Unilever as a sourcing country for consumer products sold in countries of the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unilever plans to invest an estimated US$500 million in the next 10 years in Indonesia. By doing so, Unilever reinforces its position as one of the largest employers and taxpayers in the country.

D.3.5 Unilever Indonesia


PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk (UI), an Indonesia-based consumer goods company, was established in 1933 with the founding of a local soap-manufacturing facility. The company's principal activities are the production of soaps, detergents, margarine, vegetable oil, ice cream, tea drinks, milk products and cosmetics. The company has two subsidiaries, PT Anugrah Lever123 and PT Technopia Lever. The company's headquarters is located in Jakarta, and is supported by two production facilities in Bekasi, West Java, and Surabaya, East Java. UI has become a leader in the branded-soap market, which had been dominated by Procter & Gamble124 and Colgate125. By 1940, after only seven years in business, UI manufactured 12,000 metric tons (MT) of soap and was the largest soap producer in the country. By 1948, UI had established or purchased factories to produce margarine, cosmetics, and edible oil. These activities grew until 1980, when all UI companies in Indonesia reorganised to form PT Unilever Indonesia. A year later, UI made the decision to go public on the Jakarta stock exchange (JSX)126 and sold 9.2 million shares locally (15 percent of the total). The bulk of the equity value of the business (85 percent) was retained by the parent company in the Netherlands. By 1982 it had established a network of Indonesian distributors, to whom it handed over sales activities. This sales force grew steadily to 385 distributors at the end of 2003. These companies now deliver UI brands to more than 550,000 shops weekly. It is estimated that up to 1.8 million small stores and street vendors sell UI products informally in rural markets and poor urban areas. The table below provides an insight into the history of the company in Indonesia.

Table D-2 Seventy years of Unilever in Indonesia


Soap factory opened


Margarine and vegetable-oil production begun


Colibri cosmetics factory opened


Unilever control interrupted by World War II


Facilities returned and reconditioned


Archa oil-milling factory opened


Unilever Indonesia nationalised;
Unilever factories operated under government control


Under new investment law, UI regained control of its factories


PT Unilever restructured


UI went public


Personal-care products factory opened


UI acquired Sariwangi Tea


Wall’s Ice Cream factory opened


Acquired PT Yuhan HHC business


Integration of PT Yuhan distribution with UI’s system


Kimberly-Lever joint venture signed
Acquired Bango Soy Sauce Business (joint venture with previous owner)
Integrated Best Foods Indonesia


JV with Texchem in mosquito coil business


Acquired Taro Snacks business
Integrated PT Knorr (Best Foods) Indonesia

The fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry in Indonesia is highly competitive, and within it UI leads in market share in some categories, like toothpaste and hair care, while in other categories, such as powder detergents, local companies lead. UI’s recent success is in part based on the expansion of sachet packaging, and the very extensive distribution network for UI products (which was built up after the market liberalization of 1998) and reaches all parts of Indonesia. According to UI, 95 percent of households in Indonesia use at least one UI product. UI targets consumers from all market segments, and its products are purchased by all socio-economic groups. A report suggests that the average poor family spends 5.7 percent of its average monthly outgoings on UI products. Data shows that people living on lower incomes spend a greater proportion of their budget on FMCGs than those who have larger incomes. Those with less available cash still choose to purchase personal care and cleaning products, as well as food brands. These goods are often bought on a daily basis in small sachets or pouches, packaging sizes which were first introduced by Unilever. While the unit cost is higher, owing to packaging and distribution costs that are reflected in the sale price, this marketing strategy responds to the reality that people with low incomes have limited cash on hand. Research suggests that typical low-income consumers shopping in “warungs”127 tend to be married women in their thirties, with three or more children. Most poor consumers throughout Indonesia buy UI products in warungs or from market stalls in their neighbourhoods.


Figure D-12 Sachet packaging

UI views most of its products as basic, or even essential, requirements for everyday living. Detergents and soap are relevant to basic health care: clean homes, clean clothes, and hand-washing play an important role in preventing disease. Personal grooming plays a role in establishing personal self-esteem, and even people living in poverty celebrate important events with some form of “reward” or “treat”.

Detailed consumer research conducted by UI during the economic crisis of the late 1990s revealed that consumers (both urban and rural buyers) prioritise value for money that they spend, not cheapness (universal unwillingness to compromise on quality of daily-use products). A low-income consumer cannot afford to make purchasing mistakes, for example buying non-effective products. In addition, low-income consumers require package sizes that are commensurate with their daily cash-in-hand limitations. During the crisis UI recognised that if consumers could not afford to buy its products, the company would not stay in business. It pursued three separate strategies to address this problem. Firstly, it expanded the number of its popular products that were available in affordable sachets. Secondly, it created new, less expensive formulations of popular products. And thirdly, where possible, it used locally sourced ingredients instead of more expensive imported ones, to reduce the price of known brands. The company maintained its policy of making its products available to distributors at the same price throughout the country. This strategy was complemented through the acquisition of strategic local brands or created joint-venture (JV), e.g. with PT Anugrah Setia Lestari (former owner of Bango Brands) to manage the production of “Kecap Bango”. These strategies enabled UI not only to maintain its consumer base, but actually to increase it in many areas. UI staff provided management with information on the crisis, as well as ideas on how to address it. Employees were encouraged to think about the likely impacts of economic developments on the company and how it should respond. Staff suggested ideas that succeeded in reversing sales declines of 50 percent or more in several categories during the onset of the crisis. In all, more than 200 constructive suggestions were received by the company over one two-week period.


Since 1999, under CEO Nihal Kaviratne (NK), UI has acquired seven leading local brands of soy sauce, tea and cleaning agents. UI predicts to double business within five years, but growth is becoming difficult because consumer spending is decreasing. With the removal of subsidies, people’s incomes have been squeezed. Also, income coming in from Indonesians working abroad is declining. This is why the consumer base has to be extended, so that more homes use the brand and use it more often (NK: “We’re getting people to brush their teeth not once but twice per day. Each year, you get 6 to 7 percent more people switching from once to twice a day.”). This is huge in terms of dollar value. UI also started an initiative with “pesantren”, the Islamic boarding schools, which provide UI with a steady and fixed market. Students have daily needs. In the town of Pekalongan in Central Java, UI has 200 pesantren to which it regularly supplies products. This project will be extended all over the country.

UI purchases the majority of goods and services for its business operations though a local supply chain consisting of a large network of more than 300 supplier companies. UI’s business model over the past two decades has come to focus on high-volume, high-technology, and high-value-added operations, while other parts of the business have become independent operations or have been outsourced. In this way, UI was able to expand its business while at the same time building production capacity among independent companies. In 2003, UI had more than 3,096 direct employees; nearly 25,000 people worked full time for UI within its network of direct partners; and hundreds of thousands of individuals worked within its value chain, from supplying raw materials to selling its brands. Virtually all management staff is Indonesian, as well as eight of the UI board members.

UI’s spending on advertising for the brands shown increased by 36 percent between 2002 and 2003, with the largest increase being in television advertising (40 percent) (Nielsen Media Research AdQuest 2003). Some of the company’s brands are promoted more than others. The advertising and promotions budget for a new brand can be as high as 50 percent of its net sales. For existing brands, the ratio is only 10-15 percent. Between 2002 and 2003, spending on advertising for Sunsilk shampoo declined from Rp144 billion to Rp115 billion. Eighty-nine percent of advertising is for global brands such as “Sunsilk” and “Pepsodent”, and 11 percent for Indonesian brands such as “Kecap Bango” and “Sariwangi tea”. UI aims to ensure that it advertises in a responsible way, in accordance with its worldwide brand-communication principles. According to UI, the company pays particular attention to local cultural differences and perceptions, and the need to produce advertisements with local-language variations around consistent themes and branding positions. A great deal of advertising is generated or adapted by local Indonesian agencies. A key factor for UI in determining advertising expenditure is what its competitors are doing with their brands.


UI is actively engaged in dialogue with consumers in Indonesia (externally oriented). The personal daily contact between consumers, their retailers, and UI distribution people is the source of the most accessible, regular feedback of consumer opinion on the company’s brands. Any fall in sales is a signal that consumer opinion on the company’s brand, for whatever reason, is changing, and the decline is investigated to understand the reasons behind the changes in consumers’ purchasing decisions.

D.3.5.1  UI’s financial performance

In 2001, UI was ranked by Asiaweek as the thirteenth-largest company by sales in Indonesia and second in terms of profits as a percentage of sales. Only TELKOM128, the Indonesian telecommunications company, reported higher profits. UI is the fourth-largest firm in the FMCG sector in Indonesia. The largest FMCG firm, Indofood Sukses Makmur129, had a turnover more than double that of UI, and a domestic market capitalisation of US$2.04 billion. It is hard to compare UI’s performance with that of other multinational companies such as Coca-Cola, Nestlé, Procter & Gamble, or Johnson & Johnson130, because none of them is listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX)131, so comparable data is not readily available. In December 2003, UI’s price-to-earnings ratio132 was 17.6, implying investor confidence in future growth and profits. UI’s Indonesian shares outperformed the JSX from January 1999 through to December 2002. JSX shares increased in value on average 69 percent over this four-year period, while UI’s increased in value by 1,109 percent. UI’s overall performance in recent years was strongly affected by the country’s financial crisis. It took until 2002 for UI’s sales, in dollar terms, to return to 1996 levels. By 2003, UI had improved on all financial measures from 1996.

Table D-3 UI financial performance (1996 and 1999-2003)

Key indicators (US$ million)







Five-year average 1999-2003

Totals 1999-2003

Total sales









Pre-tax profits









Total taxes paid









Profits after corporate tax, comprising:









Shareholder dividends









Retained earnings









D.3.6 Strategy


Unilever’s business strategy is to concentrate geographically on developing and emerging markets and with its products on its personal care division whose portfolio includes some of the world’s most valuable brands. Fierce competition between manufacturers of branded goods and so-called private labels (products typically manufactured or provided by one company for offer under another company's, for example retailer’s brand) dominates on the already saturated markets of Europe and North America where there has been a significant increase of private label brands in the recent years. In Europe, private labels now account for about 45 percent of products sold in supermarkets, compared to 25 percent in the USA. Wal-Mart, for instance, has already a 40 percent private label representation in their stores. Historically, private labels had been seen as low-priced, low-quality products. In recent years, however, companies have started using private labels to market higher quality items, and many believe high-quality private labels will increase their presence owing to a rise in savings strategies on the part of consumers and their trust in products which succeed even without brand names. Basically, the trend towards private label products in the area of personal care and facial products, is lower than that of, for example, cleaning materials or comestibles. This can be explained by the fact that users have a closer relationship (para-social relationship), with facial and personal care products since these products may improve looks and come into direct contact with the skin. Generally, the trend towards private labels in developing and emerging markets is only apparent rudimentarily, since consumers (as numerous studies have shown) continue to prefer branded products. One reason could be the low market penetration of private labels in these countries i.e. consumers can usually only choose branded products from local or worldwide operating companies. Owing to enormous competition pressure among manufacturers of personal care products because of the introduction of private labels, manufacturers have no choice but firstly to export their goods to other countries, and secondly to invest intensively in the respective brands. The idea behind the latter strategy is that retailers only list the three best-selling products in their range in one category, for example, shampoo. Considering the enormous power of big worldwide operating trade corporations, such as the German Metro Group, this can mean that a brand disappears from a retailer’s range within a few months when it loses customers’ favour and thus its sales figures drop. This could lead to the manufacturer selling the whole brand since the manufacturer lost its sales basis due to the retailer delisting the product. Conversely the situation in Indonesia is that 75 per cent of the retail market can still be called traditional and 25 per cent are modern and organized in the form of supermarkets, hypermarkets and convenience stores. The reasons for a strong focusing of developing and emerging markets in the field of personal care are summed up in the following figure (D-13).

Figure D-13 Personal care in D&E markets

In keeping with Unilever’s multi-local strategy, products which reflect the needs and preferences of local consumers are to be developed for the respective markets. It is not, however, a question of deteriorating into a hopelessly local strategy, i.e. to develop own brands and product lines for every market, with the corresponding packaging and ingredients, but rather to execute certain scale effects (benefit from its omnipresence in the world in terms of scale effects). Unilever manages to do this by carrying out local adaptation to respective globally marketed brands such as Sunsilk and Lux, for example (customizing its products to meet the needs and wants of the local consumers). At the bottom of the figure below is the heading “Sunsilk – tailored solutions to local hair dramas”. The following figure clarifies this strategy.


Figure D-14 Local executions of global brands

In the area of shampoo, Unilever decided to boost Sunsilk as a global brand, i.e. to introduce Sunsilk to several developing and emerging markets, to explain to customers that Sunsilk is a globally available and thereby world famous brand, and to explain that products with this brand name will be customized to respective consumer wishes and needs. This strategy led to the creation of very interesting local products within the global brand “Sunsilk”.

D.3.6.1  Cosmetics and Toiletries in Indonesia

2004 was another good year for cosmetics and toiletries in Indonesia, which grew at 11 percent in current value terms (Euromonitor Executive Summary 2005). Most of the contribution to value sales of cosmetics and toiletries still derived from essential toiletries products, namely hair care, bath and shower products, and oral hygiene. Hair care remained the biggest contributor to overall cosmetics and toiletries sales. In 2004, UI was the leader for hair care. The cosmetics and toiletries industry in Indonesia is not yet mature, and is expected to continue performing healthily. 28 percent of sales come from modern retail, and 72 from traditional “pasar” (bazaar) and “warungs”. The following paragraph will focus on the brand and its product mix adapted to local cultural conditions and processes (re-Islamization) in Indonesia by the company.

D.3.7 The Sunsilk brand: Local Touch for Global Success


Originally launched in the Netherlands in 1956, Sunsilk provides hair care solutions in 80 countries around the globe (“tailored solutions to local hair dramas”)133. It was recently re-launched throughout Europe, where it is now the fastest-growing major hair brand. Globally, Sunsilk has grown consistently at more than 20 percent a year for the last three years. Whether it is in Africa, with hair relaxers, or Brazil with combing creams, or Europe, with special treatments for limp, flat hair, Sunsilk addresses the needs of local consumers. Sunsilk brings happiness to beauty, helping women to feel good, look good and get more out of life wherever they live, according to Unilever.134 This abstract idea is the basis for local executions. The Sunsilk concept is that it makes one look better and gives one confidence, and the products which fulfil these promises are nonetheless tailored to local conditions. There are recognizable elements such as the brand name and package design, the payoff, and a symbol. Different executions based on the concept can be developed in different countries and adopted by others of similar cultural configurations. The advantage of this strategy is the combination of local elements and a centrally recognizable idea. Actual ads may be used globally, regionally, or locally depending on the need for cultural adaptation.

Contrary to common opinions, brands and their products differ widely. In an attempt to distinguish own brands from the competitors’, companies give their brands certain attributes with the help of so-called branding strategies. The branding issue has become once more the focal point of corporate activities in recent years and furthermore the major topic (Dietzhoff 1999: 50; Esch 2001: 6; Meffert, Burmann and Koers 2002: 6-7). 1998 was named year of the brand by “The Economist”. The corporate world even refers to the “magic of branding”. A brands cult is virtually attestable among Indonesians, since brands connote social group belonging, and contribute to distinguishing people from each other and to expressing one’s personality. Additionally, brands can serve a prestige role for the person who purchases them in his or her social environment (Meffert, Burmann and Koers 2002: 11). Brands act as symbols in the individual or social communication process, and satisfy the needs for self-fulfilment, social distinction and recognition. (ibid: 348). The identity endowing effect of brands is meant here, i.e. the person purchasing the branded goods receives the attributes of the product himself and defines his own self-image through it (Esch 2001: 111). Brands are personalities, which are translated into a special pictorial and written language. The idea behind the personality related brand concept is the thought that brands have their own personalities just as people do. Especially in today’s stressful world of mistrust and trouble, people are looking for escapism. Relationships between friends account for part of this. Friendship means trust, dependability, caring, fun and joie de vivre. Brands act as friends, confidantes and partners. A brand ought to give the consumer orientation and guidance as well as the feeling that he/she is wanted, belongs and is cared for. Brands should also provide emotional anchors, they ought to convey feelings and images in an overpowering variety of goods available (Esch 2001: 11). Brands simultaneously offer additional information and reduce purchasing risk (see risk orientation for Indonesia’s high score on social risk avoidance).

D.3.8 Sunsilk campaigns and brand personality


The following images (Figures D-15 and D-16) will make the idea of brand personality comprehensible. Two advertising campaigns for L’Oreal hair products are juxtaposed to the Sunsilk brand images.

Figure D-15 Sunsilk brand communications

The models depicted here (D-15) exude vitality, exuberance and joie de vivre. The images are apparently more inviting, vibrant and welcoming than the L’Oreal images (D-16) with their nonchalant, insouciant models brimming with confidence but also arrogance. The models here are much more natural than the models in the L’Oreal figure. This is also reflected in the layout of the Sunsilk ads which have more colours, and more fluidity and movement (shaking her mane of hair, the green flowing silk jilbab, the undulating locks, the moving water images). The overall look of the first set of ads is more dynamic, also revealed in the images of sunflowers, leaves, water lilies, orange slices - all images of living things. The L’Oreal set is much more static and inert, with rigid poses (woman on the right) and an almost statuesque pose.


Figure D-16 L’Oreal brand communication

The L’Oreal ads use cool, aloof images, with famous models, for example Eva Longoria from “Desperate Housewives”. The images are very sleek and sophisticated but the women depicted appear more distant and affected than the models posing in the Sunsilk ads. The woman on the right especially is utterly unapproachable and almost condescending. She does not radiate any warmth as do the models in the first set. She appears to be arrogant, self-assured and assuming an artificial pose.

D.3.8.1  Sunsilk and local adaptations

As already mentioned, Sunsilk has a tradition of being local. Sunsilk Afro, for example, launched two years ago, has become a huge success in the South African market.135 Sunsilk is also very successful in India where it is positioned as the hair expert136 and where advertising for Sunsilk is set in a “Filmi Style” Bollywood setting.137 There is no doubt that a shampoo has to guarantee the same basic benefits worldwide, i.e. that it cleans hair. However, preferences as to how hair should look are locally coloured, which necessitates local adaptation of products and their effects. Thus straighter hair is preferred in some regions (Asia, Africa, South America), and in others, curlier hair is preferable. The figure below will highlight this.


Figure D-17 Global needs but local preferences

The following figure (D-18) shows a selection of local Sunsilk adaptations, among them the shampoo “Segar dan Bersih” (“Clean and Fresh”) to be discussed here.

Figure D-18 Local adaptations under the Sunsilk brand umbrella138

D.3.8.2 Sunsilk key facts


Indonesia is a country in which Sunsilk holds a key country share, with circa 25 percent. Sunsilk is the number 1 hair care brand in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East with sales of more than €1 billion a year and selling in 80 courtiers. Particularly in Spanish speaking countries it sells under different variants of the Sunsilk names, such as Elidor, Hazeline, Seda and Sedal. The diagram below shows the market share in some strategic developing and emerging markets, among them Indonesia, and also the turnover growth of the brand since 1999.

Figure D-19 Sunsilk market performance and market share

After having highlighted the initial points of the product development, one shall move on to the strategic decisions for the year 2003/2004. In 2004, despite the high market share of almost 25 per cent in Indonesia, Unilever’s Sunsilk was confronted with the following situation. It will, as customary, be presented in a threats and opportunities (TO) analysis which, for clarity, is shown in the following table.


Table D-4 Threats and opportunities analysis: Situation of Unilever's Sunsilk in Indonesia 2004

An evaluation of the OT analysis revealed the need for action. In an endeavour to secure Unilever’s position in the hair care sector in Indonesia long-term, new products had to be launched onto the market, and customers had to be won over by means of intensified Sunsilk market presence in conjunction with a sustainable and long-term brand positioning. In order to build on their successes in the hair care market, and parallel, to achieve attractive positioning on the Indonesian market from the consumers’ viewpoint, Unilever pushed the introduction of a new product which was intended to tap into the re-Islamization trend. In the last five years, Islamic fashion has become increasingly popular, giving rise to fashionable clothing stores in urban areas offering “busana Muslim” (Muslim clothes). Amrih Widodo (Inside Indonesia: Oct-Dec 2002)139 argues that a new image of “Muslim beauty” is now supplementing, if not replacing, the Western-oriented image of beauty that has long dominated Indonesian media. One aspect of this new fashion trend is the “Jilbab gaul”, or “hip Jilbab”, which extends the scope of what it means to wear a Jilbab. A “Jilbab gaul” may leave the neck exposed or be transparent. A similar trend is wearing hair tucked up under specially designed hats, either with or without an additional scarf to cover the neck. Indonesian girls wear them often in a notoriously risqué fashion as their clothes may extend from ankle to wrist but may be skin-tight, or display occasional flashes of skin.

An increasingly large number of Indonesian women are choosing to make their fashion purchases within this wide range of Muslim clothes. Both are far away from the rural women who put on a veil to go to the market, to weddings and funerals, and to neighbourhood women’s religious study sessions. Amrih Widodo argues that in contemporary Indonesia the Jilbab has become a new kind of lifestyle statement. The Jilbab is part of the consumerist trend of defining or displaying one’s identity through what one buys or wears. It reflects a desire to express religious identity while also being cosmopolitan and modern. Like western brands or limited edition designer batik, Muslim fashion is an expression of taste but also of class, a way of positioning oneself. In everyday life, people judge other members of Indonesian society by means of lifestyle. A multitude of Islamic symbols, for example the veil, serve as a means of separation from other social groups and strata.

D.3.9  Marketing strategy


Focusing on Indonesian consumer behaviour, a corresponding product and marketing strategy was generated locally. It was necessary to develop a shampoo targeted at Muslim women who wear a veil and who take pride in their appearance. Unilever had principally the urbane middle class in mind as their target group for the afore-mentioned product. There were already four shampoos under the umbrella brand name Sunsilk on the Indonesian market prior to Sunsilk’s “Segar dan Bersih“ (“Clean and Fresh”). Not a single shampoo either from Unilever or from its competitors catered for veiled Muslim women and their hair care matters. Unilever’s Sunsilk range increased to five including “Segar dan Bersih“, the latter being the only one intended for veiled women and thus representing a real product innovation. Furthermore, it was necessary to interpret Sunsilk’s globally decided brand personality (depicted in the figure “Sunsilk is…“) for the Indonesian market. The endorsement was supposed to be designed as inviting, approachable and to radiate warmth, especially representative of the target group. The woman featured in the endorsements was not supposed to look introverted or old-fashioned either. Moreover, the advertising campaign was intended to radiate harmony. Since a shampoo for veiled women was being advertised, no hair was allowed to be shown, something of a novelty in a shampoo advertisement. The efficacy of the shampoo had to be conveyed in a novel way.

D.3.9.1  Endorsement choice

By having Inneke Koesherawati140, a former actress who achieved fame as a model and entrepreneur in Indonesia, in the campaigns, Unilever managed a feat. Inneke Koesherawati had opted to veil only since the end of the 1990s, and prior to this had always been considered somewhat irreligious, and is today revered as a “cosmo-Muslim, i.e. a modern, self-assured, successful Muslim, who lives her faith overtly. Moreover she is known all over Indonesia, and is famous for being one of the best dressed women in Indonesia, and was responsible for initiating the trend of wearing a “Jilbab Gaul“. In the Indonesian press Inneke Koesherawati was thus described141:


“From sex bomb to cosmo-Muslim. Even glamour models are embracing Muslim clothes. Inneke Koesherawati, a former pin-up girl who once posed for racy photographs for a glossy men’s magazine, recalled the day she decided to cover up. ‘I just came back from the Hajj and my body just didn’t feel comfortable any more without being covered,’ said Koesherawati whose past movies such as ‘Metropolitan Girls’, ‘Naughty Desires’ and ‘The Stained Bed’, left little to the imagination. Now she insists those days are long gone. ‘I don’t feel old-fashioned, in fact I feel more cosmopolitan,’ she says. ‘Society has now grown more tolerant of Islamic dress’.”

Figure D-20 Sunsilk’s “Segar dan Bersih” endorsement

D.3.9.2 Advertising campaign


Consumers in Indonesia like in the rest of the world prefer easily digestible information. Since pictorial information as opposed to verbal information can be assimilated more quickly, consumers prefer stronger pictorial images in information conveyance (Esch 2001: 17). The youth in Indonesia are often referred to today as a visual generation. A large proportion of the communication budget was allotted to billboards in up market locations and to costly advertising glossies which lived up to the prestigious image of the brand. These are identifiable by means of proximity to distinctive topics (status, prestige) and those expressing values (i.e. religion). The design of the adverts’ content targeted the conveying of an emotional-symbolic realm of experience through experience-oriented, often sensual, depictions. Besides, it aimed at product portrayals usually without captions. The next image shows some examples taken from the advertising campaign. The colour green is notably associated with Islam and the silky veil and the friendly charismatic look of the woman all epitomize the Sunsilk brand. Even the bottle is green, but the image on the bottle shows a different and unveiled model.

Figure D-21 Inneke Koesherawati endorsing Sunsilk (official ads)

This campaign, which was perceived as very aesthetically pleasing in Indonesia, had the desired effect. The image begs attention and deliberately evokes contact with the brand Sunsilk, which is now suddenly associated with Islamic values (AS, interview December 2004). The pleasant image arouses a positive perception and ensures that the product better received than one without a visual element (atmospheric effect). By means of these specific, emotional images, in which the silky lustre of the veil comes to the fore, while the product fades into the background, a lasting consumer attitude to the brand should be attained. Simultaneously an experience is transmitted which will make the brand able to be lived and experienced.


The individual elements of the marketing strategy helped convince women who wear veils and who consider their appearance important, to purchase the product. Print and outdoor media were the focus here rather than TV advertising, so that the members of the new middle class who watch less TV than they read newspapers and who work on the Internet, as well as spend hours daily in traffic, could be reached rather than the women living in the countryside. Billboards in urbane regions of Indonesia were reserved in the outdoor area. In Jakarta these are from 4 by 8 meters, to 8 by 16 meters in size and cost from Rp27,082,000 and Rp100,000 000 monthly (approximately from €2,700 to 10,000 [€1 = Rp10,000, exchange rate as of October 2004]). In contrast, a 30 second commercial on Indonesian TV costs between Rp9,000,000 (€900) (JTV, TVR1) and Rp25,000,000 (€2,500) (RCTI, SCTV, IVM). A 30 second radio commercial on a radio station preferred by women, such as “Female” in Jakarta or “Suzana” in Surabaya costs between Rp120,000 (€12) and Rp350,000 (€350) per broadcast. A full-page, 4c (colour) advertisement in magazines targeting women costs Rp19,400,000 (€1,940) in “Femina” (bi-weekly magazine, 130,000 circulation), and Rp20,000,000 (€2,000) in “Cosmopolitan” (monthly magazine, circulation 127,000). These prices are rather low when compared internationally (all prices: Synovate Asia Pacific Market Handbook 2004: 134-140).

In general, the hair care category is the one in Indonesia which allocates the highest budget to advertising. In 2003 in this category Rp815 billion were spent on advertising. In comparison, the cigarette category spent Rp652 billion and private vehicles spent Rp476 billion. These figures illustrate the harsh market conditions and cut-throat competition in the hair care market which expects high growth rates. In 2003 the top advertisers in Indonesia were “Clear Anti Ketombe” shampoo with Rp176 billion, followed by Sunsilk shampoo with Rp117 billion.

Besides outdoor and print advertising in magazines, adverts were placed in free newspapers which are distributed in cafés and shopping centres. Advertising campaigns in those magazines are linked to Muslim fashion, as can be seen in the image below. The advertisements are followed by visual information from Inneke Koesherawati on how to wear a veil, and on how to combine certain colours, and on which occasions which veils can be worn. Rather than as a religious symbol, the veil appears more as a means of disassociating lifestyles. In short, the fashionable side of the veil is emphasized.


Figure D-22 Advertising campaign of Sunsilk “Segar dan Bersih”

D.3.9.3 Campaign execution

The product launch (upon which a lot of hope was resting) was timed to coincide with Ramadan. It was hoped that the emotive nature of this period would have a spill-over effect on the product (the product was emotionally charged). Furthermore, a lot of veils are worn and new clothing is purchased at Ramadan, too. In this context the aim was to communicate that by wearing a veil, hair would have little contact with light and air, and needed the boosting that the special conditioning effect of the shampoo could offer. And since many Indonesian women wear veils only at Ramadan, it was hoped that many consumers would try out the product and would continue to use it after Ramadan. This was the reason for the product being in a bottle with an unveiled model on it. Thus, shortly before the start of Ramadan in October 2004, Sunsilk’s “Segar dan Bersih” was launched on to the market. It is impossible to list all the initiatives used to implement this strategy at this juncture. All documents pertaining to this process are included on the DVD enclosed.

D.3.10 Outcome

During the author’s stay from August to December 2004 and further visits to Indonesia in March and August 2005, the product appeared to be very successfully established on the market. During the product launch over Ramadan the product and its presentation seemed to have become a talking point. Word of mouth assisted the product in attaining almost iconic proportions. However, exact sales, turnover and profit figures which could help gauge its success are unavailable, since Unilever does not issue figures for individual products or markets. It is only known that Sunsilk is by far the leader in advertising expenditure in Indonesia and that the company image has improved drastically. Unilever and Sunsilk swept the boards with prizes in 2004 and 2005 for their product marketing, especially for the shampoo discussed here for women with Islamic leanings. It is considered to be the number one shampoo in Indonesia. With the launch of Sunsilk “Segar dan Bersih“, Unilever Indonesia has managed to arouse continued interest in its products, and to establish an emotional rapport, to raise identification with product and brand, and product importance in everyday life, i.e. it has managed to keep it relevant to society. By linking an everyday product to Islam, Unilever has found the key that imbues the brand Sunsilk with relevance in Indonesia, and that facilitates new growth. The brand has been indelibly stamped on social consciousness. Sunsilk has become a feminine brand with profile and character, which women can identify with. The market share increased and the brand was helped to its unique position (SWA 15/XX 22 July – 4 August 2004: “Merek-merek terbaik 2004”). Reference to the culture element religion in particular and its increasing importance for Indonesian consumers making their buying decision, helped Unilever to safeguard its market position against fierce competition and, furthermore, to gain relevance and credibility. In the case of Unilever Indonesia the adaptation of the Sunsilk brand (conceived as a global brand by Unilever) was achieved by product innovation which caters to the needs of the veiled Muslim woman and considers her increasing significance as a consumer. The success story of Sunsilk “Segar dan Bersih” illustrates that the adaptation of product and marketing strategies to local peculiarities (differentiated standardization strategy) does not inevitably lead to the overly feared (by many companies) identity dilution of the global brand or to synergy loss and inefficiency.

D.3.10.1  Outcome from a sociological perspective


The case-study demonstrates how fast economic growth in Indonesia can lead to transformation of social structures, and how these changes can in turn give rise to consumer preferences. These economic improvements do not lead to a general loss of religion’s significance as was originally expected (Siddique and Evers 1993: 1-10; Lee 1993: 35-61; Kiem 1993: 92-127; Mulder 1993: 184-194). In fact, the opposite is true. More and more people from all social echelons are turning to religion today (Akbar and Hastings 1994; Al-Azmeh 1993; Stark 1999) and this move is also reflected in their consumer behavioural patterns.

Finally, it remains to be considered how the success of Sunsilk “Segar dan Bersih” can be explained. The product and marketing campaign surrounding it are reminiscent of a quotation from Norbert Bolz (2002: 92): “The common offer of post-modern markets is: to again cast a spell on the world where the spell had been broken” („Das gemeinsame Angebot der postmodernen Märkte lautet: Wiederverzauberung der entzauberten Welt”, translation by author). Bolz explains in this way the trend towards some companies re-inventing the magic (lost as a side-effect of the modern world deprived of its mystique) by means of products endowed with religious impact. This is enabled on the one hand through the development of products and brands which achieve the cult status of “holy” goods by being accompanied by extraordinary marketing campaigns. On the other hand it is made possible through products and their application being endowed with religious impact. Looking back at the strategically chosen dates of the market launch and the marketing campaigns with their huge billboard advertisements which converted the notion of popular and obvious via the religious revelation of Inneke Koesherawati’s conversion to an Islam conforming lifestyle (she is depicted enveloped in a silky green veil and looking expectantly), Unilever appears not only to have intended to satisfy consumers but rather to tempt and enchant them, as if the consumer were shouting: “Transform me the way Inneke Koesherawati has transformed herself!” Unilever is, of course, not directly responsible for Inneke Koesherawati’s life metamorphosis, but this is indirectly implied as if to say: “I’m a good Muslim woman and I use Sunsilk. Sunsilk helps me to be a good Muslim“. The religiously charged brand has, in this case, become a means of transforming consumers. Whether you buy Sunsilk or Nivea is no longer a question of taste but rather a question of world philosophy. In this way Indonesian consumers resemble Bolz’s (2002: 108) “post-material consumers” who do not merely purchase goods. Instead they purchase stories, feelings, dreams and values. The more modern, i.e. the more differentiated a society is, the more labour is divided, the more confused society becomes, the greater the yearning for unity and entirety. Owing to this, the product reached the market at exactly the right time, because, since the beginning of 2004 the average standard of living (measured in terms of per capita income) has returned to pre-crisis levels and the rapid upturn and its accompanying social estrangement is apparent everywhere, for example, in migration and urbanization.

It seems as if despite the capitalist economic system and its social influence affecting all of Indonesia’s regions, a homogenous, secular society is not developing either, and people are not becoming more dispassionate i.e. they are not turning away from religion. The opposite appears to be true. Sunsilk’s “Segar dan Bersih” success story makes it patently obvious that consumers prefer everyday goods which are endowed with spiritual value. Consumers have the feeling that the manufacturer understands their situation, respects it and converts their special needs into tailor-made products and advertising campaigns, which other producers do not. Furthermore, it is also possible that some Sunsilk consumers consider it as a reward: “I am religious and thus I can treat myself to this product.” It could also be possible that people have an inner malaise concerning their own prosperity, and by purchasing religiously endowed or religiously produced goods, they hope to compensate for or to lessen this malaise. The product thus becomes a way of embellishing one’s own existence, i.e. one’s own world is made beautiful, and with it God’s world (in the sense of “Ibadah” [van Leeuwen (1997: 340) on the meaning of “Ibadah”: “Ibadah is - praising Allah by beautifying your surrounding or yourself – not wearing the same gold and diamond rings everyday, for example.”]), too. By using everyday objects deemed to be religious, one’s own piety is increased. In Indonesia there is a real sense of belief that what people are doing embellishes God’s world. It cannot be interpreted as the production of a pretext or justification. The Sunsilk brand becomes a totemic emblem. It highlights the distinctions between, and sense of belonging to a community at the same time. A totem sets itself apart from mundane objects by having the property to be a fascinating image which binds feelings to it. The yearning for security sought after by the consumer can be found (at least in part) in the tempting world of religiously imbued wares and goods – a yearning which previously was addressed to religion. In the consumer’s mind, he/she has purchased an Islamic product and by doing so, has demonstrated his/her independence from western goods. This, however, is completely fallacious, since Unilever is, in fact, a western company. Unilever even goes so far as to suggest that by purchasing from them, the consumer can actually conspire against western companies. This paradox is the same as the one between global markets and local content – one of the many paradoxes of the “global” or rather, “glocal” age. The brand bears the signature of global and advertising bears the signature of local, which together form a modus coexistendi, which is understood by the consumer as glocal in his realm of experiences.


The age in which products are available worldwide leads to the concept of universally similar behaviour and to the assimilation of needs on a global level. Obviously, here desire is the mother of thought. Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries are not experiencing any radical westernization process, but rather a process of modernization, which does not lead to monotypic ramifications in the affected countries. Schütte (2000: 3) summarizes it thus: “Cultures will respond differently to the process of modernization and will remain unique“. Modernization may under no circumstances be equated with westernization solely because social transformations in western countries set in first as a result of industrialization, and were driven on as a result. Westernization, on the other hand, means that non-western countries develop the way in which western countries do. Twenty years of modernization, however, can in no way obliterate several thousand years of cultural development. One can therefore conclude that the world is moving towards a more industrialized one, but not necessarily a more western world. The significance of cultural aspects, especially religion, in a global age, erroneously interpreted as disenchantment, has been analyzed and documented by this case-study in depth. The following chapter forms the conclusion of this thesis and closes the cycle of discussion.

Fußnoten und Endnoten

101  Feysen Busana Muslim: Muslim clothes fashion; Fashion, or “feysen” (Jones 2003: 187) as it is called in Indonesian.

102  English for: soziale Gemengelage.

103  District in Jakarta.

104  http://www.pasarayagrande.com/ ( 12 August 2005)

105  http://www.noor.co.id/default.asp?l=1 (19 November 2005)

106  http://www.ummigroup.co.id/?pilih=lihat&id=101 (19 November 2005)

107  http://www.x-rates.com/calculator.html (12 August 2005)

108  http://www.thejakartapost.com/review/feat11.asp (3 December 2005)

109  All slides courtesy of Retno Rustanti, Unilever Indonesia.

110  http://www.globalbusinessinsights.com/rbi/content/rbcg0036m.pdf; http://www.csr-asia.com/upload/csrasiaweeklyvol1week36.pdf; (19 November 2005);

111  http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/livelihoods/unilever_foreuni.htm (14 October 2005)

112  http://www.unilever.com/ (12 October 2005);

113  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/ (12 October 2005);

114  http://www.unilever.com/Images/1994%20-%202004%20Charts_tcm13-11995.pdf (12 October 2005);

115  http://www.pg.com/company/who_we_are/worldwide_operations.jhtml;jsessionid=O21OXDYDLYCHTQFIAJ4S0IWAVABHOLKK#I (17 August 2005)

116  http://www.kao.co.jp/en/company/group/affiliates_outside_japan.html (17 August 2005)

117  http://www.loreal.com/_en/_ww/index.aspx?direct1=00001&direct2=00001/00005 (17 August 2005)

118  http://www.beiersdorf.de/Area-About-us/Beiersdorf-Global/Country-Details.aspx?l=1&continent=5&country=ID&name= (17 August 2005)

119  http://www.hll.com/ (19 September 2005)

120  http://www.unilever.com.my/corporate/corporate_profile.asp (19 September 2005)

121  http://www.unilevervn.com/ (19 September 2005)

122  http://www.unilvervn.com/brandsasp (19 September 2005)

123  http://today.reuters.com/stocks/overview.aspx?symbol=UNVR.JK (17 August 2005); www.jsx.co.id/.../Unilever%20(UNVR)/PT%20UNILEVER%20INDONESIA%20Q3%20konsol-04%20Indonesia%20.doc (17 August 2005);

124  http://www.pg.com/en_US/index.jhtml (17 August 2005);

125  http://www.colgate.com/app/Colgate/US/HomePage.cvsp (17 August 2005);

126  http://www.jsx.co.id/ (17 August 2005);


Type of small family owned business (often a casual, usually outdoor restaurant) in Indonesia.

The term can also be used to refer to many other types of shop, including the wartel (short for warung telepon, essentially a manned phone booth) and warnet (Internet café).

128  http://www.telkom.co.id/ (19 November 2005)

129  http://www.telkom.co.id/ (19 November 2005); http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-aktien/indofood-sukses-makmur.asp (23 December 2005);

130  http://www.jnj.com/ (17 November 2005);

131  http://www.jsx.co.id/ (16 November 2005);

132  A publicly traded company is worth the current share price times the number of shares outstanding.

133  http://www.unilever.com/Images/Q4%20Roadshow%20Presentation_tcm13-32243.pdf (13 September 2005)

134  http://www.sunsilk.com/ (11 September 2005)

135  http://www.unilever.com/ourbrnads/casestudies/sunsilk.asp) (13 September 2005)

136  http://www.hll.com/brands/sunsilk.asp (13 September 2005)

137  http://www.hll.com/brands/sunsilk.asp (11 September 2005)

138  There are some grammatical mistakes in this official Unilever slide: It should be: “For hair that breaks and falls out” and “Hair that grows sparsely”.

139  http://www.hawaii.edu/indolang/bahasa/siapa.html (17 November 2005); http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit72/Theme%20-%20Amrih.htm (16 November 2005)

140  http://www.tempo.co.id/ang/min/01/index_pok.htm (18 September 2005);

141  http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=ourWorldNews&storyID=4014617 (12 September 2005)

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