

Peace, welfare, culture

Muslims as a security problem in Danish integration discourse

Ulrik Pram Gad

Summary

This article analyzes how Muslims are implied to constitute threats in the official Danish discourse of the centre-right government since 2001. It does so to provide a more nuanced picture of Danish debates on integration than the usual presentation of two discourses – culturalism and multiculturalism – pitted in opposition. By analytically focusing on “security narratives”, the article details how initial narratives of Muslims as threats to culture, welfare and societal peace merged and morphed to award surprising new roles to the state and multiculturalism. The re-evaluation of cultural difference implied in a recent strategy to counter radicalization, however, does not amount to a de-securitization of Muslims – rather it installs a need for surveillance and control of the Muslim difference.

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel analysiert die Darstellung von Muslimen als Bedrohung im Diskurs der dänischen Mitte-Rechts-Regierung seit 2001. Damit liefert er ein nuancierteres Bild der dänischen Integrationsdebatte, die üblicherweise als eine Gegenüberstellung zweier gegenläufiger Diskurse – Kulturalismus und Multikulturalismus – beschrieben wird. Mittels einer analytischen Fokussierung auf „Sicherheitsnarrative“ zeigt der Artikel auf, auf welche Weise anfängliche Narrative von Muslimen als Bedrohung für Kultur, Wohlfahrt und gesellschaftlichen Frieden miteinander verschmolzen sind und sich dahingehend gewandelt haben, dass sie Staat und Multikulturalismus überraschend neue Rollen zuschreiben. Die Neubewertung von kultureller Differenz in einer jüngsten Strategie, die einer Radikalisierung entgegen wirken soll, hat keine Entversicherheitlichung der Muslime zur Folge – vielmehr festigt sie ein Bedürfnis nach Überwachung und Kontrolle des muslimischen Anderen.

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If one reads a sufficiently broad selection of Danish debates – from marginal publications of the 1980s; via the letters to the editors of populist tabloid *Ekstra-Bladet* and conservative broad sheet *Jyllands-Posten* in the 1990s; to the nooks and corners of the internet in the new millennium – one may find strangers, aliens, immigrants, and Muslims pointed out as threats to literally everything. It is, however, beyond doubt that two movements have made a difference.¹ First, a considerable shift has taken place over the decades both concerning *what* one may say about “the strangers” and concerning *who* may – or must – say it. Animosity against strangers has moved from a marginal status to a position close to hegemony. This movement has taken place via the tabloid campaigns of *Ekstra-Bladet* in the mid-1990s², via the foundation of the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) in 1995 and its election to parliament in 1998; via the dependency of the centre-right government on the votes of the Danish People’s Party for its parliamentary majority after 2001; and via the adaption of the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*) to the rhetoric of the new alien policy³. Second, animosity against strangers has condensed around religious differences. It is no longer “strangers”, “aliens”, or “refugees and immigrants” who are pointed out as the problem: it is the Muslims.⁴ To the extent that the older concepts – or euphemisms like “new Danes” or “2nd generationers” – are used, they increasingly

¹ This text has been discussed in a series of fora. I am especially indebted to my colleagues in the Danish politological EU studies PhD network, in the Department of Political Science Schæffergård seminars and the Center for Advanced Security Theory, both at University of Copenhagen – as well as to Peter Gundelach, Lis Højgaard, Christian Fogh Rostbøll, Signe Kjær Jørgensen, Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen.

² Hervik, Peter: *Den generende forskellighed*. København 1999.

³ Jacobsen, Lotte et al.: *Menneskesyn i flygtninge/indvandrerddebatten – en kritisk diskursanalyse af den politiske debat 1995–2006*. Roskilde 2007.

⁴ Jacobsen, Brian A.: *Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik*. København 2008, 234 and 267f.; Tobiassen, Mette: “Danskernes verden var den samme efter 11. september”. In: Jørgen Goul Andersen and Ole Borre (eds.): *Politisk forandring*. Århus 2003, 361; Mouritsen, Per: “The particular universalism of a Nordic civic nation”. In: Tariq Modood et al. (eds.): *Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship*. New York 2006, 75f., 83, 88; Haldrup, Michael et al.: “Practical Orientalism”. In: *Geografiska Annaler* 88B (2006:2), 174, 183; Thomsen, Jens P. F.: *Konflikten om de nye danskere*. København 2006, 188; Simonsen, Jørgen B.: *Islam med danske øjne*. 2nd revised edition. København 2006 [2004], 8, 14, 173ff.; Hauge, Hans: *Post-Danmark*. København 2003, 54; Fenger-Grøn, Carsten and Malene Grøndahl: *Flygtningenes danmarkshistorie 1954–2004*. Århus 2004, 15, 179, 208f.

have a semantic density around “Muslims”.⁵ In this regard, 9/11 and the falling twin towers have served as a symbol for this alignment. Furthermore, religion, integration, and counterterrorism have been linked across the distinction between domestic and foreign policy by, first, the bombings on the London underground on July 7th, 2005 and the related concept of “home grown terrorists”, and second, the Cartoon crisis following the publication of twelve drawings commissioned by a Danish newspaper to portray the prophet Mohammed and the related concepts of “culture struggle” and “value struggle”.

The current Danish debates on integration are often presented as a confrontation between two discourses: culturalism and multiculturalism.⁶ The two discourses – so the story goes – agree that culture is of defining importance for the individual, but they disagree over the relative value of cultures, at least when the cultures find themselves in Denmark: where multiculturalism ideally seeks equality between all cultures, indigenous or migrant, culturalism prioritizes Danish culture. Empirically it is, however, very difficult to find a consistent voice for full-blown multiculturalism.⁷ Obviously, there are sufficient recognizable tropes for culturalists to (re-)construct this favourite opponent of theirs – but it is equally possible to reconstruct the purportedly “multiculturalist” positions as a version of “repressive tolerance” towards the differences of the “other” while waiting for the “other” to self-assimilate into “our” (universally preferable) way of life: The capacity for change of the “other” is frequently stressed – as is the *lack* of causal influence of “their” presence on “us” (at least when speaking about any characteristic of society beyond taste in cuisine). Perhaps only two things keep the

⁵ Andreassen, Rikke: *Gender, Race, Sexuality and Nationality*. Toronto 2005, 256ff.; Hasstrup, Kirsten: *Kultur. Det fleksible fællesskab*. Århus 2004, 105; Ardener, Erwin and Malcolm Chapman (eds.): *The Voice of Prophecy and other essays*. Oxford 1989, 169.

⁶ Stjernfeldt, Frederik and Jens-Martin Eriksen: *Adskillelsens politik. Multikulturalisme – ideologi og virkelighed*. København 2008.

⁷ In contrast to what Stjernfeldt and Eriksen (ibid.) claim, Holm – based on analysis of parliamentary debates – notes that “the idea that integration should take place by awarding group rights to refugees and immigrants at no point challenged the dominant concept of integration which was primarily oriented to the individual”. (“at forestillingen om, at integration skulle ske gennem tildeling af grupperettigheder til flygtninge og indvandrere, på intet tidspunkt truede den dominerende opfattelse af integration, som overvejende individorienteret”) Holm, Lærke: *Folketinget og Udlændingepolitikken – diskurser om naturaliserede, indvandrere og flygtninge 1973–2002*. Ålborg 2007, 214.

notion of multiculturalism alive: first, multiculturalism has become a label for any explicitly articulated opposition to culturalism (the opposition amounting to a rather inefficient attempt at a counter-hegemonic project). Second, the perfectly symbiotic relation which ideal type multiculturalism has with culturalism as its official opponent: by agreeing to disagree on premises which systematically make it lose every debate, multiculturalism has served culturalism well.⁸

This article claims that the representation of the Danish identity political landscape in terms of the two camps of culturalism and multiculturalism is too simple. Primarily, a more nuanced picture of the narratives told by the government is necessary. Between the self-reproducing symbiosis of the discourses of culturalism and multiculturalism, two governments – first, one under Socialdemocratic leadership; now, one headed by the Liberal party – have tried to carve out the room for an alternative policy of integration by talking as little as possible about culture. Talking “as little as possible” about culture has, however, gradually turned into “a lot”. In this article I analyze how Muslims are implied to constitute threats in the official Danish discourse of the centre-right government since 2001. The analysis, hence, does *not* focus on the narratives promoted by the decidedly culturalist Danish People’s Party (DPP). Instead, it focuses on those promoted by the government – who, on the one hand, explicitly distances itself from the DPP at times, while on the other hand attempting to avoid alienating the party which grants that government its parliamentary majority. Beginning the analysis in 2001 is an obvious choice, both because of 9/11 and because of the change in government from cen-

⁸ Wren and Hervik find culturalism to be dominant in Danish media and popular discourse (See Wren, Karen: “Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark”. In: *Social & Cultural Geography* 2 (2001:2), 141–162; Hervik, Peter: “The Danish Cultural World of Unbridgeable Differences”. In: *Ethnos* 69 (2004:2), 247–267). Hedetoft and Emerek – relatedly – find that “integration” in official Danish discourse includes a substantial measure of cultural assimilation (See Hedetoft, Ulf: “More Than Kin and Less Than Kind: The Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge”. In John L. Campbell et al. (eds.): *National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism. The Danish Experience*. Montreal et al. 2006, 398–429, here: 419f.; Idem: *Multiculturalism in Denmark and Sweden*. Copenhagen 2006 (= Danish Institute of International Studies, DIIS Brief; December 2006)) (Emerek, Ruth: *Integration – eller inklusion? Den danske diskussion om integration*. Aalborg 2003 (= AMID Working Paper; 31)). Haldrup et al. (Haldrup 2006, as footnote 4) find culturalist popular discourse to be mutually constitutive with a number of everyday practices of othering Muslims which they label “practical orientalism”.

tre-left to centre-right. However, this change of government should not be given too much weight: the incoming government developed and implemented a series of ideas initiated by the former government.⁹

More specifically, the article reads the government statements on integration of refugees and migrants and on how to counter terrorism as narratives about “us” and “them”. More specifically, the article reads these statements as “security narratives” about what “we” need to do to “them” to protect “us” from “them”. As a concept, a “security narrative” may be characterized in three ways. First, it presents an “us” in relation to a “they”. Second, “they” are presented as threatening. Third, the narrative involves the passage of time and a (potential) change in this relationship during this passing of time. What is crucial is that the text analyzed describes a threat to something valued and a means of averting this threat. This will generally imply a temporalization as part of the argument for why what is described as threatening is threatening or for why what is described as threatened is worth to be protected. In principle, this concept allows – when employed as an analytics – anything to be perceived as threatening towards anything else. However, the specific analysis in this article is concentrated on threats which are described as, first, originating from or involving Muslims; and second, directed at Denmark in one way or the other.¹⁰

⁹ Not least of which were ideas fostered by the so-called “Think Tank on challenges to the integration effort in Denmark”. The reports of this “think tank” play, as will become clear from the analysis below, a central role in the official Danish narratives.

¹⁰ The theoretical and methodological framework for this analysis fuses two lines of thought in the study of International Relations: First, Wæver’s theory of “securitization” including Huysmans’ critique of the theory in relation to the securitization of migration (See Wæver, Ole: “Societal security: the concept”. In: Idem et al.: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London 1993; Buzan, Barry et al.: *Securitization. A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder 1998; Huysmans, Jef: *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU*. London 2006). Second, a tradition for studying foreign policy as the production of identity and difference (See Neumann, Iver B.: *Uses of the Other – ‘the East’ in European identity formation*. Manchester 1999; Hansen, Lene: *Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London 2006; Rumelili, Bahar: *Construction Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia*. Houndsmill 2007) combined with narrative theory (Ricoeur, Paul: *Time and Narrative*. Vol. 3. Chicago 1988). A more detailed discussion of the theoretical and methodological framework is available in Gad, Ulrik Pram: *(How) Can They Become Us?* Ph.D. Diss. Copenhagen 2010.

The analysis asks what exactly it is that must be defended from the Muslims – and what answers to the threats are prescribed by the government.¹¹ The first group of answers are narratives of “integration”: Muslims need to be integrated into Danish society. What does that mean? How is it a threat to Danish society that there is a group of people which are not integrated in it? Why? A second group of answers start out as narratives of the prevention of terrorism – but end up speaking about the integration of Muslims, too.

In his opening speech to parliament immediately after the inauguration of the new government in 2001, the prime minister puts three threats into play: the threat to societal peace, the threat to welfare society, and the threat to cultural identity.¹²

It is an important investment in the future to have Danish alien policy back in order. For years a lax alien policy has been conducted – a policy which is now putting the Danish society under pressure. It is a problem that half the immigrants in Denmark are out of job. And it is a problem that there are groups of young second generation immigrants who are strained by serious crime. A number of them are rejecting the values on which the Danish society is built. And they reject integration into the Danish society. We have to realize these facts. We have to tighten our alien policy. Otherwise a growing opposition will evolve between the population groups in the Danish society. Being a peaceful and harmonic people is emblematic to Denmark. That is the way it should be in the future too. It is not so that we shall be identical all of us. Of course not. There has to be freedom to differ. But we have to build a strong society where there is a community around some basic values and attitudes.¹³

¹¹ As it will become clear from the analysis, the question whether the threats are “Muslim” is the subject of a political struggle. It is, hence, an analytical claim that the result of these struggles, so far, is that the threats *are* described as “Muslim”. This claim is backed up by recent research (cf. footnote 8) – but when push comes to shove, it is up to the reader to decide whether s/he is convinced by the analytical narrative presented in the following.

¹² These are basically the same three threats identified by Huysmans in an analysis of the securitization of migration and asylum in the EU (Huysmans 2006, as footnote 10).

¹³ “Det er en vigtig investering i fremtiden, at vi får bragt orden i dansk udlændingepolitik. I flere år er der ført en slap udlændingepolitik, som nu sætter det danske samfund under pres. Det er et problem, at halvdelen af indvandrerne i Danmark er uden arbejde. Og det er et problem, at der er grupper af unge anden generations indvandrere, som er belastet af alvorlig kriminalitet. Flere af dem forkaster de værdier, det danske samfund bygger på. Og de nægter integration i det danske samfund. Vi er nødt til at se disse kendsgerninger i øjnene. Vi er nødt til at stramme udlændingepolitikken. Ellers vil der udvikle sig et vok-

So Danish welfare is threatened by the low employment rate of the immigrants; Danish societal peace is threatened by their crime; and Danish values are threatened by rejection of these values. The three threats are presented as connected – but the specific connections are unclear: What group of “them” of whom “a number” reject the Danish values – is it only the criminal second generation immigrants, or does this group include the unemployed? In what direction is the causality: is it a job that leads to Danish values or is it the other way around? What is most important? What exactly is it which will destroy peaceful society?

In the following years a series of distinct integration narratives have appeared in government policy papers and the interventions of cabinet ministers in parliament, in the press, and in public appearances. Each of the narratives describes a relationship between the good which is threatened, the source of the threat, and the necessary counter-measures. In that way, each narrative leaves a more or less distinct set of roles which must be taken up by foreigners as a part of their integration. The threat to peace is narrated in three ways: first, there are two parallel narratives which focus on the criminal second generation immigrant and on the intruding terrorist – these are the focus of the first section of the article. A third narrative constructs the threat as “home grown”. To account for the shift from intrusion to “home grown”, the article needs to focus on two other threats and the narratives told about them: because in between are a series of attempts to tell stories that articulate the threat to welfare and the threat to culture. The second section of the article recounts a succession of stories discussing the threats to culture and welfare and, more specifically, labour market integration and cultural assimilation, which are supposed to ameliorate these threats. The third section zooms out to address two grand narratives which support the demand for cultural assimilation. The fourth section lays out how these central integration narratives on culture and welfare are reconfigured – in a rather surprising way – when they are merged

sende modsætningsforhold mellem befolkningsgrupperne i det danske samfund. Danmark er kendetegnet ved at være et fredeligt og harmonisk folk. Sådan skal det også være i fremtiden. Ikke sådan at vi alle skal være ens. Naturligvis ikke. Der skal være frihed til forskellighed. Men vi skal bygge et stærkt samfund, hvor der er et fællesskab om nogle grundlæggende værdier og holdninger.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a parliamentary debate on the resolution on Danish military participation in the international efforts against terror networks in Afghanistan, Copenhagen, 14th December 2001, http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20012/beslutningsforslag_som_vedtaget/B37.htm, 11th November 2009.

with the narrative of the threat from “the home grown terrorist”. A concluding section considers how Danish identity narratives may end up producing Muslim counter-narratives which can only be accounted for as threats in the terms of the selfsame Danish identity narratives.

The first threat to societal peace: intrusion

The narrative of crime as a threat to peace plays a minor role in the first initiatives of the new government – in the field of integration.¹⁴ Instead, the matter is treated as an integrated part of a more general reform of the penal code. The threat is to be averted by adjusting the incitement structures facing the individual – primarily negatively in the form of more severe punishment, but also positively in the form of supplying alternative possibilities.¹⁵ The only initiative which is targeted directly at the ethnic background of the criminal is the possibility of revoking the residence permit of non-citizens.¹⁶ Even if the connection forged by the prime minister between crime and the rejection of Danish values is not explicitly present in policy papers and legislative initiatives in the field of integration, the connection is re-established in various parliamentary debates: the crime rate is a consequence of values which have migrated to the country from outside.¹⁷ Another threat to societal peace – the terrorist – demands reac-

¹⁴ Mentioned in a subordinate clause in: Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: *På vej mod en ny integrationspolitik*. 2002, 16. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/resources.ashx/Resourcer/Publikationer/Regeringsinitiativer/2002/ny_integrationspolitik.pdf, 3rd November 2009.

¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁶ “Udlændingepolitik”. In: *Regeringsgrundlag 2001. Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse*. 2001. <http://www.stm.dk/publikationer/regeringsgrundlag/reggrund01.htm#udl%C3%A6ndingepolitik>, 3rd November 2009; *En ny udlændingepolitik*. 2002. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/442728D5-C3FA-4CD8-8557-7350ECD53745/0/en_ny_udlaendingepolitik.pdf, 3rd November 2009; *Nye Mål. Regeringsgrundlag*. 2005. http://www.stm.dk/publikationer/reggrund05/nye_%20maal_web.pdf, 30th March 2007.

¹⁷ Even when the parliamentary debate is occasioned by a survey documenting that members of ethnic minorities dissociate themselves from a series of specific crimes by a larger proportion than ethnic Danes. Cf. “1st reading of F37” (Parliamentary debate on fundamental values and norms in Denmark, 26th April 2007). [http://www.ft.dk/doc.aspx?Sampling/20061/salen/F37_BEH1_83_1_\(NB\).htm](http://www.ft.dk/doc.aspx?Sampling/20061/salen/F37_BEH1_83_1_(NB).htm), 2nd May 2008.

tions which qualify as extraordinary no matter what yardstick we may apply.¹⁸ At first, however, the threat is not directly aimed at Denmark:

When we engage ourselves in the solution of the problems of the world, it is, i.a., because we have some fundamental values of what is fair and equitable [...] That is why

¹⁸ To the DPP, the two threats to societal peace are the same, as Muslim crime is a small scale form of Islamic terror. “[T]he effort to be made against terror must not only be targeted at the persons already caught by terror networks but has to attempt to forestall such things from happening at all. In this context it is important to severely crack down on criminal, young immigrants moving in circles where crime and Islamic fundamentalism are mixed. It is well known that for example the Hizb-ut-Tahrir is recruiting young Muslims on the street level, often young Muslims offending against the law. [...] Terrorism may be defined in different ways. One definition is that terrorism is characterized by violence and speculation in fear being used to further a political opinion or a political aim. Another definition is that terror is crime threatening, undermining or outright destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country. The riots we have seen in Paris are frightening; it might not be terror but it is frightening. It is not terror in the original meaning of the word but it is nonetheless mob rule, which is embryonic terror. The unrest in Rosenhøj near Århus is, of course, of an altogether different scale, but these problems too are caused by the lack of respect for authorities and for the society which the immigrants ought to be part of. It is the lack of respect for the authorities which sows the seeds of terror.” (“[I]ndsatsen mod terror [skal] ikke alene [...] rette sig mod de personer, som allerede er blevet indfanget af terrornetværk, men også skal forsøge at foregribe, at noget lignende overhovedet sker. I den forbindelse er det vigtigt at slå hårdt ned på kriminelle, unge indvandrere, der færdes i et miljø, hvor kriminalitet og islamisk fundamentalisme sammenblandes. Det er velkendt, at Hizb-ut-Tahrir eksempelvis hverver unge muslimer på gadeplan, ofte unge muslimer, der er på kant med loven. [...] Terrorisme kan defineres på forskellig måde. Én definition er, at terrorisme er karakteriseret ved, at vold og spekulation i frygt bruges til at fremme et politisk synspunkt eller et politisk mål. En anden definition er, at terror er forbrydelser, der truer, underminerer eller ligefrem ødelægger landenes politiske, økonomiske og sociale strukturer. De optøjer, vi har set i Paris, er skræmmende, det er måske ikke terror, men det er skræmmende. Der er ikke tale om terror i ordets egentligste forstand, men det er i hvert fald et pøbelvælde, som indeholder kimen til terror. Urolighederne i Rosenhøj ved Århus er naturligvis i en helt anden målestok, men også disse problemer skyldes, at man ingen respekt har for autoriteter og heller ikke for det samfund, som indvandlerne burde være en del af. Det er mangelen på respekt for autoriteterne, der øger kimen til terror.”) MP Skaarup, Peter in: “1st reading of F7” (Parliamentary debate on the measures to counter terrorist activities in Denmark). 13th November 2005. <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/forespørgsel/f7/beh1/forhandling.htm>, 2nd June 2010.

we have shown solidarity with the USA and other countries in the international fight against terrorism.¹⁹

The countermeasures presented are, first, fighting terrorism with military means “out in the world” together with the USA;²⁰ second, to make sure that terrorists do not get inside Denmark;²¹ third, to keep them under surveillance, to catch and to prosecute them if they do anyway.²² Quite soon, however, the narrative on the terrorist threat changes so that the object of the threat is more clearly “us”. The government explicitly points out terrorism as the threat taking over from the existential threat of the Cold War:

The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different from the ones we faced during the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global terror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the international community. Terrorism today is a real and essential threat to populations everywhere in the world.²³

¹⁹ “Når vi engagerer os i løsningen af denne verdens problemer, så er det jo blandt andet, fordi vi har nogle grundlæggende værdier om ret og rimeligt. [...] Derfor har vi vist solidaritet med USA og andre lande i den internationale kamp mod terrorisme.” PM Rasmussen, Anders Fogh: “PM’s inaugural speech”. 4th December 2001. http://www.statsministeriet.dk/_p_7327.html, 3rd November 2009.

²⁰ Folketinget: “B37” (Resolution on Danish military participation in the international efforts against terror networks in Afghanistan). 14th December 2001. http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20012/beslutningsforslag_som_vedtaget/B37.htm, 11th November 2009.

²¹ Haarder, Bertel: “L32” (Act on revision of the Alien law to counter terrorism). 13th December 2001. Written presentation by Minister for Integration, http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20012/lovforslag_fremsaettelse/L32.htm, 11th November 2009.

²² At first, by passing new anti-terror legislation (Folketinget: “L35”. (Anti-terror legislation) as passed by parliament, 31st May 2002. http://webarkiv.ft.dk/Samling/20012/lovforslag_som_vedtaget/L35.htm, 11th November 2009).

²³ “Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den altødelæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorismen er i dag en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden.” Regeringen: *En verden i forandring*. 2003, 2. <http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Publikationer/Udenrigspolitik/EnVerdenIForandring.htm>, 22nd September 2008.

These initial narratives on both crime and terror may be summed up as the argument that “they” come from outside with values allowing or inducing “them” to commit crime and terror. Therefore, “they” threaten “our” societal peace. Therefore, “we” must stop “them” from intruding and make it harder for those who nevertheless get inside to follow “their” values. At the same time, it is important for the government to make clear that the threat does *not* emanate from Islam or Muslims as such:

Some in Denmark were swift to declare war on the large part of humanity which professes more or less to the world religion of Islam. We have, of course, to distance ourselves from such generalizations and such suspicions. Individual Muslims in Denmark should not suffer from this. Terrorism shall not be answered with new persecution of more nations. It is the criminals who shall be hunted down with every means compatible with our conception of justice.²⁴

After the bombing of the London underground in 2005 and the Cartoon crisis in 2006, this dissociation is placed in a new light by the concept of “home grown terrorists” and by the linking of local and global threats to constitute a single “value struggle”. By then, the threat is aimed at “us-Denmark” and not just at the more non-committing “us-who-share-values” and “us-the-populations-everywhere-in-the-world”. We will return to this below.

Culture or welfare: What comes first?

First, however, we need to chart the central debate on Danish integration policy. This central debate pertains to the importance of labour market integration relative to cultural assimilation. What is it that needs to be protected: welfare or culture? If both, how are the two threats connected?

²⁴ “For nogle i Danmark gik det meget hurtigt med at erklære krig mod den store del af menneskeheden, der i større eller mindre grad bekender sig til verdensreligionen islam. Den generalisering og mistænkeliggørelse skal vi naturligvis tage afstand fra. Det skal ikke gå ud over de enkelte muslimer i Danmark. Terrorisme skal ikke besvares med ny forfølgelse af flere folkeslag. Det er forbryderne, der skal jages med alle de midler, der er forenelige med vort retssyn.” Hornbech, Birthe Rønn in: “1st reading of L35” (Parliamentary debate on anti-terror legislation). 31st January 2002. http://webarkiv.ft.dk/?/samling/20012/salen/l35_beh1_23_4_45.htm, 9th November 2009.

What is the threat to culture: Their culture or multiculturalism?

It is well known that the DPP, which supports the government in parliament every now and then, point out Islam, Muslim culture in the abstract or specific “Muslim” practices as threats to Danish culture among a series of other objects.²⁵ This threat construction forms the background for the phrasing repeated time and again by the first minister for integration in the centre-right government: “I have repeatedly said that I am not minister for shower curtains, veils and [pork] liver pâté in kindergardens.”²⁶ The words served as an explanation for why he would *not* take action against Muslim cultural traits said to threaten this or that practice implied to be emblematic for Danish culture.

It is clear that the threat constructed by the DPP does not serve as the point of departure for the official narrative of Danish integration policy. But that does not imply that there is no threat to avert. The threat described by the government is aimed at the function of Danish culture as that which sets the rules of the game on Danish soil:

Danish culture is more important than other cultures. When I as a minister for education put the biblical narrative centre stage in religious instruction [literally: Christian studies] it was clearly an act of discrimination. One needs to be familiar with the biblical story, and one needs to be acquainted with other religions. This is discrimination and this is the way it should be. The same way in Danish lessons; there one reads Danish literature – it is more important than foreign literature. So, I contend, all this talk of equality of cultures and equality of religion – it is nonsense ... Well, Denmark is a Danish society. It is the Danes who decide in Denmark. And we are, as well, the ones who decide how many should be let in ... Isn't this discrimination? Of course it is discrimination.²⁷

²⁵ Cf. Jacobsen 2008, as footnote 4, 267f.

²⁶ “Jeg har gentagne gange sagt, at jeg ikke er minister for badeforhæng og tørklæder og leverpostej i børnehaver.” Haarder, Bertel: “US131”. Answer by the Minister for Integration, 11th May 2004. <http://webarkiv.ft.dk/doc.aspx?samling/arkiv.htm>, 9th November 2009.

²⁷ “Dansk kultur er vigtigere end andre kulturer. Da jeg som undervisningsminister satte den bibelske fortælling i centrum af kristendomsundervisningen, så var det klar diskrimination. Man skal være fortrolig med den bibelske fortælling, og man skal have kendskab til andre religioner. Det er diskrimination, og sådan skal det være. Tilsvarende i dansktimerne. Der læser man dansk litteratur – det er vigtigere end udenlandsk litteratur. Derfor siger jeg, at al den tale om kulturlighed og religionslighed – det er nonsens. [...] Danmark er nu engang et dansk samfund. Det er danskerne, der bestemmer i Danmark. Det er også os, der

In this way the source of the threat is formally displaced from specific Muslims and Islam as such to the acceptance and protection of minority cultures promoted by an abstract multiculturalism.²⁸ After this displacement the threat at first stems – rather than from Muslims – from a multiculturalist ideal of treating every cultural practice equally. The very point of this intervention of the Minister for Integration is to present discrimination as something *non-extraordinary*, as a normal course of action. In that sense the pointing out of multiculturalism as a threat serves to constitute “Danish culture” as the normalized framework for political community.

It is not just multiculturalism and the way it places cultures on equal footing which constitutes the threat. Because the concept of culture implied is binary²⁹ in the sense that culture is an either/or question, culture comes as a package deal: you either take it or leave it. So when the minister retells the perfect integration narrative, it goes like this:

The Chinese are perfect immigrants because they fulfil the only criteria for integration: integration in the labour market. It is an entrepreneurial culture where one has to contribute before one may consume. And there is no one demanding that they dispose of their culture as long as they prove themselves able to work and participate in the Danish community ... If all immigrants were like the Chinese, my job as Minister for Integration would be deeply superfluous.³⁰

The point of establishing this ideal is that not all immigrants are like the Chinese. Not all migrants have the *Chinese* culture which – according to the Minister – does *not* bar them from working and participating in society. Therefore, the government needs a

bestemmer, hvor mange der skal lukkes ind. Er det ikke diskrimination? Jo, selvfølgelig er det diskrimination.” Hardis, Arne: ”Selvfølgelig er det diskrimination”. Interview with Bertel Haarder, Minister of Integration. In: *Weekendavisen*, 1st March 2002, 3.

²⁸ This threat may, of course, also be found in DPP narratives.

²⁹ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland: “Murer og identiteter – Noen formelle trekk ved åpenhet og lukkethet”. In: Ole Tunander (ed.): *Europa och Muren. Om ‘den andre’, gränslandet och historiens återkomst i 90-talets Europa*. Ålborg 1995, 115–126.

³⁰ “Kineserne er perfekte indvandrere, fordi de opfylder det eneste krav til integration: integration på arbejdsmarkedet. Det er en iværksætterkultur, hvor man skal yde, før man kan nyde. Og der er ingen, der siger, at de skal afskaffe deres kultur, når bare de kan finde ud af at arbejde og deltage i det danske samfund [...] Hvis alle indvandrere var som kinesere, ville mit job som integrationsminister være inderligt overflødig”. Bertel Haarder quoted from Surrugue, Stephanie and Tanja P. Astrup: “Nej, vi er ikke godt integrerede”. In: *Politiken*. 9th February 2002, 3/3.

narrative about the connection between the threat to Danish culture and the threat to Danish welfare. Such a narrative comes in a series of versions. At first, welfare comes out on top – later, things gradually get more complicated.

The state – and culturalism – as threats to welfare

In the first formulations of the integration policy of the new government, focus is unambiguously on the labour market: “To the government there is no doubt that a job is the key to successful integration.”³¹ This “rationalist” narrative points out the low proportion of aliens with jobs as a threat to the way the welfare society is financed and to its ability to compete in the world market. In this narrative, a citizen able to provide for himself is a well-integrated citizen. The low proportion of immigrants active in the labour market is a threat to Danish welfare:³²

If we satisfactorily accomplish the task [of integration] it will increase employment and reduce public spending on social security. If we do not succeed we will have an increased pressure on the economy of the welfare society while we at the same time risk a society with labour shortage.³³

Notably, in this narrative the welfare society and the immigrant are in the same boat, as his exclusion from the labour market is a threat to both:

³¹ “For regeringen hersker der ingen tvivl om, at et arbejde er nøglen til succesfuld integration.” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2002, as footnote 14, 1. Even when the text does not present labour market integration as exhausting the concept of integration, it is not culture but political participation which is the necessary supplement: “A job is an important road to integration, but it does not do the trick on its own. Integration is also about being able to participate in others parts of societal life, so that the individual new citizen may enter into work in civil society associations and school boards.” (Cf. *ibid.*).

³² Welfare is not just a technical way of ordering things – it is a central element in the identity of the Danish nation state: the solidary Danish people have built for themselves a welfare society to nest the unfolding of their inner qualities (Hansen, Lene: “Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe”. In: *Idem and Ole Wæver (eds.): European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*. London 2002, 51f., 60f., 69, 80ff.).

³³ “Løser vi [integrations]opgaven tilfredsstillende, vil det øge beskæftigelsen og nedbringe de offentlige sociale udgifter. Lykkes det ikke, får vi et samfund med et voksende pres på velfærdssamfundets økonomi, samtidig med at vi risikerer et samfund med mangel på arbejdskraft.” Indenrigsministeriet: *Udlændinges integration i det danske samfund*. Tænketaenken om udfordringer for integrationsindsatsen i Danmark. København 2001, section 2.2.

In Denmark all citizens must have equal access to work life and societal life – including our new citizens who have come here as refugees and immigrants. [...] Today an all too large share of our new citizens are outside the labour market. If the affiliation to the labour market of the new citizens was the same as that of the rest of the population, 60 000 more persons would be in jobs.³⁴

In this “rationalist” version of the narrative, the threat comes from the exclusion of immigrants – and the source of the threat is not the one excluded but someone else doing something *to* the excluded. This “rationalist” narrative is also the first government narrative about the connection between cultural integration and labour market integration. It begins when “[t]he vast majority of new citizens arrive in the country wanting to contribute an effort to create a new life for him or herself in Denmark.”³⁵

The common threat to Danish welfare and the new citizens comes from the “clientification” performed by the welfare state on these new citizens.³⁶ The countermeasures proposed are, first, the deconstruction of harmful bureaucracy, and, second, a reconstruction of the incitement structures greeting the new arrival. The point of both is to get the immigrant (or his or her children) in a job as soon as possible.³⁷ The obvious way to fit culture and religion into this narrative is awarding it the role of an irrational distraction:

It is remarkable that employers who have experienced new-Danish apprentices quickly forget about the cultural background of the apprentices. In the humdrum of everyday life it is professional and social abilities which are important.³⁸

³⁴ “I Danmark skal alle borgere have adgang til arbejds- og samfundslivet – også vores nye borgere, der er kommet hertil som flygtninge og indvandrere. [...] I dag står en alt for stor andel af vore nye borgere uden for arbejdsmarkedet. Hvis de nye borgeres tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet var den samme som den øvrige del af befolkningens, ville der være 60 000 flere personer i arbejde.” Ibid.

³⁵ “Langt de fleste nye borgere kommer til landet med ønsket om at yde en indsats for at skabe sig en ny tilværelse i Danmark.” Ibid., 2.

³⁶ “klientgørelse” Ibid.

³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 2ff.

³⁸ “Det er jo bemærkelsesværdigt, at de arbejdsgivere, der har erfaring med nydanske elever meget hurtigt ‘glemmer’ elevernes kulturelle baggrund. I den grå hverdag er det ikke kultur, men faglighed og social kunnen, der er vigtig.” Frederiksen, Claus Hjort (Minister of Labour, *Venstre*): “Hvordan får vi flere små og mellemstore virksomheder til at ansætte nydanskere?”. Speech at conference 23rd April 2002. <http://gammel.bm.dk/sw8499.asp>, 9th November 2009.

Therefore it is about making space and room for everyone, disregarding the colour of skin and foreign-sounding names. One of the problems is the massive focus on religion, culture and tradition.³⁹

A misguided focus on cultural difference – culturalism – is a threat, albeit a minor one compared to clientification. This second threat should be countered by everybody taking up a more relaxed approach to cultural differences and by more interaction across cultural differences. However, a narrative involving such an outspoken hostility to culturalism is not viable in the long run, when one is simultaneously attempting to articulate a narrative awarding Danish culture the double position as that which is threatened and in itself an important countermeasure to the threat.⁴⁰

One way of making ends meet is the paperclip method: listing the two aims of integration. What is *decisive* is labour market integration – but there is *also* this other threat that can only be countered by another kind of integration. This kind is expressed by statements such as the following:

In our opinion it is the following social conditions which are decisive for whether we may speak of a successful integration: Education, employment, and self-sufficiency. [...] One of the goals of a successful integration is that foreigners endorse some of the fundamental values and norms of Denmark.⁴¹

According to these “paper clip” texts, the process of “integration” should avert threats to both welfare and values without explaining how the two are related. No narrative connection between labour market integration and cultural integration – only related

³⁹ “Derfor handler det om at skabe plads og rum til alle, uanset hudfarve og fremmedklingende navn. Et af problemerne er den massive fokus på religion, kultur og tradition.” Idem: Speech at presentation of Sønderborg’s and Løgumkloster’s Equal-project, 10th April 2002. <http://gammel.bm.dk/sw8502.asp>, 9th November 2009.

⁴⁰ The new government is, as mentioned, specifically dependent on the articulation of this narrative as it is dependent on forming a majority in parliament with the DPP. The preceding government attempted – in a more tentative way – to articulate this narrative through its resonance with the electorate.

⁴¹ “det er efter vores opfattelse følgende sociale forhold, der er afgørende for, at man kan tale om en vellykket integration: Uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse [...] Et af målene for en vellykket integration er, at udlændinge tilslutter sig og efterlever nogle grundlæggende værdier og normer i Danmark.” Indenrigsministeriet 2001, as footnote 33, sections 2.4; 2.11.

by listing. Another version relates the two types of integration causally so that labour market integration will in the end lead the immigrant to learn Danish values.

Relating culture and welfare by letting welfare lead to culture

Over time, however, a narrative surfaces which constructs a causality in the opposite direction: Labour market integration is still the central aim – but to reach the aim, cultural integration is needed. At least *certain* central culturally and religiously based values, norms, and practices must be left behind as they exclude competing Danish values, norms, and practices.⁴² The government's "Think tank on challenges to the integration effort" explicitly explains the shift to this new narrative in a report:

In the first report of the think tank, the endorsement of fundamental values and norms was not emphasized as one of the most important goals for a successful integration a par with education, employment and self-supportance. The experiences and inquiries obtained since 2001 seem, however, to indicate that values and norms should be ascribed a larger significance [...] The point that foreigners should endorse fundamental values and norms does not in itself mean that foreigners have to give up their original culture, e. g. religion, attire, or cuisine. This may, however, be necessary if insistence on the original culture is in conflict with values and norms in Denmark to such an extent that foreigners cannot participate on equal footing in working life and societal life in other respects.⁴³

⁴² Cf. Stolcke, Veronica: "Talking Culture. New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe". In: *Current Anthropology*. 36 (1995:1), 4.

⁴³ "I Tænk tankens første rapport blev tilslutningen til grundlæggende værdier og normer ikke fremhævet som et af de vigtigste mål for vellykket integration på linje med uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse. De erfaringer og undersøgelser, der er kommet til siden 2001, synes imidlertid at vise, at værdier og normer skal tillægges større betydning [...] At udlændinge skal tilslutte sig grundlæggende værdier og normer indebærer som udgangspunkt ikke, at udlændinge skal opgive deres oprindelige kultur, fx religion, påklædning eller madkultur. Dette kan dog være nødvendigt, hvis en fastholdelse af den oprindelige kultur strider mod værdier og normer i Danmark i et sådant omfang, at udlændinge ikke kan deltage på lige fod med danskere i arbejds- og samfundslivet i øvrigt." Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: *Værdier og normer – blandt udlændinge og danskere. Tænk tanken om udfordringer for integrationsindsatsen i Danmark*. København 2007, 4; Cf. idem: *Regeringens vision og strategier for bedre integration*. Juni 2003, kap. 4.2.3.

In this new narrative, the culture, religion, values and norms of the individual immigrant end up as a threat to Danish welfare. The weight of the countermeasures is gradually shifted over the years. Initially, “diversity management” and local, “practical solutions which satisfy everyone” are mentioned.⁴⁴ Later, as we shall see, a clearer allocation of roles and responsibilities is presented.

Grand narratives of homogeneity and universal values

Before the government narrative clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, it has been “beefed up” by articulating two more abstract narratives: A functionalist narrative focused on “cohesive force” points out cultural homogeneity as a prerequisite for welfare. An exceptionalist narrative about Denmark as a pioneer nation describes Danish values as universally valid. Though the two narratives may at first seem at odds, they – as described by Mouritsen⁴⁵ – both reinforce the same cultural countermeasure: the spread of Danish values.⁴⁶

Functionalism: Plurality as a threat to welfare

The “functionalist” narrative hinges on the concept of “cohesive force”.⁴⁷ Like the narrative which constructed cultural integration as a means to labour market integration,

⁴⁴ “håndtere mangfoldighed praktiske løsninger, som tilfredsstillere alle” Ibid.

⁴⁵ Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 78ff.

⁴⁶ Mouritsen analyses the two narratives under the labels “instrumental homogeneity” and “particular universalism” as part of a discussion of national and civic values as they are related in debates on Muslims. Hedetoft sketches elements of both narratives – focusing, however, primarily on functionalism – in an analysis of Danish policy, media and public discourse on integration (Hedetoft, Ulf: “‘Cultural transformation’: how Denmark faces immigration”. In: *OpenDemocracy.net*. 30th October 2003. http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article_1563.jsp, 1st November 2006, 3; Idem 2006, as footnote 8, 398, 401, 407). Lægaard discusses the particular universalism of Danish liberalism as a form of nationalism (see Lægaard, Sune: “Liberal nationalism and the nationalisation of liberal values”. In: *Nations and Nationalism* 13 (2007:1), 37–55).

⁴⁷ Peter Gundelach reminds me (author’s conversation with P. Gundelach on 25th May 2008) that the established sociological terminology has “social cohesion” for the Danish “sammenhængskraft”. I have elected to retain the literal translation “cohesive force” because of the connotations which the phrase carries in Danish: Firstly, “cohesive force” is something

this narrative presents the national economy (and the welfare goods it allows) as the threatened object. But this narrative does not explain only a competitive economy with a high employment rate:

The government will suggest [...] specific [...] steps with a view to strengthen our competitive force and our cohesive force. Cohesive force; that is to secure a society that hangs together. A society in which there are no excessive social or economic divisions. [...] But cohesive force is also to secure a society that hangs together in terms of values. One of the strengths of Danish society is that we – despite differences in opinion on a series of specific questions – nevertheless build on a common foundation of certain fundamental values. Some of these values are challenged these days.⁴⁸

Economic success for a nation comes from being competitive – and a decisive factor in Denmark's ability to compete is the trust among people made possible by cultural homogeneity. The threat in this “functionalist” narrative is not individual unemployment but cultural differences. A cultural difference is not just any link in the causal chain; it is the source of the threat:

A minority among the immigrants have become more religious – and [...] they have become so in a way that may be of significance for their integration. We need to take this seriously [...] Why is it important to integration to talk about values? Because education

that is temporally and causally situated *before* cohesion; it is a force which effects cohesion. Secondly, omitting the prefix “social” allows “cohesion” to articulate either “social”, “cultural”, or both; a specific ambivalence which is active in the narratives presented by the prime minister. This lack of specificity is different from the established sociological use of “social cohesion”, which in English denotes the “social cohesion” across cultural plurality – and which has allowed a twin concept of “cultural cohesion” to be mainly applied in organizational and management studies to denote the need for an organization *not* to be multicultural. The Danish “cohesive force” allows – as we shall see – both a threat from cultural plurality as such and a threat from lack of “social cohesion” across cultural plurality.

⁴⁸ “[Regeringen vil foreslå ...] en række konkrete [...] skridt, som skal forstærke både vores konkurrencekraft og vores sammenhængskraft. Sammenhængskraft, det er at sikre et samfund, der hænger sammen. Et samfund, hvor der ikke er for store sociale og økonomiske skel. [...] Men sammenhængskraft er også at sikre et samfund, der værdimæssigt hænger sammen. En af styrkerne i det danske samfund er, at vi trods forskellige holdninger til en række konkrete spørgsmål dog bygger på et fælles grundlag af visse fundamentale værdier. Nogle af disse værdier bliver udfordret i disse år.” Rasmussen, Anders Fogh in: “F18” (Concluding debate), 15th June 2005, PM’s intervention. http://stm.dk/_p_7495.html, 9th November 2009.

and jobs are not enough. If we want to keep the cohesive force in Danish society, everyone needs to know and observe the fundamental rules of the game.⁴⁹

In this way, the object threatened in the functionalist narrative is still welfare – but cultural homogeneity is (*qua* a necessary link in the causal chain narrated) co-promoted as a valuable good. This gives the narrative an enhanced compatibility with purely culturalist narratives.

Exceptionalism: Their values as a threat to our (common) values

The second grand narrative which produces the need for cultural integration is the “exceptionalist narrative” which describes how Denmark – by virtue of its history and culture – is uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world: The narrative equates a series of specifically Danish values and practices with universally good values and practices. In that sense, this second narrative seeks recourse to elements of Danish identity discourse constructing Denmark as a humanitarian example to the world.

Mouritsen focuses his analysis on the possibility of Muslims’ citizenship on two arguments adding to Danish exceptionalism.⁵⁰ The first argument claims that the Lutheran version of Christianity is a precondition for separating politics and religion – and therefore a precondition for freedom.⁵¹ On the one hand, Christianity liberates politics from religion: “It is Christianity which constitutes the distinction [between politics and religion]. [...] The preaching of Jesus makes it possible [for us to] discuss politics and agree or disagree about politics without the matter going ‘sacral’.”⁵² On the other

⁴⁹ “[E]t mindretal blandt indvanderne er blevet mere religiøse, og det er på en måde, der kan have betydning for integrationen. Det skal vi tage alvorligt. [...] Hvorfor er det vigtigt for integration at tale om værdier? Fordi uddannelse og job ikke er nok. Hvis vi skal bevare sammenhængskraften i det danske samfund, skal alle kende og overholde de grundlæggende spilleregler.” Hvilshøj, Rikke: “De siger ja til demokratiet”. In: *Frederiksborg Amts Avis*. 17th March 2007, 3.

⁵⁰ Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 79–83.

⁵¹ Berg-Sørensen, Anders: “Hinsides sekularisme og hvad så?” In: *Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift*. (2006:48), 59–72.

⁵² “Det er kristendommen, der sætter sondringen [mellem religion og politik]. [...] Jesu forkyndelse er med til at gøre det muligt [at vi] kan diskutere politik og være enige eller uenige om politik uden at der går ’hellighed’ i sagen.” Fergo, Tove: “At skelne i sammenhængen”. In: *Folkevirke*. (2003:58), 3–5.

hand, Christianity liberates people from salvation becoming a political project: “Without gospel, salvation becomes a political task. Political ideologies will reign freely over people’s souls.”⁵³ If, the story goes, Christ had not already taken care of salvation, an attractive – and dangerous – market would be open for political projects offering the prospect of salvation.

The second argument, which Mouritsen presents, claims that democracy and equality in Denmark – by virtue of, for example, the folk high schools and the co-operative movement – have developed into a form of life.⁵⁴ In addition to freedom, equality and democracy, the same argument may be identified in relation to other central concepts. An especially forceful narrative is constructed when the prime minister articulates the exceptionalist narrative with the functionalist:

As a small, peaceful country – where the people is homogenous and where the borders of language and country nearly coincide – we have very special conditions for influencing with our values. We have a deeply rooted democracy which is not just based on certain formal institutions and laws, but exists as a culture in the Danish population. One may introduce institutions and laws but it is of no use if there is not a very strong democratic culture deep in the population. [...] Conversation is an important part, we are very consensus-orientated, and we prefer to take the views of minorities into account.⁵⁵

The effect of this link between functionalism and exceptionalism is triple: First, an image is developed in which Denmark is a perfectly calibrated nation-state in which

⁵³ “Uden evangelium bliver frelsen en politisk opgave. De politiske ideologier får frit spil over sjælene.” Hornbech, Birthe Rønn: *Lige Venstre*. København 2001, 168.

⁵⁴ The two arguments are tied together by two prominent figures: N. F. S. Grundtvig og Hal Koch; by their substantial national and theological messages as well as the roles they are awarded in historical narratives (cf. Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 80f.).

⁵⁵ “Som et lille fredeligt land, hvor folket er homogent, og lande og sprogrænser stort set følges ad, har vi helt særlige forudsætninger for at påvirke med vores værdier. Vi har et rodfæstet demokrati, der ikke kun er baseret på nogle formelle institutioner og lovgivning, men som er en kultur i den danske befolkning. Man kan sagtens indføre institutioner og love, men det nytter ikke noget, hvis der ikke er en meget stærk demokratisk kultur dybt i befolkningen. [...] Samtalen er en væsentlig del, vi er meget konsensusorienterede og kan bedst lide, at der bliver taget hensyn til mindretallene.” Ib, Helle: “Demokratiets pris”. Interview with Anders Fogh Rasmussen (PM, *Venstre*). In: *Danmarksposten*. (2003:4), 16–19. Mouritsen (Mouritsen 2006, as footnote 4, 13) concentrates his analysis on the two sentences “Vi har et rodfæstet demokrati [...]” and “Samtalen er en væsentlig del [...]”.

the boundaries of the state, the nation, the territory, the culture, the language and the religion coincide. This national self-image becomes, in the narrative promoted by the prime minister, a precondition for perfect freedom and democracy. Second, that perfection places on the shoulders of Denmark a special obligation to export our knowledge and values to the rest of the world:

It is not a form of cultural imperialism in which our way of thinking is forced upon other peoples. But we do have an obligation to be on guard for freedom and human rights – and with that also to try to spread it to other parts of the world in which one does not have peace and freedom, and where the human rights are violated. To me there are certain entirely fundamental values – which one may call universal – which are not to be repressed.⁵⁶

Third, the way others outside Denmark do *not* live up to the ideal national package deal constitutes a threat to the universal realization of universal values:

But one needs to be patient when it concerns the Middle East since there are a lot of historical, cultural and religious barriers, and it might be so that one must for a considerable span of time accept forms of democracy which do not in all regards fully live up to what we in Europe and the USA understand by this concept.⁵⁷

In the early versions of the narrative, the threat against universal values is not acute. But, as we will return to, the threat appears more pertinent when linked directly to terror and when the terrorist is “home grown”.

⁵⁶ “Det er ikke en form for kulturimperialisme, hvor vores måde at tænke på skal påtvinges andre folkeslag. Men vi har en forpligtelse til at stå vagt om frihed og menneskerettigheder – og dermed også til at forsøge at udbrede det til andre dele af verden, hvor man ikke har fred og frihed, og hvor menneskerettighederne krænkes. Der er for mig nogle helt grundlæggende værdier, som man godt kan kalde universelle, og som ikke må undertrykkes.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen cited in Ib 2003, as footnote 55, 16.

⁵⁷ “Men man bør være tålmodig, når det gælder Mellemøsten, for der er mange historiske, kulturelle og religiøse barrierer, og det kan også godt være, at man i en rum tid bliver nødt til at acceptere former for demokrati, der ikke i alle henseender lever fuldt op til, hvad vi i Europa og USA forstår ved begrebet.” Ibid.

Freedom: an offer you can't refuse

Just as the combined functionalist and exceptionalist narrative legitimizes Danish “systems export”, the way in which Denmark embodies universal values legitimizes more heavy handed integration measures at home. Observers of the Danish welfare state have noted a recent change in the governmental techniques employed. Central to the function of the welfare state is now the induction of a “duty to be free” in its clients.⁵⁸ When this tendency meets the narratives of integration, it acquires the form of an obligation to secure the *drittwirkung* of certain human rights, a role which the state takes upon itself: the rights of the individual are not – as human rights traditionally – threatened by the state but by others in the civil society. More specifically, the state obliges itself to free Muslims from their culture – whether or not the individual realize that it is oppressed or not:

We must help the individual immigrant woman to live an active life and we must change the opinion of both men and women for the benefit of integration [...] It is related to another worrying tendency [...] that is, the coming generations. Turkish and Pakistani descendants have not gotten closer to Danish values and norms entirely as it could be expected taking into account that they have grown up in Denmark. This shows that there is still a need for a strong integrating effort. A huge challenge is still ahead of us ... We have long ago left the naïve belief of earlier times that everything will solve itself by itself.⁵⁹

The government's “think tank” allocates the responsibility so that, on the one hand, “the aliens take responsibility themselves for becoming a part of the Danish society and that they accept they must change certain of the values of the country of origin to

⁵⁸ Cf. Andersen, Niels Åkerstrøm: *Borgerens kontraktliggørelse*. København 2003, 114–123.

⁵⁹ “Vi skal hjælpe den enkelte indvandrerkvind til et aktivt liv og have ændret holdninger hos både mænd og kvinder til gavn for integrationen. [...] Det hænger også sammen med en anden bekymrende tendens [...] nemlig de kommende generationer. Tyrkiske og pakistanske efterkommere har ikke nærmet sig danske værdier og normer helt som man kunne vente, i forhold til at de er vokset op i Danmark. Det viser, at der fortsat er behov for en stærk integrationsindsats. Vi har stadig en stor udfordring foran os. [...] Vi har for længst forladt tidligere tiders naive tro om, at det hele løser sig af sig selv.” Hvilshøj 2007, as footnote 49.

be integrated.”⁶⁰ While on the other hand “we in Denmark – to a much greater degree than is the case today – draw the attention to and inform [oplyser] about Danish culture and way of living as well as about what norms and unwritten rules we have in Denmark”⁶¹. It does, however, not suffice to “draw attention” to our values; it is necessary that “we in Denmark dare to make clear demands on the aliens that they must endorse fundamental values in the Danish society and that we lay down clear guidelines which they [...] must accept.”⁶² For the demands to reach the target group, the street level bureaucrats of the welfare state must be deployed: “Teachers, social workers and other persons in contact with aliens on a daily basis should [...] in their daily work make direct and distinct demands on the aliens that they must endorse the fundamental values in Denmark.”⁶³

While the initial integration narrative of the government was in 2001-2 that the welfare state with its clientification was threatening the (labour market) integration, six years later the conclusion is that the welfare state is the necessary countermeasure against a threat aimed at cultural homogeneity.⁶⁴ The welfare state needs in one and the same move to avert the threat which Muslim culture poses to the freedom of each Muslim individual – and thereby against the universal realization of the universal value of

⁶⁰ “at udlændinge selv tager et ansvar for at blive en del af det danske samfund, og at de accepterer, at de må ændre visse af oprindelseslandets værdier for at blive integrerede.” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2007, as footnote 43, 25.

⁶¹ “vi i Danmark, i langt højere grad, end tilfældet er i dag, gør opmærksom på, hvilke grundlæggende værdier det danske samfund bygger på og oplyser om dansk kultur og levevis, samt om, hvilke normer og uskrevne regler vi har i Danmark.” Ibid.

⁶² “at vi i Danmark tør stille klare krav til udlændinge om, at de skal tilslutte sig grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund, og at vi udstikker klare retningslinjer, som de [...] må acceptere” Ibid., 26.

⁶³ “Pædagoger, lærere, sagsbehandlere og andre personer, der dagligt har kontakt med udlændinge, bør [...] i deres arbejde stille direkte og tydelige krav til udlændinge om, at de må tilslutte sig de grundlæggende værdier i Danmark.” Ibid., 27.

⁶⁴ The Think Tank on Integration suggested in its report that clear instructions be produced for the employees in individual institutions and municipalities (cf. *ibid.*, 27). The parliamentary debate on the report, however, concluded by calling for that it is discussed locally how one is to relate to how to handle conflicts of values (cf. Folketinget: “Resolution V65” on the fundamental values in the Danish society, passed by the government parties and the DPP. 3rd May 2007. <http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/tingdok.aspx?samling/20061/vedtagelse/V65/index.htm>, 9th November 2009).

freedom. Danish values are offered to the Muslims as a possibility – but by being a possibility of universal value, it is actually “an offer you can’t refuse”. Like the Godfather, the government cannot afford not to deliver on the offer, lest culturalism make more demands for assimilation. The employment of state power is needed to make migrants live up to their potential by integrating them to universal values. This novel role for the state is stressed when the threat from the home grown terrorist must be averted too.

The second threat to societal peace is home grown

In the aftermath of the bombings of the London underground on July 7th, 2005, it was clear that the narrative on the threat of terrorism had changed. Whereas 9/11 prompted the need for Danish solidarity with the US, the narrative now presented as terrorism targeting a much closer “we”: “In Denmark terrorism is a threat to society, to the values it is built upon, and to the individual citizen.”⁶⁵ At the same time, the narrative included new means to avert the threat. The prime minister still stresses the need for every “necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror networks”⁶⁶ abroad and at home. But after allocating the responsibility for the London bombings to “home grown” terrorists, another task is presented as urgent: “We have to prevent support and recruitment for terrorism [...] through an active integration policy at home [...]. We have to prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of extremists.”⁶⁷

The narratives of a threat to societal peace is in this way explicitly merged with the narrative of a threat to cultural homogeneity – and the integration measures are defi-

⁶⁵ “I Danmark er terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, og mod den enkelte borger.” Espersen, Lene: “L217”. Act on revision of the penal code, etc. 31st March 2006, written presentation, Minister for Justice (*Konservative*). <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/lovforslag/1217/fremsaettelsestale.htm>, 1st September 2008.

⁶⁶ “nødvendige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk” Ibid., 15:20.

⁶⁷ “Vi skal forebygge opbakning og rekruttering til terrorisme [...] gennem en aktiv integrationspolitik herhjemme [...] Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideology.” Rasmussen, Anders Fogh in: “F7”. Parliament debate on the measures to counter terrorist activities in Denmark. 16th November 2005; Cf. Regeringen: *En verden i forandring*. 2003, 13. <http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Publikationer/Udenrigspolitik/EnVerdenIForandring.htm>, 22nd September 2008.

nately a part of the “broad spectrum”⁶⁸ of measures employed to prevent terrorism. The home grown terrorist is, however, not an isolated threat. On the contrary, it is part of a broader threat which now – also – emanates from “home”.

After the Cartoon crisis following the publications in the *Jyllands-Posten* daily twelve caricatures commissioned to “scorn and ridicule” the followers of the prophet Mohammed, the narratives are tied together even more tightly to the distinction between foreign and domestic politics. Employed is the concept of “value struggle”.⁶⁹ The prime minister begins his opening speech in 2006 in two ways: first, he ties 9/11 and the Cartoon crisis together as two episodes in a narrative of the fight against the same threat. Second, the freedom of expression – immediately resonating with the context of the Cartoon crisis to everyone in the audience – is posed as the decisive front in that struggle:

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four airplanes in the USA. Thousands of innocent human beings were killed. And ever since, the world has not been the same. Over the last five years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a global value struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions. It is a value struggle between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral. We must actively support freedom and popular rule. We have to guard our rights and freedoms. Guard the right to choose how we want to live our life. Guard the freedom of expression – the most important of all rights and freedoms. It is important that we make it clear to ourselves what type of extremist forces we are facing.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ “bredspektret” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration: *En fælles og tryk fremtid – forslag til en handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikaliserings blandt unge, version posted for consultations*. June 2008. http://borger.dk/forside/lovgivning/hoeringsportalen/faktaside?p_hoeringid=2146000244, 22nd September 2008.

⁶⁹ The concept of “value struggle” in the rhetoric of the prime minister has developed out of the concept of “cultural struggle”. As was the case with “cohesive force”, the PM initially employed the concept without any allusion to “Muslim relations”: the “cultural struggle” was, in his 1993 book, advocacy of a “minimal state”, envisioned as part of a struggle to free citizens from the state by eradicating their “slave mentality” in relation to the “social state” (Rasmussen, Anders Fogh: *Fra socialstat til minimalstat. En liberal strategi*. København 1993).

⁷⁰ “Den 11. september 2001 kaprede 19 terrorister fire fly i USA. Tusindvis af uskyldige mennesker blev slået ihjel. Og siden har verden ikke været den samme. Gennem de sidste

The prime minister then employs the words “The global value struggle is taking place in Denmark too”⁷¹ as a segue to discussing problems relating to “extremists” and “fanatical fundamentalists” in Denmark. Finally, he links these problems to challenges to labour market integration by saying that:

It is difficult to reach fanatical fundamentalists through better integration. But we may and must prevent the medieval thoughts and opinions of fundamentalism from having a fertile ground in Denmark. Therefore it is very crucial that the young Danes with an immigrant background get an education, get a job, get equal opportunity and a fair treatment in the Danish society.⁷²

The new counterterrorism narrative produced, hence, claims that labour market integration should prevent fundamentalism.

Bringing multiculturalism – and the state – back in⁷³

Nevertheless the narrative presenting integration as a means to counter terrorism departs from a distribution of roles in which “Danish Muslims and immigrants in Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against terrorism”⁷⁴.

fem år er det blevet klart, at vi står midt i en global værdikamp. Det er ikke en værdikamp mellem kulturer eller religioner. Det er en værdikamp mellem forstandig oplysning og fundamentalistisk formørkelse. Mellem demokrati og diktatur. Mellem frihed og tyranni. I den kamp kan man ikke være neutral. Vi må aktivt støtte frihed og folkestyre. Vi skal værne om vore frihedsrettigheder. Om retten til selv at vælge, hvordan vi vil leve vort liv. Om ytringsfriheden – den vigtigste af alle frihedsrettigheder. Det er vigtigt, at vi gør os klart, hvilke ekstremistiske kræfter, vi står overfor.” Idem: “R1”. PMs opening speech, 3rd October 2006. http://stm.dk/_p_7541.html, 16th June 2011.

⁷¹ “Den globale værdikamp foregår også i Danmark.” Ibid.

⁷² “Det er svært at nå fanatiske fundamentalister gennem bedre integration. Men vi kan og skal hindre, at fundamentalismens middelalderlige tanker og holdninger får grobund i Danmark. Derfor er det meget afgørende, at de unge danskere med indvandrerbaggrund får uddannelse, får job, får lige muligheder og en fair behandling i det danske samfund.” Ibid.

⁷³ The merging of integration policies with counter-terrorism policies – and the involved policies of dialogue sketched in the last subsections of this chapter – is the focus of a more detailed analysis in Gad 2010, as footnote 10, chapter 8.

⁷⁴ “danske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod terrorisme” Rasmussen 2005, as footnote 67.

Therefore it is decisive for the success of the narrative that these allies play the role which they have been awarded. The Ministry of Integration – in its 2008 draft “Action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people” – finds that culturalism may be a threat to the participation of the allies:

[Our c]reation of suspicion of ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For this reason too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not placed on anyone able to contribute to the solution.⁷⁵

The result is a narrative involving elements of both inclusion of difference and two-way dialogue – combined to resemble the very multiculturalism which was initially declared to be a threat. Now, inclusion and dialogue is a necessary means to avert the threat from radicalization. The next episode of the narrative, however, involves a necessary measure of control and surveillance. First of all, this episode focused on the “poorly integrated” already in focus as “criminal second generation immigrants”. Secondly, however, these measures are *also* focused on what appears to be “well-integrated” Muslims: They must, on the one hand, be included and engaged in dialogue. At the same time, they are nevertheless potential terrorists precisely because they are Muslims. This task demands vigilance in the street level bureaucrats of the welfare state – but it also demands that they be aware of their limitations so that they may call in the necessary expertise to assist: “To judge whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious interest demands such a highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the individual [crime-prevention] worker to distinguish.”⁷⁶

The narrative, thus, continues as the government – to avert the culturally based threat to societal peace – turns to the very multiculturalism which was initially presented as a

⁷⁵ “Mistænkeliggørelse af etniske eller religiøse grupper kan bruges aktivt i den propaganda, som vi ser fra dem, der er modstandere af et mangfoldigt demokratisk samfund. Også derfor er det vigtigt, at ingen, der kan bidrage til løsningen, mistænkeliggøres for at være en del af problemet.” Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008, as footnote 68, 13.

⁷⁶ “At vurdere, om der er tale om voldelig radikaliserings eller blot politisk eller religiøs interesse, kræver en så højt specialiseret viden, at det for den enkelte medarbejder vil være umuligt at skelne.” *Nyidanmark*. Newsletter of the Ministry for Integration, etc., special issue on the anti-radicalization action plan. 2008 (2), 11.

threat to Danish culture. However, as multiculturalism still poses a threat, it is necessary to employ the very welfare state which was initially presented as a threat to labour market integration. The resulting narrative institutionalizes a set of procedures for surveillance and control of the limit of acceptable cultural and religious difference – the limit of who may be included and who may be engaged in dialogue without endangering the peace. The conclusion must be that, even if the government does not explicitly point out Muslims as an existential threat, Muslims are nevertheless implicated in a security discourse as threatening.⁷⁷ And if they are not, they might very easily implicate themselves.

Conclusion: Counter-narratives as security problems

However, the centre-right government's narratives on the presumptive threats from Muslims to Danish society do not end here. A last step of the analysis must be to discuss in what meaningful ways the narrative may continue and what directions it may take in the future. Any continuation of a narrative depends on *how* the ones awarded a role in the narrative partake in the continuation. Such a partaking has as its point of departure exactly that: the taking up of a part, a role presented by the narrative – even if this leads to a departure from the role, to taking issues with the role, or to taking exception to the way the role is described.

As the analysis is aimed at identifying security problems, the task of this conclusion is to identify limits to which kinds of continuations the narrative can handle without producing more security problems. An even more pertinent topic is to identify security dilemmas. For example, situations in which the official Danish narrative on what to do about (and to) Muslims produces perspectives of the future which – all, many, some, a few – Muslims insist that they *can only* meet with a “counter-securitization”. This is a situation where the *answer* to the existential threat posed by the official Danish narratives (according to this specific Muslim identity narrative) involves continuing the spiral by posing a threat to the Danish narrative. Ghassan Hage, in an analysis of the limits to multiculturalism as a form

⁷⁷ A discourse which, notably, also spins itself around the government narrating it in the sense that it awards roles to the welfare state and to multiculturalism almost diametrically opposite the one pointed out for it by the government at the point of departure.

of governmentality,⁷⁸ points to two mechanisms which may be relevant to the Danish situation. The mechanisms may, however, here set in earlier than in Hage's analysis, inasmuch as multiculturalist strategies are, when push comes to shove, a rather limited feature of the Danish narratives.

This is because even the most far reaching multiculturalism is *not* a narrative of equal cultures. To the contrary, it is a narrative on how to make sufficient room for *the other* culture to flourish in a way which does not make it feel threatened in areas that it holds to be critical for its identity. The precondition for this narrative is that the majority culture still sets a "neutral" frame.⁷⁹ This is the reason why even the most far reaching multiculturalisms presents themselves to be threatened by "the seriously religious Muslim" – Hage's label for those Muslims who insist that the space for Islam must in principle be unlimited.⁸⁰ This is the reason why there is no big difference between old school demands for assimilation and "the new milder form of asserting the need for immigrants (meaning primarily Muslims) to adopt the "core values" of particular nations"⁸¹.

This mechanism has quite clearly been at work in the difficulties which "seriously religious" Muslims have encountered when engaging in party politics: Even when declaring themselves willing to endorse a party platform without any substantial reservations, the theologically phrased discursive work they need to do excludes them from being eligible.⁸² It is not possible to be simultaneously 100 per cent Dane and 100 per cent Muslim. The official Danish narratives demand that one chooses or at least prioritizes between the two. Furthermore, Hage draws attention to differences in the way various types of nationalism perform exclusion: traditional, culturalist nationalism either does not welcome aliens at all – or openly awards them a subordinate role. Such "non-interpellation" or "negative interpellation" obviously produces a sense of being marginalized *from* commu-

⁷⁸ Hage, Ghassan: "Analysing Multiculturalism Today". In: Tony Bennett and John Frow (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis*. London 2008, 488–508.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 498.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 505.

⁸¹ Ibid., 507.

⁸² Hervik, Peter: *Mediernes muslimer – en antropologisk undersøgelse af mediernes dækning af religioner i Danmark*. København 2002; Jørgensen, Signe Kjær: "'Hvad er egentlig problemet?'" En analyse af diskursive barrierer for muslimske folketingskandidater i dagspressen". In: Marianne Holm Pedersen and Mikkel Rytter (eds.): *Islam og muslimer i Danmark efter 11.9.2001*. København (forthcoming).

nity; of not belonging to it.⁸³ Present day official nationalism, however, does actually often award what appears to be an equal role to the alien. It may be a “multiculturalist” role which appears immediately equal. Otherwise, it may be a role in a “process of integration” which places equality at the end of a process of adjustment. Here, however, a problem may arise as the alien happily accepts and takes up his or her role – only to be refused: “The role wasn’t meant like that – it wasn’t meant to be played like that or by someone like you.” Perhaps one more demand was added to the list – “well-integrated”. This type of “mis-interpellation”, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized *within* a community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one belonged to.⁸⁴ That mechanism obviously appears in a Danish context – not the least because the roles in the Danish integration narratives shift according to the threats in need of aversion. The threshold for “successful integration” is an incessantly moving target. The question is whether “successful integration” – in the terms of the narrative – is possible at all, when a Muslim background may produce a distinct need for vigilance on the part of the welfare state. Is it possible for a Muslim to escape the role of a potential threat? Hage, finally, describes how the two mechanisms may reinforce each other: When the “well-integrated” Muslim finds that his or her way of playing the role is questioned – the result may be “assimilation or recognition fatigue”.⁸⁵ In that situation, an identity as a “seriously religious Muslim” may appear as an attractive alternative.⁸⁶

If this choice is made, Danish narratives of integration have produced a security problem for themselves: they have provoked an answer which in their own continuation may best be described as a threat. The threat, notably, is produced without the “seriously religious Muslim” engaging him or herself in terrorism or denouncing democracy. The specific way in which official Danish identity discourse constructs the Muslim may contribute to decreasing loyalty to Denmark and even to increasing the actual terror threat. However, an excluded Muslim does not need to take to such extreme measures to appear threatening: the mere act of formally departing in Islam when reasoning ones way to democracy is a

⁸³ Hage 2008, as footnote 78, 503f.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 503f.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 507.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 507f.

threat to the narrative.⁸⁷ You may begin your argument for democracy in Jesus, in Yahweh, or in the nature or dignity of man – and you may pledge loyalty to Denmark by solemnly swearing with reference to each of the above – but not Mohammed, because a “seriously religious Muslim” is not to be trusted. The answer to that threat may be yet another round of demands to be “fully integrated” as well as the surveillance necessary to confirm the integration – which may instigate yet another round of dissociation. The way to break this destructive spiral involves attention to its existence, as “it is precisely when faced with authoritarian forms of requirements to assimilate that people create protected spaces where they can express and live their cultures outside the authoritarian gaze demanding conformity”⁸⁸. The pains taken to formulate an invitation to dialogue when writing the counter-radicalization action plan⁸⁹ may be interpreted to signal such an attention – even if the plan did not succeed in escaping the spiral. In the same way, one may find reason for optimism in the answer of the new prime minister when pressed to engage himself in the “value struggle”:

Well, I would like those girls to take off their veil. But I would like them to do it themselves. Because if I should be the one doing it, two more would start wearing the veil in protest for every one taking it off. That is my approach. And it is not because I do not see the challenge that I do not want to force them. I flatter myself that it is actually because I do see the challenge.⁹⁰

A few months later, however, the government decided that since “the burqa and the niqab do not belong in Danish society [...] the government urges that existing rules and possibilities for actually limiting the use of the burqa and the niqab be fully exploited.”⁹¹

⁸⁷ Cf. Hervik 2002, as footnote 82; Jørgensen forthcoming, as footnote 82; and Gad 2010, as footnote 10, chapter 8.

⁸⁸ Hage 2008, as footnote 78, 507.

⁸⁹ Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008, as footnote 68.

⁹⁰ “Altså, jeg vil jo gerne have de dér piger til at tage tørklædet af. Men jeg vil gerne have dem til at gøre det selv. For hvis jeg gør det, vil der dagen efter være to mere, som tager tørklæder på i protest. Det er min indfaldsvinkel. Og det er ikke, fordi jeg ikke kan se udfordringen, at jeg ikke vil tvinge dem. Jeg bilder mig ind, at jeg faktisk er, fordi jeg kan se udfordringen.” Krause-Kjær, Niels: *Lars Løkke*. Viby 2009. [Interview with PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen (*Venstre*)].

⁹¹ “Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske samfund [...] regeringen [opfordrer] kraftigt til, at de eksisterende regler og muligheder for faktisk at begrænse brugen af burqa og niqab anvendes fuldt ud.” Regeringen: *Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske samfund*. Government position paper, posted 28th January 2010. <http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/Regeringen.pdf>, 19th April 2010.