Axel Hägerström war der große schwedische Schulbildner mit Einfluß auf Juristen, Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftler; darüber hinaus wird eine ganze Generation von Politikern in intellektueller Abhängigkeit von ihm gesehen, vielen gilt er gar als der Theoretiker des modernen schwedischen Staates in seiner etatistischen, sozialdemokratischen Wohlfahrtstradition: Sein Kampf gegen die Metaphysik und seine Kritik an naturrechtlichen Vorstellungen wurde grundlegend für den skandinavischen Rechtsrealismus und hatte zudem großen Einfluß auf die schwedische sozialdemokratische Ideologie, den sogenannten Funktionssozialismus. Die Uppsala-Schule des Rechtspositivismus ist von seiner antiidealistischen Auffassung von der Setzung der Moral durch Macht geprägt, doch trotz des seinerzeit großen Einflusses ist Hägerström über die Grenzen Schwedens hinaus kaum noch bekannt.
Time and again polemics over Axel Hägerström (*1868, #SYMBOL#1939) and the role of his value philosophy erupt in Swedish dailies, as well as among professional philosophers and other scholars.
Hägerström’s basic notion is that there is no science in morals, merely on morals.1 This bold statement has always generated criticism. In Sweden this criticism ranged from the Marxian scholar Arnold Ljungdahl to the educationalist and philosopher John Landquist. The latter coined “Nihilism” as an originally pejorative label for Hägerström’s philosophy, a label which soon was proudly accepted by its adherents as its proper name, although it in addition often is defined as the emotive theory of values.
There is not much written on Hägerström in international encyclopaedias of philosophy. However, if there is one Swedish philosopher who should be represented in such Pantheon, Hägerström would be the obvious choice, as exemplified in Blackwell’s Dictionary of Philosop2.
Hägerström was professor of Practical Philosophy at Uppsala and his inaugural lecture from 1911 “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning” is not only central for the understanding of his works, but also an important albeit neglected piece in the history of ideas and of social science doctrine.
This is the first time a negative value ontology is explicitly launched in a more precise and comprehensive manner, even if David Hume as well as Occam might be seen as forerunners to the radical antimetaphysics developed by Hägerström. A more contemporary source of inspiration was Alexius Meinong.
In his personal Uppsala-life Hägerström has a certain resemblance to Immanuel Kant’s Königsberg-life. He seldom left Uppsala and did not travel to international conferences. He was a “house plant”, deeply attached to his wife and daughters. He belonged – like many Swedes of his generation – to the German Kulturkreis in the widest sense. His voluminous dissertation on Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt (more than 800 pages) was written and published in German, as was his main mature work, Der Römische Obligationsbegriff (two volumes). He also wrote his autobiography in German (published by Felix Meiner in Leipzig in 1929) in the series Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen.
Hägerström grew up in a deeply religious home in Östergötland (his father was a Lutheran minister) and it was a shock to his parents when young Axel declared that he had decided not to study theology and become a priest. In fact, much of Hägerström’s antimetaphysics must be seen in a context, where atheism as well as radicalism and secular (scientific) orientation replaced theology. This deep belief, combined with an expressed sense of a true calling could partly explain Hägerström’s obvious selfconfidence. In fact, he regarded his own thinking as a Copernican revolution in philosophy.
Among Hägerström’s contemporaries Hans Kelsen, Max Weber, and the Finlandian anthropologist Edvard Westermarck developed similar ideas, imprinted by anti natural law and radical antimetaphysics. They were rather independent of each other even if they seem to have been aware of each others work.
There is no intellectual biography written on Hägerström, except for a rather slim volume by his daughter.3 His ideas have been spread mainly by his followers in jurisprudence, the so called Scandinavian school of legal realism. The Professor of Law at Lund Karl Olivecrona’s Law as Fact4 which soon became an international textbook has been translated even into Japanese, and through the Uppsala Professor Vilhelm Lundstedt, who made a parallel political career as a social democratic senator, Hägerström’s thinking would eventually exercise considerable influence on social democratic policy in Sweden. Actually, Lundstedt could be seen as an important figure for understanding some specific traits in Swedish political culture and its relative disregard of natural rights. Hägerström’s ideas have a certain affinity to American pragmatism (John Dewey, Oliver W. Holmes, Roscoe Pound) and neo-pragmatists (Richard Rorty) as to continental European thoughts, for instance the œuvre of Niklas Luhmann, where the function of law rather than its normative validity is in focus. The transition from jus to lex was in itself no novelty. We find it in British utilitarianism, especially in the works of Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. The question is: what comes first? Law or justice? To a legal positivist concepts like “right” or “wrong” are only meaningful within a defined positive legal order. To a proponent of natural law on the other hand, there is some sort of transcendental system of norms behind like the ten commandments, which we are supposed to try to obey, and the law to codify. Also to many legal positivists there might be a system of norms behind the law but this should be understood as remaining traits of metaphysics, residuals of natural law thinking. These lingering elements of natural law metaphysics in legal positivism were something Hägerström and his pupils loved to criticise (like Hägerström in his polemics against various theories of the free will as a legal source). This is a parallel to Gunnar Myrdal’s critique of the value bias in doctrines of economics and it is a crucial key to the understanding of why legal positivists and nihilists seemed to disagree, even if their basic approaches evidently had a very strong affinity. On one occasion Hägerström and Kelsen actually met for a debate in Uppsala but they were evidently unable to understand each other.
Hägerström is still with us. Even if he is now and then declared “dead and buried” the corpse is still “twinkling”. The recurrent “obituaries” are themselves in fact proof of his confirmed presence and the virulence of his thought, which is not yet fully incorporated into the body of social thought, despite the fact that he addresses precisely the central topics on the postmodernist agenda.
There is no particular “Hägerström School” of philosophy. In this sense he reminds us of Max Weber. Hägerström had pupils but more so in jurisprudence and theology5 than in professional philosophy. There is also something self-dissolving in his philosophical position which in a way marks the end of philosophy as traditionally understood. Hägerström’s philosophy is “victorious to death”. Hägerström just like Max Weber formulates very strong basic positions which remain virulent since they tend to be accepted by almost everybody, although without a due recognition of the source. They are even “embraced” – unwillingly – by the opponents. Hence, one does not become a Hägerströmian because it is a neat and nice position, but rather because there is no intellectually honest alternative except for the Icarian flights of well meaning but hardly convincing “backdoor normativism”. Hägerström offers irreversible insights of postenlightenment and his ideas are like the cave of the lion, many footprints leading in and none out. Today die-hard pre-enlightenment natural law thinking is not really taken seriously and it has to fall back on revealed truth, like in the case of Leo Strauß and his followers. Others, like Alisdair MacIntyre, instead try to reconnect to Aristotelian foundations in their search for firm norms – but are actually wrestling with, and not overcoming, the problem of value incommensurability which is so central to Hägerström and which codifies the most tragic insight of postenlightenment, generating the necessity and anxiety of choice which we associate with the names of Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard (and today in social science maybe with Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman).
I have not seen any valid criticism of Hägerström, except for some rhetorics about semantic details where Hägerström was less sophisticated. The Uppsala philosopher Ingemar Hedenius misses the point in his criticism of the so called Hägerström-Lundstedt error, which is, moreover, notoriously misunderstood. Hedenius maintains that at least some normative “non-genuine” statements about “right” or “wrong” should after all mirror a tacit reality and thus have a truth value, as basically cognitive statements (if they are understood as such), and hence have a scientific meaning-content and could be judged as true or false. To the Hägerströmian all such statements lack such a cognitive meaning since they are not statements about reality, more than let us say a sneeze or a cough. They are thus neither true nor false or maybe always false. (Here we have a matter of interpretation where the debate still goes on.) Hedenius’ position that Hägerström’s plea for a non-cognitivistic value sentence theory only applies to genuine statements about “right” or “wrong” and not some utterances that only on the surface seem to be such statements although they actually do refer to reality appears to me as trivial – and above all, does not at all – not even in the view of Hedenius himself – alter Hägerström’s basic position (which he shares). It is a sort of empathic criticism which aims at improving rather than refuting, although it has been misunderstood by many, e.g. Theodor Geiger (see below).
Hedenius is just as much anti natural law as Hägerström and his basic point that non genuine sentences about “right” or “wrong” might have a truth content (since they are statements over something else than they appear to be sentences about) and thus after all have a scientific truth content, is something altogether different from ascribing truth value to genuine value sentences and on that crucial point Hedenius and Hägerström are of one mind. In my view the Uppsala philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau6 is right in his assertion that Hedenius’ criticism is trivial and in full accordance with Hägerström’s point. Vilhelm Lundstedt, nevertheless, dedicated a whole series of lectures to an aggressive rejoinder against Hedenius.
It is not by chance that two prominent intellectual refugees in Sweden – Ernst Cassirer and Theodor Geiger – both have written books on Hägerström.7 Geiger basically echoes Hedenius but overestimates the scope of his own criticism. He wishes to “improve” Hägerström’s antimetaphysics. He seems to believe that his criticism should alter Hägerström’s positions but I simply cannot see that this is the case.8 Geiger himself writes that: “Personally I declare myself for value-nihilism and antimetaphysics”.9 But alleged errors in Hägerström’s sociological foundations in Geiger's view somehow make his philosophy invalid, which to me appears both as unproven and even as flawed argumentation.
I find it frustrating to read Hedenius and Geiger. They are crystal clear as long as they elaborate and explain Hägerström’s position but both become very abstruse and opaque when they try to develop their own criticism. Hägerström might have had his limits and flaws as a semantic and as a sociologist – but his basic philosophical points remain firm and unaltered.
In some respects Hägerström discusses parallel themes with Friedrich Nietzsche. The slogans “Beyond good and evil”, “Der letzte Mensch“ and “Death of God” come to mind, as unifying themes for Hägerström, Nietzsche and Weber. In “Beyond Good and Evil” Nietzsche wrote: “There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena”.
The existential anxiety of choice is thus a predicament we can not escape. We have today new possibilities to recast our lives, as Anthony Giddens phrases it. But choice is also a necessity and there are no firm authorities to rely on; we are on our own.
The death of God is both an expression in Nietzsche and a label for the Enlightenment. God is dead and there are several churches. We would love to have the firm values that our instrumental means-end-analyses require but – we simply cannot find them or, rather, we find too many and thus we have to choose. We thus have to postulate our ultimate goals, in a situation imprinted by polytheism or perspectivism. This should – which Hägerström also pointed out – rather generate a certain humbleness on behalf of various Weltanschauungen and their political parties. Ideological fanatics in postenlightenment are faced with a lack of credibility, when they try to invoke “Ormus vs Ariman” or various crusade ideologies time and again, while on the other hand ugly and less civilized ideologies cannot be refuted by scientific means – or neither proven, nor refuted.
There is yet another – and more vulgar – connection to Nietzsche, namely the view of laws and norms as merely fences to control the “domesticized cattle” of ordinary people, fences which the more supreme individuals can disregard – since they have no morally binding force. We are here close to the double morals of Machiavelli. Historically it is obvious that laws have the advantage of making our actions predictable. This is what modern trade and commerce require and the purpose which modern laws (in contrast to feudal) fullfill, ever since the so called papal revolution 800 years ago. It is tempting to ascribe conventions about what is “fair” in a specific culture a guise of moral objectivity, regardless its validity. As the colourful Bishop Anton Niklas Sundberg in Karlstad said, when theologians debated the existence of the devil and hell a century ago: “We still need a hell for the peasants, don’t we?” Hägerström himself did not share any Übermenschenideal, his contribution is to claim that we have to reconcile with a polytheist predicament which in his view would promote tolerance and countervail ideological value rational fanaticism. It might sound cynical that moral convictions are matters of civility and cohesiveness, legitimacy and belief systems in different cultures, rather than matters of absolute truth and validity – but anyone actually pleading the validity of norms carry the burden of intersubjective proof.
The loss of firm norms makes us unhappy, insecure, and without orientation. The new ideologies of the 19th Century were all children of the enlightenment and could be seen as secular religions – but they pointed in different and competing directions.
Of course, natural law and Christianity remain viable alternatives but after the enlightenment their claim of a monopoly no longer had any credibility. They were reduced to optional alternatives in the market place of ideas but without a privileged position. The philosophical basis for the validity claim on behalf of natural law had been eroding ever since the 13th century, accelerated by the contributions of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bentham. To Bentham notions about right or wrong were fictitious entities and he characterized natural law as nonsense on stilts.
We have no scientific means at our disposal to decide the architecture of the “Good society”. Modern social engineering is more parochial (Lokalvernunft, the historian and anthropologist would say) although it rests on Western values, with universally increasing relevance in modernity and modern capitalism.
There are signs that Hägerström’s personal allegiances were much in the tradition of French radicalism, e.g. Émile Zola, and he was himself a radical, with a benevolent attitude to socialism.
His most prominent pupils took very different political positions; Lundstedt as a social democrat imprinting Swedish political culture and Olivecrona exposing himself to accusations of Nazi-sympathies, which might very likely be an overstatement. But as late as 1943 he hoped for a German victory in the Second World War. He wrote books in which he said that if Germany were to lose, Europe would be dominated Russia and America, two young warrior nations much inclined to control European natural resources. After the war he admitted that he had overlooked the ideological factor.
There are several overlaps between Hägerström and the continental European thinkers he never really met, above all Max Weber, whose ideal-type-methodology indeed could be characterized as polytheist or existentialist, anchored in the philosophy of the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. But there are also affinities to Ernst Troeltsch and his analysis of the crisis of historicism. According to Troeltsch values vary with culture and the crucial question then is how to accomplish objective values. The core of historicism – the denial of eternal laws and norms – seemingly promoted relativism and anti-natural-law modes of thinking.
There are admittedly problems of interpretations here. Rickert has been called the father of historical relativism, yet relapsed into notions of eternal suprahistorical values. Weber was more consequent on this point, although leaving the limits of science an open question; we cannot say for sure where the infinite process of science must hold its horses in the future. Hägerström is more radical. To him values lack truth content, while in the case of Weber we rather do not know if they do.
Hägerström’s combination of a negative value ontology and a non-cognitivistic value sentence theory is the most radical position – as well as a very strong one. It is also a position that readily makes us feel uneasy. It is easy to see some nasty consequences an “overspill” from science to social attitudes, resulting in moral indifference and moral deficit, promoting a “community” filled with antisocial “free-riders”. To quite some extent that is what we have today which is also reflected in modern political science (Robert Putnam and the communitarians, like Michael Sandels and Amitai Etzioni).
However, the validity of Hägerström’s position is hard to challenge, and the consequence of his position should not be mixed up with its validity. It is a position difficult to escape – with preserved intellectual honesty and without employing some wishful thinking – even if we would like to. There is nothing charming about Hägerström’s position. But all attempts at refutations I have seen have the character of another “Indian rope trick” or backdoor normativism. Everybody wishes to challenge “relativism” and “nihilism”, none ever succeeded. It is a bit like the dog barking at the moon.
The Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal operationalizes Weber’s solution to the problem of identifying norms serving as basic values in our rationalized hierarchies of means-end-rationality. Weber has resolved the normsender problem by using the notion of culture. The values were to be identified, that could fill in for the Wertobjektiven, the validity of which we simply cannot verify, but which we still need for our Wertbeziehung (value relation, point of view). According to Myrdal we shall connect to significant and relevant values, i.e. values that could serve as guidelines for unions and parties and other important actors in society. This we might call a more political or instrumental version of Weber because, being a German, he relied more on university professors or charismatic leaders as interpreters or innovators of values to “jump on”.
Gunnar Myrdal was explicitly influenced by both Weber and Hägerström and his approach is paradigmatic for today’s policy science.10 He practises his approach for instance in An American Dilemma11 where he at length elaborates on the values serving as useful points of departure, despite the fact that there is no way to prove their normative validity. They are indispendable but have to be made explicit in order to avoid uncontrolled value intrusion.
One might say that Myrdal, a powerful and influential analyst but hardly an innovative thinker, does to Weber and Hägerström what Samuel Pufendorf once did for Hobbes, i.e. contributes to the diffusion of their basic thoughts to a wider readership.
There is admittedly a danger that Hägerströmianism might lead to an identification of might with right, power with justice. As a small homesteader I like to invoke Lockean concepts of property, in my defence against the populist state power and – the Swedish – so called functional socialism that places the common good before individual rights in its imposition of new Draconian taxes, on firewood from my own forest or whatever. Alas, I cannot prove my viewpoint, I can only embrace, plead and act as if it was true and valid. To the individual a constitutional order is a nicer arrangement than full fledged mass democracy, as Helmut Schelsky once said. The same goes on the larger scale for human rights in general and to a Hägerströmian the UN charter might be the manifestation of a growing civilization etc, but not “true”. It is merely a subjective opinion, with a purely ideological status.
The Swedish-Finlandian scholar Harry Järv once wrote that “it is not true that all men are born free and have equal rights and human value, as is stated in the UN charter. There is no theoretical foundation for such a statement. Laws and conventions are artefacts with sometimes positive and sometimes damaging consequences. It is, nevertheless, possible to act as if the UN charter is the truth; and undoubtedly, it would be beneficial to mankind to do so.” I fully agree.
Thus the small independent forest owner must be prepared to claim his independence and his natural rights against other powers – and then he needs to cooperate with other citizens in a similar position, to protect his rights. In this process he is incorporated in a positive order, a community, with positively defined rights and obligations. It is a rational trade off. One buys one’s security, by sacrifising parts of one’s independence. The escape from the anarchy of the state of nature has its price. In the old Wild West the lone pioneer moving on westwards might be the hero – but the Homestead Act, the colt revolver and the barbed wire built civilization and communities with cohesiveness and civility. This answers well to the transition from a Hobbesian state of everybody’s war against everybody, into a system of well defined social order. This is the motivation for accepting a state of affairs in which others decide and one has to obey. This is more pronounced in Bentham, to whom jus is replaced by lex, i.e. the law has priority over “justice”. Lex can be found in legal praxis as expressed in the court decisions, while it remains unclear what jus really is. It is harder to achieve a consensus about jus than lex, although communicative Utopianism à la Jürgen Habermas – and originally Socrates – seems to recure. They seem to be well meaning but they still have the same flaw as Rousseau’s Volonte generale: how to deal with dissenters?
Hägerström was the prophet and Olivecrona and Lundstedt his apostles. The Danish scholar Alf Ross also contributed to the diffusion of the Scandinavian legal realism. To Ross the law is like traffic rules; it is simply practical to agree which side of the road to drive on – and how to implement sanctions if bills are not paid, property stolen, relatives killed, etc. Hägerström himself liked to portrait the belief in law as a moral thing as magic (and superstition), the roots of which he tried to trace in several of his works.
Again I think, Hägerström is right – but I also recognize that the seamy side of Hägerströmianism is less visible in a small and homogeneous peasant society like Sweden than in, let’s say Belgium or Bosnia. There is no reason to allow relativism and nihilism to expand from a purely philosophical position to become a life-style dominated by indifferent attitudes – but such “overspread” easily happens. On the other hand, the dangers of totalising ideologies organized in Weltanschauungsparteien seem to be a more urgent problem in recent history. Hägerströmian „nihilism” is neutral and provides no guidelines for our conduct of life.
Hägerström has a high degree of omnipresence but yet an underutilized potential in modern social thought. This is partly due to tensions within the Uppsala school of philosophy itself.12 Several younger anti-metaphysic philosophers distanced themselves from Hägerström (Vienna and Oxford philosophy being additional sources of inspiration) and would only reluctantly and somewhat unwillingly admit that Hägerström was the most original philosopher.13 To some extent we might also sense a condescending attitude among philosophers to practioners in the field of social science. Hägerström’s Nachlaß, some 25.000 pages of unpublished manuscripts, is kept at the Carolina Rediviva in Uppsala, while the collected works of his intellectually less important colleague Adolf Phalén has been published.
Hägerström’s influence is manifested in many ways. In Sweden his imprint is manifest both in the political culture and in literature. The difficulties to harmonize Sweden to European legal praxis as regards constitutional rights for the individual against the state can be traced to Hägerström and Lundstedt. This general cultural influence is well documented by Staffan Källström.14
It seems to me as a national feature of certain significance that Scandinavians have an obvious taste for being either number crunchers or dark anti-metaphysics, often positivists, as a sort of inverted “Lutheranism” – and when they do jump on ideals they do so rather fanatically, like the Swedish-American scholar Georg Lundberg, who like Auguste Comte late in life became “religious”. Idealist speculation or grand systems do not have a market in Sweden, since the downfall of Boströmian idealism a century ago (which was more a Swedish “Hegelian” ideology for the state officials than a proper philosophy).
At least in the case of Lundstedt it seems that Hägerströmianism was an almost religious conversion, where the vacuum in ethical norms somehow was substituted in a typical and slightly paradoxical manner by “public welfare”, to which the individual was subordinated. Lundstedt was a colourful scholar who in the League of Nations in Geneva and other fora preached that the idea of international law in the normative sense was a danger to peace and international cooperation.
In a longer perspective Hägerström carries coal to the same fire of secularization as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, Weber, and Myrdal. Anti-natural law and calculability are core elements and rational economic man the central metaphor. The gradual demise is already embryonic in Thomas Aquinas and further promoted by Pufendorf, who in his days was accused of “Hobbesianism”, used as a synonym to atheism. It is strange that the victory of natural rights (as codified in written constitutionalism) coincide with the erosion of natural law.
For more than a millennium political philosophy dealt with the intentions of God and the route to salvation – and the worldly societies being a preparation for the eternal sacred life or at least Doomsday. Pufendorf worked in the aftermath of the 30-years-war and his project was to elaborate the demarcation between “sociology” (civil society) and theology, so we do not have to become deadly enemies already over confessional topics, like the holy trinity. In the process society (ordered peaceful coexistence between citizens, claiming by Man defined rights and obligations) becomes a goal in its own right.15
Hägerström’s ethical realism (a problematic term since it to the American probably would indicate the opposite position, - natural law – rather than legal positivism in the European sense) touches upon matters of legitimacy and contingency, which is a sinister and central theme from Machiavelli, via Hobbes, to Weber, Parsons – and Carl Schmitt. The Norwegian scholar Rune Slagstad16 has analysed this particular tradition in his work on liberal constitutionalism.
Hägerström is also basic for understanding the slogans Death of Ideology – after Fukuyama’s End of History – and Beyond Left and Right17. The enlightenment resulted in competing ideologies and norm systems and the weakening of religion. This creates a market for tracking down normative elements contributing to uncontrolled value intrusion in social science. To both John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx their theories dealt with both what is and what ought to be; the gulf between the two became explicit through Weber, Hägerström, and Myrdal. The 19th century is mixed and the discourses on how to organize and how to explain society intertwined. Hägerström – and his parallel classics – changed this and created the predicament we now have. We might label this the predicament of modernity, and if that is so postmodernism would just appear as a school of thought that only belatedly understood the real meaning of modernity.
1 “Science has only to indicate what is true, while it is nonsense to regard the idea of obligation as true”, and further, “moral philosophy as a science is purely and simply a science of actual moral evaluations in their historical development, based on a psychological analysis and conducted by a critical philosophical investigation of the ideas which are operative therein.... Moral science may not be a teaching in morals, but only a teaching about morality”, as he writes in his inaugural lecture from 1911.
2 Mautner, Thomas (Ed.): A Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford 1996.
3 Waller, Margit: Axel Hägerström. Människan få kände. Stockholm 1961. See also Jes Bjarup: Reason, Emotion and the Law. Studies in the philosophy of Axel Hägerström. Aarhus 1983, diss. at the University of Edinburgh. This book, though, is almost apocryphal and hard to find.
4 Olivecrona, Karl: Law as Fact. 2nd ed., London 1971 (1st ed. 1939).
5 Especially in Lund theologians (Anders Nygren) took impression which lead to a new understanding of the relation between science and faith as supplementary rather than alternative approaches.
6 Marc-Wogau, Konrad: Studier in Axel Hägerströms filosofi. Uppsala 1968.
7 According to Krois at the Humboldt-Universität, working with the Cassirer Gesamtausgabe, Hägerström was a formative influence to Cassirer (personal conversation fall 1997).
8 Eliaeson, Sven: „Geiger, the Upsala-School of Value-Nihilism – and Weber.” In: Fazis, Urs u. Jachen C. Nett (Hg): Gesellschaftstheorie und Normentheorie. Theodor Geiger Symposium. Basel 1993 (= Monographien zur Soziologie und Gesellschaftspolitik, Vol. 25), 225–34.
9 Geiger, Theodor: Debat med Uppsala om moral og Ret. Lund / Copenhagen 1946, 17.
10 This is evident in an article Myrdal wrote in Ekonomisk Tidskrift in 1931 – but also further supported by his unpublished “memoirs” kept at Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv in Stockholm. I would like to thank Stellan Andersson, who kindly put this “apocryphal” material at my disposal. The intentional depth of any influences on Gunnar Myrdal remains a problem for further inquiry.
11 Myrdal, Gunnar: An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York / London 1944.
12 Nordin, Svante: Från Hägerström till Hedenius. Lund 1984. See also: Eliaeson, Sven: „Review of Svante Nordin: Från Hägerström till Hedenius.“ In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift. 87 (1984), no. 4, 372–79.
13 Hedenius in Filosofisk Tidskrift is very illustrative in this sense. Hedenius, Ingemar: „Minnen av Adolf Phalén“. In: Filosofisk Tidskrift. 1 (1980), no. 1, 24–34.
14 Källström, Staffan: Den gode nihilisten. Axel Hägerström och striderna kring uppsalafilosofin. Stockholm 1986.
15 Pufendorf, Samuel: On the Duty of Man and Citizen. Cambridge 1991.
16 Slagstad, Rune: Rett og Politik. Oslo 1987, especially the chapters 3 and 4 on “Liberalismen og dens machiavelliske kritikere: Schmitt, Weber, Olivecrona” and “Rettens legitimitet”.
17 Giddens, Anthony: Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge 1994.