Master Thesis

From Mobilization to Institutionalization: Urban Social Movement Organizations in New York City - Between Radical Demands and Reformism.

Von der Mobilisierung zur Institutionalisierung: Urbane Soziale Bewegungen in New York City - zwischen radikalen Forderungen und Reformismus.

Student: Sebastian Wormsbächer
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Talja Blokland
Dr. Andrej Holm
Handover Date: Berlin, 31.05.2016
ABSTRACT

The study of Social Movements (SMs) is a growing field in the social sciences. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute a nuanced approach to the institutionalization of urban Social Movement Organizations (SMOs). It explores several SMOs fighting for affordable housing in New York City (NYC). This thesis argues that the institutionalization and professionalization of SMOs does not always entail the risk of a de-radicalization, depolitization or de-mobilization of collective action. SMOs can maintain a balanced conflictive and cooperative power-relationship with the state. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, research on SMs often described New Social Movements (NSMs) as anti-bureaucratic. More recently, social scientists see SMOs as becoming institutionalized and even co-opted by governments.

In order to study the institutionalization of SMOs in NYC, categories as external and internal resources and external networks were developed and compared. In this thesis it is argued that the degree of institutionalization of SMOs defines their goals. Generally, SMOs have different capacities and resources. Moreover, external funding of these SMOs does have an impact on their internal organization and their political stance towards reform policy. To study this, a methodological framework was developed through which institutionalization and the political agenda could be defined. In doing so, qualitative methodology (semi-standardized interviews) is applied to categorize the different SMOs into three different types, namely issue-concerned groups, neighborhood groups and umbrella organizations.

KEYWORDS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Talja Blokland, Dr. Andrej Holm and Dr. Henrik Lebuhn for their advice, helpful comments and constructive criticism during the writing process. Also, I want to thank my fellow students for the helpful comments in the colloquia. They contributed substantially to the final version.

Furthermore, I want to thank Dr. Albert Scharenberg and Dr. Stefanie Ehmsen, co-directors of Rosa-Luxemburg Stiftung – New York Office, for their support and understanding for my research during my internship in New York City.

I would also like to express my appreciation for the time leaders of SMOs and experts took for giving me interviews.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional support throughout the period of my academic time and my friends for their advice.

All remaining errors are mine, of course.
# Table of Contents

**Abstract**  
II

**Acknowledgement**  
III

**Table of Contents**  
IV

**List of Figures and Tables**  
V

**List of Abbreviations**  
VI

## 1. Introduction  
1

## 2. Definitions and Literature Review  
5

2.1 Urban Governance and Protest  
5

2.2 Social Movements (SMs) and Urban Social Movements (USMs)  
8

2.3 Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)  
12

2.4 Key Stages in the Development of SMs  
18

2.5 The Institutionalization of Social Movements  
20

2.5.1 Defining Institutions  
21

2.5.2 Framing the Institutionalization of SMOs  
21

2.5.3 Theorizing the Institutionalization  
24

2.5.4 Implications of the Institutionalization  
27

2.5.5 Radicalization and Orientation Towards Reformist Policy  
29

2.5.6 Factors of the Institutionalization  
31

2.6 Summarizing the Theory  
37

## 3. Research Methods and Data Sources  
39

3.1 Research Methods  
39

3.2 Methodology: Data Sources  
39

3.3 Hypotheses  
43

3.4 Conceptual Framework: Spectrum of Groups  
43

3.5 Group Members and Resources  
44

## 4. Empirical Work  
46

4.1 Background to SMOs in NYC  
46

4.2 Comparative Case Study: SMOs in New York City  
49

4.2.1 Issue-concerned Groups  
49

4.2.2 Neighborhood groups  
56

4.2.3 Umbrella Organizations  
61

4.3 Summary of the Comparative Case Study  
68

## 5. Conclusion  
74

**Literature**  
VII
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW CHARACTERISTICS SMs, USMs and SMOs ........................................ 18
FIGURE 2: KEY STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMs .................................................. 20
FIGURE 3: FACTORS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF SMOs POLITICAL AGENDA ............ 31
FIGURE 4: EXTERNAL RESOURCES ..................................................................................... 33
FIGURE 5: INTERNAL RESOURCES ..................................................................................... 34
FIGURE 6: EXTERNAL NETWORKS ....................................................................................... 35
FIGURE 7: FACTORS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION .................................................................. 37
FIGURE 8: RESOURCES OF ISSUE-CONCERNED GROUPS .................................................. 56
FIGURE 9: RESOURCES OF NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS ..................................................... 61
FIGURE 10: RESOURCES OF UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS .............................................. 68
FIGURE 11: COMPARISON OF ISSUE-CONCERNED GROUPS, NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS AND UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................................. 70
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B4G</td>
<td>Before it’s gone, take it back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSN</td>
<td>Brooklyn Solidarity Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHIP</td>
<td>Bushwick Housing Independence Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>Community Action for Safe Apartments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHTU</td>
<td>Crown Heights Tenant Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Community Service Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4F</td>
<td>Equality for Flatbush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRNY</td>
<td>Make the Road New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYC</td>
<td>New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWB</td>
<td>North West Bushwick Community Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Political Process Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMT</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTCA</td>
<td>Right to the City Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs</td>
<td>Social Movement Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMs</td>
<td>Social Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHAB</td>
<td>Urban Home Assistance Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMs</td>
<td>Urban Social Movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. INTRODUCTION

All social movements must be defined in some degree by their political projects, or their attempts to influence institutional and political change (Foweraker 1995: 69).

In 2008, New York City (NYC) experienced the peak of a housing crisis which has been characterized by limited access to housing and unaffordability for middle and lower classes. In addition, it has been marked by a speculative real estate market which has left renters and mortgage owners vulnerable to displacement.¹

As a consequence, protests occurred in NYC but also in other parts of the world where similar changes were taking place.² Affected renters started to form and join Urban Social Movements (USMs). They are rather spontaneous, non-institutionalized Social Movements (SMs) related to the city or community aiming to achieve control over their urban environment. Some USMs turn into institutionalized, bureaucratic and professionalized urban Social Movement Organizations (SMOs),³ in an effort to help people facing displacement due to their inability to afford high rents.⁴ Both, USMs and SMOs, expressed their demands through the slogan ‘city for all’. Their goal was and remains to rally supporters and to address the urban housing crisis and the weakly regulated real estate and rental markets.⁵

¹ To get an overview of the gentrification development in NYC, a map shows the process in the different boroughs of NYC and can be accessed under the following URL: http://www.governing.com/gov-data/new-york-gentrification-maps-demographic-data.html, last called: 27.02.2016.
² In 2014, the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights stated an enduring housing crisis for the urban environment. It represented the most pressing human rights issue facing cities all over the world.
³ As this thesis speaks about SMOs working in the urban sphere, thereafter it will not be mentioned that they are urban SMOs and just called SMOs as the urban context has been pointed out.
⁴ SMOs differ from USMs as they are often having centralized decision-making structures and are organized by paid staff whereas USMs tend to have fewer resources to use.
⁵ Beyond the protest, scholars such as David Harvey (2008) stated that all people should enjoy the ‘Right to the City’, not just capitalists.
The literature on USMs and SMOs predates the advent of the urban housing crisis. Since the 1960s, social scientists such as McCarthy and Zald (1977), Castells (1983) or Mayer (2009) had theorized about SMs, USMs and SMOs. There is no scholarly consensus on the effect institutionalization has on SMOs (Castells 1983), however, the observations range from a self-defeat of the protest movement due to the financial dependency on donors who might dictate the agenda (Dryzek 1996), to a strengthening of the movement by the implementation of formalism and routine procedures allowing a better uptake of resources (Tarrow 1994). Tarrow (2011) asserts that institutionalization and professionalization have no major impact on SMO’s commitment towards their original goal.

With regard to their political role, SMOs are paradoxical. On the one hand, they often oppose governments; on the other hand, in order to address certain wrongs or bestow rights, they are to varying degrees’ dependent upon them. Their strategic interaction with the state brings SMOs into the political arena. They often start out as radical, extra-institutional gatherings of people seeking to fight injustice. To do this, they spend a lot of effort, emotional energy, money and time. Many SMOs have found it difficult to sustain initial enthusiasm and commitment. To address this, some SMOs seek to build more durable organizations that institutionalize the struggle. Political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and lobby groups are examples of professional protest groups.

This thesis attempts to analyze different SMOs working on housing issues, as it seeks to shed light on SMOs working within the urban context of the global city of New York City. Thereby, this study seeks to adds to the academic discussion knowledge about the institutionalization of SMOs with a focus on different resources used by SMOs working in NYC. The focus on one city necessarily comes with a certain lack of external validity. However, due to the following conceptual reflections in this thesis one can determine a reasonable degree of internal validity. Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the following research question:

*How does the institutionalization of SMOs in NYC affect the ideological political agenda of the organizations?*
This thesis adds to the growing field of studies on SMOs by focusing on different resources used by urban SMOs in NYC. Despite the many publications on similar topics, no scholars have systematically studied the aforementioned resources on the basis of SMOs in NYC. The structure of different SMOs in NYC offers a rich example of case studies since it provides insights into various degrees of institutionalization. To support the study, categories were created for SMOs and labeled as external resources, internal resources, and external networks. In the purpose of the study, SMO were categorized according to their type of resources in a manner nonexistent in the literature about SMOs. The categories help to explain the degree of institutionalization and whether SMOs are focused on demanding reforms and/or becoming more radical.

SMOs share the same aims but at times they vary depending on their articulation. The type of movement, goals, life cycle, social composition, available resources and the context in which they emerge are valuable significant qualities to analyze and to differentiate them. A comparative case study in the following thesis helps to underline the differences between SMOs. Additionally, this work considers the relationship between SMOs and their interaction with the state. Moreover, the attempt of SMOs to institutionalize is analyzed. Therefore, a significant amount of original research was necessary in order to present a comparative case study and provide an in-depth examination of eleven SMOs.

The tenant’s interests are not a passive effect of policy, but possess a certain institutional autonomy. How autonomous can SMOs interact within the institutional frames they are acting within? How is their political identity related to their funding? SMOs often receive their funds from grants, philanthropic foundations and contracts with governments in order to provide services such as advocacy. Most SMOs rely on these three sources, but in widely varying ratios.

Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to shed light on the differences between SMOs in NYC, especially with respect to their degrees of institutionalization. It builds on field research

---

6 Most of the researched organizations could agree that they belong to a broad movement which produces numerous ‘protest activities’ mainly by using a ‘non-institutionalized action repertoire’ and the constitution of ‘mobilized networks of networks’ without formalized membership and decision making (Neidhard and Rucht 1991: 452).
conducted between January and April 2015 in the form of interviews with SMO leaders based in NYC. By choosing the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews, it is possible to comprehend the approach of each SMO towards institutionalization. Moreover, the interviews lead to a better understanding of the organizing situation for SMOs in NYC and allow a comparison to be made between different SMOs concerning their resources and political activities. This study also tests if the current theory on SMOs as well as institutionalization theory adequately explain the outcomes from the interviews.

The scope of this thesis is to analyze the institutionalization of SMOs. Hence, it cannot answer how they emerged or why some institutionalized USMs have not succeeded in the political arena. It does not focus on the cause of the housing crisis in NYC, but rather on the resulting problems and the movements which seek to correct them. Moreover, the results offer an insight into movements that operate within a political culture, with social, economic and cultural frameworks that allow them to operate. The findings might also be relevant for other cities and SMOs that operate under comparable circumstances. Furthermore, the results can help SMOs to choose whether they should follow the path of institutionalization to achieve their goals or not.

To answer the research question, chapter two begins with a more comprehensive explanation of urban governance issues and continues with a summary of the key theoretical frameworks and research related to SMs, USMs and SMOs. Likewise, in chapter two the thesis presents the SMs theory’s main propositions and an illumination on institutionalization. Chapter three describes the analytical categories for a comparison of different SMOs and the methodology. In this chapter, the research method, building a matrix from the literature and semi-structured interviews explaining the different factors of institutionalization, will be shown. Furthermore, chapter three discusses hypotheses which are tested later in this work. Chapter four presents the results of the interviews, with factors created to measure the degree of institutionalization. Also, it provides a comparison of the different organizations after dividing all SMOs into three types of organizations, namely issue-concerned groups, neighborhood groups and umbrella organizations. Finally, chapter five concludes the analysis by summarizing and discussing the outcomes and raising new questions for further research.
2. DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

To situate this thesis within a wider intellectual debate, the concepts and definitions of Social Movements (SMs), Urban Social Movements (USMs) and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) will be divided in different sections. In order to explain their outreach and context, for example, it is important to understand the definitions, but also, it is important to understand the context where they were created. In NYC, some SMs began with an idea and slogan such as ‘black lives matters’ or, related with the initial example of housing crisis, ‘the rent is too damn high’. These definitions are an ethereal idea that coalesces in an intellectual debate about how they became an institutionalized organization. Thereby, they became a subject of intellectual debate among contemporary scholars.

This chapter will present the context of the urban governance and emergence of USMs. It follows the definition of SMs, USMs, and SMOs. Further, this chapter will discuss how these movements gradually professionalized. Also, it will clarify what is meant by the term institutionalization.

2.1 URBAN GOVERNANCE AND PROTEST

The outstanding fact of modern society is the growth of great cities. Nowhere else have the enormous changes which the machine industry has made in our social life registered themselves with such obviousness as in the cities (Park and Burgess 1967: 56).

Every member of civil society can take part in the urban governance process. However, globalization and the expansion of private sector influence erodes the power of the general citizens in the urban governance process through the “sell-out” of public commodities (Koon 2011: 25). In capitalist societies, the role of the economy is becoming more important in the urban governance process as it has the power to effectively influence decisions made by the government. The formal government as an institutionalized political system, as well as

7 Urban governance refers to ‘collective action’ which involves an overlapping and interaction of “the spheres of the state, the economy and daily life” (Healey 2007: 16).
informal networks outside the formal governmental structure, play an important role that affects the outlook of policies and the institutional set up (Koon 2011: 9).

Power relations are a key concept, which should be considered when talking about ‘right’ in urban governance. One important approach is the idea of hegemony presented by Gramsci. Urban governance is a dialectic issue, as Gramsci understands hegemony as the relations between the state and the civil society (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci argues that the relations depend on the circumstances of the particular period of time. The legitimacy of action lies beneath the institutional set up of a city, which also grants people with power. USMs are organized as an outlet to demand changes and let the government hear their voices (Koon 2011: 9).

In order to strengthen the citizen’s rights, Henri Lefebvre (1993) calls for the re-structuring of urban governance with his idea on the ‘Right to the City’. Local inhabitants should have a voice in all decisions that produce the urban space. His concept of the ‘Right to the City’ goes beyond the state-bound limitations in urban governance (Purcell 2002). According to Lefebvre, the empowerment of the inhabitants is necessary. In order to realize the empowerment a ‘radical metamorphosis’ is needed (Purcell 2002: 106). More recently, David Harvey (2008) views the ‘Right to the City’ as a right people should have. Harvey criticizes the contemporary circulation and accumulation of capital as it creates an imbalance of geographical and social concentrations of surplus products which affect all aspects of life.

---

8 Common people can be actors in the contemporary urban governance landscape shaping the development of a city through various means of collective actions in lived space (Healey 2007).
9 Gramsci underlines the need “for civil society to be expanded” in order to develop a counter-hegemonic world through the expansion of governance capacity (Buttigieg 1995: 32).
10 Lefebvre suggested that the revolutionary working class was constituted out of urban rather than factory workers. This is a different kind of class formation as it is more fragmented and divided and has multiple aims and needs and is often disorganized (Harvey 2013: xiii).
11 Harvey regards the right to the city as something that no longer exists and what is an empty signifier everybody can fill with a meaning and is claimable. He underlines that the definition of the right itself is an object to the urban struggle (Harvey 2013: xv). Only the creation of an anti-capitalistic movement that focuses on the transformation of the daily urban life as a goal can reconstitute a totally different kind of city (Harvey 2013: xvi).
12 Henri Lefebvre wrote in his essay ‘The Right to the City’ in 1967 that the right was a cry and a demand at the same time. The demand asked to face the crisis of everyday life in the city and to create an alternative urban life that is less alienated and more meaningful but conflictual and dialectical (Harvey 2013: xii).
He regards urbanization as a class phenomenon, making clear that capitalists need to make profit through the extraction of surpluses from somewhere and from somebody else (Harvey 2008). Through laws and legislation, the economic mechanisms can further consolidate and provide capitalists more power to shape urbanization. As a result, people are left with limited resources and thereby they are “subjected to the capitalist system” (Harvey 2008: 23). Access to the city is a common and not an individual right.  

To make this transformation, the urbanization process has to be reshaped. Grassroots alliances can emerge as alternative political forces (Harvey 2003). In order to fight for the right ‘city for all’, USMs band together to transform the social order of the urban environment (Buechler 2000). USMs are groups of people who come together as an attempt to transform the existing social setting in the urban space, provide platforms for the people to express their ideas and allow open debates to let others seek alternatives to the neoliberal city. They can influence the governance landscape and are important to urban governance. This process is a symbol to the ‘right to the city’ as USMs take part in shaping the future of cities (Harvey 2003). The following sections will focus on the nature of SMs, USMs, their transformations and how these movements have changed the governance landscape.

13 Harvey argues that institutions have the task to impose concepts of the world in order to limit the construction of alternatives. 
14 Harvey sees the urban sphere as “an incubator of revolutionary ideas, ideals and movements.” He underlines one has to understand “that politics has to focus on production and reproduction of urban life as the central labor process out of which revolutionary impulses arise it will be possible to radically transform daily life” (Harvey 2013: xvi). 
15 The traditional left regards USMs as reformists dealing with specific and not systemic and revolutionary issues nor authentically class movements (Harvey 2013: xiv). 
16 Lefebvre insisted that the revolution in our times has to be urban - or nothing. Harvey regards this position as right (Harvey 2013: 25). 
17 It has everything to do with ongoing struggles over who gets to shape the qualities of daily urban life. The participation has to do with people seeking some kind of response to a brutal neoliberal international capitalism (Harvey 2013: xii).
2.2 Social Movements (SMs) and Urban Social Movements (USMs)

One reason why it is difficult to define SMs is that they are by nature shifting entities. However, resistance is the core of SMs as they oppose the status quo and state institutions. In the following passages, the differences between Social Movements (SMs) and Urban Social Movements (USMs) will be discussed.

Defining Social Movements

Social Movements (SMs) can be defined as collective action, taken in solidarity by people with a common purpose, aimed at challenging the state (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013). The repertoire of collective action differs in the contexts and may range from symbolic resistance to protest. SMs are permanent as a means of public policy making (Tilly 2008). They involve disadvantaged groups which are excluded from society as well as parts of the middle classes (Le Gales 2002) and are defined as socially shared activities and beliefs aiming at changing some aspect of the social order (Gusfield 1970). SMs are not confronting political leaders over single revolts or insurrections, but “rather resemble strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space” (Diani and McAdam 2003: 1).

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), SMs begin as socially shared activities, as informal mobilizations, and gather around some demands. The aim of SMs is to attract support and retain it and try to convert adherents into constituents and non-adherents into adherents (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Castells (1997) argues that SMs “must be understood in their own terms, namely; they are what they say they are” and he remarks that SMs “may be socially conservative, socially revolutionary or both, or none” (Castells 1997: 70). Melucci et al. (1989) claim that SMs cannot be understood by looking just at their manifest side (protest events). Also, one needs to take into account their latent side (networks in everyday life).

18 In democratic countries SMs demand the recognition for certain groups as blacks or gays and protest against government policies.
SMs are much more organized and strategic compared to more spontaneous and momentary crowd events. As opposed to crowds at protest events, SMs are characterized by their durability. Herbert Blumer (1951) defines them as:

Collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in condition of social unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopers for a new system of living (1951: 199).

Thus, Blumer argues that SMs do not appear ‘ready formed’ but arise over a period of time out of prior interactive processes – they have a ‘career’ (Blumer 1951: 199).

In the beginning they are only individual responses calling for social change and the process of agitation starts (Blumer 1951: 201). Sometimes these efforts can lead to the formation of ‘specific social movements’ coordinating strategies to pursue concrete goals and take an organizational form. SMs have networks of organizations and individuals who share the same aims and ideologies. However, SMs can be differentiated to Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) (McCarthy and Zald: 1977), which will be presented later in this thesis. In addition to this, the difference between SMs and Urban Social Movements (USMs) will be explained.

The difference between USMs and SMs


---

19 Contemporary SMs are organized by citizens who may not have any political affiliation (Johnston et al. 1994). SMs are not centrally organized by political parties like the working-class movement used to be in the past.
20 There is no guarantee that a movement will be more than individual efforts at change.
21 Blumer calls this phase the ‘general social movement’.
22 Individual calls for people to live in more environmentally friendly ways would constitute a general social movement, organized groups with strategic goals and strategies like Amnesty International would constitute a specific social movement.
23 SMOs have institutionalized structures with clear resources allocation. Allocative resources refer the way material resources are the constitution of norms, values and regulatory procedures; systems of meaning include frames of reference, ideologies, rationalities and discourses (Giddens 1984).
24 Previously, urban sociology had tended to focus on community and social integration, at the expense of neglecting the political economy of urban development and conflicts of interests (Prujit 2007: 1).
25 A transformation process comprising three periods can be found in the literature.
term USMs became a symbol and writers used the term to challenge the North American Social Movement Theories (SMT) of the 1970s such as Collective Behavior (CB) and Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT).  

The literature on USMs shows a wide range of problems that citizens have responded to. Firstly, it is about ‘collective consumption’ like housing shortages, growing discrepancies between rents and wages, landlords’ neglect of maintenance and insufficient healthcare as well as education. Secondly, about ‘urban planning’ as displacement and destruction of city spaces. Thirdly, related to specific issues as anti-squatter policies, property-owners against proposed social housing and against property taxes as well as racist groups against migrants (Prujit 2007: 1).

Generally, writings on USMs developed in isolation from SMT. Some writers classed USMs as old SMs, like the labor movement, because of the material character of their demands (Fainstein and Hirst 1995: 183). The difference between the definition of USMs and SMs, is that aims of USMs are based on a specific territory. USMs are a specific type of SMs, regarded as a means of urban policy making. However, their demand is related to the ‘urban’ and this has consequences on the reproduction of the space. USMs politicize the city “as a context for distinctive problems of social and economic justice” (Tornkiss 2005).

---

26 Since the 1970s the SMT was undergoing an explosive growth which was not taken up in work on USMs. Theoretical frameworks as CB, NSMs, political process and framing emerged. In part, these frameworks focus on the definition of grievances, boundaries and social composition of the group affected, recruitment of support and sustenance of SMOs, creation of identity among supporters, choice of methods of actions, the social, economic and political context in which they operate and the interaction with the state and opponents (Pickvance 2003: 105). Furthermore, the process of mobilization was neglected in the early writings about USMs as it often was regarded as a matter of detail by writers on structuralism.

27 Harvey argues that another reason for the isolation of USMs theory is that social theory neglects space. Social Theories (Marx, Weber, Smith) focus in their approaches on time and not space. In these theories, space is a contingent aspect rather than a base for human action (1990: 231). According to Harvey, there has been a predisposition to give time and history more priority than space and geography. The neglect of space in social theory is based on the focus of social theory on ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’. In other words, social theory has concentrated on change, revolution and modernization rather than being in a space or a locality (Harvey 1990).

28 Pickvance explains that USMs cannot be regarded as either old or new SMs as they demand greater participation, new rights and other ‘non-material features’ (2003: 106).

29 They are, as Castells argues, “processes of purposive social mobilization, organized as in a given territory, oriented towards urban related-goals” (1997: 60).
Frequently, USMs are treated as a distinctive movement in their own right, standing apart from other movements, and were described as struggles to create more “just, democratic, and livable cities for inhabitants” (Miller and Nicholls 2013: 3).

Overall, the action repertoire of USMs overlaps with other SMs. Actions like rent strikes, squatting and developing alternative spatial plans are specific for USMs (Prujit 2007: 1). Their organizational pattern can be bottom-up, which involves building networks of activists and occasional participants and creating committees, and possibly formal organizations, newsletters, neighborhood centers. It can also be top-down, when political parties build local organizations or when political groups try to take over or make use of a movement that started as a bottom-up group (Prujit 2007: 1). The top-down involvement of political groups or parties is often viewed as detrimental as it can lead to a transformation into state-oriented bureaucracy and it clashes with the prevalent ideal of self-management (Castells 1983).

The interest of this thesis is limited to urban-oriented movements shaping the life in New York City. This includes different collectives using different forms of action. In acknowledging Castells (1983: 328), these USMs share some characteristics in spite of their diversity. These organizations: 1). consider themselves as urban, in any case related to the city or community in their self-denomination, 2). are locally-based and territorially-
defined. The second goal refers to cultural identity as the maintenance or creation of autonomous local cultures. Castells means hereby an orientation towards community.

36 The third goal is related to the search for increasing citizen participation in local government and achieving urban self-management (Castells 1983: 328).

37 Davis (2005: xv) describes the difference between professionalized SMOs and classical SMs as followed: “While the typical SMO might be envisioned as the homespun formalization of a singular grassroots movement, contemporary movement organizations often seem to have absorbed the organizational logic of corporate sector, in which economies of scale and efficiencies available through contracting out have shaped the kinds of organizational structures observed.”

38 The acronym SMO is very popular but is very ambiguous as it has very different meanings among different authors (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 140). However, most researchers in the field would suggest to use the SMO label (Burstein 1999; Diani 2004).

39 Mayer (2009) outlines that institutional pressures on USMs over the last 40 years have led to a situation where many protests have morphed into programs. As the state is in a shrinking situation, SMOs do now more and more reproduce and sometimes reinvent themselves by implementing local social and employment programs or community development (Mayer 2009: 374).
change”. Zald and Ash (1966) recognize SMOs as a distinct component of movement mobilization. McCarthy and Zald, as its original proponents, see them as more structured and formalized organizations. They define them as:

a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which characterizes preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of society […] A Social Movement Organization is the complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement […] and attempts to implement these goals (1977: 1217)

According to Hodgson (2006: 8), it is important to underline that organizations are a special kind of institution with additional feature that involve:

1. criteria to establish boundaries and to distinguish their members from non-members;
2. principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge;
3. chains of command delineating responsibilities within the organization.

Therefore, SMOs are bureaucratic organizations often led by paid staff that mobilizes resources. Thus, they can pursue collective action and have a centralized decision-making structure (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1231).

There was growing awareness that organizational components of movements were critical to procure resources and sustain the movement during times of slowed collective action (Caniglia & Carmin 2005).

Generally, SMOs are not equal to SMs but they play a very important role within them. They fulfill a number of functions as they include participants

40 There is some level of ambiguity concerning the precise distinctions between SMOs, civic organizations, interest groups and non-profits.
41 Rucht (1994) distinguishes SMs and SMOs from parties and interest groups due to their power and legitimacy. Another definition by Lofland (1996: 2) sees SMOs as: “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought be organized that, at the time of their claims making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society”. That definition is less useful for bigger SMOs as Amnesty International or Greenpeace.
42 An example of a professional SMO is Greenpeace.
43 The American Society has witnessed a trend what McCarthy and Zald (1977) called ‘professional’ SMOs in the 1970s. They are established by well-resourced movement entrepreneurs who want to give their resources to profit later from collective action. In the 1960s and 1970s ‘conscience constituents, people who sympathize with a cause but will not personally benefit from collective action became more important for initial mobilization. They provided resources to launch and maintain SMOs in the 1960s (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1224). Suzanne Staggenborg (1988: 160) calls these people ‘angels’ which help the aggrieved population who does not have resources to launch their own struggle.
by offering services, define organizational aims, manage and coordinate contributions, collect resources, train, select and replace members (Scott 1981: 9). SMOs must mobilize resources from the surrounding environment in form of money or through voluntary work. Also, they must neutralize opponents and increase the support from the public and the elite (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1215). Moreover, SMOs can secure continuity to collective action when opportunities for action are modest and people are difficult to mobilize. To some extent, they can represent and take leadership roles on behalf of SMs. One approach regards SMOs as collectivities oriented to relatively specific goals with a relatively formalized social structure. A second approach argues that they share an interest in the survival of the system. A third approach conceives SMOs as unstable coalitions of interest groups determining goals through negotiations. Consequently, their structure and activities are strongly affected by environmental factors (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 138).

Hanspeter Kriesi (1996) described the internal structure of SMOs as being composed of the following features:

1. Formalization by having written rules, fixed procedures, formal leadership and often offices;
2. Professionalization by having paid staff;
3. Differentiation through a functional division of labor;
4. Integration through a horizontal/vertical coordination.

In order to mobilize resources, it is necessary to emulate organizational forms that conform to institutional norms (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Hannan & Freeman 1989). Staggenborg (1988) identified a pattern similar to for-profit organizations. Accordingly, formalized

---

44 Generally, organizations are an important source of continuity and can easier mobilize people and resources than individuals (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 138).
45 Zald and Ash (1996) noted that SMOs are unique entities and deserve special consideration as they serve as an important, if not decisive basis for mobilization.
46 Scott (1981) regards SMOs as rational, natural and open systems Scott.
47 The passivity of members is even expected and not problematic for the organization and activists follow a professional career path.
48 It is important to be aware of the heterogeneity of organizational forms adopted by activists within SMs (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 140).
49 This process is referred to as ‘institutional isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).
organizations are more likely to have routinized jobs, a division of labor, hierarchical decision-making and specific criteria for members. Informal organizations more often have volunteer workforces, relaxed policies and unclear decision-making processes (Staggenborg 1988). A set of criteria to determine the formality level of SMOs was created by Gamson (1990). These standards examined whether or not there are:

1. Paid staff;
2. A formal written budget;
3. A governing board;
4. Official tax-status;
5. Formal incorporation.

Gamson (1990) also tries to differentiate between formality levels. He asserts that formal structures promote a sort of legitimacy for organizations. The legitimacy helps to mobilize resources. Therefore, SMOs having formal structures often experience less conflict or uncertainty than informal organizations (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1977). With such organization, SMOs are in better position to create or respond to openings in political channels (Ferree and Hess 1985). They are better able to gain access to diverse networks comprised of allies, authorities and other potential supporters (Tarrow 1998). There is also considerable support claiming formal SMOs are more likely to survive (Edwards & Marullo 1995). Therefore, Clemens and Minkoff (2004: 155) argue that “the more organization, the better the prospects for mobilization and success”. On the other hand, informal organizations tend to be more adaptable to problems and unintended circumstances which lead to new opportunities (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Piven and Cloward 1977). Furthermore, informal SMOs are more inclined to use disruptive tactics that are sometimes useful to pressure elites (Tarrow 1998). On the one hand, scholars argue that informal SMOs often remain committed to their original goals and organizational integrity (Piven & Cloward 1977). Furthermore, formalization and routinization can increase their chances to mobilize resources. On the other hand, professionalization increases the risk of co-optation and the dismantling of the movement (Edwards 1994; Walker & McCarthy 2010). Therefore, Clements argues that this process can create a distance between leaders and followers:
Hierarchical bureaucratic organization is necessary to compete effectively in the formal political arena, yet the processes of competition and organization distance the leadership from the interests of their followers and from the organization's initial commitment to the transformation of the political system (1993: 764).

Activists therefore have to decide about how to establish their organization in the midst of these complexities.

**SMOs, their benefactors and relations to authorities**

In the 1970s, Gamson (1990 [1975]) found that challengers are more likely to win when they possess a well-structured organization “because they facilitate mass participation, tactical innovations, and rapid decision-making” (Morris 1984: 285). However, there are also problems as professional SMOs are bound by the wishes of their benefactors as McCarthy and Zald described:

> The growth and maintenance of organizations whose formal goals are aimed at helping one population but who depend on a different population for funding are ultimately more dependent upon the latter than the former (1987 [1973]: 371).

From a growing collaboration with authorities, similar consequences might be the outcome. Therefore, Kriesi addresses that the working relation has ambivalent implications for the development of SMOs:

> On the one hand, public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for the SMO; on the other hand, the integration into the established system of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilization capacity of the SMO and alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the long run (1996: 155).

However, even professionalized and bureaucratic SMOs may promote radical challenges and defiance and can also engage in various forms of activism (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 147) as this thesis wants to analyze through the example of SMOs in NYC. After all, professionalization might lead to a defeat of the protest (Piven and Cloward 1977).

In sum, SMOs can be seen as formalized, collectively formed organizations having same preferences as SMs. Other than SMs, SMOs try to achieve social change through negotiations with authorities and benefactors. They have central decision-making structures by having formal leadership. Scholars argue that their dependency on receiving financial resources can
weaken them in the long run. Therefore, SMOs are following defined as professionalized movement organizations with close ties to the institutional system. The nature of the movements also affects their tactics — if they are institutionalized (have staff, resources, relations with the state) and work together with politicians or if they are more radical direct action tactics which later on will be analyzed with a comparison-case of NYC (Staggenborg 1988: 599).

*Summarizing Characteristics of SMs, USMs and SMOs*

In order to summarize SMs, USMs and SMOs, the following chart helps to better understand differences:
### 2.4 Key Stages in the Development of SMs

For better understanding possible evolutions of SMs, four key stages in the development of SMs are presented. Key in all stages is the ability of agitators to create “emotional attachments between participants and the cause” (Edwards 2014: 25). Emotional attachments to the cause provide participants with motivation to get involved in activism (high costs and little reward). Involvement can come with personal costs like time, energy, money, freedom or even life. Those participating need to have a strong emotional investment in the cause as often these SMs only have little success. The role that emotions play in different stages varies but they generally weave passion, commitment and loyalty between the actors and thereby knit them together as a group to persist over a time and to formulate goals (Edwards 2014: 25).
In the first stage, ‘Social Unrest’, agitators try to inspire emotional reactions to social problems (Blumer 1951: 205). In the second stage called ‘Popular Excitement’, emotions are the glue holding the group together by generating an ‘esprit de corps’. Firstly, the identification of common enemies (people to blame) cements the existence of the group and the loyalty to it (you are with or against us). Secondly, personal relationships within the group (participants become friends) and thirdly, group rituals (‘ceremonial behavior’) like meetings, rallies, parades and demonstrations reconfirm commitment to the group. When members participate in these rituals, their sense of belonging to the group is reinforced as they feel like they are part of something bigger. Solidarity is the result of the ‘esprit de corps’. Members recognize themselves as belonging to the same group and sharing the same aims and willingness to help and support each other (Blumer 1951: 206).

In the third and fourth stage (‘Formalization’ and ‘Institutionalization’) SMs become more formal and established. The movement becomes an organization with its own rules, policies, beliefs, and tactics. For the movement it is important to develop some members’ feeling of attachment and loyalty beyond ‘esprit de corps’ to sustain itself in the long-term. ‘Esprit de corps’ is related to excitement but a group needs to ensure members’ commitment and a longer lasting ‘group morale’ has to emerge (Blumer 1951: 208). In order to achieve this sense of purpose, movements have to develop political ideologies which inspire adherents with a sense of blind faith (like religions). Movement ideologies contain beliefs as: the divine, righteous, or sacred nature of the cause or the absolute necessity of pursuing the cause (Blumer 1951: 209).

---

50 James Jasper (1997) calls this emotional reaction a ‘moral shock’ that gets people interested in a cause.
51 Blumer defines this ‘esprit de corps’ as “the organizing of feelings on behalf of the movement” and it creates a sense of belonging to the group and sharing its mission (Blumer 1951: 205).
52 Often Movement rituals include ‘sentimental symbols’ like slogans, songs, poems, hymns, and uniforms through which the feelings people have for each other and the cause are expressed and reinforced (Blumer 1951: 208).
53 Blumer calls this process an ‘enduring collective purpose’ (Blumer 1951: 208)
Other organizational sociologists underlined that the adaption is only one evolutionary possibility among many. SMs need also to react by moderating its aims when a conflict in the close environment arises and it can also become more radical (Jackson and Morgan 1978). It could also reduce the contacts to the outside world (Meyer and Rowan 1983). In fact, few SMs survive for a significant time (Minkoff 1995: ch. 3). Some dissolve because their aims have been achieved. SMs that coordinated only a specific campaign disappear for example when the campaign is over (Zurcher and Curtis 1973). Therefore, SMs can also take the direction towards moderation, radicalization, greater formalization, towards greater contact with the surrounding environment or of ‘implosion’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 151). The following chart summarizes the different stages of SMs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages in the career SMs</th>
<th>Mechanisms for development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social Unrest</td>
<td>Agitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Popular Excitement</td>
<td>Development of Esprit de Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Formalization</td>
<td>Development of Group Morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Institutionalization</td>
<td>Development of Ideology and Tactics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Key Stages in the Development of SMs, adapted from Herbert Bluhmer (1951: 203).

**2.5 THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

Scholars writing from the institutionalization and co-optation perspectives expand our knowledge on the relationship between SMOs and the institutions they try to challenge. This section builds a foundation for the understanding of and demonstrates the possible use of institutionalization and co-optation by SMOs.

---

54 Diani and Donati (1999) analyzed that trends towards institutionalization and professionalization came along with emerging radical grassroots groups in the 1980s.
55 Furthermore, changes in one SMO towards institutionalization can go along with the radicalization of another.
2.5.1 Defining Institutions

The major focus of the literature on institutions and transaction costs has been on institutions as efficient solutions for solving problems of organization in a competitive framework (North 1991: 98). Institutions are important because they are the structure that matters the most in the social realm as they “make up the stuff of social life” (Hodgson 2006: 2) and structure the life by setting rules. As a result, the institutions structure the political, economic and social interaction by informal constrains as sanctions, taboos and formal rules as constitutions, or laws (North 1991: 97). More generally, they “enable ordered thought, expectation and action by imposing form and consistency on human activities” (Hodgson 2006: 2). Institutions bring order and reduce the uncertainty in the exchange between people. Despite the fact that rules imply constraints, they can open possibilities which would not exists otherwise. Therefore, regulation can be seen as an ally of freedom but breaching these rules can also become subject of discourse (Hodgson 2006: 4). However, as Michael Polanyi (1967) argued, rules can never be purely or fully matters of conscious deliberation. In the end, rules are the product of explicit agreement brought by some authority as the state and they imply sanctions by not following them (Hodgson 2006: 5). Concluding, institutions are the outcome of human interactions and aspirations without being designed in every detail by any individual or group.

2.5.2 Framing the Institutionalization of SMOs

Social Movements theorists conceptualize institutions as arenas within which social activity unfolds (Scott 2001: 8). One can speak of being inside or outside an institution. Within institutions, behavior is regulated through rules, norms, and deviations and enacted through symbols, rituals, and ceremonies. The arena can be more or less institutionalized but they usually have rules of order which have to be followed.

56 Otherwise, Ronald Jepperson defines institutionalization as a pattern of “standardized interaction sequences” (1991: 145). Thereafter, an institution is a social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process. When there is a regular fashion repetitively activated, Jepperson refers to a pattern as institutionalized.

57 Now one can ask why people follow these rules. They obey laws not only because of the sanctions but also because legal systems can acquire the force of moral legitimacy and the moral support of others.
Many SMs scholars turn their eyes to the pattern of interaction between SMs and the political system they try to challenge. A trend can be seen in which SMs are increasingly turning into a routine element of normal politics in modern democracies (Meyer 2007). Therefore, Patricia Hipsher (1998: 157) defines institutionalization as:

a process that involves a shift towards more standardized, nonthreatening forms of collective action that entail less mobilization and less disruption. Institutionalization involves greater reliance on negotiations, the electoral process, and working through government institutions and agencies.

Adding, Suh (2011) defines institutionalization of SMs as a process of which they traverse the official terrain of formal politics and engages with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement’s goals. Once the movements are institutionalized, activists of SMs often take posts within the government and work inside the institutions on their goals. They modify their goals in ways that make them attainable through bureaucratic, legislative and judicial procedures. Further, they regularize and moderate their collective action repertoires to persuade or pressure the government to enact policies and laws that reflect the priorities of SMs (Suh 2011: 2).

According to the author, the institutionalization promotes, on the one hand, the formalization of internal structure, on the other hand, the professionalization of the movement’s agents. The first aspect of institutionalization is to broach the issue by the creation of formal structure around groups that formerly have categorized as informal. Thereby, a legal status is needed and a charter upon which norms and rules for the organization’s operations were established (Dowbor 2011: 6). The formalization of the organizational structure and the professionalization of the membership requires organizations to seek stable resources to ensure the viability of their activities. If these resources do not come from the movement’s...
supporters or associates, the organization has to look for funding through other organizations or even the government.\textsuperscript{61} This often leads organizations to compromise on their more radical stances, leading to co-optation by the government or the organization’s financiers (Meyer & Tarrow 1998).\textsuperscript{62}

As previously stated, SMOs can range in their levels of formality. Research suggests that even when organizations begin as informal structures, they often progress towards greater levels of formality. Therefore, SMOs often follow a similar rational progression towards bureaucratic and institutionalized entities and structures.\textsuperscript{63} Institutionalized norms and rules are incorporated to gain increased prospects of survival, stability, legitimacy and resources. Classical theorists argued that the progression towards rationally structured SMOs could lead to conventional institutions co-opting and subverting the initial goals of movements (Selznick 1965 [1949]; Michels (1962 [1911]). More recent scholars dispute that the bureaucratization is an inevitable outcome, pointing out that there are many heterogeneous forms of organization (Jenkins 1977; Rucht 1999; Voss and Sherman 2000).

There is a widespread agreement that in the case SMs are institutionalized, their alternative ideals and goals are getting modified in order to maintain the established institution (Coy & Hedeen 2005; Osterman 2006). The literature often states that the move towards institutionalization and the co-optation leads to the demise of a movement (Tilly 1979; Zald & Ash 1966; Mauss 1975). Coy and Hedeen define the concept of coercive isomorphism\textsuperscript{64} (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) in order to create a process model of co-optation. They define the term as:

\begin{quote}

156). By having a privileged position, bureaucratized professionals tend to close all channels to those who stand outside the establishment of the SM and this are less encouraged to incorporate new themes and tactics. \textsuperscript{61} Therefore, the term ‘funded’ (McCarthy and Zald 1987: 358) or ‘registered social movement organizations’ (McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991: 68) have been used. \textsuperscript{62} Co-optation occurs when SMO leaders associate authorities more than with the constituents of SMs. They themselves then take over the values of the organization and leave the values of the SM behind. Sometimes leaders are paid by authorities to redirect their activities in exchange. \textsuperscript{63} A view, founded on works from Weber and Michel, suggests that movements become progressively rational and institutionalized in order to survive. Thereby, they become more conservative in their ideals. \textsuperscript{64} According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), isomorphism is a process that forces one unit in the population “to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions”. There are two types of it: competitive and institutional.

---

23
[the] influential role of powerful exogenous institutions and resource providers, particularly the state, in fostering or imposing the reproduction of organizational patterns and values that reinforce the status quo (2005: 408).

In this model, the institution invited the challengers into the policy-making discussions, while redefining the challenger’s terms. In the final stage of their model the priorities and goals become routinized into standard processes and even legislative regulation. At this point the challenging movement may itself create an institution to support, maintain and protect the goals they have now. This process is co-optation. Many scholars question the effects this process might have on a movement’s goals and their integrity (Buttry-Watson 2014: 23).

2.5.3 Theorizing the Institutionalization

The Political Process Theory (PPT) in particular, has made propositions concerning the institutionalization of SMs and their relations with political institutions in order to understand their emergence, coalescence and transformation (Tilly & Tarrow 2007; McAdam and Scott 2005).

On the one hand, the emphasis has fallen on the institutionalization of the repertoire of contention, stemming from the analytical focus on extra-institutional channels and the movement’s conditions as an outsider in relation to the consolidated political system. On the other hand, scholarship has made propositions about the institutionalization of SMs. The interpretation of institutionalization developed in both cases, had a dual sense of incorporation of forms of action (protest) and political agents (SMs) into the existing routines of the normal political life. Shortly, the PPT proposed two facets of the institutionalization concept as state-authorized peaceful protests and the transformation of movements into SMOs (Dowbor 2011: 3).

Co-optation due to institutionalization

Studies linking SMs and institutionalization are rooted in structural perspectives and put emphasis on politics and collective mobilization as motor of change and addresses the
relations between activity, collective organization and existing institutional contexts (Schneidberg and Lounsbury 2008: 649).

Tarrow (1994) theorizes that SMs move from an oppositional protest to an increasingly bureaucratic and institutional position, which allows them to negotiate with or become even part of the political establishment. Przeworski (1991) notes that actors of SMs sensibly shift their strategies once the protest has access to the state through institutional means. At this point, the radical collective street action is less beneficial than the inclusion into the established state with its diverse processes. Often activists have to choose whether to ‘participate or perish’ (Przeworski 1991).

*Change within institutions or loosing characteristics*

In the literature on SMs, however, some see institutionalization equal to co-optation. The government as a co-opting body embraces movements in order to sustain its own legitimacy and authority and to anticipate threats to its own stability. Thus, institutionalization is regarded as detrimental to SMs (Piven and Cloward 1977). When a movement is co-opted, it loses its collective identity and solidarity (Castells 1983), its power to provide an alternative to the mainstream politics (Jordan and Maloney 1997), its utopian ideal of changing society and the radical outward thrust of mass politics falters (Piven and Cloward 1997). Also, it loses the disruptive effect if its collective action no longer exists (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Emphasis has been laid on institutionalization of the repertoire of contention and the condition of the movement as an outsider of the political system. The PPT proposed the

65 Several studies showed that institutions are seen as settlements of political struggles over the character of fields fuelled by the mobilization of challengers around competing projects and logics (David and Thompson 1994; Fligstein 2001; McAdam and Scott 2005; Armstrong 2005). These studies describe an image of the process of institutionalization as a sequence or interaction between contestation and mobilization around alternative visions of order and more conventional institutional dynamics (Schneidberg and Lounsbury 2008: 653).

66 Katzenstein (1998) argues that these views see a difference according to the ‘form’ location’ and ‘content’ between movement politics and institutional politics. Thereafter, movement politics are disruptive rather than peaceful, take place in the street rather than in institutions and they seek radical change rather than incremental innovation.
transformation of the movement’s organizations into lobbies or political parties as Tarrow explains:

The pattern of institutionalization is almost everywhere the same: as the excitement of the disruptive phase of a movement dies and the police become more skilled at controlling it, movements institutionalize their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for their supporters through negotiation and compromise—a route that often succeeds at the cost of transforming the movement into a party or interest group (1998: 101).

Tilly & Tarrow explain the process of institutionalization as the “incorporation of performances and political actors into the routine of organized politics” (2007: 216). They describe it as: 1. The institutionalization of the social movements’ action repertoire and 2. The institutionalization of the organizations. Through routinization, both actors, the SMs and the authorities, take recourse to the same legal script determining the way protest can be organized. Thereby, the state begins to respond and interact with the movement’s protest in regulated and institutional ways (Tilly 2004). Meyer and Tarrow (1998) argue that in the process of becoming more institutionalized, SMs are replacing disruptive forms of protest with more conventional forms (rallies, petitions, marches). Disruptive forms are then becoming less conventional.

Scholars as McAdam et al. (2005) argue that ‘non-institutional’ challengers make their way at the end of a protest cycle into the ‘institutional’ politics. With institutionalization, the focus in the political arena becomes on protests, which are the most effective political instrument to the disadvantaged (Meyer & Tarrow 1998: 20). When the state itself is the sponsor, a reduction of protests and contention can be expected followed by a “whittling of grass-root support and a cessation of mobilization” (Dowbor 2011: 6). As organizations gain access to important institutions within the political regime they transform into one form of institutionalized agent such as an interest group, party or union (Meyer & Tarrow 1998). Then they have to establish routines that can assure them participation in negotiations with

67 Repertoire institutionalization refers to the routinization of the forms of collective action characteristic of SMs as rallies or demonstrations.
68 If protest becomes institutionalized, it is questioned whether SMs still have some effective way to stake their claims (Meyer & Tarrow 1998: 26).
69 Castells (1983: 328) argues, that the institutionalization of a movement means that it loses its identity.
70 Koopman (1993) calls the tendency of SMOs at the end of a protest cycle ‘institutional’ forms.
main institutions. These routines imply a transformation into one or another of these institutions. This process is followed by schisms, fragmentation and demobilization (Meyer & Tarrow 1998).

Many scholars associated institutionalization with demobilization, moderation, political co-optation or incorporation (Tarrow 1989; Hipscher 1998, Rucht 1999). Scholars asked if SMs are “losing its power to surprise, to disrupt and to mobilize, and to provide a meaningful and effective alternative form of politics for those without access to more conventional means of influence” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 26). Many other researchers showed that SMs can also produce change working within established institutions (Staggenborg 1988; Katzenstein 1998). Sometimes, institutions even came about as responses to the mobilization of SMs (Goldstone 2004). Tarrow (2011) argues that the institutionalization of protest repertoires does not necessarily lead to demobilization, explaining that the ‘contained movement’ has already institutionalized politics by using strikes as part of their repertoires in the 20th century.

However, the process indicates a loss of specificity as challengers of the political system and a loss of previously-held degrees of contentious power (Tilly 2004: 150). The institutionalization of protest can lead to intensive relations with political parties. Thereby, a certain specialization of the activists is demanded which brings a decrease in broader participation and mobilization capacity (Tarrow 2011). When their repertoire institutionalized, the SMs have danger to lose their characteristics that enabled them to destabilize the political regime.

### 2.5.4 Implications of the Institutionalization

In this thesis it is argued that the institutionalization of SMs does not always entail the risk of a de-radicalization, de-politization or de-mobilization of collective action. Even after their institutionalization they can maintain a balanced conflictive and/or cooperative power-relationship with the state. Conventional politics can complement disruptive tactics but do

---

71 Historically, SMs used their power to disrupt and create uncertainty and as well “gained their power to build constituencies and occasionally influence authorities” (Meyer & Tarrow 1998: 25).
not have to replace them (Pruijt 2003). By taking advantage of institutional opportunities they can produce influential politics responding to the movement goals and can urge the government to be accountable for their implementation (Banaszak 2010, Raeburn 2004).

Institutionalization can also enable SMs to acquire stable platforms and they can channel unrepresented collective interests to politics. Therefore, the institutionalization of movements should not only be related to co-optation. Further, it should not be argued that institutionalization ends a movement’s vitality. The institutionalization of SMs can be understood as one possible outcome of the process of confrontation and collaboration with power holders (Tilly 1994). The relationship between the movement and the state is interactive and not static: the state can disagree or cooperate with the SMs. The SMs can decide whether they cooperate or not (Jenkins 1995).

The institutionalization process can happen in two ways: 1. SMs pressure for institutional recognition allowing them to pursue ‘bottom-up’ demands in state policymaking or 2. in a ‘top-down’ process, the state invites SMs to participate in resolving social problems (Giugni and Passy 1998). The institutionalization process has several implications for SMs.

First, institutionalization requires that a movement’s actors decide to join the state apparatus and that power elites decide to incorporate them and respond positively to their demands (Dryzek 1996; Giugni 1998). Therefore, institutionalization is a consequence of the strategies of both parties: the approach by SMs and the integration policy by the state. When both sides see that they have reconcilable interests or even share interests they can decide to pursue them through the institutionalization process (Suh 2011: 5). Second, the state must have capacity and propensity and would only encourage the institutionalization if it considers it

---

72 Once they entered the formal political arena and established ‘organizational habitats’ within institutions (Katzenstein 1998), activists become ‘institutional activists’ (Santoro and McGuire 1997) or ‘unobtrusive activists’ (Katzenstein 1998).
73 The growing literature on SMs coalitions highlights that they occasionally build coalitions with the state and political parties in order to capitalize on opportunities or to counter threats (VanDyke and McCannon 2010).
74 As the integration of homosexuals in the decision making on how to contain the proliferation of AIDS in Latin America.
75 By nature, the movement institutionalization is a loose, temporary and strategic coupling between the SM and the state (Steam and Almeida 2004).
politically necessary (Tilly 1994; McAdam 1996). Third, to maintain their power while participating in the established system, SMs must keep their organizational identity and autonomy, their original source of collective power (Sandoval et al. 1998).

2.5.5 Radicalization and Orientation Towards Reformist Policy

In sociological theory, radicalism is overly broad defined: “[radicals are] persons who advocate institutional change” (McCormack 1957). Koopmans (1993) argued that radicalism is often determined by the state and how it responds to situations. Cross defined three types of radicalism which can be 1.) referred to the practice of high-risk or extreme activities of movements, 2.) the process during which activists become radicals and 3.) an identity to activists who may or may not already be radicalized (Cross & Snow 2011: 117). In this thesis it will be followed Cross and Snow with their definition of radicalization describing it as SMs who embrace “direct action and high-risk options, often including violence against others, to achieve a stated goal” (Cross & Snow 2011: 118). Thereafter, radical groups see violence as the primary means of social change. Activists in those radical groups violently interact with authorities, especially with ‘social control agents’ such as the police (Cross & Snow 2011: 120). Summarizing, radicalization is defined by external structural factors such as the state and police as well as by internal movement dynamics.

The literature shows different lines in defining the relation between the institutionalization and radicalization.

Tarrow (2011) emphasized increased competition between SMOs as an important mechanism of change. It could lead to institutionalization and turn SMOs towards conventional politics or towards radicalization and sectarianism. As radicalization and institutionalization are contrary processes only the “most inchoate and decentralized

76 SMOs that are politically institutionalized and integrated must cross the boundary between the SM sector and the state (Suh 2011: 6).

77 Della Porta (1995) found in a study of political violence by leftist in Italy and Germany that movement ties lead to increased involvement. Movement ties often lead to friendship ties and become friendship ties which convert into activist ties. Thereby radical activists develop a collective identity reinforcing movement values in the end binding radical activists more firmly to the goals and tactics of SMs. (Cross & Snow 2011: 120).

78 Activists explain that formality and established hierarchies can inhibit potentially illegal behavior (Cross & Snow 2011: 118).
movement organizations engage in both simultaneously” (Tarrow 2011: 208). When moderate leaders institutionalize their tactics to retain mass support, radicals may employ confrontational tactics to gain support of the militants. Therefore, radicalization can be seen as a common outcome of competition: “a shift in ideological commitments towards the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention” (Tarrow 2011: 207).

However, radicalization and institutionalization can occur at the same time and can be mutually constitutive (Meyer 1993). Both cases contribute to the decline of protest. Some people possibly are more satisfied with reforms or scare street violence. State authorities can react to some SMOs with concessions and co-optation while they can marginalize and repress others having more radical demands (Koopmans 2004: 29). Such dividing strategies of authorities may lead to different strategies within movements. Some disintegrate into institutionalized moderates and others, often marginalized, towards sectarian radicals (Koopmans 2004: 29). Resulting, both external strategies lead to changes of the internal processes of SMOs.

Often discussions about the form of protest, whether violent or not, is in the focus of SMOs and leads to the competition between radicals and moderates. Competition may arise from ideological conflicts, from competition for space in a static organization or from personal conflicts for power between leaders. Koopmans states that “if the regime offers few channels of access, responds by repression and is unwilling to reform, radicalization will be the dominant outcome” (2004: 29). It can also develop due to a lack of coordination. Therefore, the political agenda of SMOs will be differentiated in this thesis between radicalization and between an orientation towards reformist policy:

---

79 Jai Kwan Jung (2010) analysed that the ‘new social movement’ cycle was marked by a combination of violence and institutionalization.

80 Increased access and government concessions often accompanies radicalization. When activists are pushed into extreme forms of actions by competition, repression and frustrations, others will seek accommodation with elites and electoral advantages and by doing so, they moderate their goals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Radicalization</td>
<td>• radical demands such as abolishing capitalism&lt;br&gt;• often unruly methods&lt;br&gt;• less cooperation with state authorities (e.g. police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Orientation towards reformist policy</td>
<td>• specific and limited goals&lt;br&gt;• more moderate stance and legal approach&lt;br&gt;• more cooperation with state authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Factors for the Determination of SMOs Political Agenda, illustration by the author.

2.5.6 Factors of the Institutionalization

The following part operationalizes the factors determining the institutionalization of SMOs by building categories out of the conducted interviews. Analysts identified durable patterns of resource inequality of SMOs (Shanahan and Tuma 1994; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). The relationship between SMOs and institutions are seen as an “analysis of power and conflict relations” and will be focused in the following (Edward and McCarthy 2004: 125).81

Generally, SMOs have either tangible or intangible resources available. External resources are tangible resources like money, space and public relations campaigns of SMs (Factor 1: External Resources). Money is interchangeable and can buy space and publicize movement ideas but not vice versa. People are the primary intangible resource of SMs, which heavily rely on human capital. SMs are generally low on tangible resources with only an erratic flow of money but they are strong on human resources.82 Material resources are comprised by financial and physical capital such as monetary resources, property, office space, equipment and supplies. Money is the focus for SMOs, as they must pay their bills with those

81 Pierre Bourdieu theorized three forms of capital (economic, cultural and social). Edward and McCarthy (2004) differentiate between moral, cultural, social-organizational, human and material resources. For both, moral resources include legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support and celebrity and tend to originate outside of SMs or SMOs. They are bestowed by an external resource knowing to possess them and retracted through public acts of disavowal or backstage by spreading the world.

82 However, not all people can contribute the same to a social movement but most activities involve their deployment.
Material resources, particularly money, are more tangible than other types of resources (Edward and McCarthy 2004: 127).

Money is the most tangible resource depending on its daily international currency exchange but it can be converted into other resources. SMOs with tangible resources can enjoy greater flexibility in the range of strategies and tactics available to them. Money can easily be converted into other resources through equipment, staff, founding of organizations, organizing events and in the production of certain cultural resources (ibid.: 129). Money and human labor are proprietary, whereas cultural resources are not proprietary and are not in the public domain, negatively affecting SMs’ effort to gain access to and utilize them (ibid.: 130).

SMOs need funding and have different possibilities for securing it, including aggregation from constituents, self-production, appropriation, co-optation and patronage. SMs can aggregate private resources from beneficiaries and conscious constituents. Cultural resources in a movement can be aggregated by organizing conferences where activists can share information, discuss strategies or conduct training (ibid.: 134). External patronage appears when external actors provide SMOs financial support, but have some degree of proprietary control over it. This refers to government contracts, foundation grants and large private donators. Patronage could also be human resources and is common when coalitions of SMOs organize large events together (ibid.: 134). Often, SMOs receive their resources from a combination of internal and external resources.

The mobilization of money and technologies depends upon social movement activists asking citizens or those in charge of other organizations for financial contributions. Technologies for mobilizing money can be distinguished between ‘narrowcast’ (only a few deep pockets of money are targeted) and ‘broadcast’ (widely shallow pockets) (ibid.: 138). SMOs can receive significant annual donations from large financial supporters as foundations or

---

83 For most SMOs, often a 501(c)3 status is necessary to receive certain kinds of funding (Bell et al 2006). The status means that a nonprofit organization has been approved by the Internal Revenue Service as a tax-exempt, charitable organization. Under charitable religious, educational, scientific, literary or other organizations are understood. More information about the status can be read under following URL: https://www.501c3.org/what-is-a-501c3, last called 6.3.2015.
wealthy philanthropists and also from direct mail strategies by asking for money from many adherents (Edward and McCarthy 2004: 138). Once a SMO has a large budget it will incur serious organizational costs and therefore disincentives for changing. SMOs having extensive financial help at their founding by patrons (ibid.: 139).

Thereafter, the external resources will be shortly described as following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. External Resources:</td>
<td>• Grants from either foundations, big donors or grassroots donations from adherents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances and Space</td>
<td>• Access to public resources as spaces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: External Resources. Source: illustration by the author.

*Internal resources* as cultural resources - tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks such as organizing protest events, running a meeting, forming the organization, initiating a festival or knowing how to use social media (*Factor 2: Internal Resources*). It includes tactical repertoires, organizational templates or technical or strategic know-how. Not every group member can have this kind of knowledge but it can be helpful to facilitate movement activities even though cultural resources are widely available. Tactical repertoire depends on individual experiences and products like know-how about recruitment help SMs to better prepare collective action (ibid.: 126).

Endogenous factors are important to consider, as organizational attributes also facilitate the movement’s institutionalization (Giugni and Passy 1998). Movements with professional or specialized knowledge that the state needs are more likely to act within this political arena. SMs with formal, professional, centralized and bureaucratic structures can easier institutionalize. Once these SMs are institutionalized, they are adept at generating consensus on what demands they should present and at reaching political compromise (Gamson 1990).

---

84 Often, SMO leaders and their cadre write their own grant proposals to foundations for support, larger SMOs outsource that.
85 After SMOs are formed they make strategic choices about their goals, structure and forms of collective actions as about the organizational form and mobilizing technologies. That choice can have direct implications for the ability of SMOs to build organizational capacity.
Formal and centralized structures do not necessarily result in an organizational oligarchy and often even help the organization to survive (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988). SMs create cultural products like collective-action frames, tactical repertoires, music, literature and organizational templates and thereby self-produce resources. SMOs also co-opt resources by borrowing them from other groups who aggregated them. The *internal resources* can be summarized as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. Internal Resources: Professionalization of the SMO | • Paid staff  
• Membership fees  
• Behavior regulation through rules, norms and deviations  
• Bureaucratic processes and structures  
• Services and educational opportunities for members  
• Hierarchical structure  
• No personal relations anymore (as friendships)  
• Tactical repertoire  
• Know how |

Figure 5: Internal Resources. Source: illustration by the author.

The institutionalization of protest leads to intensive relations with external players and SMOs are working within institutions (Factor 3: *External networks*), meaning that they interact with external institutions. Otherwise, the SMO is working from the outside arena. Within institutions the behavior is regulated through rules, norms and deviations. Also, SMOs have built up different cooperation with other progressive groups working on same issues. The SMO works closely in cooperation with local politicians. Furthermore, the SMO has contact to lawyers, works in the court, or has the capacity to advise tenants with legal problems in the housing field.
Concluding, the *external networks* of the SMOs can be summarized as following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **3. External Networks:** Interaction with external Players and Institutions | • law clinics  
• cooperation with political parties  
• cooperation with local politicians  
• cooperation with other SMOs  
• work within Institutions  
• work with think tanks and researchers |

Figure 6: External Networks. Source: illustration by the author.

External factors are important for SMOs to institutionalize. For the institutionalization of SMOs, domestic structural conditions must allow SMOs to incorporate their demands into policy alternatives and to promote them in the political process (Tilly 1994; Tarrow 1998). The capacity and inclination of the state to engage with SMs determines whether the SMs become institutionalized or not. The structure of political opportunities is important as it prescribes the possible strategies for SMs and their gains (Ferree and Mueller 2004). As the political opportunity structure expands, the chances for the institutionalization of the SM increases. The relationship between the political opportunity structure and the SM is mutually dependent or supportive (Suh 2011: 8).

Political forces receive pressure to pursue political reforms by institutionalized or not institutionalized movements. Institutionalization expands the political clout as political collaboration among reformist political groups consolidates and enhances power, repertoires and legitimacy. Thereby, the SMs can better pursue their political objectives (Tarrow 1998). The political opportunity structure depends on the nature of the state and the character of political parties.86 The institutionalization of SMs is more likely under a democratic, 

---

86 For the institutionalization of movements an open state and democratic parties are needed (Hipsher 1998). The character of the state and the status of reformist forces within the state influence the prospects and procedures for the institutionalization (Giugni and Passy 1998). ‘Overdeveloped’ states responding to challengers by excluding them are less conducive to the institutionalization than weak or more inclusive states. Strong states (centralized power structure and institutions for administrative management are more effective at policy formulation and implementation. In these states SMs can win concessions from the state and achieve their goals (Kitchelt 1986). Strong states do not rely on the assistance of other institutions or groups (SMOs) than weak states as they consider them as not trustworthy and legitimate allies or representatives of the popular opinion.
decentralized state structure where local governments, courts and the ruling party have a relative autonomy. These institutions are also ‘entry points’ for SMs providing opportunities to build coalitions with state actors (Stearns and Almeida 2004).

For SMOs to forge successful policy-oriented alliances they must be integrated into a political system where reformist political forces already enjoy legitimacy and influence through a moderate success in elections (Sandoval et al. 1998). Institutionalization is also more viable when SMs have the ability to form alliances with influential progressive groups and with political parties having similar agendas and strategies.87

In summary, the institutionalization of protest organizations can have a demobilizing effect and can support the transformation of organizations into political players with access to the state. All of the described factors explain the Institutionalization of different SMOs. In this thesis these institutionalization factors are tested with the analyzed SMOs and compared:

87 Almeida (2010) calls that ‘social movement partyism’ which gives more opportunities for SMs to institutionalize and which can increase also impacts on policy outcomes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. External Resources: Finances and Space</strong></td>
<td>• grants from either foundations, big donors or grassroots donations from adherents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• access to public resources as spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Internal Resources: Professionalization of the SMO</strong></td>
<td>• paid staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• membership fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• behavior regulation through rules, norms and deviations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• bureaucratic processes and structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• services and educational opportunities for members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• hierarchical structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• no personal relations anymore (as friendships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• tactical repertoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• know how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. External Networks: Interaction with external Players and Institutions</strong></td>
<td>• law clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cooperation with political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cooperation with local politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cooperation with other SMOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• work within institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• work with think tanks and researchers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Factors of Institutionalization, illustration by the author.

### 2.6 Summarizing the Theory

In the preceding pages it has been analyzed what Social Movements (SMs) are, how Urban Social Movements (USMs) differentiate from SMs, and how Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) work, how they emerge and develop and become increasingly institutionalized. This kind of study is particularly important as it attempts to explain not only how and why SMOs emerge but also illuminates this by comparing different SMOs working in New York City. It also provides an analysis of the way institutionalization influences the political agenda of SMOs. The growing body of literature on SMOs focuses disproportionally on large, national organizations (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). This thesis seeks to expand the knowledge on how small and medium, locally founded SMOs in New York City, organize their strategic discussions concerning organizational structure, strategic moves and their use of networks.
One the one hand, the literature regards the institutionalization of SMs as means of access to the state. On the other hand, it regards their institutionalization as detrimental to co-optation. Becoming more bureaucratic allows the movements to negotiate or even become part of the political establishment. Thereby, tactics and attempts become institutionalized in order to benefit although compromises and negotiations with authorities are needed. Thereafter, the state interacts in regulated and institutional ways. At that point, a danger is seen as the movements could replace their protest forms with conventional ones. In the end, this could lead to fragmentation and demobilization of the movement.

The next chapter presents the methods used for analyzing the internal resources, external resources and external networks of SMOs in NYC.
3 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

The following section explains the method used to answer the research question and to test and analyze the hypothesis. Furthermore, it outlines the background of the used data sources.

3.1 RESEARCH METHODS

Between the two common methods of social science research, I chose the qualitative design for this research. There are two types of methods of research which are used in the collection of data: quantitative and qualitative methods (Ghauri et al. 1995). On the one hand, the quantitative method consists of data quantified through the help of mathematics and statistics (Bryman and Bell 2007). Data is collected and empirically tested to see if a relationship can be found and conclusions be drawn. Therefore, the quantitative methods are related to numerical interpretation. On the other hand, qualitative methods often refer to case studies where the data comes from a few studying objects (Bryman and Bell 2007). These methods allow to better understand, interpret and observe in natural settings and has a closeness to data with a sort of insider view (Ghauri et al 1995). The type of research approach to select depends on the kind of study. However, the qualitative method takes ‘the whole picture’ in the focus which the quantified method cannot do. Therefore, for my research a qualitative approach is more suitable in order to fulfill the purpose of this research, since this thesis is researching the institutionalization of SMOs in New York City. Analyzing the institutionalization is difficult to measure in a quantitative way as ideas, therefore internal organizational processes and opinions about the political system are needed to be operationalized. By using the qualitative method, it is possible to understand the institutionalization and their approach, whether radical or reform demanding, of each SMO.

3.2 METHODOLOGY: DATA SOURCES

The main method I employed was semi-structured interviews as qualitative methodology is commonly employed in organizational research (Wood 2012). Interviews lead to greater depth of understanding in comparison to other techniques as they allow a better engagement
of complexities occurring in a specific environment (Gillham 2003). The reason for choosing the semi-structured interview technique is due to the aim to encourage the interviewees to freely discuss their own opinion and their beliefs on their personal SMO. This method allows the adjusting of questions depending on the particular situation of the SMO. However, a semi-structured interview is neither a free conversation nor a highly structured questionnaire (Wood 2012). Instead, a semi-structured interview allows for changes in the order of questions and gives respondents the ability to expand upon their ideas and speak in greater detail about their particular SMO and their own experiences, rather than relying on questions determined in advance. Therefore, semi-structured interviews are more flexible and less standardized in comparison to structured interviews or surveys (see annex for the Interview Questions). One problem is that semi-structured interviews are rather organized to a completely organic conversation. Another problem that can occur is misunderstandings and misinterpretation of words. This could be a problem within the research, especially because the interviews were conducted in English, which is not the author’s mother tongue.

This thesis builds on field research conducted in New York City between January and April 2015. I completed 16 interviews and 11 interviews have been selected for my comparison. It has been tried to work out a balanced sample of different kind of organizational form of SMOs. Therefore, necessarily the other 5 interviews were excluded from the research. I found my interview partners after intensive internet-based research of interesting SMOs. I gained access to my interview partners by sending out emails by describing my research interest. The interviews were conducted with the partners who responded positive to my interview request. I have to assume here, that the reasons for not responding are unrelated to my research topic. After my first interviews were taken often I received references for other interview partners.

88 Other techniques dominating the various date collection in the qualitative data sector are for example observations, fieldwork visits or document analysis.
89 Semi-structured interviews use indirect questions to receive answers needed for the research without giving a feeling for the interview partner being compromised.
The sampling procedure was based on specific criterion. I intended to identify different organizations having a variety of institutional and organizational arrangements and of urban protest and movement. The selection of the interviewees was directly engaged within the organizations; often head and leading-figures of groups or other representatives were interviewed. The interview questions were guided by preliminary review of literature about SMs, USMs and SMOs. In order to increase the reliability of the answers, all interviews have been recorded with a Smartphone, which the interviewees approved for use in their interviews. Subsequently, the interviews have been transcribed by using the software MAXQDA. They lasted between 40 minutes and 2 hours, with the average length of 1 hour. The questions refer to organizational structure, size and type of membership, resources, activities and links to other groups.90 One interview was conducted in a group with two interview partners (CSS interview)91. Most interviews were held at the office of the organizations, one was captured at the place I lived (NWB interview) and the others were conducted at Rosa-Luxemburg Stiftung – New York Office. All interviews were conducted in a comfortable and open environment for the person interviewed. Each interview was held under similar conditions. My interview partners came from different organizational and contextual settings and do represent the range of SMOs working at New York City. Before my interviews, I clearly explained the procedures already in the email correspondence and again at the interview meeting. I proposed the location of the interview and offered alternatives in the case my interview partner was not satisfied with my first suggestion. I received permission from all my interview partners to use the interview for research purposes.

The reason for choosing New York City as location for my research is that the city is a valuable location for this kind of investigation for two reasons. First, the city is a good example for the growth of great centers in which enormous changes to social life occur. As Saskia Sassen (1991) has shown, a new type of ‘global cities’ like NYC have emerged, that reconfirms the central role of ‘relocation’ by globalization in metropolitan cities. The cultural

90 The interview questions can be viewed in the annex of this thesis.
91 The Abbreviation stands for each interviewed SMO.
repercussions of these processes of gentrification and relocation lead to the creation of new diasporas and the increasing presence of tourists and also of homeless people. Urban spaces and urban cultural representation have fundamentally been restructured and modified (Sassen 1991). This process of change has important political consequences which SMOs are trying to tackle.

Second, during my stay in Brooklyn, I could not only conduct interviews, but also participate in events and demonstrations organized by interviewed leaders of SMOs. The direct participation in activities as meetings and rallies gave me some better understanding about how these SMOs work and about the problems these SMOs are facing. Still, that fact did not affect my design of the semi-structured questionnaire. Prior to the starting point of my research, I was in contact with several organizers, which created a level of trust that made the request to pursue the organizations as a research object easier.

The sampling procedure was based on specific criterion. The interviewees selected were directly engaged in the organizations, often head and leading-figures of groups or other representatives. While it is not possible to know the impact of my participation in the events of some of the SMOs on the interviewees, my participation does not appear to have dissuaded my interview partners from speaking freely about their organizations. Most did not know my engagement in some of the SMOs, but a few acknowledged my participation in their organization, and invited me to their meetings and events, and spoke with greater excitement about the history and trajectory of their own organization.

After capturing the interviews, I started to build codes out of existing theories and my interviews. After I coded the interviews with MAXQDA, I could compare the different SMOs to one another. I began to form theoretical connections between categories that I developed during initial coding as the external resources, internal resources and external network.92 The question, whether large and well-resourced groups engage in moderate activities rather

92 See MAXQDA file on the attached disc for a complete list of codes.
than demonstrative protests can be answered by differentiating the groups into these three categories.

3.3 HYPOTHESES

This study takes an approach to critically understand the institutionalization of SMOs. Hypotheses were built by the literature review from section two and by the taken interviews. My first hypothesis is that the degree of the institutionalization of SMOs informs to a great extent the formulation of goals and aims, as well as the stance towards a reform directed policy. Clemens and Minkoff (2004), and Clemens and Cook (1999) stated that institutionalization is a better indicator of stability than of change and can also explain their political agenda, which results from sustainable funding. This suggests my second hypothesis, namely that the degree of institutionalization of an urban SMO substantially influences its stance towards a reform oriented policy. The funding some organizations receive from big foundations can impact the political views of the organizations. This suggests hypothesis three, namely that the source of funding can influence an organization’s political agenda.

In this thesis the method of comparative case study is employed. Comparative case studies involve the analysis of similarities, differences and patterns across cases that share a common focus or goal. The researched SMOs work in the same domain and the same cause (fighting gentrification, protecting and promoting affordable housing, better terms for relations between tenant and landlord, etc.). They are different from each other mainly in the form of organization. Therefore, by comparing these SMOs to each other in this thesis, variables have been defined to better compare them.

3.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SPECTRUM OF GROUPS

In the existing literature on SMOs it has been stressed that SMOs are comprised of a large number of groups which vary considerably in many dimensions. This is confirmed by the spectrum of groups in the research as a large variety in terms of size, structure, ideology, thematic areas and forms of activity are presented.
The interviews include smaller, medium to large and larger organizations which, however, represent quite different structural types. In this paper the groups are divided into three different types of organizations: first, *issue-concerned groups*, second, *neighborhood groups*, third, *umbrella organizations*. The Right to the City Alliance (RTCA) is a formal organization based on membership and has branches at local, state and national levels. Urban Home Assistance Board (UHAB) and Community Service Society (CSS) resemble the hierarchical and well-organized corporations to be found mostly in the American economy. The offices play a key role as these organizations have no local groups but a large number or regular and irregular donors who support the activities of these SMOs. For CSS, money is the key resource rather than activist and volunteer work.

### 3.5 Group Members and Resources

One indicator of the strength of organizations is the size of their membership. When examining the members of a given organization, one can distinguish between different classes of groups based on their membership. Large organizations, the author defines as those with more than 250 members, medium-sized organizations with more than 100 members, SMOs up to 100 members as small and SMOs with 10 members or less as very small.

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) has emphasized the importance of money as a transferable and convertible asset of SMOs. SMOs need money they receive through funding from constituents, co-optation and patronage or through private funding from beneficiary and conscience constituents. SMOs receive, most from a combination of internal and external resources, as stated before. Material resources are comprised by financial and physical capital as monetary resources, property, office space, equipment and supplies. As money is highly important for SMOs it has been in the focus as all bills are paid with that resources. Material resources are more tangible as well as money is more tangible than other resource types (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 127). Money can easily be converted into other resources through equipment, staff, founding of organizations, organizing events and in the production of

---

93 McCarthy and Zald (1977) explain three different organizational resources: infrastructures, social networks and organizations. Infrastructures are public goods like postal service, sanitation or roads, sidewalks and traffic lights and therefore are non-proprietary social resources.
certain cultural resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 129). Money and human labor are proprietary whereas cultural resources are not resources which are proprietary or in the public domain affect SMs effort to gain access to it and utilize it (ibid.: 130).

However, as several groups keep their budget confidential, information on finances has not always been given by the interview partners. A third relevant aspect of organizational resources is paid staff. The increase in staff numbers is usually accompanied by an increase in professionalization and division of labor. These processes may also affect the number and role of volunteers, as having paid staff improves the chances of installing this professionalization and division of labor on a permanent basis.
4. EMPIRICAL WORK

The following part of the thesis will first explain the situation of SMOs in New York briefly and will then present the researched SMOs. Before each type of group of SMO will be analyzed, the characteristics of the group will be presented. In the end, the groups will be compared by using the presented factors of institutionalization and the political agenda explained in chapter two. However, the different SMOs will be divided in three group it has to be stressed that they all belong to a protest movement and cannot be seen as hegemonic political parties.

4.1 BACKGROUND TO SMOs IN NYC

There is a folkloric explanation of the strategy of the tenant movement in NYC stating “The landlords have the money, but we have the numbers”. SMOs in NYC are interest groups defined by a set of government policies that benefit tenants. Through those SMOs, one of the city’s fundamental political-economic conflicts engages the state. They are defined by its members shared belief that tenant rights and affordable housing are essential for a just city. In this organizational field, many professionalized SMOs interact under the influence of similar pressures.

---

94 In this understanding, tenant power is not on direct action but in political action, trading votes to elected representatives for favourable legislation.
95 For better understanding in which surrounding USMs in New York City work expert interviews have been held with Thomas Angiotti (CUNY), Tom Waters and Victor Bach (CSS) and John Krinsky (City College of New York City). In the interviews the history and present situation of the SMOs in New York City is described. The interviews can be found in the annex of this thesis.
96 Concerning the US state one has to admit that it is a democratic state. There are different types of democracies. Liphart (1999) distinct between majoritarian and consensus democracies. Majoritarian democracies concentrate power whereas consensus democracies divide it. The US is a majoritarian electoral system and has a two-party system with a single party government, executive dominance and interest group pluralism. Furthermore, the American presidential system divides power between the President and the Congress. The Congress is divided into two equally powerful chambers and power is even more divided by the federalist division of power between the federal government and the state governments. As there are only two parties in this majoritarian system it is very difficult to successfully create new parties. Therefore, challengers try to introduce their demands into the program of one of the existing parties (Kriesi 2015: 4).
Ronald Lawson (1986) presents in his book “The Tenant Movement in New York City, 1904-1984” different SMOs in New York City. These have always had a complex organizational structure in which tenant associations at the building level are linked into multiple wider organizations at the city, state and federal levels. In the final chapter of the book, Lawson describes the state of affairs of NYC in 1984 by presenting three major citywide groups: the Association for Neighborhood Housing and Development, Metropolitan Council on Housing (which will also be presented in the comparative case study), and the New York State Tenant & Neighborhood Coalition – and a large number of neighborhood groups, with groups from the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens rising in importance. The situation many groups in 1984 faced did not change in 2015 from before (Interview CSS 2015). Some of the mentioned groups changed their name but still play a central role. Some SMOs still challenge their leadership. The left and neighborhood groups out of Manhattan below 96th street are still a rising force but also continue to look for a strategic leadership from citywide groups. Even in 2015, this picture still holds to a large extent. In other respects, the picture changed significantly between 1997 and 2015 as old citywide groups have less control over the housing movement as a whole. Many neighborhood groups want to shape citywide campaigns and not just lend their support (Interview CSS 2015).

The scientist Thomas Angotti knows many SMOs in NYC and the housing situation well. Angotti sees the current urban movements critical. He values the community organizing by explaining that SMOs in NYC are often ‘only neighborhood based’:

And this is where we miss the old left and we miss the institutions of the past and the mass movements and the civil rights movements and the parties that were able to integrate people's understanding and were able to operate in more than one neighborhood so the fight back occurs at a neighborhood level and every neighborhood battle tends to be isolated from the others (Interview Angotti 2015)


98 Thomas Angotti is Professor of Urban Affairs and Planning at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York and Director of the Hunter College Center for Community Planning & Development.
Furthermore, Angotti argues that most groups nowadays are less radical and more professionalized than they were in the 1970s and 80s as most groups became closer to politicians and received money from foundations:

You have young professionals who believe that they have to be more moderate in order to preserve their funding and preserve their status and legitimacy. It's self-destruction because ultimately it makes them more irrelevant (Interview Angotti 2015).

The only option Angotti views, is to reject new deals with elected officials as ‘the public’ is not able to do this in the ‘neoliberal period’ (Interview Angotti 2015):

So the government leaders, the elected officials are all about negotiating deals. They are trying to get something to make local neighborhood people happy. Ok we'll give you a little park or yeah maybe paid by the public or maybe paid by the developer. [...] So the most radical community organizers are those who refuse that watching in the same. We are not here to negotiate a deal because this is not going to happen. (Interview Angotti 2015).

Angotti stresses in the interview that the institutionalization of SMOs can be seen as detrimental. He pledges to have a movement that rallies against private property, which, according to him, is the fundamental problem (Interview Angotti 2015). According to Angotti, the inclination to defend private property is deep in the US-society. He argues that more moderate SMOs have problems to organize people:

So one of the things that's a sign of how much we need to do is when you have projects like Blackstone where you have big investment capital coming in you hear people say, and these are especially city officials, elected officials and the more moderated community activist they say, well the development is going to happen anyway. It's going to happen so what we need to do is get something for ourselves (Interview Angotti 2015).

In order to show evidence of the mentioned arguments about SMOs in NYC, in the following the Comparative Case Study will present the current situation of SMOs working in NYC and proofs statements from Angotti, Lawson, Waters and Bach. The Comparative Case Study based on data from interviews taken in 2015.
4.2 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: SMOs IN NEW YORK CITY

The literature about SMs and SMOs is interested in the factors determining the influence of the institutionalization process upon SMOs. This comparative case study seeks to advance such knowledge. The aim here is to understand the relationship of the institutionalization and the political agenda of SMOs in New York City.

4.2.1 Issue-concerned Groups

*Issue-concerned group* organize around specific issues, often local in an affected building or block, less often city wide. Issues these groups protest against are often driven by a specific change in housing policies or developments in the housing market. The tenants cannot leave these buildings since the neighborhood has been gentrified in the last couple of years. Usually these groups are consisting of affected tenants joined by supporters (Vollmer 2015).

*Issue-concerned* groups are a new kind of tenant protest with bottom up participation of the affected tenants. Their professionalization and formalization is often not too strong and bureaucratic structures are not that established. Therefore, these groups tend to have a flat hierarchy even though some groups have elected leaderships that try to be inclusionary. Members of these groups are often friends or have other personal relations to each other. However, these groups foster a relatively open environment for newcomers, seeking to integrate these new members into group life and forge a collective identity (Vollmer 2015).

Often these groups are dynamic and receive the most public attention and solidarity. Usually, these groups start with an organization process in an affected building or an affected neighborhood. Landlords in these areas tell their residents their rents are increasing. Often the displacement or discussions about the increase in a hallway about grievances are the starting points for coming together. By knocking on doors and first meeting the neighbors to get to know each other and analyze the situation collectively. Identifying the cause for their situation is the first challenge since often the information by landlords is sparse. The social

---

99 In the following the different SMOs will be categorized into three different types firstly presented by Vollmer (2015) and explained in the section before. With these three categories it is easier to compare the SMOs and see patterns which occur in certain types of SMOs.
character of the groups remains an important factor during the process of building up the organization. During that process the groups stay relatively diverse in their membership according to class, race, age. Rather, the group focuses on social issues and on political or identity questions. The majority of the active participants in these groups are women. A reason for this might be that women often still feel responsible for their homes and also are perceived to be the more sociable gender. Social events like neighborhood picnics or other meetings are important for the vital performance of the groups creating a sense of community (Vollmer 2015).

Knowledge exchange and mutual teaching about housing policies and possible direct action are important forms of practices within the group and with support from the outside. Sometimes groups create their knowledge even by doing their own research, often in cooperation with academics. Also, the groups meet with local politicians to gain political support. However, these issue-concerned groups are aware of the threat of being instrumentalized by parties and contained into dominant discourses. Some groups also disrupt participatory meetings, of local governments leaving them collectively or claim more participation (Vollmer 2015).

In the meetings with landlords, tenants of these groups try to negotiate compromises and often receive support by tenant unions and supporting lawyers. Some groups also organize sit-ins or personalized press campaigns against landlords. Squatting is not a usual tactic but some groups do consider this practice. Groups often favor public attention because policy changes are identified as main cause of a lot of grievances. Demonstrations and rallies are used to mobilize supports and the media. The authentic local voice of residents remains very important for the media coverage and for drawing solidarity as well as people can easily relate to their grievances. A broad political understanding of their own practice needs to be established for the groups (Vollmer 2015).

**Crown Heights Tenant Union (CHTU)**

The Crown Heights Tenant Union (CHTU) is a Union of Tenant Associations that started to work in 2013 in order to fight against gentrification, displacement and illegal rental
overcharges in the neighborhood of Crown Heights in Brooklyn.\textsuperscript{100} CHTU is trying to bring old and new residents together and thereby is trying to go beyond simplified notions of gentrification that blame new comers for the process induced by profit interest of developers and urban politics (Interview CHTU 2015).\textsuperscript{101} There are now 40 buildings organized by CHTU. Together they seek to secure tenant rights and to use a ‘collective bargaining strategy’ (Interview CHTU 2015). However, CHTU has a range of tactics “standing from traditional picket it or rally a soft direct action” as office picket. Within CHTU there is also a discussion about rent strikes and other escalating methods as ‘economic actions’. CHTU identified a cycle “in which low paying tenants are pushed out, and newer tenants are charged rent far higher than the legally regulated limit” (Interview CHTU 2015). CHTU receives financial support from the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) for workshops but CHTU itself has no paid workers.\textsuperscript{102} As a main goal, CHTU demands a 5 year rent freeze and a re-regulation of apartments which have been de-regulated. Furthermore, tenants should have the power over repairs and renovations, decide when they are done, and should have the opportunity to have tenant associations in buildings (Interview CHTU 2015). Rent should not rise, even after renovations. The tenants should in the end have control of the building (Interview CHTU 2015).

Generally, CHTU has no \textit{external resources}. Also, the SMO has not professionalized and therefore has no \textit{internal resources} yet as there are no membership fees or paid staff, however, the hierarchical structure is still developing. Also, the SMO is increasingly opening up to new members and therefore, most relationships are not personal anymore. Within CHTU there are different positions regarding the work with politicians as some do support this strategy and some are not willing to work with them which is regarded as a ‘good

\textsuperscript{100} A lot of the founding members were involved at Occupy Wall Street and came all from the same neighborhood and decided to start CHTU and followed in the beginning an autonomous concept by the model of Occupy Wall Street but now regards itself as a ‘demand based organization’.  
\textsuperscript{101} CHTU has a clear political agenda, the so-called ‘Unite and fight’ strategy in which the landlords are seen as the ‘true target’.  
\textsuperscript{102} UHAB has paid staff (Cea Weaver, Jessica Wolf and Jorge Flecha) doing internal organizing work and especially provide technical assistance for CHTU. Thereby, bureaucratic work grows. CHTU faces the development of different political factions which is regarded as a ‘healthy development’ (Interview CHTU 2015).
balance’. CHTU organizes demonstrations and organizes so-called ‘court solidarity’. Therefore, it has developed external networks (Interview CHTU 2015). A new team within the tenant union reinforces that solidarity by providing free services to members when they need to go to the housing court as they get evicted or have a process against their landlord. This team works on understanding “what happens in courts and to build up the capacity around members” (Interview CHTU 2015). The members of this court solidarity committee joins tenants into the court and provide various advice on what the lawyers say in order to fulfill the tenant wishes. Concluding, CHTU is working on reforming policy but at the same time is very active in educating tenants. The group does not have its own funding but receives support through UHAB by helping to organize. The group has contact to politicians but is still figuring out how intense these contacts should be developed.

**Brooklyn Solidarity Network (BSN)**

The Brooklyn Solidarity Network (BSN) was founded in 2014 and is a group that tries to build a “culture of resistance against landlords and bosses in Brooklyn” (Interview BSN 2015). The group believes that the needs of the working people in Brooklyn are antagonistic to the priorities of landlords, bosses and politicians and wants to liberate every citizen from state and private ownership (Interview BSN 2015).

Generally, BSN does not have any financial resources and therefore no external resources. The only resource the group has is their own work, as was said in the interview. As the group identifies as an anarchist group there are no internal resources developed. The group follows an anti-hierarchy concept and has no leaders. The group uses legal methods in their fight but describes themselves as anarchists and anti-capitalists supporting revolution and desires to build a culture of resistance against capitalist oppression. Community members should confront capitalists and ‘abolish the system’. Therefore, the group wants to confront

103 The group states: “We exist to demonstrate working anarchism in Brooklyn, and we will not stop organizing until we have achieved a Brooklyn in which every resident is liberated from state and private ownership of their lives”. See the ‘about’ part of the website under: brooklynsolidarity.org, last called 09.09.2015.

104 See the ‘mission’ part of the Website under: brooklynsolidarity.org, last called 09.09.2015.
landlords directly using a solidarity network model which is also used in Seattle to confront landlords.\(^{105}\)

The SMO does not work together with any other SMO in NYC and therefore has no *external networks*. Consequently, the group explicitly referring to themselves as anarchists, who support revolution, has no stance towards a reform policy. Negotiations with landlords are not the focus as landlords are seen as antagonistic to the working class. The group is keen to use so-called ‘escalating campaigns’ including phone blasts, picketing and disrupting business. Therefore, the group is not reform policy oriented.

*NORTH WEST BUSHWICK COMMUNITY GROUP (NWB)*

The North West Bushwick Community Group (NWB), established in 2013, is a group working in Bushwick, Brooklyn with the aim to address local concerns and meet Community needs.\(^{106}\) NWB tries to work as an advocate for policy against private capital, which increasingly seeks to purchase buildings in Bushwick. The group leader states that they “look to facilitate the Communities” organizational and action oriented goals seeking a Community Land Trust in Bushwick. The group has no funding and members also do not donate (Interview NWB 2015).\(^{107}\)

In general, NWB has no *external resources* and has no *internal resources* build. The group does support direct action and in it is attending bigger community meetings including the meeting of the community board. Also action around one bigger project (Rheingold) is organized and the group tries to pressure the developer by aiming to get school funding. Direct action is seen in a ‘more flexible framework’, the group also does not want to “have the reputation of just being like angry kids” (Interview NWB 2015). Therefore, the group is involved in diverse bureaucratic processes and has built up *external networks*. The group also

\(^{105}\) The solidarity network model is based on the AEIOU principles: Agitate, Educate, Inoculate, Organize and Unite. More about the concept can be read under following URL: http://seattlesolidarity.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10&Itemid=26, last called: 22.05.2016.

\(^{106}\) Most members were involved in Occupy Wall Street.

\(^{107}\) Only one member gave hundred dollars to create the groups’ website.
has contact with squatters who went together with the group to a community board meeting carrying a banner. As the squatters had more radical ideas, NWB decided to focus on some more moderate policy and balance their actions more. The group is working closely with city council members and therefore, is focusing on reform policies. Still, NWB denounces other politicians as “the driving force of this rezoning” (Interview NWB 2015). Thus, NWB is reform oriented but also uses direct action to promote the idea of a Community Land Trust. The group has no funding and understands itself more as a pressure group empowering community members through education.

*Equality for Flatbush (E4F) and Take back before it’s gone (B4G)*

Since 2012, Equality for Flatbush (E4F) organizes against police repression and against gentrification and promotes affordable housing in Flatbush, Brooklyn. Before it’s gone, take it back (B4G) is a working subgroup that developed out of E4F and is documenting gentrification. Speaking out in the community and mobilizing against poverty is one of the most important aims for E4F. A long term goal for both groups is mobilizing communities, having meetings, and starting campaigns like the non-eviction campaign. The group also wants to start having meetings at buildings in the neighborhood and to connect the tenants with one another. The general goal of E4F is to expand and to have more members and to give trainings, especially for the ‘cop watchers’ (Interview E4F/B4G 2015).

E4F has contact to a housing attorney. Therefore, has built up *external resources* that remain relatively undeveloped. E4F organizes events of direct action such as demonstrations and also takes landlords to court. The group also blocks apartments of landlords. Generally, E4F uses any method to help people to stay in their neighborhood. E4F organizes eviction blockades as a method of direct action and continually talks to people in the community. Both groups have only limited resources and access to meeting spaces alike churches,

---

108 The attorney does work as a non-profit and tries to defend people who mostly are facing foreclosures in the housing court. E4F inform tenants about their right to have a lawyer in the housing court and helps to find a lawyer.

109 E4G has different working groups in which most members are active in as a checkpoint working group.
demonstrating that they have *external resources*. Generally, E4F has no funding but the group has raised around $16,000 within a year through donations. The SMO has no *external network* build up yet.

E4F wants to empower tenants by informing tenants about their legal rights. The group is still new and most of the organizing E4F and B4G is linked to the group’s founder, Imani Henry, who describes himself as a Marxist-Leninist. Therefore, the SMO has no *internal resources*. As gentrification is seen as an attack against the community, E4F pledges to build affordable housing. E4F regards itself on the left pole contacts to politicians are seen as ‘not desirable’ as the group is “not for gentrification at all” (Interview E4F/B4G 2015). E4F holds the city accountable for the rezoning program of New York City. In short, E4F and B4G both do not desire reform politics as the groups do not want to work together with politicians or play any role in the legal system. Instead, the groups want to organize direct actions against landlords.

*Summary Issue-concerned Groups*

*Issue-concerned groups* work around specific issues often in a block or in a building and less city wide. Often in these groups all members exchange their knowledge and discuss possible forms of direct actions. Those SMOs have no *external resources* or *internal resources*. Except the anarchist group BSN, all other SMOs have *external networks*. CHTU and NWB are working closer with politicians and on reform policies and are more reform oriented. BSN is explicitly a radical SMO and also E4F and B4G are not willing to compromise with ‘the system’ (Interview E4F/B4G 2015).

CHTU is a young group fighting gentrification and displacement in Crown Heights. The group includes 40 buildings in which it is trying to secure tenant rights. The group receives financial and work support from UHAB but does not have its own paid staff. A main goal of the group is a 5 years rent freeze and regulated apartments. The group organizes demonstrations and supports tenants in the court. For ensuring education about housing rights and ensuring that tenants are not getting overcharged, CHTU urges new tenants to become informed about the rent history of their apartment. The group is proposing reform policies
but focuses more on education. As it is a young group there are still discussions about how closely the group should work together with politicians. In contrast to CHTU, BSN stands in complete opposition to reform policies. The group defines itself as explicitly anarchist and anti-capitalist and wants to fight against landlords. The group does not have any leadership and works on ‘escalating campaigns’ rather than working together with any politician or on any reform agenda (Interview E4F/B4G 2015). NWB is another young group working in Bushwick for getting a Community Land Trust. The group is involved in diverse processes and does not want to have a radical image to the public as it wants to be open for newcomers. NWB is reform oriented but has no financial funding at all. The very young grass-root groups E4F and B4G are membership organizations and located in Flatbush (Brooklyn). Both groups have no financial resources. All collected money for flyers comes from small donations. E4F demands affordable housing units but does not want to work together with politicians. Therefore, it is not reform oriented and wants to use direct action as their concept.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Social Movement Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Resources</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Resources</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Networks</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation towards</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reformist policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: Resources of Issue-concerned Groups, illustration by the author.

4.2.2 Neighborhood groups

*Neighborhood groups* usually form opposition to changes occurring in the neighborhood. They organize in that area, often in alliance with other local or *issue-concerned* groups. The common concerns are commercial and rental gentrification, displacement and the conversion

---

110 The Community Land Trust is a model to preserve affordable housing, avoid gentrification and build community wealth.
of rental apartments into condominiums. *Neighborhood groups* connect affected tenants, negotiate with local politicians and often start small-scale campaigns involving direct action like demonstrations and sit-in blockades aimed at the public of the neighborhood. Often these groups have built networking abilities and knowledge on housing policies which are important for other groups (Vollmer 2015).

These groups often have bureaucratic structures and work more professionally than *issue-concerned groups* (Vollmer 2015). The relationship of members is less personal even though in the leadership there are frequently personal contacts and friendships that are built after working together for years. The setting is still open for newcomers even though there is a higher barrier to become active in the group than in the *issue-concerned groups*, as the network in *neighborhood groups* is more vertically organized than horizontally structured (Vollmer 2015).

Regularly, these groups have a clearer political intention than *issue-concerned groups*. Most members have a long background in urban activism. In New York, some of these groups have long traditions and are deeply rooted in the neighborhoods (Vollmer 2015).

**Make the Road New York (MRNY)**

Make the Road New York (MRNY), founded in 2000, is a grassroots organization strengthening the power of Latino and working class communities’ and wanting to achieve ‘dignity and justice’ (Interview MRNY 2015).111 MRNY provides education, training and other services.112 The organization has now more than 140 people working as staff for the organization. MRNY has 16,800 members in total coming from all Boroughs of New York.

---

111 Make the Road was created in 2008 after the grassroots organizations ‘Make the Road by Walking’ and the ‘Latin American Integration Centre’ merged.
112 MRNY works on different fields: Expanding Civil Rights, Promoting Health, Improving Housing, Winning Workplace Justice, Improving Public Education and Empowering Youth. The ‘Improving Housing’ pillar focuses to fight for safe housing and to expand local green space. See following URL for more information: http://maketheroad.org/whatwedo_housing.php, last called: 14.09.2015.
As the SMO has paid staff and receives membership fees MRNY does have *internal resources*.

MRNY’s goal is to eradicate poverty and “improve the lives of hundreds of thousands” (Interview MRNY 2015). As MRNY is a membership based organization, all members should pay a onetime membership fee of $120. Most funding comes from foundations such as Robin Hood, the Ford Foundation or the Open Society Foundation. Smaller foundations give annually $5,000 or $10,000 and some bigger ones can even give up to $250,000. The budget of MRNY in 2014 was over $9 million. There are also government grants which cover most of the classes but do not cover the organizing costs of MRNY as the law does not allow to cover these costs by these funds (Interview MRNY 2015). Therefore, MRNY has established *external resources*.

MRNY pressures politicians to first invest in the community and ask them for necessary changes. Therefore, MRNY has *external networks*. New housing and construction in the neighborhood which is planned should be “accessible to the long term residents” who only earn small money wages (Interview MRNY 2015). New developments for middle class families are not denied but low income families in the neighborhood should still have affordable housing. Moreover, when new business comes into the neighborhood the jobs should pay “a living and not a minimum wage” (Interview MRNY 2015). MRNY has good relations with elected officials but also some ‘rocky’ ones with those who do not do ‘the right thing’. Therefore, MRNY has taken direct actions in front of their offices (Interview MRNY 2015). MRNY regards itself as progressive and left and cares most about the advancement of migrant communities in the City and State of New York. Concluding, MRNY has close contacts with politicians and receives money from big foundations and through state funding. The organization demands policy reforms in many fields. Affordable housing for the

---

113  MRNY has offices in the Boroughs of Brooklyn (Bushwick), Queens (Jackson Heights), Staten Island (Richmond), Long Island (Breton) and recently they opened one in Pennsylvania (Redding), Connecticut and New Jersey (Newark).
114  If interested persons want to become a member and cannot pay the fee it can be waived. Moreover, MRNY offers classes to their members. Everybody can become a member but has to donate in order to cover the costs for the course. The donation consists of a two-year payment plan.
communities to stay is a major demand. Nonetheless, the organization is working closer with
the Latino community than with other communities similarly facing evictions and pressure.

**Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA)**

Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) is a non-profit organizing project of New Settlement Apartments based in Southwest Bronx. CASA has the mission to protect and maintain affordable and safe housing by using collective action methods, running local campaigns, organizing tenant associations (working to get repairs, fighting landlord harassments and stopping displacement), providing monthly workshops (around basic tenants’ rights) and legal clinics or by holding regular community building and leadership development programs (Interview CASA 2015).

CASA has 1300 members and pays eight staff members working on different campaigns. Therefore, CASA has *internal resources*. The organization has a strong hierarchy. Directors of CASA are meeting every week to work on the agenda of the organization. The directors decide on the campaign and the staff calls all members to meet. On a voluntarily basis, hundreds of tenants living in the Bronx help the organization. For their membership meetings CASA has facilities they can reserve but still have to pay for. CASA receives funding from donations and from the organization New Settlement. Therefore, CASA has *external resources*. CASA tries to have rallies “every couple of months […] as often as needed” (Interview CASA 2015). Generally, CASA works with politicians, even though the organization would not become part of an electoral campaign as it wants to stay neutral. Thus, it has built up *external networks*. However, CASA stresses that it is not a communist organization, but considers itself as a progressive organization though, it still does not use this term officially. CASA has the mission to “protect and maintain affordable and safe housing throughout the collective action of organizing tenants” (Interview CASA 2015).

---

115 The goal is to build a ‘unified and empowered community full of knowledge and strong leaders’. See following URL: [http://casapower.org/what-we-do](http://casapower.org/what-we-do), last called 09.09.2015.

116 New Settlement gets federal funding and city funding as they are a non-profit organization and therefore have a budget they can use to fund CASA. See following URL: [http://www.settlementhousingfund.org/index.html](http://www.settlementhousingfund.org/index.html), last called: 21.10.2015.
short, CASA maintains close ties to politicians at the city council. Working with tenants on the ground, the organization does not use a radical language and directs towards a reform policy as CASA work together with politicians on amendments in the legislative process to reach more affordable housing units.

**Bushwick Housing Independence Project (BHIP)**

The Bushwick Housing Independence Project (BHIP) is a Bushwick, Brooklyn based local service providing organization founded in 2000. BHIP advocates for low-income and migrant tenants by providing a legal clinic and a once-a-week. Hence, BHIP has *external networks.*

The organization has direct contact with the affected tenants and provides resources to help tenants with their problems. Furthermore, BHIP focuses on education and advocacy by offering free in-court advocacy for hundreds of families every year (Interview BHIP 2015).

BHIP informs the community about housing policy and reforms by offering bilingual workshops a few times per year. BHIP is reform policy oriented as the organization sends a delegation to the Rent Guidelines Board hearings to work in the Board on issues concerning affordable housing.

Being located in a church, the organization has strong connections to the Latino community living in Bushwick who visit the church every Sunday, evidence that the SMO has *external resources.* The church is ‘the key’ as the group also uses the Sunday masses for explaining their goals to the people (Interview BHIP 2015). By having workshops and flyers translated into Spanish, most community members living in the neighborhood for many years are welcomed by BHIP. The organization has only one paid staff member working full time and the weekly lawyer who provides the civic clinic paid by donations.

BHIP is still a smaller organization and most work depends on the one paid staff. Therefore, BHIP has *internal resources* although memberships are not possible. Moreover, there is no elected board working for the organization. Nonetheless, BHIP is reform oriented and does

---

117 BHIP has the mission to ‘preserve existing affordable housing’ and on ‘defending tenants who are most at-risk in our city’s housing crisis, especially immigrants and low-income tenants’. See the self-description under following URL: http://bhip-brooklyn.org/, last called 09.09.2015.

118 See the self-description under following URL: http://bhip-brooklyn.org/, last called 09.09.2015.
not consider itself as a leftist organization. Furthermore, BHIP has good contacts with politicians and does work with them on a regular basis.

**Summary Neighborhood groups**

*Neighborhood groups* organize in a certain area against gentrification and use direct actions to fight against it. All of these SMOs do have *external resources, internal resources* and *external networks*. All of them are oriented towards reformist policy and are less radical in their demands.

Make the Road is working all over New York and has a huge membership base. Make the Road has good contacts with politicians and receives a lot of money from big foundations and through state funding. The organization demands affordable housing especially for Latino community members. CASA, located in the Bronx, is somewhat smaller and receives funding by donations and through an NGO. CASA also works closely together with politicians. As Make the Road, CASA demands affordable housing units. BHIP is based in Bushwick and advocates migrants, especially those with a Latino background. The small organization is organizing workshops and offers a legal clinic for tenants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Social Movement Organizations</th>
<th>MRNY</th>
<th>CASA</th>
<th>BHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Networks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orientation towards reformist policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Resources of Neighborhood Groups, illustration by the author.

### 4.2.3 Umbrella Organizations

*Umbrella organizations* have the challenge to bring different groups together and provide services like information or organization skills. Their goal is to gain political momentum
within the governmental process and to educate and politicize participants and the wider public. They can roughly be distinguished between established organizations providing services to tenant groups and being a lobby group themselves and between groups trying to establish common organizational structures to unite protest. These groups are working very professionally and have centralized and bureaucratic structures. The relationship among the members and the staff is not personal and members do not become active through friendship alike. The groups are not very inclusionary even though some groups try to activate interested persons to become members. The groups have a clearly vertical network but still all have a collective identity (Vollmer 2015).

**Community Service Society (CSS)**

The Community Service Society (CSS) is an independent agency working for low-income New Yorkers and has a 170-year history. It was founded in 1939 and has its roots in the 19th century social service agency concerned with philanthropic work for the urban poor. CSS is one of the biggest and broadest research and lobby groups working on behalf of low-income people living in New York.\(^{119}\) CSS lobbies for affordable housing, for the preservation of public funding and regulation of housing. Furthermore, CSS provides politicians and protest groups with research and offers a platform to create networks between protest groups and their supporters. During the elections for a new Mayor in New York, CSS put housing on the political agenda and pressured candidates to position themselves towards affordable housing and proposed policies even before the new elected Mayor de Blasio could do so (Interview CSS 2015).

Generally, CSS uses tools such as advocacy, research and policy analysis as well as volunteer mobilization to tackle poverty on multiple fronts.\(^{120}\) Within the Housing Unit, CSS works

---

\(^{119}\) During that long history CSS had significant achievements as it was working on New York City’s first tenement housing laws and supported creating the nation’s free school lunch program as well as CSS advanced the old age assistance program which was a forerunner to Social Security. See following URL: http://www.cssny.org/pages/our-history, last called 13.09.2015.

\(^{120}\) With an annual survey of low-income New Yorkers CSS wants to understand their challenges and works around different issues in which a positive change is aimed to break the ‘cycle of poverty’: Access to Health Care, Affordable Housing, Disconnected Youth, Economic Security, Imprisonment & Reentry,
with tenant leaders, fellow advocates and policy makers at all governmental levels. Therefore, CSS has big external networks.\textsuperscript{121} The funding CSS receives comes from rich individuals and therefore has external resources. CSS would not label itself a progressive organization but most people working there would. Victor Bach, a researcher in the Housing Unit, calls himself a leftist but “also as a pragmatic policy person” (Interview CSS 2015). CSS has contacts to a number of organizations nation-wide and is working in the so-called ‘national housing coalition’ (Interview CSS 2015).\textsuperscript{122} Rent regulation and subsidized housing are seen as solutions for the housing crisis. CSS also argues that the capitalist market cannot be foregone. Therefore, CSS sees regulated land and subsidized housing as a ‘viable policy proposal’ (Interview CSS 2015). Internally, the organization has paid staff and regulated structures and therefore has internal resources.

In summary, CSS as a research and advocacy think tank is financially independent and at the same time reform oriented. Still, CSS knows how to pressure politicians as the elections for Mayor in 2013 showed. CSS is always close to politicians (even to politicians in Washington D.C.) to promote rent regulation and subsidized housing.

\textit{Metropolitan Council on Housing (Met Housing)}

The Metropolitan Council on Housing is a tenants’ rights membership organization working for more than 50 years at the forefront of housing struggles in New York City. Generally, Met Council is promoting housing justice. In addition to rent strikes, Met Council worked on numbers of social justice issues and also supported the squatting movement in the 1970s. In the 1980s the organization promoted rent control.\textsuperscript{123} The mission of Met council is not only to make tenants aware of their rights but also to activate and organize those rights and impact

\footnotesize{Volunteer Mobilization and Workforce & Poverty. See following URL: http://www.cssny.org/pages/vision, last called 13.09.2015.}
\footnotesize{121 The strategic research and advocacy work of CSS in the Housing Department wants to build ‘public will for investments in affordable housing and economic opportunity for low-income residents’. See following URL: http://www.cssny.org/advocacy-and-research, last called 13.09.2015.}
\footnotesize{122 See the following URL for more information: http://nlihc.org/, last called: 13.09.2015.}
\footnotesize{123 Since the 1970s Met Council organizes the annual Tenant Lobby Day in Albany to demand rent reforms from the legislator. See following URL: http://metcouncilonhousing.org/our_history, last called: 15.09.2015.}
legislation. Stronger legislation for better protecting tenants is one of the core aims of Met Council. Met Council is working together with 12 different buildings (Interview Met Council 2015).

Met Council is close to tenants as it has a number of tenant-assistance programs, including a tenants’ right telephone hotline and a walk in clinic open for everyone. Therefore, it has built up *external networks*. Through the clinic, tenants help tenants and those who receive help become active in campaigns for housing justice. Financially, Met Council receives most funding from donors who want to support their work and from their membership fee. Hence, Met Council has *internal resources*. Still, many volunteers do support the work of Met Council and help the full time working staff with their work. By advocating for tenants, the SMO tries to draw a bigger picture and explain the housing crisis to the tenants. Met Council tries through education to help people understand that the problems they have as tenants are the same issues faced by other tenants and to activate tenant rights. Met council is connected to members of the city council and is connected to activists of the Workers Family Party. Therefore, Met Council has *external networks*.

Mostly, Met Council is advocating tenants having problems with their landlords with the help of their hotline. Also, Met Council tries to mobilize tenants by inviting members and mobilizing tenants to big rallies. The organization is trying to connect tenant associations to “the bigger picture” (Interview Met Council 2015). Reform policy is not the main focus of the organization as advocacy is the main field but still it is supported by Met Council. Therefore, it still is reform policy oriented. The organization is membership and donor based

---

124 Tenants call the number and the volunteers at Met Council listen to the questions tenants have and advise them. Often tenants call and do not know which rights they have especially as the laws are difficult to understand. Met Council uses the hotline to call people back to ask how the situation with the landlord developed. Also, Met Council asks during the calls if the person who receives help wants to become a member or want to get involved in demonstrations.

125 Members receive a subscription to the magazine of Met Council and they get news and updates about the tenants’ rights movement.

126 Most people of the board would consider themselves as left.
and therefore is not dependent on big foundations or state funding and therefore has no external resources.

**Right to the City Alliance (RTCA)**

Since 2007 the Right to the City Alliance (RTCA) uses the phrase introduced by the French intellectual Lefebvre (1968). RTCA wants to organize around gentrification and displacement and tries to connect diverse grievances as police harassment, immigrant rights and indigenous justice. The alliance has members nation-wide. The alliance organizes marches and coordinates actions in various cities and aims to become a recognizable movement around housing issues (Interview RTCA 2015).

The SMO understands itself as a ‘base building organization’. Therefore, RTCA does not provide services (Interview RTCA 2015). All member organizations of the Alliance are the ‘base building organizations’. Next to them there are also so-called ‘resource allies’ that are individuals like lawyers, academics or institutions like universities. The work of RTCA is well structured as it has six permanent staff members and a steering committee which meets monthly online. The committee is working on the strategic plans of the Alliance. Therefore, RTCA has *internal resources*. Members of the Alliance have to pay membership fees as high as $500 a month, with larger organizations paying between $700,000 and 1 billion a year and smaller organizations paying only $100 per month. The SMO has several 'resource allies' as well as individuals such as professor David Harvey and Peter Marcuse who pay $50. By having numerous allies, the SMO has a big *external network* (Interview RTCA 2015).

RTCA wants to be free and independent from any other political view. Therefore, RTCA wants to increase the funding from the base instead of only receiving money from big

---

127 The RTC follows the idea to have the right to have land and housing free from market speculation, land ownership, economic justice, indigenous justice, environmental justice, the right to transportation and services for the ‘working class’, freedom from police and state harassment, democracy and participation, economic reciprocity and restoration from those who exploited or displaced the local economy and the right for healthy and stable communities who shall be protected from economic pressures forcing to migrate. See following URL: http://righttothecity.org/about/mission-history/, last called: 16.09.2015.
foundations such as the Open Society Foundation. By receiving that money, the SMO has developed external resources. With the help of different publications written by different professors in the urban studies field, RTCA wants to support ‘reform fights’ and help to politically educate. Their work is described as “a balance of a lot of reform fights to make a kind of a kinder capitalism, to make it more livable, to make it more equitable” (Interview RTCA 2015). Therefore, RTCA is reform orientated but still considers itself as a socialist organization even though it would say that only in ‘certain circles’ (Interview RTCA 2015).

It can be seen that RTCA is a strong organized organization with a left ideology. By receiving funding from different big foundations, the leftist language cannot always be used even though the organization would use radical left terminology in their day to day work and has a common understanding of the capitalist society. It can be concluded that RTCA can be seen as part of a left movement even though the organization state funded. Rallies are supported but still the alliance understands itself as a think tank for reform policy.

**Urban Home Assistance Board (UHAB)**

The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) was founded as a self-help group of residents in the crisis-ridden New York of the 1970s. During that time abandoned buildings were left to deteriorate. Residents renovated buildings and even collectively governed them. In that time UHAB organized the idea of shared-equity housing co-ops. Today, UHAB assists tenants threatened by de-regulation or disrepair, provides them with ideas of collective ownership of their buildings, and supports them in case they want to become a ‘lasting affordable co-op’ (Interview UHAB 2015). Internally, UHAB has executive boards and a strong hierarchical structure. Therefore, UHAB has internal resources.

Even though the co-op work at UHAB is funded by the city of New York and the Housing Department, UHAB has a strong connection to every building it takes care of. Therefore,

---

128 The homesteading movement was part of an autonomous movement, bringing together urban grievances with ideas of self-government and self-sufficiency (Katz/Mayer 1985).
129 The work is based on the following principles: self-help, democratic residential control, shared-equity (or limited-equity) co-op ownership, cost-effective sustainability and continual learning.
UHAB has *external resources*. All these buildings pay a membership fee (annually $50) and have monthly meetings with UHAB organizers.\(^{130}\) Still, UHAB tries to help organize grass-root groups and therefore supports the Crown Heights Tenant Union (CHTU) with technical assistance. With CHTU, rallies and protests are planned and a common strategy is discussed (Interview UHAB 2015).

Generally, UHAB researches risk buildings and tracks buildings that show violations and builds tenant associations at these buildings. UHAB flyers the buildings and tries to mobilize people and organizes the tenant association meetings (Interview UHAB 2015). In the meetings UHAB members try to identify leaders who can build and support the movement in the neighborhood. These leaders receive training in order to bring the movement forward. UHAB teaches the leaders how to set up tenant associations in the buildings. Furthermore, UHAB teaches them about outreach and political education. UHAB works closely with City Council members and also with the state assembly from the Democratic Party and the Family Working Party on ‘legislative stuff’. Therefore, UHAB has *external networks* (Interview UHAB 2015). By these forms of empowerment of tenants, it can be seen that UHAB still tries to be part of the tenant movement. Furthermore, UHAB has a leftist orientation as the organization underlines to “move beyond racial barriers, class barriers” and to identify the landlords, bankers, and other figures who push tenants out of their buildings and are responsible for unfair rent laws as the underlying problem (Interview UHAB 2015). It can be concluded that UHAB is still part of a left movement even though it receives state funding and works closely with the state assembly. Reform policy is accepted by UHAB as long it helps the local tenants.

*Summary Umbrella Organizations*

*Umbrella organizations* provide knowledge and organization skills to educate tenants and a wider public. All of these SMOs do have *external resources* as well as *internal resources*. Furthermore, they have all built strong *external networks* and all groups do have more interest

---

\(^{130}\) In the department caring about coops ‘probably 30 people’ work.
in working on reform policies. However, all groups have sympathy for radical visions but are working on smaller levels. With its long history, CSS is an independent research think tank having close ties with politicians and promotes rent regulation and subsidized housing without being a membership organization by receiving only donations. Therefore, CSS clearly advocates for policy reforms. Met Council, on the other hand, has a similarly long history and has a closer connection to tenants through its advocacy and its status as a membership based organization. Hence, most funding comes from the members and donors. The focus of Met Council is less oriented towards reform policy and more on tenant education. The RTC Alliance receives funding from big foundations even though it is a membership organization. The organization clearly advocates for reform policy. UHAB receives state funding but still tries to remain part of the tenant movement in New York City and is working very close together with local groups as CHTU is a project of UHAB. Still, reform policies are also accepted by the organization. All four presented *umbrella organizations* would consider themselves as left or even socialist but do not explicitly label themselves so in public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Social Movement Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Resources</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Resources</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Networks</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalization</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orientation towards reformist policy</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Resources of Umbrella Organizations, illustration by the author.

### 4.3 SUMMARY OF THE COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

In order to better compare the different groups, the following summary will present the differences of the aforementioned SMOs. *Issue-concerned groups*, as CHTU, BSN, NWB and E4F/B4G, are groups who were founded more recently but do have different
organizational concepts. All of these groups have no external resources or internal resources. Only BSN does not work together with local government deputies as it sees itself as a force fighting the capitalist system. All other SMOs have established external network. Only one organization, CHTU, has capacities to work within courts. None of the groups has connections to parties but all of them have built alliances with other progressive groups. Generally, issue-concerned groups do not have contact to think tanks and do not apply for funding from foundations. However, NWB once had contact to researchers. NWB and CHTU have access to public resources and are also working close to institutions. All SMOs who receive funding from foundations have to apply for it. They have to use radical termination in their application in order to receive funding. However, in general also these groups have far reaching demands and want to abolish the capitalist system as a future goal as the others. CHTU and NWB do have concrete goals which they want to achieve in the work together with politicians.

Neighborhood groups as MRNY, CASA and BHIP have financial resources, work together with local government politicians and within courts. Therefore, they have external resources, internal resources and external networks. These groups do not have any party connections but build alliances with other progressive groups, except BHIP, which does not have the resources to work together with other organizations. Think tanks and researchers are no partner for these groups. Through different funding possibilities, all groups have access to public resources. None of the groups have far reaching goals as all organizations work more on concrete policies and try to help people in concrete serious risk. Therefore, neighborhood groups are labelled as reform-oriented.

Umbrella organizations as CSS, Met Council, RTTCA or UHAB have a long tradition and have existed already for years, some even for more than 50 years. Due to their long standing existence, these organizations have ample financial resources, which they mostly receive from big foundations. Therefore, umbrella organizations have external resources, internal resources as well as strong external networks. All work closely with local politicians and within the court system and have contact to parties, mostly with the left-wing Workers Family
Furthermore, they have close contacts to different progressive alliances. All *umbrella organizations* work together with researchers on a daily basis. As all of these organizations receive state funding and have paid staff and offices, they have access to public resources. All *umbrella organizations* have far reaching demands and at the same time specific and limited goals that they want to achieve mostly together with politicians but also through close work with grass roots organizations. UHAB, for example, is working closely together with CHTU. All *umbrella organizations* are labelled as reform oriented. Still, they have sympathies for radical demands coming from *issue-concerned groups*.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 11**: Comparison of Issue-concerned Groups, Neighborhood Groups and Umbrella Organizations, illustration by the author.

The table summarizes the different SMOs by comparing their degree of Institutionalization and their radicalization as well as their tendency for reform demands. Problematic with this figure is that correlation is not equal to causation. Institutionalization can, but does not have to, lead to reform orientation. Still, institutionalized groups can have radical demands as it has been shown in the section before.

131 To learn more about the political ideas of the Workers Family Party and their goals in New York visit the following URL: http://workingfamilies.org/states/new-york/, last called: 03.01.2016.

132 Problematic with this figure is that correlation is not equal to causation. Institutionalization can, but does not have to, lead to reform orientation. Still, institutionalized groups can have radical demands as it has been shown in the section before.
neighborhood groups and blue umbrella organizations. It is exemplified that there are intersections between the different groups, especially between two neighborhood groups (MRNY and CASA) and the umbrella organizations. However, it is shown that issue-concerned groups have a lower level of institutionalization than neighborhood groups and umbrella organizations. Therefore, the higher the level of institutionalization, the more the tendency for reform demands increases. Institutionalization, measured as internal and external resources and external networks, correlates negative with radicalization and positive with reform demands. This distribution correlates with the three from literature taken groups (issue-concerned groups, neighborhood groups and umbrella organizations).\textsuperscript{133}

Generally, all these SMOs play an important role in the political and civic life of cities. Cities provide important resources to their residents through services, access to space and buildings. SMOs that act more within the public are better able to access these services and resources.\textsuperscript{134} Less formalized groups are ineligible to receive this kind of support. SMOs are more likely to survive without external money when activists donate their own time and money into the organization. SMOs that want to employ full-time cadre need to regularize or institutionalize the flow of money into the SMO. For obtaining private funds from individual constituents’ public relation skills are required whereas sources of funding coming from institutions need more program development skills as umbrella organizations have built.

Private donations can rarely serve to provide access to public resources. Organizations set agendas, provide access to decision-making arenas, help to pass policies, monitor and shape policy implementation and shift the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions. Yet, organizational capacity does not necessarily have to come from formal organizations. Grassroots organizing can energize and mobilize many activists but it is hard to sustain a movement on the back of one extremely dedicated volunteer.\textsuperscript{135} Sustained collective action requires substantial organizational capacity. Inequalities between

\textsuperscript{133} The statistical method used to receive the correlation are quasi dummy variables which are built through a qualitative analysis.

\textsuperscript{134} Often a 501(c)3 status is necessary to receive funding as explained in footnote 85.

\textsuperscript{135} This can be seen by several researched SMOs in this study.
organizations can be reduced by dedicating additional city resources to assisting low-resource neighborhood groups in obtaining a formal status\textsuperscript{136} and by funding and supporting them with technical assistance, leadership training and facility use.

The comparative case study reveals that the SMOs deliberately sought co-optation by the institution they were attempting to change, namely the housing legal system.\textsuperscript{137} It is apparent that intentional decisions throughout their development led to this strategy. Because most analyzed SMOs sought co-optation early, they were able to develop quickly and gain legitimacy and support even as young organizations as the majority of the analyzed issue-concerned groups show. The literature typically speaks of co-optation as a negative prospect as it often correlates with dependency of state institutions and a loss of reliability, which results in the decline of SMOs and the dilution of its goals. This study defies such expectations, supported by the findings that SMOs benefited mostly from their co-optation. Here the example of umbrella organization must be taken as these organizations were able to operate for a longer time only due to their co-optation tendency.

Contrary to what most theorists in this area of study have assumed, institutionalization is not necessarily the end of a movement. Whereas the mainstream theoretical literature assumes that organizational consolidation and growing resources or institutionalization more generally would result in a decline and/or de-radicalization of protest activity, my results show a more complex relationship. Large and well-resourced umbrella organizations are less prone to confrontational action. By contrast, small issue-concerned groups and medium-sized neighborhood groups that were most inclined to confrontation. In short, SMOs in New York City can be characterized by organizationally strength and flexibility. Hence, umbrella organizations and neighborhood groups tend to work closer with politicians and have more funding than issue-concerned groups. One important factor is that umbrella organizations and neighborhood groups have existed for a longer period of time. Therefore, they have already built closer ties to politicians and fought about their political participation. Younger,

\textsuperscript{136} The regularly status is a 501(c)3 status.
\textsuperscript{137} This can be proofed especially by the longer existing SMOs as they did not from a very early stage in their development.
issue-concerned groups such as CHTU or NWB are still in their founding process and have fights about their political orientation. Other groups as the more radical and community based issue-concerned groups have less willingness to cooperate with state institutions.

In summary, also institutionalized SMOs can still have a radical approach upon influencing the debate about housing in NYC and less institutionalized SMOs can also have a stronger willingness to influence the political debate by searching cooperation points with government institutions. Therefore, the picture taken can give a tendency but still is unable to give general explanations about the effect of institutionalization upon SMOs in NYC.
5. CONCLUSION

In capitalist societies, the role of economic forces is of highest importance in the process of urban governance and can heavily influence decisions made by governments. This is perceived by many as a violation of the ideas of democracy and democratic principles, which is articulating in the “sell-out” of urban space, often without the permission and support of local residents during the decision-making.

Therefore, Henri Lefebvre (1993) and David Harvey (2008) described the idea of a ‘Right to the City’ in which local inhabitants of cities should have a voice in all decision-making processes affecting the urban space. In order to give a more concrete meaning to this right, Urban Social Movements (USMs) came together to fight against the “sell-out” of the city. These Social Movements (SMs) focusing on the urban question, are groups involving disadvantaged groups which are excluded from society as well as parts of the middle classes. USMs politicize the city through actions like rent strikes, squatting and the development of alternative spatial plans, as they try to achieve control over the urban environment. After some time, USMs tend to become more professionalized Social Movement Organizations (SMOs): Bureaucratic organizations, characterized by having paid staff and a more centralized decision-making structure. SMOs formalize both their internal structure and their relations towards the institutional system. Often, SMOs follow a similar rational progression towards bureaucratic and institutionalized entities and structures. SMOs incorporate institutionalized norms and rules in order to gain increased prospects of survival, stability, legitimacy and resources. When SMOs have close ties to the institutional system, their tactics can be affected by it. Otherwise, SMOs can also be more focused on radical direct action tactics.

Hence, Social Movements theorists regard the institutionalization of SMOs from two perspectives. Either the institutionalization leads to a self-defeat of the protest movement due to the financial dependency on donors, or it can possibly even strengthen the movement by implementing formalism and routine procedures in order to better coordinate resources. Their
institutionalization moves SMOs from an oppositional actor to a bureaucratic organization, it allows them to negotiate with institutions and even to become part of the political establishment. The institutionalization can thereby be interpreted as co-optation, because the government, as a co-opting body, embraces movements in order to sustain its own legitimacy and authority and to anticipate threats to its own stability.

However, in this thesis it has been argued that the institutionalization of protest repertoires does not necessarily lead to de-mobilization and co-optation, although a specialization of activists by the institutionalization of SMOs often leads to a decrease of mass participation and mobilization. The latter notwithstanding, it was argued that after SMOs have institutionalized, they can maintain a balance of conflictive and/or cooperative relationship with the state as their politics can complement disruptive methods but do not have to replace them. Therefore, the institutionalization of SMOs does not necessarily lead to co-optation. Nevertheless, the process has implications as the state has to incorporate the demands of the SMOs and must have capacity to encourage the institutionalization of SMOs. Following this argumentation, SMOs can produce influential politics responding to the goals of the movement by taking advantage of institutional opportunities and can even urge governments to be accountable for their implementation. In the end, the institutionalization of SMOs can transform them into political players with access to the state. Thereby, the state can regulate the SMOs' protest forms and replace them with conventional ones. This in turn could lead to fragmentation and finally demobilization of the whole movement.

In order to analyze these assumptions on the basis of empirical data, the differences between eleven SMOs in a comparative case study based on field research conducted in New York City in 2015 were focused by this thesis. Specifically, it analyzed how the institutionalization of SMOs in NYC affects the ideological political agenda of the organizations. Regarding that question, a rather complex picture has emerged. The results of the case study reach beyond simplified notions of a deterministic transmission of a higher institutionalization into a less radical agenda. Generally, through institutionalization SMOs incorporate the routine of institutional politics.
Taken as a whole, the structure of SMOs working in the housing field in New York City is quite complex and differentiated. Consequently, it has been decided to differentiate the SMOs by dividing them into issue-concerned groups (weak professionalization but high social character), neighborhood groups (well professionalized and bureaucratic, big networks and knowledge on housing policies) and umbrella organizations (strongly professionalized, political advisors, service oriented).

In addition, this thesis showed how SMOs in New York City work with limited resources. Three categories have been identified which were presented in a comparative case study. It has been focused on external resources (material resources such as money, space, and others), internal resources (tactical repertoires, organizational templates) and external networks (cooperation with politicians, parties or other SMOs). At the same time the SMOs favor different political agendas ranging from radical forms of collective action named radicalization to a reformist orientation towards reformist policy.

In consequence, the comparative case study stipulated that umbrella organizations are the best equipped SMOs by having the largest extent of external resources, internal resources and external networks, while also being most relevant for the exchange of information and joint campaigns. Umbrella organizations offer general guidance, financial support and the use of their ‘name brands’, decentralized units at the base can absorb or create networks of trust that are free to develop their own programs and engage in forms of action appropriate to their settings. These organizations are not limited to their own activists as they can activate broader ‘protest communities’.

The groups which are better organized around an interest or cause or a shared background or common barriers to inclusion, have better odds of being seen, heard and acknowledged by civil society. However, not all organizations have equal access to the public, as non-profit organizations tend to be better at opening up civic and political spaces. Bureaucratization and formalization can present challenges to those who favor grassroots participation. On the other hand, formal organizations play an important role by participating in local decision-making and can lobby politicians more effectively with their policy analysis.
Electoral politics and contentious mobilization are both important, as are strategies of legal claims-making, bureaucratic incorporation, and local identity construction. *Issue-concerned* groups can and do engage in all these different political activities but often lack *internal resources* and *external networks*. Often activists feel that the requirement for creating a formal board of directors and the funding regulations that come with being a formal organization detract from the mission of many of the more community based *issue-concerned* groups. Also, some SMOs spend too much time trying to find funders. Therefore, their work on the mission suffers through a lack of time. Most of the leaders of *issue-concerned* groups work at home as they do not have an office and are financed from their personal earnings and with the help of other group members.

*Neighborhood groups* do often have a stronger bureaucracy and therefore *internal resources*, general funding through grants as *external resources* and well-built cooperation partners and therefore *external networks*. But the formalization of collective energies could lead to organizational sclerosis, the domination of many by a small group of elites, bureaucratization and other processes antithetical to a radical participatory view of social action.

In this thesis it was argued that the institutionalization of SMOs does not per se entail the risk of de-radicalization, de-politization or de-mobilization of collective action. Also, it has been shown that the institutionalization does affect the political agenda. However, the better institutionalized SMOs can still mobilize more people than less institutionalized SMOs. All mentioned *neighborhood groups* have institutionalized, but are still mobilizing and try to maintain a balanced power relationship, between conflict and cooperation, with the state. *Umbrella organizations* generally pursue a less conflictive strategy but try to support conflictive SMOs in their interaction with the state. *Issue-concerned groups* are the least institutionalized SMOs. Therefore, they have a lower risk to de-radicalize than *neighborhood groups*.

This thesis has found evidence that supports the first hypothesis, namely that the degree of institutionalization can define their tactics as well as their aims. Still, some less institutionalized *issue-concerned groups* can have a stance towards a reform policy although
they have less cooperation with the state than neighborhood groups. This thesis also has found evidence supporting the second hypothesis, namely that the degree of institutionalization does highly influence an organizations’ stance towards a reform directed policy. Even the less institutionalized issue-concerned groups can favor more structured work and try to cooperate better with politicians and governments. Certainly, some SMOs do not fit into this analysis but as most of the SMOs do, the hypothesis was not rejected.

Moreover, some of the evidence supports the third hypothesis, namely that the source of funding can influence the political agenda of an organization although the funding party is not solely responsible for defining it. Most funded neighborhood groups and umbrella organizations define their own agenda. However, funding is essential and needed for their organizational work. Financial resources open up new opportunities and arenas for SMOs where they can interact and build up external resources and external networks. However, this thesis could neither focus on the financial negotiations nor the pressure that is applied by third parties regarding the SMO’s political agenda. Concentrating on financial negotiations would open up a new research project. Therefore, it could not be described in this thesis due to its focus and limitations.

Additional research on SMOs is required to understand the long-term impact for the institutionalization of SMOs. By comparing SMOs from different cities, the research questions laid out in this work could further be tested by producing more evidence. Furthermore, it could be researched how it is possible for SMOs to set the political agenda in New York and influence rent laws. Furthermore, research should expand on how the different SMOs interact with each other and compete for resources. Their various forms of conflict and cooperative interaction merit more research, as these relationships may have an impact on the goals, outcomes, and political agenda of these SMOs. Furthermore, it could be researched which particular interests supports SMOs and what the current political strategies and private sector interests are. Another possible avenue of research could be the composition of SMs in this field, i.e. an analysis of who engages in activism. Specifically, the role of university education deserves further scrutiny. Further attention should be directed on the impact of social media on SMOs and their usage.
Finally, a tendency of a balanced institutionalization of SMOs using the state authorities for achieving their goals can be seen in the upcoming years. If SMOs follow this path, cooperation of different SMOs will be necessary/beneficial and resources should be shared with each other in order to achieve ‘housing for all’.
LITERATURE


• Koon, S. (2011): Urban governance and social movements in the context of urban regeneration in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong.


Sandoval, S. A. M. (1998): Social Movements and Democratization: The Case of Brazil and the Latin Countries. In: Giugni, Marco G./McAdam, Doug/ Tilly,