

A STOCHASTIC PROGRAM FOR OPTIMIZING MILITARY SEALIFT SUBJECT TO ATTACK

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19 July 2002

Abstract

We describe a stochastic program for planning the wartime, sealift deployment of military cargo subject to attack. The cargo moves on ships from US or allied seaports of embarkation through seaports of debarkation (SPODs) near the theater of war where it is unloaded and sent on to final, in-theater destinations. The question we ask is: Can a deployment-planning model, with probabilistic knowledge of the time and location of potential enemy attacks on SPODs, successfully hedge against those attacks? That is, can this knowledge be used to reduce the expected disruption caused by such attacks? A specialized, multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer program is developed and answers that question in the affirmative. Furthermore, little penalty is incurred with the stochastic solution when no attack occurs, and worst-case scenarios are better. In the short term, insight gained from the stochastic-programming approach also enables better scheduling using current rule-based methods.

1 Introduction

The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for planning the wartime deployment of US cargo ships, and their cargo, from US or allied seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) to overseas seaports of debarkation (SPODs) (USTRANSCOM 2000). This command uses little optimization to guide its planning for a deployment and, to our knowledge, no stochastic optimization to accommodate uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is (a) to develop a stochastic-optimization model that proactively plans for potential disruptions caused by enemy attacks on SPODs, and (b) to illustrate the potential benefit of using such a

model with realistic deployment data. Our model is designed to provide insight into tactical and strategic issues associated with military sealift. A real-time operational tool would need to capture more detail than the model we develop here.

1.1 The Problem

Military sealift deployments are driven by a flexible schedule of movement requirements contained in the Time-Phased Force-Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD describes the cargo needed in the deployment and the military units to which that cargo belongs, e.g., a Marine Expeditionary Force or a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion. A typical timeframe for a TPFDD is 100 days. The schedule includes time windows for when cargo will be available for loading at the SPOEs, when it should pass through an SPOD, and when it should arrive at its in-theater destination.

Currently, a TPFDD is planned using software tools like the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) (USTRANSCOM 2000). However, the emphasis in the last few years has been on embedding such systems within a global command-and-control system so that all cargoes and lift assets are visible to planners who must deal with contingencies “on the fly.” Quick responses to contingencies are important, but JFAST is largely a rule-based system that cannot optimize (or re-optimize) a schedule with respect to an objective such as “minimize delay.” Furthermore, JFAST ignores the possibility of disruptions to the deployment caused by enemy attacks.

The deterministic mixed-integer programs of Aviles (1995), Brown (1999) and others, along with the deterministic version of the model described in this paper, address the lack of optimization in existing sealift deployment-planning systems. Within the limits of modeling approximations, these models provide an exact assignment and routing of ships to deliver the TPFDD cargoes as best possible. The models typically minimize the ton-days of late cargo, which are weighted in some fashion with respect to the amount of lateness.

While a deterministic optimization model is potentially useful, it ignores the fact that an enemy may disrupt the deployment by attacking the cargo-movement “network,” probably in some forward area, i.e., near the SPODs. The potential for such disruptions is of increasing concern within the US military (Joint Publication 3-11 2000, p. II-3). Attacks might be carried out by mining harbors and/or shipping channels, or by attacking SPODs with missiles carrying conventional, nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, or by terrorist attack. Therefore, our main question is: Can we plan a sealift deployment while effectively hedging against the potential disruption caused by attacks on our cargo-movement network in forward areas? Our purpose is to convince planners that current planning tools can be improved: Not only should these tools optimize, but they should also plan proactively for potential disruptions.

We build a multi-stage stochastic-programming model, called the “Stochastic Sealift Deployment Model” (SSDM), to address these issues. SSDM can be modified to model many types and locations of attacks, but we focus on biological attacks on SPODs, because SPODs have been characterized as being particularly attractive targets for such attacks (Joint Publication 3-11 2000, p. III-30).

Biological weapons are not new, but their potential for serious military use has increased in recent years (Cohen 1997, Defense Intelligence Agency 1998), and a biological attack on an SPOD could certainly disrupt a deployment. Furthermore, biological weapons are inexpensive to produce, and over a dozen of the United States’ potential adversaries may possess or may be engaged in research on such weapons (Barnaby 1999, pp. 10-11). Thus, the threat must be taken seriously. We assume that any biological attack is immediately detected, as would be the case with biological warheads delivered by ballistic missile. This may not be a limiting assumption because new detection systems are capable of quickly detecting biological warfare agents that might be surreptitiously spread by terrorists or an enemy’s special operations forces. (For example, see the papers in Leonelli and Althouse 1998.) An attacked SPOD will shut down

entirely during a decontamination period, after which the port's cargo-handling capacity will come back to normal over a period of time, following some recovery schedule. The severity of the attack, which may be uncertain, dictates the length of the decontamination period and the recovery schedule. The state of the art in determining the potential damage caused by a biological attack is not far advanced (Alexander 1999), but SSDM can be easily adjusted to account for the latest information as it becomes available.

For simplicity, we assume at most one attack will occur during the deployment period, although that attack may strike more than one SPOD. The timing, location(s) and severity of the attack are uncertain and follow a probability distribution developed by intelligence reports and planners. The single-attack assumption has one significant advantage: It enables us to model the deployment using a special type of multi-stage stochastic program (e.g., Birge and Louveaux 1997, pp. 128-135), which is easier to solve than a model in which attacks could occur repeatedly. This assumption is reasonable at this stage of study, because no current deployment-planning models account for even a single attack, and because significant insight can be gained by studying this case.

Other assumptions limit the scope of the work here: (a) Only a single generic cargo ship is modeled, specifically, an American Eagle Roll-On/Roll-Off vessel carrying 15 ktons of cargo (1 kton = 1,000 short tons = 907 metric tons), because this ship is typical of those used in planning exercises (Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency 1994, Alexander 1999), and (b) airlift assets and airlift delivery requirements are ignored. Conceptually, SSDM is easily extended beyond assumption (a) to incorporate a fleet of ships with different cargo-handling characteristics (see Brown 1999), although the model would grow in size and solution times would increase. Assumption (b) simply reflects the focus of the model. To a large extent, airlift and sealift optimization may be considered separately because the mode of transport for each cargo "package" is specified by the TPFDD and the two transportation

networks share few resources. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, sealift delivered about 85% of all dry cargo, but airlift delivered most of the cargo in the early part of the deployment (Lund et al. 1993).

1.2 Stochastic Programming and Military Deployments

Stochastic programming has seen limited application in military deployment problems, yet the study of related transportation problems under uncertainty reaches back to Ferguson and Dantzig (1956). A notable early exception is an application of two-stage stochastic programming for scheduling monthly and daily airlift with uncertain cargo demands (Midler and Wollmer 1969). Modest computational power has, presumably, impeded the application of similar techniques to modern large-scale military mobility systems.

Currently, simulation is the preferred method of dealing with uncertainty in deployments. The Warfighting and Logistics Technology Assessment Environment (WLTAE) links warfighting and logistics simulation models into a single large simulation (Sinex et al. 1998). The logistics modules of such simulations typically use rule-based methods like JFAST and have limited, if any, capability for optimal re-scheduling after an attack. However, we note that Brown (1999) does provide re-optimization techniques suitable for embedding in the WLTAE simulation model. In particular, whenever a modeled disruption in the deployment takes place, his mixed-integer program, or a faster heuristic, can re-schedule the next set of ships and cargoes to be deployed.

A series of optimization models for planning sealift deployment has been developed at the Naval Postgraduate School (Aviles 1995, Theres 1998, Alexander 1999, Brown 1999, Loh 2000). All of these contribute to our understanding of the problem, but all have significant limitations. For instance, Theres (1998) ignores uncertainty; Aviles (1995) and Brown (1999) plan using deterministic models that assume no disruptions will occur and then re-optimize after a simulated disruption (an attack) does occur; Alexander (1999) and Loh (2000) have explicit

stochastic models, but can handle only small problems and have unrealistic limitations on, or relaxations of, post-attack recourse.

Deterministic airlift optimization models, analogous in concept to the above sealift models, have been developed by Killingsworth and Melody (1995), Rosenthal et al. (1997) and Baker et al. (2001). These linear programs model aircraft movements by continuous variables rather than the integer variables with which we model ship movements. A continuous approximation of many, relatively small, cargo aircraft is probably appropriate, but such an approximation is inappropriate for fewer and much larger ships. Goggins (1995) and Niemi (2000) have developed stochastic-programming variants of the deterministic optimization models of Rosenthal et al. (1997) and Baker et al. (2001), respectively, to incorporate aircraft reliability. Both models are stochastic programs with simple recourse (e.g., Ziemba 1974); in particular, recourse amounts to paying a penalty for exceeding airbase capacity. So, unlike the model we develop here, those models do not encompass dynamic re-routing. Mulvey and Vanderbei (1995) and Mulvey and Ruszczyński (1995) describe a two-stage stochastic program, called “STORM,” that assigns aircraft to routes in the first stage and, after realizing random point-to-point cargo demands, assigns cargo to aircraft. In contrast to STORM, our scheduling paradigm does not require an *a priori* commitment to the vehicle routing schedule over the entire planning period. Powell et al. (2001) are currently developing techniques based on simulation and dynamic programming to handle uncertainty in airlift deployments.

Sensitivity analysis, parametric programming, scenario analysis and other related ideas are frequently (mis-)used in an attempt to determine the effect of uncertain parameters in an optimization model. It is well known by stochastic programmers, but apparently less well known in the general OR and military OR communities, that it is usually inappropriate to apply these techniques to decision-making problems under uncertainty. Frequently, activities that provide needed flexibility in a stochastic system are not utilized at all in the solution to the optimization

problem under any single realization of the uncertain parameters, but these are exactly the kinds of problems that sensitivity analysis, parametric programming and scenario analysis attempt to exploit. Below, we discuss these issues in the context of two military stochastic-optimization problems from the literature, and refer the reader to Wallace (2000) for a more general discussion.

Whiteman (1999) investigates a network-interdiction problem with uncertain interdiction effects using the following general approach: (a) He first solves the deterministic model, an integer program, using mean values for uncertain parameters, (b) he then investigates the solution for acceptability (sufficient reduction in expected network capacity) using Monte Carlo simulation and (c) if it is unacceptable, he finds some near-optimal solutions to the deterministic problem and performs the same objective-function estimation procedure until an acceptable solution is found. The near-optimal solutions typically interdict more network components than does the original solution and are therefore, intuitively, more robust to failed or partially successful interdictions. While the technique may lead to a good solution that satisfies a specified probabilistic criterion (e.g., expected capacity is reduced by at least 80%), there is no guarantee that the solution is near-optimal. When the underlying problem is convex (e.g., a linear program), convex combinations of candidate solutions are feasible and hence sometimes advocated. But again, there is no guarantee that such an approach will yield an optimal, or even acceptable solution.

Brooks et al. (1999) propose a technique they call “exploratory analysis” for solving what are, essentially, stochastic-programming problems. A weapons-mix problem is provided as an example. For motivation, they first solve a linear program to assign a given weapons mix (say, 1,000 weapons of type A, 2,000 of type B and 1,500 of type C) most effectively to a set of targets. The potential target set is known, but the reliability of the weapons against those targets is not. The linear program’s solution is correct only if those reliabilities are known.

(“Reliability” is essentially the probability that the weapon will be successfully delivered to kill the target.) The authors then show, using Monte Carlo estimation, that assuming expected reliabilities for the weapons produces poor results and that applying standard sensitivity analysis (e.g., Dantzig 1963, pp. 265-275) is futile. As an alternative technique, they propose exploratory analysis, which (a) defines an exhaustive set of weapons mixes, (b) culls that set using “expert knowledge” to eliminate obviously inferior solutions (c) simulates multiple scenarios of the weapons’ reliabilities, (d) uses these scenarios to estimate the effectiveness of each candidate weapons mix, and (e) selects the mix having the best sample average. (Initially, the authors consider the results for a single theater or war, but later add scenarios with multiple theaters.) So, using a brute-force enumerative technique, the authors find an arguably good solution to the stochastic-programming problem: “Find the mix of weapons that is best, on average, across a large set of reliability values for the weapons.” Standard stochastic-programming techniques would probably lead to that solution, or a better one, more efficiently.

Stochastic programs, and particularly multi-stage stochastic programs, can be computationally expensive to solve. That fact has probably played a role in leading analysts to resort to the kind of approaches outlined above. Because the type of multi-stage stochastic program we develop here has at most one uncertain event, it exhibits quadratic growth in the number of time periods instead of the exponential growth characteristic of general multi-stage problems. Infanger (1994, pp. 43-47) describes a different class of multi-period problems in which capacity-expansion decisions with long lead-times result in what is effectively a two-stage stochastic program. These problems grow linearly in size with the number of time periods. Restricting, in some manner, the solution space is another commonly used technique to reduce dimensionality of a multi-stage stochastic optimization problem. For example, in stochastic dynamic programming, optimizing over the class of time-stationary policies can help yield computationally tractable models (e.g., Bertsekas, 1987, Chap. 5). In a similar spirit, Mulvey et

al. (2000) use nonlinear programming to search the class of “fixed-mix” investment policies in a multi-period asset-liability management model; see also Fleten et al. (2000) and Gaivoronski and de Lange (2000).

1.3 Outline of the Paper

In the remainder of this paper, we first describe SSDM in general terms, and then mathematically. We then describe our simulation of current, rule-based planning methods, which we compare to SSDM. We present computational results using data that represent a deployment similar in scope to that of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment of 1991. The last section of the paper provides conclusions and points out areas for further development of SSDM.

2 The Stochastic Sealift Deployment Model (SSDM)

2.1 Introduction

This section provides a general and mathematical description of SSDM, which builds upon similar models formulated by Alexander (1999) and Loh (2000). The model consists of four main entities, a ship-movement sub-model, a cargo-movement sub-model, linking constraints, and non-anticipativity constraints (Wets 1980).

The ship-movement sub-model routes a ship from an SPOE where it is loaded, to an SPOD to be unloaded, and then back to an SPOE, not necessarily its originating port. But, it also allows a ship to be re-routed from one SPOD to another in response to an attack, provided the ship has not entered a berth, but is actually waiting just outside the SPOD. Ships nominally require a fixed amount of time to unload their cargo, and they return to some SPOE immediately after unloading is complete where they can be directly reloaded for another delivery, or wait until needed. If an attack occurs during unloading, the unloading period is extended by the decontamination period. For simplicity, ships become available for initial use according to a pre-specified schedule, once the deployment commences. (Most of these ships are civilian, converted

to military use for military contingencies, according to established agreements.) A more detailed model might also incorporate uncertain availability of ships, and even breakdowns and weather-related delays.

The cargo movement sub-model is similar to that for ship movement but incorporates separate constraints for each commodity called a “cargo package.” It also adds an echelon of variables to move cargo from the SPODs to the final destinations. This movement of cargo would typically be accomplished by trucks or railcars, which are modeled through a single, generic transportation mode. Side constraints control the movement of cargo out of the SPODs and reflect cargo-handling capacity of the port in various situations: There is a nominal cargo-handling capacity, but capacity goes to zero immediately after an attack and during decontamination, and returns to its pre-attack level over a period of time after decontamination is complete. Because of permanent losses to personnel, post-attack cargo-handling capacity might never reach its pre-attack level, but this possibility is ignored for the sake of simplicity. (If the post-attack capacity is assumed known, the model can be trivially modified to handle this. If this capacity is uncertain, it simply adds scenarios to be considered.)

Linking constraints ensure that sufficient ship capacity is scheduled to carry the cargo being moved from SPOE to SPOD, being re-routed between SPODs and being moved from outside an SPOD into that port to be unloaded. Because cargo is not assigned to a specific ship, the combination of linking constraints and flow-based sub-models does imply a relaxation of real-world constraints. In particular, cargo can, in effect, move between ships that are waiting outside an SPOD, but this does not occur in our computational examples.

The model’s variables and constraints are indexed by scenario, which encompasses the time and location(s) of the attack, or indicates that no attack occurs. A solution to SSDM is said to be *implementable* (Rockafellar and Wets 1991) if under any pair of scenarios a and a' , with

attack times $t_a \leq t_a'$; all decision variables associated with them are identical through time t_a-1 . Non-anticipativity constraints ensure that this is the case.

The data set we analyze in this paper has two SPODs located in the Middle East, but our assumption of a “single” attack allows a simultaneous attack on both SPODs or on either SPOD and not the other. Scenarios could also encompass varying attack severity because of the weapons used or environmental factors, which would translate into longer or shorter decontamination periods and recovery schedules. For simplicity, this severity is fixed in our computations.

The fact that we consider only a single attack substantially reduces the size of our multi-stage stochastic program. Figure 1a shows a typical multi-stage scenario tree in which, after the first period, an attack may occur in any time period (at a given SPOD, say) during a four-period horizon and may occur any number of times. For instance, the left-most leaf of the tree represents the “no-attack scenario” and the right-most leaf represents the “attack-in-every-time-period scenario.” Figure 1b illustrates the scenario tree that represents the simplifying assumption of SSDM in which at most one attack will occur. (The actual scenario trees for SSDM are somewhat more complicated because of multiple attack types.) The number of nodes and scenarios in the tree of Figure 1a grows exponentially with the number of stages while, in Figure 1b, the number of nodes grows quadratically and the number of scenarios grows linearly.

2.2 Mathematical Description of SSDM

The mathematical description of SSDM follows a standard format for mathematical programs except that indices, sets and data are divided into deterministic and stochastic groups. All model elements that depend on the scenario index a are deemed “stochastic.”

Deterministic Indices and Index Sets

$e \in E$ Seaports of embarkation (SPOEs)

$d \in D$	Seaports of debarkation (SPODs)
$f \in F$	Final destinations (geographic locations where cargo is delivered)
$c \in C$	Cargo packages, i.e., cargo moving from the same SPOE to the same final destination with identical available-to-load dates, and required delivery dates
$e(c)$	Fixed, originating SPOE for cargo package c
$f(c)$	Fixed, final destination for cargo c
$t \in T$	Time periods, $T = \{1, \dots, t_{\max}+1\}$ (nominally days); t_{\max} is the end of the time horizon and $t_{\max}+1$ is a dummy time period
$T_{e(c)} \subseteq T$	Allowable shipping periods for cargo c from SPOE $e(c)$ (depends on cargo availability dates, shipping delays and latest acceptable delivery date)

Stochastic Indices and Index Sets

$a \in A$	Attack scenarios. In addition to timing, the scenario contains the information on the SPOD or SPODs attacked, and could contain the post-attack decontamination time and recovery schedule. This set also includes the “no-attack scenario” denoted a_0
t_a	Attack time of scenario a ($1 < t_a \leq t_{\max}$) for $a \neq a_0$; $t_{a_0} = t_{\max} + 1$
$T_a \subseteq T$	Time periods that run from the first period up to but not including the attack time for scenario a , i.e., $T_a = \{1, \dots, t_a - 1\}$
$T_{da} \subseteq T$	Set of periods t' such that if a ship enters SPOD d at time t' then it will still occupy a berth there at time t (depends on unloading time and any necessary decontamination)
$T_{da}^* \subseteq T$	Time periods, if any, during which SPOD d remains contaminated under scenario a (computed using t_a defined above, and δ_{da}^U defined below)

Deterministic Data

δ_{ed}^1	One-way travel time from SPOE e to just outside SPOD d (time periods)
δ_{de}^2	One-way travel time from SPOD d to SPOE e (time periods)
$\delta_{dd'}^3$	One-way travel time from just outside SPOD d to just outside SPOD d' (time periods)

δ_{df}^F	Travel time from SPOD d to destination f (time periods)
τ_c^{ALD}	Available-to-load date for cargo c . This is the earliest date (time period) the cargo is available at its SPOE for loading
τ_c^{CRD}	Required delivery date (CRD) for cargo c at its final destination $f(c)$ (time period)
δ^{MAX}	Cargo delivered later than $\tau_c^{CRD} + \delta^{\text{MAX}}$ is considered unmet demand for any type of cargo (time periods)
$\tau^-(c, d)$	Earliest-possible-arrival date (time period) for cargo c at its destination $f(c)$ given that it travels through SPOD d ; computed using τ_c^{ALD} , $\delta_{e(c),d}^1$ and $\delta_{d,f(c)}^F$
$\tau^+(c)$	Latest-possible-arrival date (time period) for cargo c at its destination $f(c)$; defined as $\tau_c^{CRD} + \delta^{\text{MAX}}$
$LPEN_{cdt}$	Late-delivery penalty (penalty units/ton) for cargo c leaving SPOD d in period t . The penalty is based on the difference between actual and required delivery dates: $LPEN_{cdt} = \left[\max \left\{ 0, (t + \delta_{d,f(c)}^F - \tau_c^{CRD}) \right\} \right]^\alpha$. The exponent satisfies $\alpha > 0$, with $\alpha > 1$ used in practice
$UPEN_c$	Penalty for not delivering a required ton of cargo c within its required time window (penalty units/ton); $UPEN_c > \max_{d,t} \{ LPEN_{cdt} \}$
ϵ_1	Small penalty to discourage unnecessary ship voyages (penalty units/ships)
ϵ_2	Small penalty to discourage unnecessary re-routing of ships (penalty units/ships)
$XTOT_c$	Total amount of cargo c required (tons)
$VCAP$	Capacity of a ship (tons)
$VBERTH_d$	Berthing capacity at SPOD d (ships)
$VINV_{et}$	Number of ships entering inventory at SPOE e at time t (ships)

Stochastic Data

δ_{dta}^U	Unloading time for a ship that enters SPOD d in period t under scenario a (time periods); includes decontamination time if an attack occurs during unloading. Since ships are not allowed to enter an SPOD during decontamination, this parameter is defined only for $t \in T - T_{da}^*$
$XCAP_{dta}$	Capacity of SPOD d to handle cargo at time t under scenario a (tons/time period); the nominal capacity drops to zero after an attack and during decontamination, and slowly returns to its nominal or near-nominal level after decontamination
ϕ_a	Probability that scenario a occurs

Variables

Under scenario a :

vi_{eta}	Number of ships in inventory at SPOE e at time t
vs_{edta}	Number of ships starting voyages from SPOE e to SPOD d at time t
vb_{dta}	Number of ships at waiting area outside SPOD d at time t
$vrr_{dd'ta}$	Number of ships re-routed from SPOD d to SPOD $d' \neq d$ at time t
vh_{dta}	Number of ships entering berth at SPOD d at time t
vr_{deta}	Number of ships returning from SPOD d to SPOE e at time t
xs_{cdta}	Tons of cargo c shipped at time t from SPOE $e(c)$ to SPOD d
xb_{cdta}	Tons of cargo c at waiting area outside SPOD d at time t
$xrr_{cdd'ta}$	Tons of cargo c re-routed from SPOD d to SPOD $d' \neq d$ at time t
xh_{cdta}	Tons of cargo c entering berth at SPOD d at time t
xi_{cdta}	Tons of cargo c in inventory at SPOD d at time t awaiting shipment to its final destination $f(c)$

xw_{cdta} Tons of cargo c transported to its destination $f(c)$ from SPOD d at time t

xu_{ca} Tons of unmet demand for cargo c

Formulation

$$\begin{aligned} \text{minimize } & \sum_a \sum_c \sum_d \sum_t \phi_a LPEN_{cdt} xw_{cdta} + \sum_a \sum_c \phi_a UPEN_c xu_{ca} \\ & + \varepsilon_1 \sum_a \sum_e \sum_d \sum_t \phi_a vs_{edta} + \varepsilon_2 \sum_a \sum_d \sum_{d' \neq d} \sum_t \phi_a vrr_{dd'ta} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

subject to:

$$-vi_{et-1a} - \sum_d vr_{de,t-\delta_{de}^2,a} + \sum_d vs_{edta} + vi_{eta} = VINV_{et} \quad \forall e, t, a \quad (2)$$

$$vh_{dta} - \sum_e vs_{ed,t-\delta_{ed}^1,a} + vb_{dta} - vb_{dt-1a} + \sum_{d' \neq d} vrr_{dd'ta} - \sum_{d' \neq d} vrr_{d'd,t-\delta_{d'd}^3,a} = 0 \quad \forall d, t, a \quad (3)$$

$$-vh_{dta} + \sum_e vr_{de,t+\delta_{da}^U,a} = 0 \quad \forall d, a, t \in T - T_{da}^* \quad (4)$$

$$\sum_{t \in T_{dta}} vh_{dt'a} \leq VBERTH_d \quad \forall d, t, a \quad (5)$$

$$vh_{dta} \equiv 0 \quad \forall d, a, t \in T_{da}^* \quad (6)$$

$$vr_{deta} \equiv 0 \quad \forall d, a, t \in T_{da}^* \quad (7)$$

$$\sum_d \sum_{t \in T_{e(c)}} xs_{cdta} \leq XTOT_c \quad \forall c, a \quad (8)$$

$$xh_{cdta} - xs_{cd,t-\delta_{e(c)d}^1,a} + xb_{cdta} - xb_{cdt-1a} + \sum_{d' \neq d} xrr_{cdd'ta} - \sum_{d' \neq d} xrr_{cd'd,t-\delta_{d'd}^3,a} = 0 \quad \forall c, d, t, a \quad (9)$$

$$-xh_{cdta} + xi_{cd,t+\delta_{da}^U,a} - xi_{cd,t+\delta_{da}^U-1,a} + xw_{cd,t+\delta_{da}^U,a} \leq 0 \quad \forall c, d, t, a \quad (10)$$

$$\sum_c xw_{cdta} \leq XCAP_{dta} \quad \forall d, t, a \quad (11)$$

$$-\sum_d \sum_{t=\tau^-(c,d)-\delta_{d,f(c)}^F}^{\tau^+(c)-\delta_{d,f(c)}^F} xw_{cdta} - xu_{ca} = -XTOT_c \quad \forall c, a \quad (12)$$

$$\sum_{c|e(c)=e} xs_{cdta} - VCAP vs_{edta} \leq 0 \quad \forall e, d, t, a \quad (13)$$

$$\sum_c xrr_{cdd'ta} - VCAP vrr_{dd'ta} \leq 0 \quad \forall d, d' \neq d, t, a \quad (14)$$

$$\sum_c xh_{cdta} - VCAP vh_{dta} \leq 0 \quad \forall d, t, a \quad (15)$$

All variables are non-anticipative, e.g.,

$$vi_{eta'} = vi_{eta} \quad \forall e, a, a', t \in T_a \cap T_{a'} \quad (16)$$

All variables are non-negative (17)

Ship variables are integer: $vi_{eta}, vs_{edta}, vb_{dta}, vrr_{dd'ta}, vh_{dta}, vr_{deta}$ (18)

Any variable with a time index not in T is fixed to 0, e.g.,

$$vrr_{dd'ta} \equiv 0 \quad \forall d, d' \neq d, t \notin T, a \quad (19)$$

2.3 Description of the Formulation

The basic premise of the model is to meet demands for cargo of various types during specified delivery time windows, although this will probably not be possible given limited system capacities, especially after attacks. This component of the objective function (1),

$$\sum_c \sum_d \sum_t LPEN_{cdt} xw_{cdta} + \sum_c UPEN_c xu_{ca}, \quad (20)$$

measures the *disruption* associated with scenario a . The first term corresponds to late deliveries with the per-ton penalty $LPEN_{cdt}$, which will increase as the function τ^α , where α is a strictly positive parameter and τ is the number of periods the cargo is late. We typically use $\alpha > 1$ to express, roughly, “One ton of cargo late for t periods is worse than t tons of cargo late for one period.” The second term in (20) strongly penalizes cargo not arriving during an acceptable delivery window: Such cargoes are absorbed as unmet demand with a penalty that is higher than for the latest acceptable delivery. Therefore, ignoring the last two terms of (1), this objective function measures the *total expected disruption* for a deployment plan. We note that large inventories of early-arriving cargo could be vulnerable to attack, but within the scope of our

model, explicit penalties are unnecessary to handle this. If early-arriving cargo is vulnerable, it ends up being delayed in one or more attack scenarios and is therefore penalized appropriately. The last two terms of the objective function are small factors to eliminate unnecessary ship movements.

The ship-movement sub-model is represented by constraints (2)-(7) and associated variables. The cargo-movement sub-model is represented by constraints (8)-(12) and associated variables. Constraints (13)-(15) link the two sub-models and constraints (16) account for non-anticipativity, which ensure implementability of the decision variables with respect to the various scenarios. Note that, although these constraints are written for every pair (a, a') , it suffices to enforce them for appropriately defined pairs of “consecutive scenarios.”

Of course, all variables are non-negative and the ship variables are required to be integer; see constraints (17) and (18), respectively. Additionally, variables with time indices outside of T do not represent true model entities and must be fixed to 0; see constraints (19).

Constraints (2) are ship-supply constraints for each SPOE. The supply of ships at time t includes those ships that become available via $VINV_{et}$ according to a pre-designated plan which does not depend on the scenario a (but could if desired); it includes those ships that have returned from earlier deliveries ($vr_{de,t-\delta_{de}^2,a}$); and it includes those ships that have previously been put into “inventory” at the SPOE awaiting assignment (vi_{et-1a}). The supply of ships is used to deliver cargo (vs_{edta}) or is held in inventory (vi_{eta}).

Constraints (3) are flow-balance constraints for the ships just outside the SPODs. A ship can arrive from an SPOE ($vs_{ed,t-\delta_{ed}^1,a}$) or by being re-routed from another SPOD ($vrr_{d'd,t-\delta_{d'd}^3,a}$). A ship that arrives can “park” outside the SPOD waiting for an available berth (vb_{dta}), it can enter the SPOD and berth (vh_{dta}), or it can be re-routed to an alternate SPOD ($vrr_{dd'ta}$).

Constraints (4) ensure that a ship entering an SPOD (vh_{dta}) does not leave and return to an SPOE ($vr_{de,t+\delta_{dta}^U,a}$) until it has time δ_{dta}^U to unload, and decontaminate if necessary.

Constraints (5) ensure that berthing capacity is not exceeded by the ships that have entered the SPOD. Constraints (6) and (7) ensure that no ships enter or leave a contaminated SPOD.

Constraints (8) are supply constraints for cargo; they are inequality constraints because, under certain scenarios, it can be determined that certain cargo cannot reach its destination within the allotted time window, so it will not be shipped. Constraints (9) balance flow of cargo just outside the SPODs, analogous to constraints (3) for ships.

Constraints (10) are inequality versions of flow-balance constraints for cargo inside the SPOD. Cargo that enters the SPOD, at time t (xh_{cdta}) becomes available to enter inventory ($xi_{cd,t+\delta_{dta}^U,a}$) or be shipped out to its final destination ($xw_{cd,t+\delta_{dta}^U,a}$) after it has been unloaded, and possibly decontaminated, at time $t + \delta_{dta}^U$. Cargo in inventory from an earlier unloading is also available for shipment ($xi_{cd,t+\delta_{dta}^U-1,a}$). These constraints are inequalities because it is possible for cargo to arrive so late, or be trapped for decontamination inside the SPOD so long, that it cannot reach its final destination in time to be of any value. Such cargo is unloaded at the SPOD and is subsequently ignored by the model.

Constraints (11) limit shipments of unloaded cargo out of the SPOD depending on that SPOD's cargo-handling capacity. There is a nominal capacity for each SPOD, which becomes zero immediately after an attack, i.e., during decontamination. The capacity then increases toward the nominal capacity during a post-decontamination period following some recovery schedule. Constraints (12) are simply the demand constraints for each cargo, with variables xu_{ca} absorbing unmet demand.

Constraints (13)-(15) ensure that cargo is transported only if there is sufficient capacity on the ships that must move that cargo. These constraints cover cargo moving from SPOE to SPOD, from one SPOD to another, and from just outside an SPOD into its docks.

3 Simulating Rule-Based Planning

Ideally, we would like compare deployment plans developed through optimizing SSDM to plans developed through current rule-based planning methods. SSDM explicitly incorporates and evaluates the total expected disruption across all scenarios, but to evaluate rule-based planning we would have to perform the following steps for a given “test case,” i.e., combination of data and probability distributions for when and where potential attacks might occur:

1. Use rules to create a baseline deployment plan, “Plan0,” under the no-attack scenario a_0 .
2. For each scenario $a \neq a_0$: Evaluate the cargo movements using Plan0 up to the time of the attack, simulate the disruption caused by the attack, and then plan the (re-) deployment of ships and cargo from the attack time onward using a rule-based procedure.
3. Compute the total expected disruption using the disruption values computed above and the given probability distribution.

We cannot perform the above procedure exactly because no actual deployment-planning software is available to us. However, we can simulate that procedure by replacing rule-based plans with optimization-based plans. In particular, Plan0 is determined by solving a single-scenario variant of SSDM under the no-attack scenario—call this model $DSDM(a_0)$. The redeployment is determined through another single-scenario model running from t_a through the end of the horizon given the simulated effects of an attack at time t_a —call this model $DSDM(a/a_0)$. The entire procedure, or “deterministic heuristic,” is denoted DSDH.

In some of our test cases, attacks can only occur late in the time horizon and it seems that planners could probably take this information into account to make the rule-based deployment plan more robust against attack. In such cases, common sense dictates that we push the cargo through the system as quickly as possible so as to minimize the amount that is susceptible to attack in later time periods. We modify $DSDM(a_0)$ to reflect this by adding a negative penalty (i.e., a benefit) into the objective function for early cargo arrivals. In particular, if one ton of cargo package c whose required delivery date is τ_c^{CRD} actually arrives in period $t < \tau_c^{CRD}$, it incurs a “penalty” of $-\beta(\tau_c^{CRD} - t)^\alpha$, for some $\beta > 0$, but if it arrives after τ_c^{CRD} , it incurs the usual penalty of $(t - \tau_c^{CRD})^\alpha$. Model $DSDM(a_0)$ with this modification is denoted $DSDM'(a_0)$, and the overall deterministic heuristic that uses this initial model is denoted $DSDH'$.

We have found that a single small value of β will yield solutions to $DSDM'(a_0)$ that are optimal with respect to the original objective of $DSDM(a_0)$, but do push cargo through more quickly. Thus, there are multiple optimal solutions to $DSDM(a_0)$ and we are taking advantage of that fact. In effect, we are solving the goal program that (a) optimizes one objective, i.e., it minimizes disruption, (b) adds a constraint that requires all solutions be optimal with respect to that objective value, and (c) then optimizes a secondary objective of pushing cargo through quickly.

By using $DSDH'$, we are trying to find an acceptable solution to our stochastic program from among multiple-optimal deterministic ones, yet in the introduction we warned that this might be impossible. However, if it is possible at times, we will be satisfied that we have (a) provided a stochastic-programming baseline for validating current methods, and (b) improved those methods in the short term. We can still argue that those methods should be replaced in the long term, and we will do this with computational results at hand in the next section.

Complementing our rule-based planning methods, we devise a procedure to compute a lower bound z^+ on the optimal objective value of SSDM. We call this procedure D^+ . The value z^+ is computed by solving, for each $a \in A$, $DSDM(a)$, which is the deterministic version of SSDM with the effect of the scenario a attack incorporated. The expected disruption computed over all scenarios is z^+ . This is a lower bound—it is an example of the well-known “wait-and-see bound,” e.g., Birge and Louveaux (1997, p. 138)—because in each scenario the optimizing planner is assumed to know if and when an attack will occur.

4 Computational Results

This section describes the computational results for SSDM, DSDH, DSDH', and D^+ . All computation is performed on a 1.7 GHz dual-processor Pentium IV computer with 2 Gb of RAM, running under Microsoft Windows 2000. Models are generated using GAMS (Brooke et al. 1996) and solved using CPLEX Version 7.0 (ILOG 1999), with a 1% relative optimality tolerance.

4.1 Data

The data describe a hypothetical deployment to the Middle East requiring the movement of about 3,000 ktons of cargo, in 11 different packages, over the course of 100 days aggregated into 50 two-day time periods. The cargo is required between periods 7 and 45 of the deployment and the maximum-lateness parameter (δ^{MAX}) is 7 periods. There are four SPOEs in the United States and Europe and there are two SPODs, denoted d_1 and d_2 , in close proximity to each other in the Middle East. The travel time between SPOEs and SPODs ranges from 6 to 12 periods. 158 ships become available to load cargo according to a pre-specified schedule over the course of the first 15 periods. Each ship can transport up to 15 ktons of cargo per trip. This hypothetical deployment is similar in scope to the one executed under Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 (Alexander 1999).

Each SPOD has berth capacity for at most nine ships at a time. Under normal conditions, a ship is unloaded in two periods and the port has 150 ktons/period of cargo-handling capacity to forward that cargo on to its final destination. Any attack on an SPOD, however, will close the port for a number of periods for decontamination, during which the cargo-handling capacity is lost entirely and the unloading process is halted. Decontamination commences immediately after the attack and, upon completion, ships continue to unload at their standard rate. However, other cargo-handling capacity at the port only returns to normal gradually, according to a given recovery schedule. We consider a fixed decontamination period of 7 periods with capacity recovering at a rate of 25% per period after decontamination. These values could be part of scenario definitions in a more detailed model.

The objective function of SSDM, equation (1), measures total expected disruption (see Section 2.3) to the deployment. Disruption resulting from late deliveries is measured in terms of “weighted kton-periods.” Specifically, k ktons of cargo that are τ periods late incur a penalty of $k \times \tau^{1.5}$. Disruption resulting from an unmet delivery of k ktons of cargo from package c is $k \times \tau_c^{1.5}$, where τ_c is a strict upper bound on the number of periods late that package c is still considered worth delivering.

4.2 Test Cases and Results

In the following, we analyze the benefits of the stochastic solution using combinations of attack types and probability distributions we call test cases. In practice, analysts would develop these from intelligence reports. The attack types are:

$S = \{\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}\}$: An attack occurs at SPOD d_1 or at SPOD d_2 , but not both, or no attack occurs;

$S = \{\{d_1\}, \{d_1, d_2\}\}$: Mutually exclusively, an attack occurs at d_1 , both SPODs are attacked simultaneously, or no attack occurs; or

$S = \{\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}, \{d_1, d_2\}\}$: Mutually exclusively, d_1 is attacked, d_2 is attacked, both d_1 and d_2 are attacked simultaneously, or no attack occurs.

The probability distributions for the test cases are defined by (a) the probability of no attack, $\phi_{a_0} = 0.5$, (b) by the assumption that in any given period, an attack of any element of S is equally likely, and (c) the following conditional distributions for the timing of an attack:

U1: Uniform distribution over periods 4 through 40,

T1: Triangular distribution over periods 4 through 40 with mode 22,

U2: Uniform distribution over periods 4 through 18,

T2: Triangular distribution over periods 4 through 18 with mode 11,

U3: Uniform distribution over periods 26 through 40, and

T3: Triangular distribution over periods 26 through 40 with mode 33.

The first distribution, U1, is the “baseline distribution” accounting for almost no information. T1 employs the same range of periods but gives more likelihood to attacks occurring in the middle of the deployment. U2 and T2 represent a situation in which planners believe the enemy will strike early in the deployment: Perhaps the enemy believes, and our intelligence suggests, that early strikes will have a strong psychological effect against us and compound our scheduling problems in a way that a later strike would not. U3 and T3 represent the anticipation of late strikes: Perhaps intelligence reports indicate that the enemy will experience some delay in deploying his biological weapons.

Table 1 describes the set of test cases and associated model statistics. Table 2 displays the computational results for the test cases under the various models and solution procedures: SSDM, DSDH and DSDH', as well as the lower-bound procedure D^+ .

The SSDM column of Table 2 reports the total expected disruption, i.e., objective function value, for the stochastic model applied to each test case. All solutions are within 1% of optimal and solution times are displayed in parentheses, in elapsed seconds.

In summary, the results show that

1. SSDM reduces total expected disruption over the simulated rule-based planning of DSDH by an average of 22% with a range of 1% to 47%. With respect to the improved heuristic DSDH', SSDM reduces expected disruption by an average of 8%, with a range of 1% to 14%.
2. Even though DSDH' was intended to improve results with late attacks (U3 and T3), it also performs well relative to DSDH when the attack can occur over the widest range of periods (U1 and T1). Under early attacks (U2 and T2), DSDH outperforms DSDH', but all such differences are small, i.e., at most 0.3%; thus, we only discuss DSDH' in what follows.
3. The lower bound provided by D^+ is below the near-optimal solution value of SSDM by an average of 20%. This indicates that even if DSDH' does provide a good solution, we still must solve SSDM to verify its quality.
4. Early-attack cases leave the least flexibility for the stochastic program to improve upon rule-based planning. The average reduction in disruption of SSDM over DSDH' is 3%, with a range of 1-6% for the six U2 and T2 cases.
5. Conversely, the stochastic program has the greatest leverage when attacks can only occur late in the deployment. The analogous average and range for the six U3 and T3 cases are 11% and 7-13%. Finally, the range and average for the U1 and T1 cases are 8% and 5-11%.

We explain the general dominance of DSDH' over DSDH (result 2 above) as follows:

Even if attacks can occur at any time, it makes sense to push cargo through the system as quickly

as possible because, if an attack occurs, delayed cargo has as much slack time as possible to reach its destination. However, pushing cargo quickly is a “double-edged sword”: The higher disruption for DSDH’ compared to SSDM is largely explained by the fact that DSDH’ moves cargo too fast to the SPODs in a few scenarios, and a large quantity becomes trapped in the attacked SPOD in those scenarios and cannot reach its destination in time. SSDM better balances the speedy arrival of cargo against the flexibility to reroute cargo waiting outside an SPOD that may be attacked.

Table 3 helps investigate the behavior of the various procedures under likely and especially disruptive scenarios. Since the no-attack scenario is likely to occur, we want to know if the solutions from the stochastic model are robust in this scenario. The table shows that they are. The table also shows that the worst-case scenarios for the stochastic model are usually less disruptive than the worst-case scenarios for rule-based planning.

The results above seem to indicate that the stochastic-programming approach can yield substantial improvements over rule-based planning, which is represented by a tuned deterministic optimization model (arguably an optimistic representation of rule-based planning). It is important to understand when the need for using a model such as SSDM is most acute. As described above, when SSDM has the most time prior to the attack to hedge (i.e., the U3 and T3 distributions), the value of the stochastic solution is the largest. We test this sensitivity with respect to the distribution governing the time of attack by considering a triangular distribution, denoted T3’, in which we change the mode of the triangular distribution from 33 to 40. The associated computational results for each of the three attack types are shown in Table 4. The expected disruption of SSDM’s solution is better than that of simulated rule-based planning by 25%, 14%, and 13% for the three types of attack; these values have increased from 8%, 13%, and 10%, respectively, for the original T3 distribution. These results are consistent with the trend in Table

3 of SSDM solutions becoming more valuable as we move from early attack times, to the widest range of attack times, to late attack times.

5 Conclusions

This paper has devised a specialized, multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model for planning the delivery of sealift cargo in a wartime deployment, subject to possible enemy attacks on one or more seaports of debarkation (SPODs). The attacks are simulated by halting berthing, unloading and other cargo handling until decontamination is complete; the timing and location of the attack are uncertain. Once decontamination is complete, post-attack cargo-handling capacity of the SPOD gradually returns to normal. We focus on the effects of biological attacks, but the model could be modified for conventional, nuclear or chemical attacks.

The stochastic program SSDM and two (simulated) rule-based planning schemes have been tested with data from a realistic wartime deployment with 158 ships becoming available at different times during the deployment, 11 cargo types, four seaports of embarkation where cargo is loaded and two SPODs where cargo is unloaded before reaching its final destination. Our test cases assume there is a substantial probability of no attack, but if an attack does occur, it occurs with known probability distribution for timing and location.

Expected cargo lateness, measured in weighted ton-periods, improves by up to 25%, depending on data and probabilistic assumptions, when compared to expected results obtained using a simulation of current, rule-based planning techniques. (In fact, we compare against a “tuned” rule-based technique that is rooted in a deterministic optimization model and may overestimate how good rule-based techniques can be; hence,

our comparisons are conservative.) However, there is little price to pay in terms of cargo lateness for the stochastic solution if no attack occurs. In conclusion, hedging against a possible attack can provide substantial benefits if an attack occurs, and incurs only minor penalties if not.

Our simulations of current rule-based plans have shown that it may be possible to establish rules that are more robust against potential attacks early in the deployment horizon, without using a special stochastic-programming model. In these cases, SSDM improves over rule-based planning, designed to push cargo through the system as quickly as possible, by only an average of 3%. However, this contrasts with larger averages of 8% when an attack may occur at almost any time (uniform distribution for attack time), and 11% and 17% for two sets of late-attack distributions. Except in the case of early attack, it may be impossible to adjust a rule-based system to behave nearly as well as a stochastic one. Furthermore, it is probably impossible to know how well rule-based planning is performing without an optimal, stochastic solution to serve as a baseline lower bound. (One standard lower bound is very weak.) So, rule-based systems can be improved, but the stochastic-programming approach will ultimately be superior.

The current emphasis in the US military's deployment planning is for providing up-to-the-minute tracking of all cargo and transportation assets, with the ability to quickly respond to contingencies. This is no doubt important, but planners can expect more timely arrival of cargo into a theater of war if they proactively plan for those contingencies.

Further testing and development of SSDM is warranted. The model should be tested against wartime deployment situations in other parts of the world. Conceptually, the model is easy to expand for other sources of uncertainty such as the location of the cargo-carrying ships when deployment planning is commenced. Also, SSDM currently assumes that if an attack occurs during the deployment, there will only be one, although it

may affect more than one SPOD: The model should, of course, be expanded to consider more than one attack, but this will require more general, multi-stage stochastic-programming models and solution techniques.

6 Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the students at the Naval Postgraduate School whose research has provided the foundation for our work: Tammy Glaser, Steven Aviles, Michael Theres, Christopher Alexander and Loh Long Piao. David Morton's research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant DMI-9702217 and the State of Texas Advanced Research Program through grant #003658-0405-1999. Javier Salmerón's research was supported by a National Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship. Kevin Wood's research was supported by the Office of Naval Research and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The authors thank all of their supporting agencies.

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


Figure 1a. A multiple-attack scenario tree

Figure 1b. A single-attack scenario tree

Figure 1. A standard scenario tree represents multiple attacks on a single SPOD (Figure 1a) and a specialized tree represents SSDM's assumption of at most one attack (Figure 1b).

Attack types	Distri- butions	/A/	Problem Sizes					
			SSDM			DSDM(a_0)		
			m	n_1	n_2	m	n_1	n_2
$\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}$	U1, T1	75	605,346	672,399	44,260	2,691	5,254	596
	U2, T2	31	165,170	229,013	18,300			
	U3, T3	31	321,410	320,965	18,300			
$\{d_1\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1, T1	75	605,346	672,399	43,890			
	U2, T2	31	165,170	229,013	18,150			
	U3, T3	31	321,410	320,965	18,150			
$\{d_1\}, \{d_1\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1, T1	112	906,674	1,003,004	65,720			
	U2, T2	46	264,410	339,270	27,000			
	U3, T3	46	480,770	475,908	27,000			

Table 1. Problem definitions and sizes for the stochastic sealift deployment model SSDM and its deterministic counterpart DSDM(a_0), which assumes no attack occurs. Each test case is described by: (a) The subsets of SPODs where the attacks may occur (e.g., $\{\{d_1\}, \{d_1 d_2\}\}$ represents a case where either d_1 , or d_1 and d_2 , may be attacked, but not d_2 alone), and (b) the conditional probability distribution for the time of attack, given that an attack occurs. The number of scenarios /A/ is also shown. Problem sizes are given in terms of numbers of structural constraints m , continuous variables n_1 and binary variables n_2 . The sizes for SSDM are “raw,” i.e., before substituting out non-anticipativity constraints and making other reductions. The CPLEX preprocessor can reduce n_1 and n_2 for SSDM by up to 50% and m by up to 80%.

Attack types	Distribution	A	D ⁺	SSDM	DSDH	DSDH'
$\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}$	U1	75	3,056 (113)	4,648 (368)	5,686 (64)	4,899 (58)
	T1	75	3,398 (115)	4,896 (409)	5,519 (68)	5,163 (60)
	U2	31	2,650 (56)	4,426 (63)	4,474 (41)	4,475 (38)
	T2	31	2,647 (55)	4,755 (62)	4,785 (42)	4,786 (37)
	U3	31	3,014 (32)	4,491 (106)	6,620 (12)	5,098 (11)
	T3	31	2,943 (32)	4,386 (108)	6,175 (12)	4,715 (11)
$\{d_1\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1	75	10,951 (139)	12,118 (312)	14,958 (72)	13,310 (67)
	T1	75	12,182 (144)	13,022 (286)	15,396 (71)	14,456 (68)
	U2	31	7,959 (67)	9,877 (53)	10,463 (47)	10,480 (46)
	T2	31	9,148 (66)	11,189 (56)	11,669 (47)	11,707 (47)
	U3	31	12,320 (39)	12,768 (84)	18,422 (12)	14,438 (11)
	T3	31	12,377 (39)	12,507 (84)	17,847 (12)	14,105 (10)
$\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1	112	8,259 (199)	9,750 (1,377)	11,961 (101)	10,466 (94)
	T1	112	9,418 (196)	10,483 (1,089)	12,391 (101)	11,499 (94)
	U2	46	6,244 (99)	8,301 (107)	8,627 (68)	8,639 (66)
	T2	46	6,837 (104)	8,979 (103)	9,171 (67)	9,193 (68)
	U3	46	9,218 (55)	10,084 (184)	14,359 (17)	11,277 (15)
	T3	46	9,232 (54)	9,894 (190)	13,874 (17)	10,899 (15)

Table 2. Results for SSDM and related models in $\text{ktons} \times \text{days}^{1.5}$ of total expected disruption. Paired values are objective value and, in parentheses, solution time in seconds. All models are solved with a 1% optimality gap. Overall, stochastic planning with SSDM reduces disruption significantly over basic rule-based planning with DSDH and the improved deterministic heuristic DSDH'. DSDH' leads to smaller disruption than DSDH except in the "early attack" cases of U2 and T2.

Attack types	Distribution	A	No-attack scenario		Worst-case scenarios	
			DSDH'	SSDM	DSDH'	SSDM
$\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}$	U1	75	1,974	2,154	17,425	14,468
	T1	75		2,004		14,468
	U2	31		1,974	14,092	14,060
	T2	31		2,017		14,102
	U3	31		2,004	17,425	15,767
	T3	31		2,034		15,767
$\{d_1\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1	75		2,034	68,584	60,253
	T1	75		2,089		60,253
	U2	31		2,017	47,646	46,212
	T2	31		2,185		46,212
	U3	31		2,077	67,867	54,803
	T3	31		2,004		58,701
$\{d_1\}, \{d_2\}, \{d_1, d_2\}$	U1	112	2,049	68,584	60,253	
	T1	112	2,049		60,253	
	U2	46	2,017	47,646	46,212	
	T2	46	2,017		46,212	
	U3	46	2,064	67,867	54,803	
	T3	46	2,004		58,701	

Legend:

No-attack scenario: Disruption (objective function value) for the deterministic and stochastic planning methods when no attack occurs.

Worst-case scenarios: Worst disruption, across all scenarios, for the given method.

Table 3. Results for special scenarios for SSDM solutions and solutions of DSDH', all in $\text{ktons} \times \text{days}$ ^{1.5} of disruption. Columns under "No-attack scenario" show that only a small penalty is paid for hedging against potential attacks when none occurs: DSDH' gives the disruption for the optimal plan when no attack occurs, and the values for SSDM-generated plans, computed against this scenario, are only slightly higher. "Worst-case scenarios" show that the worst disruption observed with the stochastic model is usually better than the worst disruption observed under rule-based planning (DSDH').

Test Case	A	D ⁺	SSDM	DSDH'
{{d ₁ },{d ₂ }}-T3'	31	2,579 (32)	3,628 (102)	4,551 (11)
{{d ₁ },{d ₁ ,d ₂ }}- T3'	31	10,222 (38)	10,865 (81)	12,410 (11)
{{d ₁ },{d ₂ },{d ₁ ,d ₂ }}- T3'	46	7,674 (53)	8,680 (184)	9,767 (15)

Table 4. Results for the three types of attacks under a modified triangular distribution for the time of attack. Objective values appear outside of parentheses and run times in elapsed seconds appear within. The new distribution for the time of attack, T3', results from changing the mode of the original triangular attack-time distribution T3 from period 33 to period 40. As before, the probability of no attack is 1/2.