Self-understanding and understanding others

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Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz

Dekanin der Philosophischen Fakultät III
Prof. Dr. Julia von Blumenthal

Gutachter: 1 Prof. Dr. Boike Rehbein
2 Prof. Dr. Jessé Souza

Student: Tamer Söyler

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Zusammenfassung


Schlagwörter: Verstehen, globaler Süden, Gegenhegemonie, emanzipatorisches Denken
Abstract
Universalist fixation on truth has long dominated and pre-structured the analyst’s understanding of being in the world. The emergence of the Global South has given rise to a challenge to the hegemony of one-size-fits-all approaches. The ontological shift has revealed the relevance of different ways of understanding being in the world. A threshold of change has become visible. The potentiality for counter-hegemonic approaches is increasing. This study looks at the limits of understanding, and how those limits can be, and are being, overcome. It discusses the difficulties associated with transformation in thinking, the degree to which thought is pre-structured, and the irrefutability of moments of change. It establishes a link between understanding and emancipation. Finally, it questions the role of the universities as guardians and purveyors of thinking in the present emancipatory movement of understanding being in the world beyond the boundaries set by hegemonic thinking.

Keywords: understanding, Global South, counter-hegemony, emancipatory thinking.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to friends and family. They shared the burden of my doctoral studies in all imaginable ways. Their support will always be remembered.
Acknowledgments

Writing has been my second nature during my graduate studies. I wrote excerpts on several topics in the last years. I have made countless efforts to systematically index my notes. A textual structure did not occur authentically. This is why I decided to let egalitarian spontaneity to run its course. The approach of egalitarian spontaneity opposes hierarchical relations between excerpts. It has a counter-structural emphasis. It values forming immediate relations without bureaucratizing the text. Following this approach, I allowed my notes fluctuate by continuously experimenting with them. Experiments have been successful. Large bodies of text often connected to each other of their own accord. However, interference from my side was sometimes demanded. I had to step in occasionally for the purposes of bridging the text blocks. The master document evolved from one form to another under my guidance. The result was a consistent album of ideas. It will be beneficial for the readers if they approach the work this way.

Friends and colleagues had read the text in various stages. They were never provided with the opportunity to read a complete draft. They had to work with fragments. I am indebted to them all. To my surprise, not only had they read the fragments but they were also happy about it. To be more precise, they have read the parts without a guiding whole. They did not mind putting an effort for relating the fragments to their wholes via imaginary theoretical inclusion. In other words, they were interactive readers. They willingly participated in the text and contributed to it.

After completing my dissertation, I realized that most chapters were written during my time at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). I am grateful to the teachers, staff and students of the Center for Studies of the Social Systems (CSSS) at JNU. My thanks go to my JNU friends. My perspective has been influenced not only by my stays in India but also in Germany, Brazil and Turkey. I would like to express my gratitude to the students, teachers and lecturers at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I edited the dissertation during my stay at Universidade Federal Fluminense, Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política. Special thanks to Jessé Souza, Carlos Henrique Aguiar
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Introduction

The rise of the Global South represents a vital juncture in terms of an ongoing tectonic shift in ontology. But it is only meaningful if accompanied by a global movement of building emancipatory thinking. Western and non-Western strands of critical thinking must work together to challenge an all-encompassing global hegemony. This entails recognition of the multiplicities of being in the world and different ways of understanding.

Reality is a complex amalgam of dichotomies. An exploration of the relations between dichotomies is necessary for emancipatory understanding. The hypothesis is that emancipatory understanding is the only tool by and through which the morass of conflicting approaches and epistemologies can be transcended and hegemony confronted.

This dissertation is informed by both formal and informal fieldwork in different countries spanning nearly a decade. It will attempt to provide a tentative and dialectical mental map for arriving at a form of emancipatory understanding.

Everything flows. It has become a custom over time to quote Heraclitus for making a rather obvious point which has proven to be a persistent intellectual cliché by now. Though never actually uttered by Heraclitus, this adage has been widely used when characterizing his thought. Even though what the aphorism really means remains a matter of metaphysical discussion, when taken literally and pushed to a conclusion, it states the obvious: nothing stays the same or everything changes. In other words, there is nothing in existence—including this statement—which one can understand to be timeless and forever true. Everything is momentary, in the sense that things remain in one place only for a brief period of time. Or to put it in plain words, the basic condition of the world is change.

It may sound obvious to state that everything flows; nevertheless the statement is misleading, as one could convincingly make a counter argument that the basic condition of the world is actually stability. Or, a statement with more accuracy could be that there is
no basic condition of the world that one can claim to exist convincingly. Being philosophically cautious does not mean that one should drop change and stability entirely as conceptual categories. It is in fact possible to argue that while societal configurations tend to be stable and potentially lacking future freedoms and possibilities of emancipation, change is inevitable and stability is always challenged with the shift in equilibriums of consciousness and configuration. If the discussion is understood within this framework, then it could be actually stated that this dissertation is concerned primarily about change and stability.

The dissertation engages with the idea that the challenge to stability can come either from consciousness, or from configuration, or from both. It argues that while the change in configuration does not always have to be progressive, it could lead to an elevation of consciousness in a positive way. Against this background, the dissertation attempts to provide a tentative framework of ideas for arriving at what is coined as emancipatory understanding. The main purpose of this type of understanding is to recognize the emancipatory potential in social transformations, so that betterment of life becomes possible. The dissertation claims that unrealized possibilities of emancipation in social life can be found on individual, micro, meso, macro and civilizational levels especially when those levels are interpreted within a wider spectrum of time and space. The dissertation assigns a fundamental task to social analysts with emancipatory inclinations—they should work hard to unveil these unrealized possibilities of emancipation in social life and pave the way for their maturing, so that betterment of life becomes a reality.

Against the background of earlier points, the dissertation can then be seen as an elaboration of a major argument with many sides. Thought is ingrained in existential conditions which could be also defined as social configuration; any given configuration is most likely to be dominated by a conformist sense, or any given configuration can be non-conformist for only short period of time. This period of non-conformist tendency has to be recognized and interpreted as such by the critical analysts, meaning that within no given configuration could it be possible to simply assume the existence of critical
thinking. If critical thinking is not naturally favored by the configuration and cannot be reached at ease, the only way to develop critical thinking is making a conscious and rigorous systematic effort which requires analysts to acknowledge the fact that since thought is ingrained in existential conditions, and therefore tends toward conformism, critical thinking has to focus on ways for getting out of that particular uncritical situatedness. Against the background of this major argument, the dissertation turns to the author’s fieldwork for identifying ways of getting out of hegemonized consciousness.

Since the main motivation of the dissertation is to look for a theoretical innovation for transforming the ways critical analysts see the world, the dissertation takes a theoretical tone. This inevitably causes sideling of the empirical part of the work that comprises formal and informal fieldwork, which took place in different parts of the world spanning nearly a decade. The empirical work informs the theoretical discussion but due to the nature of the inquiry, the connection is often not expressed explicitly. Most of the fieldwork that inspired this dissertation took place in the Global South, allowing the author to reflect on the relationship between consciousness and configuration and how consciousness responds to shifts in the configuration. These studies focused on three types of shifts in the configuration; the rise of the Global South, studying non-native contexts, and focusing on social events, without putting forward any final judgment or making exhaustive claims about every other possibility.

Out of these three factors of change, the dissertation puts a special emphasis on events against the backdrop of a broader engine of change, namely the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South. First, it is argued that emancipatory understanding is becoming increasingly probable with the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South as the dominance of Global North comes to an end, and as a consequence the hegemonic position of the Global North is put into question. Second, it is discussed that the contemporary global configuration is increasingly charged with eventfulness, thus making it possible to develop two types of thinking as defined in the dissertation, event driven and event based thinking, for furthering critical thought. With this in mind, final
chapters are dedicated to the empirical case of social protests and the possible impacts of these protests to higher education.

Against this background, the dissertation tries to fulfill two goals. First, it aims to add more dynamism to critical thinking; second, it suggests that such a dynamic interpretation of critical thinking must be taught at the universities.

The first chapter introduces the central concepts of the guiding thesis of the dissertation and provides an outlook. The chapter puts forward a supporting argument for the main assertion of the dissertation: since Western social sciences are positioned firmly in the Eurocentric tradition, they suffer from an inherent distortion in their perspectives. The viewpoint of Eurocentric tradition claims to universality appears as fully legitimate, within this perspective truth claims are self-evidentialized to such an extent that they start to appear as natural, causing a major hindrance to self-reflective thinking. The chapter delves into the issue of universalism and relativism by referring to the contrast between objectivism and subjectivism; criticizes the prevailing social science approach as objectivist and Universalist by relating it to the development of Western capitalism and its expansion to the rest of the world. The chapter stresses the fact that the underprivileged have long been deprived of the possibilities of expressing themselves effectively and legitimately, and finally argues that the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South opens up new possibilities for counter-hegemonic perspectives.

The second chapter probes into the subjective-objective antinomy and argues that the subjectivist critique is forced into an impasse that objectivist conceptual tools must be used for countering objectivism, and the chapter suggests that this approach is doomed to failure because the more social sciences try to remain within the norms of prevailing science and orient towards natural sciences, the less emancipatory they become. Also discussed is the impact the separation between scientific cultures and disciplines become harmful under the influence of such a separation, disciplines are encouraged to polarize towards natural scientific discourse. When social sciences try to imitate natural sciences, they will not be able to go beyond the limited perspective of deduction and measurement.
It is suggested that social sciences should rethink their separation from philosophy, and by taking a stronger philosophical stance they can leave the relative safety of arbitrary dichotomies and reinvent their perspectives. Finally, it is argued that this is how unconventional frameworks that are geared for making sense of the world and doing justice to its multi-centric setting can be formed.

The third chapter illustrates how closely the Universalism of the Eurocentric tradition is linked with the homogenizing tendencies of globalization and the expansion of global Capitalism. It is argued that Eurocentrism and the theoretical project of modernization have already progressed very far and an all-encompassing process of standardization has started to dominate social existence. Against this background, the chapter focuses on the degree to which thinking processes of analysts are pre-structured. The metaphor of IKEAization is used in a novel way to make a twofold point related to understanding. While uniformity is promoted across the globe as a remedy for all ills, one-size-fits-all approaches have proven to be a failure. The contemporary social world is challenged by futile efforts of responding to the pressing questions of the time with standardized solutions. This chapter contends that since there can be no universally applicable Absolute, there can be no linearity in development either; hence attempts to globally impose linear development can only result in an unequal configuration which would fuel hegemonic thinking. Finally, the chapter argues that the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South challenges the hegemonic attitude of rendering problems invisible without even trying to tackle them.

The fourth chapter engages with the main thesis of the dissertation by elaborating on post-schools of thought which are identified as generators of counter-hegemonic thought motivated by the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South. The chapter sheds some light on two polarizing attitudes toward post-schools, neo-colonial persistence and provincialist isolation in thought, and argues that both perspectives are unproductive and must be avoided. The chapter acknowledges the continuing relevance of the post-schools with reference to their various contributions, but especially to the new perspective they bring for understanding the relation between structure and surface by
stressing the relative intrinsic logic of the surface as a determinant in this relation. Against this background, the chapter discusses that if the hegemonic structures are not only external but also laid down in thought, analysts with critical inclinations or not, can never be fully aware of the hegemonic pre-structuredness. This means neither reflection on structure nor on thought can unveil the hegemonic pre-structuredness and overcome it, thus reflection either from the hegemon or the counter-hegemon remains limited and the potential of emancipatory understanding stands inactivated. The chapter suggests that one must look somewhere else to find an entry point into counter-hegemonic thought, and by putting forward the idea that social occurrences are a good place to turn the attention to for finding counter-hegemonic potentiality, the chapter sets the background for the next chapter to elaborate on this idea.

The fifth chapter follows the final argument of the fourth chapter on the relationship between social occurrences and counter-hegemonic potentiality by discussing that critical thinking can be fueled by such events if they are interpreted in an emancipatory way. To develop this argument further, the chapter first revisits the argument made in the previous chapter on re-imagining the relationship between structure-surface, and exemplifies the meta-level discussion with reference to the case of contemporary Turkish political configuration. The chapter argues that if social upheavals can serve as a laboratory for testing the limits of understanding, such an examination would lead to the conclusion that an authentic counter-hegemonic perspective can arise only from a counter-hegemonic configuration. And since such a configuration is closely tied to an event, eventfulness cannot be artificially created or imagined hypothetically; hence even in the cases where analysts try to be genuinely critical, their Herculean empirical and theoretical efforts are destined to remain limited. The chapter reviews the history of June 2013 protests in Turkey for elaborating on these ideas.

The sixth chapter looks at the question of emancipatory understanding within the context of counter-hegemonic events, using the example of June 2013 events in Turkey for clarifying the conception of emancipatory understanding and pushing the theory further. After placing a set of arguments, the chapter goes back to the earlier parts of the
dissertation for shaping the vision of the main contention: hegemonic pre-structuredness is tied together with the everyday order of things and it is perceived as common-sensical knowledge. One cannot escape from common-sense simply by taking a self-critical stance, because even when making an effort to step out of hegemonic pre-structuredness, the analyst still continues to presuppose most of the categories of thought that are used. Against this background, this chapter puts forward three fundamental principles which constitute the backbone of the argument that must be understood by the analyst who strives to develop critical thought. First, understanding, in one form or the other, is inherently limited and the perspective of the analyst remains largely restricted. Second, even this limited perspective needs a counter-hegemonic event to set the background for it as a necessary condition for thought, as this is only when the critical perspective can be seen as legitimate. Third, even when the first two conditions are provided, understanding is destined to remain unfinished in the hermeneutical sense, and complete understanding can only remain as a desire.

The seventh chapter continues the discussion of the possibility of counter-hegemonic events, with a focus on the structure of counter-hegemonic events in general and the June 2013 upheaval in Turkey in particular. The chapter argues that a counter-hegemonic event does not automatically become a condition for emancipatory understanding; analysts have to recognize the counter-hegemonic aspects of the event and interpret the event in this particular way. This then leads to a consciousness leap towards critical thinking. This chapter elaborates on the concept of consciousness leap by arguing that while in everyday life social actors pass by social events which are potentially relevant for creating new categories of thought, these occurrences are not made an issue for counter-hegemonic thought. They go unnoticed, which in return teaches analysts an important lesson: one’s relative distance to the socially transformative event and the density of one’s involvement will determine whether or not and to what extent one registers the possibility for a consciousness leap, rendering the possibility for counter-hegemonic emancipatory understanding detectable only on the border between hegemony-dominated and counter-hegemony-dominated spheres. Finally, by following
Alain Badiou but adding to his philosophy, the chapter distinguishes two types of thinking, event based and event driven, and argues that since critical thinking tries not to classify the interpreted event under existing categories, and understands truth as an incomplete process, event driven thinking will be the engine of new thinking and elevate critical thinking, even though it will be short-lived. Event based thinking, on the other hand, will draw on this new stage of critical thinking and last longer, contributing to critical thinking until the new event occurs which will be interpreted accordingly and change critical thinking again.

The chapters previous to the final chapter have examined the possibilities for counter-hegemonic thought, and left for the final chapter the duty to address the question of what can be done to promote emancipatory understanding within and outside universities. The eight chapter looks at the contemporary public role of the universities and launches a critique of the contemporary university system. It argues that the current system of higher education by its very nature cannot promote emancipatory understanding. On the contrary, it blocks unconventional patterns of thought and works against this emancipatory mission. It is argued that part of the incapacity of the university system to promote emancipatory understanding is related to the structural factors that are inherent in prevailing forms of science. This explains why a comprehensive university reform, which is conducive to emancipatory understanding is needed. The chapter argues that Michael Burawoy’s two-fold strategy, taking up knowledge forms from the Global South, and expanding university and social sciences even more to the general public, may be an effective way to respond to the overall limitations in higher education.
Chapter 1: Contemporary Configuration

The introductory chapter sets the background for the discussion to come in the rest of the dissertation. It provides reference points for subsequent chapters in four subsections. The chapter elaborates upon each of these subsections at the outset of the discussion. It summarizes the ways in which they relate to the overall discussion in the rest of the dissertation.

The first section of the chapter undertakes two sets of important tasks: first, it investigates the objectivist and subjectivist antinomy. The ostensible purpose of the chapter is to challenge the categorization: it is argued that the aforementioned division is arbitrary. But the real goal of the chapter is making use of the categorization: the dichotomization has substantial basis. It gives hints about one’s approach to understanding. The chapter utilizes the dichotomization as a tool of mental stimulation. The goal is reaching at emancipatory understanding. In accordance with this purpose, the antinomy is implemented to be nevertheless gradually transcended.

The first section secondly discusses that the objectivist science is asserting itself with the spread of global capitalism. The objectivist science, therefore, promotes monophonic ways of understanding of being in the world. To counter this trend, it is argued that subjectivist approaches to understanding must be encouraged. This is how an emancipatory perspective is expected to be developed in the end. As a consequence of this process, a revival of egalitarian spontaneity is anticipated.

The second section of the chapter attempts to understand the roots of two distinct attitudes which are coined as objectivism and subjectivism. The section relates the question at hand to civilizational analysis. A tentative answer is found in the civilizational status of capitalist modernity: one must appreciate alternative ways of being in the world. This is how one can stand against the domination of a monophonic understanding of the capitalist modernity. The concept of alternative modernities must be underlined.

In the light of the above discussion, the section highlights the importance of the practice of unthinking. It explains why the practice of unthinking should be considered as
a prerequisite for building emancipatory understanding. The section draws on the ideas of the postcolonial scholar Chatterjee and underscores the importance of criticizing the Western sociological tradition. It is argued that Western sociological tradition has institutionalized the Western perspective of capitalist modernity. According to this framework future was envisioned. When the normative culture of capitalism was formed, it has determined the contemporary way of being in the world. Alternative ways of being in the world were dismissed. The section arrives at an overall conclusion: the motivation behind unthinking the tradition of capitalist modernity is not one of provincialism but a meta-level engagement. And this meta-level struggle aims at finding sound ways forcountering hegemony.

The third section concentrates on the issue of emancipatory imagination. It focuses on how global capitalism has rendered objective science as the norm. It argues that the phenomenon of the rise of the Global South can be registered as an ontological shift. It is also discussed that such an ontological transformation must be directed in the right way. This can be accomplished via the lessons learned from the self-reflective provincialization of the hegemonic order. The all-encompassing ideologization of global capitalism will be countered this way.

Against this background, the third section elaborates on the contemporary trends. It is argued that the gravitation of the current forms of hegemonic thinking to the project of de-provincialization is recognizable today. This is how the Universalist hegemony claims its former prestige. The section accordingly envisages a strong inter-relationship between premeditated thinking and the intellectual tendency of conforming to prevalent traditions of thought. It is argued that this is how subjectivist approaches are dismissed or incorporated. The section highlights what is known as the narcissistic dilemma of the subjectivist critiques: in a configuration where an all-encompassing ideology shapes consciousness, the only way for emancipatory understanding to come into being is via event based and event driven imagination. The section elaborates upon a solution which is neither about reinventing the wheel, nor reaching a level of transcendental consciousness, but rather about arriving at a leap of consciousness. It is argued that this is
how one can at times avoid premeditated thinking and attempt at launching a new knowledge initiative.

The fourth section amplifies the notion of hysteria—the mood of the marginalized and illegitimate. It focuses the attention on the self-evidentalized equilibrium in a given order. It provides three options to challenge conformism and alter reality: destructive anarchism, docile reconciliation, and enhancing embryonic emancipatory consciousness for acquiring future legitimacy. The third option is favored. It is argued that the opponents of emancipatory understanding are connected to the system. Therefore, they are always better equipped for supporting the stance they take. In the worst case scenario they could always resist to counter-hegemonic critiques by creating imaginary enemies through a process of ahistoricization. The fourth section of the first chapter closes with an argument: a counter-hegemonic emancipatory threshold comes into being as a result of an eventful constellation of consciousness. Any project that does not serve this purpose must be perceived as suspicious. One must aim for the unattainable desire: utopia.

**Antinomy**

There is some value in stating the obvious at the outset: objectivism and subjectivism are two ambiguous terms. One cannot divide social theory into two camps. Categorizations of this kind are arbitrary. Different takes on the subject matter converge on different levels. Clear-cut classifications are challenging. They are hard to achieve and intrinsically problematic. It is difficult to find convincing reference points.

One cannot rely on the differences that are created through binaries. Such binary codes are inherited from the society as commonsensical norms. These norms provide the default principles for being part of that particular society. This is how understanding being in the world in that particular context comes into being. Analysts can try to transcend binary codes and dualisms. This is important for maintaining a critical distance.

Gender relations are a perfect representative example. One is taught to understand male in relation to female. The conceptual and linguistic world is pre-structured
accordingly. Binary constructions are self-evidentalized. The constructions of the conceptual and the linguistic world are rendered commonsensical. This way they gain real effects. Social agents start making sense of their being in the world in reference to these guidelines. This is how binaries self-evidentalize inequality. Male is privileged over the female. The category of female is gradually marginalized (Boler, 2010, p.193; Foster, 2008, p. 273; Pacifici, 2000, pp. 223-226).

Binaries are nothing but interdependent linguistic devices. One term is defined by the absence of the other. They must be challenged and dismantled. A dialogical approach must be encouraged. Critical analysts may keep their critical distance with binaries. Nevertheless, they cannot dispute persistent patterns. They cannot turn a blind eye to the polarization of different schools of thought. Analysts are faced with the challenge of understanding today’s multi-centric world. They have to try clustering persistent sets of ideas. This is how they can come up with convincing analytical frameworks.

The terms objectivist and subjectivist have a history. But the varieties of meanings the two terms comprise cannot be entirely clear to analysts. There can be no one singular form of objectivism or subjectivism. Analysts, therefore, always practically transcend the boundaries of limited categorization. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) is a prime example. Bourdieu successfully harmonized the two strands of thought. Hence especially in the case of analysts like Bourdieu, framework of analysis cannot be categorized simply by choosing from one category or the other.

Bourdieu’s sociology is received in all kinds of ways by intellectuals from different parts of the world who belong to various schools of thought. There is especially a lot written on Bourdieu’s formulation of habitus. Bourdieu claimed that habitus is an analytical tool. It transcends the objectivist–subjectivist antinomy. The concept can be regarded as the backbone of Bourdieu’s theorizing. And reception of his work can be interpreted and understood in terms of reactions to the conceptualization of habitus (Bourdieu, 2002). Two types of interpretation of Bourdieu’s theorizing can be put forward: supporters and critics.
Those who support Bourdieu’s analytical conceptualization contend that Bourdieu has been successful at marrying phenomenological sensitivity of the tradition of suspicion to phenomenological positivism of the analytical tradition. And thus Bourdieu transcended the objectivist–subjectivist antinomy. Therefore, Bourdieu’s theorization cannot be categorized by the antinomy. One can even conclude that he contributed to the global development of emancipatory understanding. Bourdieu’s critics would disagree with this interpretation. According to this perspective, Bourdieu was not successful at incorporating the issues related to the concern of phenomenological sensitivity. Therefore, even though Bourdieu’s sociology can be regarded as a novel effort to dismantle the objectivist–subjectivist antinomy, Bourdieu in their view has to remain an objectivist. It could be even argued that Bourdieu conceals his deterministic and reductionist approach by using an ambiguous language about his theorizing. As a conclusion then, following this particular line of interpretation, one can even argue that Bourdieu’s contribution to emancipatory thinking has been mainly harmful (Harker, Mahar & Wilkes, 1990).

Critics of Bourdieu accordingly make couple of critical claims: Bourdieu is methodologically and theoretically distanced to social constructivism. He is mainly concerned with strengthening the objectivist point of view. His incorporation of phenomenological sensitivity serves the purposes of legitimizing an objectivist perspective. And what matters for Bourdieu is specifying the social mechanisms that structurally condition one’s being in the world. The opposite approach would be refusing to interpret Bourdieu’s theorizing as objectivistic. According to this view, even though one cannot deny that Bourdieu is rigorously empirical, his commitment to empirical work never translates into determinism or reductionism (Robbins, 1991). On the contrary, Bourdieu sees irregularities in social life as inevitable. He never excludes them from his theorizing. Even though habitus inevitably runs into inconsistencies and ambiguities in social analysis, Bourdieu argues that shortcomings are somewhat negligible. The most important irregularities can be grasped within the boundaries of habitus. And thus habitus
proves to be a quite successful analytical category. It thrives at comprehending empirical phenomena (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

As a conclusion, although it is possible to consider Bourdieu’s analysis an area of investigation that relies almost exclusively on positivistic empirical data in order to advance and extend its theories, it will only become evident after a closer look at his work that such a view can no longer be considered as tenable. It will become evident to the reader that because of the success of his phenomenologically sensitive analytical tool, habitus, Bourdieu is ironically accused of being reductionist. Thus, from this standpoint, it could be put forward that Bourdieu has been successful at transcending the objectivist–subjectivist antinomy. This is why he has been criticized by both parties. Against the background of this discussion, one can then conclude that even in the case of a sophisticated thinker like Bourdieu, who gets very close to transcending the limited boundaries of the objectivist–subjectivist antinomy, it is possible to talk about two distinct tendencies of thinking which prove to be relevant for contemplating on emancipatory understanding (Robbins, 1991).

This text cannot address all kinds of different aspects of the objectivist and subjectivist debate. It can, however, set the background by clarifying what is meant by objectivism and subjectivism. This can be done by shedding some light on the philosophical bases of the two approaches. To do so, one needs to follow the standard philosophical convention and focus on three branches of philosophy. Regarding the philosophical bases of the subjectivist and objectivist traditions, three relevant points—ontological, epistemological and methodological—can be made.

First, there is a fundamental difference between the objectivist and subjectivist ontological positions. While the former argues that a truth claim can be made, the latter is hesitant to make such exhaustive truth claims. The objectivist approach argues that one can grasp reality as it is. The subjective approach, on the other hand, puts a special emphasis on subjectivity for highlighting the internal dimensions of perception mechanisms. Second, when the epistemological bases of the two approaches are contrasted, it will be seen that while the objectivist party aims for causal laws at best
(e.g., positivism), and probabilistic laws at worst (e.g., post-positivism), subjectivist thought puts a special emphasis on the contextual (and empathetic) nature of knowledge (e.g., interpretivism). Third, as far as the methodological matters are concerned, objectivist thought tends to be empiricist. It is after unambiguous data. To do that, it uses hard methods which came into being after the social sciences followed the lead of the methods of natural science. Subjectivist thought, on the other hand, allows vast space for contingency and ambiguity. It uses methods which are recognized as soft by the objectivist line of thought. According to subjectivist thought, the discussion around methods—hard or soft—is irrelevant. No uniform ready-made method out there can be applied to each and every single case. Meaning and empathetic understanding are the ultimate aims of subjectivist thought (Knöbl, 2012; Söyler, 2007).

Therefore, without suggesting that the existent diversity of academic cultures can be homogenized, and despite the difficulties and criticism one could encounter by putting forward such a categorization, it is argued in this text that the two terms can be articulated as enabling concepts.

One must simply acknowledge the fundamental ontological, epistemological, and methodological differences between the two different stances. These are not two faces of the same coin. The disagreements between the two approaches concern more than the methods they use. Accordingly, three relevant points need to be raised at this stage.

First, subjectivism and objectivism are not purely mental constructions of the philosopher or the historian. Two distinct lines of thought have dominated the history of social sciences. The categorization has a substantial basis. Whether to call them something else may not be necessarily an interesting discussion. Second, subjectivism and objectivism both came into being for understanding social phenomena. But they are built upon entirely different principles. The cornerstone of subjectivist thought is the recognition of the importance of the subjective experience of the narrators. A narrator’s being in the world is the principal element to be understood. From this existential ground level, one progresses towards other levels (i.e., micro, meso, macro, civilizational, etc.). Objectivism, on the other hand and more than anything else, is concerned with the big
picture, and it applies abstract analytical frameworks so that one can consequently make sense of the singular cases through regression. It may be necessary to emphasize again that analysts such as Bourdieu successfully use both techniques in their analyses. Third, objectivism and subjectivism exist in antagonism. But stating that objectivists are the archenemies of the subjectivists would be a gross exaggeration. One must however underline the importance of the dynamic of the aforementioned antagonism. The objectivist lines of thought maintain a negative attitude towards subjectivism by excluding it. This is far from being a productive dialectical confrontation. By trying to assimilate the subjectivist approach in academia in a rather systematic way, the objectivist approach claims a strong monopoly on what science means.

If the monopoly of objectivist thought is taken for granted, and the quality of science one does is judged accordingly, relational and relativistic approaches—different forms of subjectivist thought—will not look different from each other. Neither of these approaches would successfully fulfill the objectivist criteria of science (e.g., against such criteria one must note, even Bourdieu’s relational sociology would not fall into the category of science). The dismissal of all subjectivist thought, then, leads to a shortfall in explanations for phenomena that cannot be reduced to objectivist arguments. Thus, knowledge of the social world will be reduced to a certain conception of science which does not do justice to the multiplicities of other ways of both being in the world and of understanding the social world. With the spread of global capitalism, a monophonic understanding of science is fast becoming common currency in these days of renewal. As of now, this proves to be one of the biggest obstacles against the development of emancipatory understanding. While the ontological universe is being transformed and creating possibilities for an emancipatory transformation, epistemology and methodology continue following hegemonic trends. For future emancipatory struggles, it is a matter of utmost importance that the way is smoothed for all kinds of understanding. Without the guidance of subjectivist perspectives, the risks for hegemony reconstituting itself are just higher.
Being in the World

If the point elaborated above is valid and there are substantial reasons for analysts to name two schools of thought, a question must follow from this construction: why do some analysts tend for the objectivist line of thought while others aim for the subjectivist trend? This is a fundamental question. As any other question which relates to the rudiments of a subject at hand, this question cannot be answered with sweeping generalizations which surely will fail to stand up to scrutiny. Any answer needs to be related to the being in the world of the subject of the investigation. After a large enough number of singular cases has been examined, one may gradually arrive at a point which enables to speculate on a particular empirically grounded pattern. Therefore, one needs to work with a fore-structure and utilize a guiding theoretical approach: an existential framework of analysis can be interpreted sociologically.

The activities of human beings are influenced if not determined to a good extent by their particular thrownness into the world. Therefore, an analyst’s understanding of the world is very much related to his or her particular way of being in the world (Heidegger, 1986, p. 142). In the first instance, the practice of relating an analyst’s take on social inquiry to this analyst’s being in the world appears to be a subjectivist answer to a subjectivist question. When one takes a closer look, the subjectivist nature of the question and the answer do not appear as obvious. The existential language can be translated into a sociological one. The same theorization would translate as follows: one’s social existence (being in the world) is directly related to one’s situatedness in the respective social structure (thrownness) (Heidegger, 1986, p.55). Therefore, one’s understanding of the surrounding world is mostly conditioned by the milieu and the socio-culture (Rehbein, 2007) to which one belongs (inauthenticity of existence) (Heidegger, 1986). The particularities of one’s existence, in other words, habitus—one’s momentousness of thrownness— (Bourdieu, 2002), will shape one’s way of seeing the world (Kinville & Söyler, 2012; Rehbein, 2007). Human existence and activities in this world are very much determined by different layers of existential conditions.
In order to probe into the reasons why some tend for the objectivist line of thought while others for that of subjectivist, an analyst can take the benefit of a compartmentalized and cascaded analysis: one first investigates the narrator’s habitus, and locate this person in habitus groups and milieus (Bourdieu, 2002). Second, the social embeddedness of the subject in socio-cultures, social structures and cultures are determined (Rehbein, 2007). Finally, the analyst tries to locate the subject in the civilizational context (Eisenstadt, 2003). The analyst gradually reaches from the ground level of individual to the overarching framework of civilization. This way a sociological inquiry of one’s being in the world—micro sociology on the interactional level—is pushed into a civilizational analysis—macro sociology focusing on the historical patterns: *longue durée* (Braudel, 1980). The result of such an analysis is high-level analytical abstraction.

Seeing everyday actions through civilizational spectacles is no doubt a speculative effort. Analysts construct abstract theoretical models for explaining various dimensions of one’s being in the world. But existence presents a complex mosaic of relations. And any generalizing statement on these relations is bound to be empirically false. This is why narrators would rarely feel that such general descriptions about their ways of being in the world correspond in all ranks to their own personal experiences. Narrators inevitably lack personal details. The abstract view of the analyst appears very different from the substance of their lived experience. To state the obvious: analytical frameworks are broad and vague. Analytical truth is rarely a good mirror for emotional truth. And proposed models have to deal with critiques. At the ultimate end, lived experience is very personal. And it may never be understood completely (Mandelbaum, 1970, pp. 11-12). Complete transparency is an unattainable desire: even the narrator may not understand himself or herself. Therefore, the mismatch between emotional and analytical truth is evident. And it cannot be of immediate concern.

One will not give up research practice because of lack of transparency in understanding. This is particularly the case in the civilizational analysis. Intellectuals dedicate their lives to bridging classical and contemporary sociological theory with
comparative history. For the last decades, Eisenstadt has been the leading name in this field (2003). It is possible to interpret Eisenstadt’s work in all different kinds of ways. To remain within the confines of this text, a particular interpretation can be highlighted: one of Eisenstadt’s main foci has always been investigating how world-views (including objectivism and subjectivism) are shaped by civilizational heritage. Civilizational analysis by definition promotes a multi-centric approach to history. Therefore, it could be claimed that Eisenstadt primarily works on the civilizational status of modernity (Eisenstadt, 1999, p. 62). Eisenstadt historicizes modernity. He deconstructs the dominant narratives in the social sciences which implicitly or explicitly make Universalist statements about Western modernity. According to Eisenstadt, Western modernity is significant in terms of civilizations. There is nothing essentially good or bad about it. It has acquired a global character. Therefore, it needs to be examined for exploring alternative ways of existing in the world. The desire for understanding alternative ways of being in the world is the major motivator for Eisenstadt’s investigation of multiple modernities. And it promises a theoretical exercise: one can practice stepping in and out of an all-encompassing ideologization and try to envisage an alternative order of things. This is why his approach proves fruitful for the discussion of emancipatory understanding. Eisenstadt’s historical analysis is accompanied by multi-disciplinary analyses by scholars from all around the world. Scholars from the Global South (more specifically from the former colonies) took the lead in these investigations. Indian multi-disciplinary postcolonial scholar Partha Chatterjee is one of the leading names in this field.

Chatterjee’s work branches out in many directions, which are far from easy to articulate. His critique of Western sociological tradition is relevant for the purposes of the argument in this chapter. Therefore, some light will be shed on this critique which complements Eisenstadt’s line of argument. Chatterjee starts his critique by putting Max Weber (1864-1920) under the spotlight. He argues that Western sociological tradition played a prime role in institutionalizing the particular world-view of Western civilization as universal (Chatterjee, 2012). According to Chatterjee’s understanding of the
development of Western modernity, Weber put out an intellectual framework through which the sociology of Western modernity was expressed as a global process: a project that was supposed to be carried out into the future. Weber identified the main aspect of modern society: the normative culture of capitalism. Rationalization and bureaucratization were the fundamental characteristics of this modern society. Disenchantment with the world in the form of secularization was the spirit of the times. Weber’s modern subject had a rational will. This subject was sovereign in decision making. Therefore, the modern subject was fully responsible for his or her actions (Chatterjee, 2012).

The application of Weber’s construction of the modern subject has been followed by scholars for generations. This particular conceptualization of the modern subject was not limited to the Global North (e.g., Amartya Sen, 1999). These were universal tendencies, historically compelling truths for all peoples of the world. Therefore, Weber’s construction was not only normatively legitimate but also binding. Once the norm was established, assigning Western modernization the quality of being universal, it meant that whatever Western modernization as a uniform package represented could be implemented globally. This was done in two forms: empirically and normatively (Chatterjee, 2012). Societies outside the limited geography of the West were chosen as subject matter for the sake of finding the best possible ways for the respective countries to adopt the universal Western formula. Universal norms were promoted by more developed societies. These were the means for evaluating the rest of the world. In the normative sense, these norms constituted universally desirable standards. This pedagogic attitude had an all-encompassing character. It derived its legitimacy from the particular historical experiences of the West (Chatterjee, 2012). In the context of this paper, an important component of this world-view is defined as objectivism. Even though a better conceptualization is always a possibility, as far as the limitations of this paper are concerned, the term objectivism serves its purpose.

As any other postcolonial intellectual, Chatterjee has been criticized of neglecting to think analytically about the historical differences between various Western
enlightenments (e.g., Cotesta, 2012). Critiques are not completely unwarranted. Postcolonial literature is not immune to what one might call as ‘reverse provincialism’. It partly suffers from the very same homogenizing and generalizing tendencies of the grand Western narrative that it makes issue of. This attitude can be understood against the background of the collective memory of colonialism. Emotionally charged analyses are related to the colonial past. Nevertheless, one must be careful at arriving at such totalizing conclusions. An evaluation based on wrong premises may result in a great loss. Postcolonial literature is incredibly rich and it provides many opportunities for learning new ways of understanding existence. Postcolonial thinkers, especially globally acknowledged ones such as Chatterjee, do not come even close to indulging an intellectual mood which is defined in the next sections as postcolonial hysteria. One can even make a statement in the same vein which will surely sound point-blank wrong: postcolonial literature is about everything but postcolonialism. Intellectuals like Chatterjee, who are teaching in the prestigious academic institution of the Global North, have no interest in homogenizing a diverse and plural body of Western experiences. Looking at their works up close, one will distinguish—among a mass of topics and material—a pattern revealing itself: while postcolonial thinkers seem to be primarily occupied with issues related to the colonial past of their respective countries, they are preoccupied with a bigger question on the meta-level. The philosophical attention is put on understanding hegemony. Ideally, this is how one must read postcolonial literature. It could be argued that influential postcolonial thinkers such as those mentioned in this text (e.g., Chatterjee, Ashish Nandy and Dipesh Chakrabarty) philosophize about finding new ways to form counter-hegemonic consciousness. They are essentially counter-hegemonic thinkers. They seek new ways to generate emancipatory understanding. Therefore, postcolonial literature can be interpreted against the background of the contributions they have been making to emancipatory understanding. The postcolonial engagement with colonial past, tradition and modernity can be understood accordingly.

This subsection aimed to shed some light on the works of Eisenstadt and Chatterjee. Without passing broader comments about the content of their works,
interpretative claims are put forward. The main purpose of drawing on Eisenstadt and Chatterjee was to point at the importance of the practice of questioning self-evidentalized aspects of being in the world. It is argued that one is situated in an all-encompassing order. And one tends to take his or her situatedness for granted. Such an indifference to existence reveals everyday persistence of conformity. Due to lack of self-reflectivity hegemony is reproduced every day. Emancipatory understanding requires counter-hegemonic thinking. And this cannot be done without stepping out of the all-encompassing order of things.

**Emancipatory Imagination**

With the spread of global capitalism objectivist conceptions of science have become the norm. The rise of the Global South has altered the ontological configuration (Rehbein, 2013). The transformation provides the intellectual environment for challenging this hegemonic pattern. The all-encompassing hegemonic ideologization of capitalist modernity can be now altered. Possibilities for building an alternative reality can never be completely dried up. To achieve this long-term goal, the transformation must be guided in the right direction. Emancipatory imagination can always be generated by the act of unthinking contemporary trends. There is a core principle for keeping one’s attention focused on the matter of emancipatory understanding: one can highlight the multidimensional aspects and consequences of existence. Relational notions of truth and critiques of Universalist reason are the keys to this endeavor. This attitude has an enduring history. It does not exist in a vacuum. A critical stance to society and life has always been relevant. Monophonic types of understanding of being in the world were never fully accepted as the only existing legitimate approaches. The attitude of building relational perspectives on truth has proved to be persistent. Nevertheless, this strand of thought has always been confronted by the objectivist school of thought. The confrontation today has turned into a conflict.
It can be argued that the Universalist hegemony is claiming its former prestige. It aims to re-legitimize itself and reestablish its authority. It tries to do so by following a shortcut: it chooses and follows the strategy of reducing contemporary subjectivist thinking to a fancy postmodern trend. Concerns of thrownness and emphases on existential analysis are presented as manifestations of postmodern fashion. According to this logic, postmodernism as a philosophical movement has completed its mission. Processes of dismantling or deconstructing are no more relevant. And one must now work on reassembling. Against this background, the project of provincializing objectivism is presented as irrelevant. A counter-project is promoted—de-provincialization: the contemporary forms of subjectivist critique are isolated from traditions of thought. They are presented to exist in vacuum. This is how subjectivist critiques are associated with a kind of contemporary self-help age mentality (Kinville & Söyler, 2012): subjectivist critiques are preoccupied with the contemporary tendency to love the self. Postmodern individuals are bombarded with the idea that they are unique and special. They, therefore, believe that they can develop a novel way of thinking and transform the world. The objectivist response amounts to an overall conclusion: it is probably not a good idea to try thinking differently. Creativity can be used for other purposes. One can, for example, try to put together a review of existing literature creatively. Analysts need to conform to the tradition.

The logic of the project of de-provincialization is self-fulfilling: a substantial argument is what elevates the discussion. Substantial arguments draw on literature. Subjectivist critique does not have a tradition. It does not draw on literature. Therefore, subjectivist critique is not substantial. And thus it does not elevate the discussion. Subjectivist critique then should be dismissed: one must put an end to the practice of schizophrenic deconstruction. Or the critique must be incorporated, for example, methodologically: as an internal part of the objectivist analysis. The dismissal takes the form of exclusion. Subjectivist perspectives are seen as irrelevant for science. They are pushed into the ‘impure’ fields of humanities and arts and aesthetics. Under the global hegemony of objectivist science, humanities as well as arts and aesthetics have been
terminated all over the globe. This is a process known as ‘the death of humanities’. Subjectivist perspectives in this way are marginalized. Incorporation of subjectivist analysis into that of objectivist takes the form of assimilation. Subjectivist thought is forced to clothe itself in the terminology and the conceptual apparatus of the objectivist tradition. The essential concerns of the subjectivist critique such as multiplicity, ambiguity, contingency, etc. are compromised. As a result, understanding in general is harmed. And emancipatory understanding in particular is mutilated.

No error can persist unless it contains a grain of truth. There must be some truth to the objectivist critique. Subjectivist perspectives can be preoccupied with a certain sense of postmodern love for the self. The world has not seen the end of history. But the world has definitely witnessed the phenomenon of the rapid spread of global capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992). Such a configuration promotes a neo-liberal ideology. And it is accompanied by a strong tendency for love of the self. Thinking is determined to a great extent by prevailing existential conditions. This sets the configuration within which the thinking process comes into being. Therefore, subjectivist critique borrows its elements from the world to which it turns its critical gaze. This is why a substantial critique of the system cannot be generated with ease from within. One can make bold claims: emancipatory imagination can always be generated by the act of unthinking contemporary trends. It is, however, not clear how one can step out of an all-encompassing ideologization. One’s consciousness is shaped or even determined by the social situatedness. In order to think different, one has to unclothe this consciousness. Therefore, it is definitely a matter of debate whether or not critical thinking can be critical enough. This is why emancipatory models of thinking are accused of falling into a narcissist dilemma: critical thinkers are so unique and special that rather than letting the world go its own way, they want to change the order of things by claiming a transcendental standpoint. Therefore, the argument goes, self-proclaimed emancipatory thinking is haunted by its inner contradiction: it is motivated by the postmodern love for the self.
Under these circumstances, one must highlight the difference between two types of claims. First, that the dominant ideology shapes the boundaries of the possible for counter-hegemonic critique. And second, that thinking is categorically determined by the dominant ideology. The former acknowledges spaces of potential social change: the dominant ideology might shape the consciousness but one can surmount given thresholds through leaps of consciousness. The latter denies the possibility of change: the dominant ideology conscribes emancipatory consciousness entirely (there-can-be-no-other-way thinking). There are good enough reasons to believe that there is always space for emancipatory thinking to flourish (Chapter 6 & Chapter 7). Otherwise discussing hegemony would be a contradictory act. Even in the case of a complete exhaustion of consciousness by the dominant ideology (i.e., a case of over-determination) there will always be a possibility for an opening of a threshold of emancipatory consciousness (e.g., an eventful configuration can provide the setting). Therefore, even though young and inexperienced analysts tend to be more excited about the possibility of change, it could be argued that their naiveté is not groundless. There will always be grounds for dialectical thinking to flourish. A substantial critique of the world in which the analyst lives will always be possible. The scale of the transformation will be debatable but there is always the possibility of emancipatory thinking. It is a matter of question exactly when thresholds of emancipatory consciousness persistently occur and different visions and alternative realities are provided with more space remains. Nonetheless, alternative ways of interpreting the world will come into being out of these efforts. Therefore, one cannot reduce this strand of thought to a banal postmodern ruckus (Žižek, 2011).

Emancipatory analysts have to deal with two contradictory forces which are forcing them to go in opposite directions. They try their hardest to think differently. At the same time, they are obliged to position their ideas within the available tradition. They are expected to use a prescribed language and a premeditated format. They are confronted with the task of thinking differently by meditating on what is already available. Analysts are paralyzed by these contradictory forces. They are habitualized in a normative framework. They are inevitably rendered docile. They lack the elements which a possible
act of resistance requires (Žižek, 2011). The act of thinking differently demands a journey to the self. It is true that after taking that journey, the farthest level a young scholar, or activist, or public intellectual usually reaches is not one of enlightenment but rather a shocking disillusionment. However, such a realization of one’s ignorance does not have to amount to a pessimistic conclusion. When emancipatory analysts try their hardest to think in novel ways, they are not necessarily trying to reinvent the wheel. They can aim towards unexplored territories while acquiring what is already available. They are not trying to reinvent the square wheel either. It is obvious that many problems were worked out by earlier efforts. And starting from ‘a point of zero’ would mean overlooking the state of the art. For an emancipatory analyst, thinking afresh takes place as part of a bigger project that would perhaps take a lifetime of work. Therefore, unthinking what is available—doubting—is not a project in its own right. In order to rethink, one does not have to invest large amount of time into the process of dismantling. The desire is not to come up with an entirely different way of thinking. It is rather the subtask of the emancipatory project. As it will be explained in the coming chapters, one should also regard the contribution of the post-schools from this perspective.

Several issues should be examined and acknowledged in order to set up a convincing argument in favor of launching a new knowledge initiative. Analysts must be aware of the risks involved in attempting to reach a threshold where emancipatory understanding becomes more probable. The more radical the proposal is the higher the probabilities are for creating an underdeveloped framework of understanding. Using a standard model of understanding as a blueprint would relatively prove to be easier. It would be hassle-free and provide better results. Going after embryonic forms of knowledge initiatives promises greater risks. The lack of prospects for producing rigorous and coherent new frameworks of analysis is the biggest liability of such an undertaking. But it needs to be remembered that the greater the risk of failure the bigger the potential payoff can be. Karl Marx (1818-1883) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) are good examples. They undertook the risk and departed from their usual structural austerity to develop a new approach. And they were rewarded by a
consciousness leap (Glock, 2004, p. 419; Knöbl, 2012; Monk, 1991; Wittgenstein, 1958, Preface, para. 1-3, 8-9). Emancipatory thinking, therefore, requires a separation from the limitations of conventions. One cannot force embryonic thought fragments in any single direction against their natural inclination. Otherwise, they would soon be crippled (Wittgenstein, 1958, Preface, para. 2). Expressing ideas in their incomplete forms—as albums of ideas—is a necessary intellectual engagement (Wittgenstein, 1958, Preface, para. 3). This is simply because reality is complex and thought lags behind (Söyler, 2009a, p. 67). Hence, emancipatory analysts focus on the opportunities provided by what is defined in this work as ‘emancipatory threshold’. Whenever an emancipatory constellation comes to surface, analysts are encouraged to submit their unfulfilled perspectives for common use and collective thinking. This does not mean that all perspectives have the same value. But this is also the point: one does not have to have a complete framework of ideas, a perfect closure of ideation, for being able to pass a relevant comment on a topic to which one is perhaps existentially connected than any other person. This is how one can benefit the most from an emancipatory eventfulness.

The particularities of one’s being in the world provide this person with a unique constellation of perspectives which enables one to grasp certain things better than the others (J. Souza, personal communication, December 24, 2013). Therefore, one must never be silent. On the contrary, one must make as much noise as possible (Sitas, 2012). A deprived person is the most competent expert on poverty. This is so even if the poor lack the necessary language for expressing the various dimensions of their deprivation (Narayan, Pritchett & Kapoor, 2009). Provided an opportunity and given a voice, they would be able to provide input that can be incorporated into the system of a scientific inquiry. When platforms are provided for people coming from all walks of life, they will be able to state their perspectives freely in their own language (Žižek, 2012a). Their relative existential advantages (e.g., lived experience) render them capable (Guru & Sarukkai, 2012). They will be able to come up with original perspectives. And novel perspectives would cumulatively amass and make analytical sense in the long run.
Science after all progresses in a cumulative fashion. This is not a bad idea if it is also applied academically (Rehbein, 2013).

**Hysteria**

In any given situation, the prevalent order of things dictates a conformist configuration where critical perspectives come under assault. Critical takes on this order problematize the self-evidentalized equilibrium. Therefore, they are marginalized on account of the fact that they threaten law and order. Critical perspectives are perceived as destructive and illegitimate. Legitimacy ultimately is defined in terms of one’s capacity to conform. When the configuration is altered, the definitions of conformism and nonconformism change. Conformists become illegitimate, and nonconformists become legitimate. Therefore, any struggle is essentially about changing the all-encompassing order of things.

If the struggle is about altering the configuration, and future legitimacy will be generated by this new setting, a counter-hegemonic resistance would need to stay away from two types of reactions: destructive anarchism and docile reconciliation. The problem with the first approach is that it regards the prevalent order of things as illegitimate and grants itself the right to use illegitimate means to retaliate. The second approach distorts the counter-hegemonic attention by coming to terms with the order by accepting secondary concessions from the opponent. Therefore, counter-hegemonic resistance must opt for the third option and work for the maturation of the embryonic emancipatory consciousness. This is how emancipatory agents will act upon altering the prevalent configuration for acquiring future legitimacy. Against this background, one can now shed some light on the objectivist strategy of reducing the subjectivist critique to a momentary disease of the postmodern age.

Whenever a counter-hegemonic approach proposes an alternative way of looking at the current order of things, it would receive resistance from the established tradition. As the established tradition is better equipped with a coherent framework of analysis which
has long been consensually validated, resistance would be sound and effective in misrepresenting the counter-hegemonic reaction by ahistoricizing it. Emancipatory analysts then must respond by highlighting the historical persistence of their line of thinking. As much as one can construct a lineage for the objectivist tradition from ancient times onwards, the opposite is very much possible, and a genealogy can be sketched for the subjectivist tradition. There has always been a persistent philosophical desire under different labels to challenge objectivist tradition. The goal has been “further[ing] reflexive understanding, hermeneutic mediation, and philosophical critique” (Scholte, 1972, p. 431). This has been ongoing and one must add a rather productive dialectical process between traditions of scientific and interpretative, objectivist and subjectivist, value free and normative approaches. Therefore, it can be claimed that objectivists are fighting against an ahistorical enemy that they have created in their minds by misrepresenting reality. This imaginary enemy can be called *postcolonial hysteria*.

After successfully historicizing the counter-hegemonic thinking, one must deal with what happens to be a central issue in emancipatory thinking. If everything really flows and one’s consciousness is determined by one’s being in the world, this would mean that for an alteration to occur in one’s consciousness, the world one lives in needs to be transformed fundamentally. The opposite is also true. A fundamental transformation in the configuration can come into being as a result of a shift in consciousness. Then neither the historical deposit of emancipatory consciousness, nor a large scale change in the configuration can guarantee an emancipatory leap. As it will be argued in the later stages of this text, a counter-hegemonic emancipatory threshold comes into being as a result of an eventful constellation of consciousness and the world that embeds that consciousness. That constellation is unique in the sense that at that particular time and space an unprecedented network of relations manifests itself. The constellation can be imagined as an emancipatory laboratory that comes into being for a brief period of time. It produces a new subject that constitutes the object of the investigation. The emancipatory consciousness of the new subject constantly changes. It is a self-reflective, debating and learning subject who understands history. It is then a matter of utmost importance to learn
from these events as well as from the new subjects as they transcend the earlier emancipatory consciousness. As the discussion is elevated, the earlier emancipatory consciousness that is not charged by the eventfulness is obliged to tune itself according to this new emancipatory constellation (Chapter 7).

It has been argued that the objectivist line of thought understands the project of provincializing Western social sciences as a part of an outdated postmodern deconstruction philosophy. The idea follows that postmodern philosophy has come to a dead-end and the time has come to launch a counter reconstruction project. The goal of this project is to de-provincialize Western social sciences. Depending on the context, de-provincialization may refer to at least two complementary issues. First, it implies the obvious necessity of reinterpreting classical Western social theory. Contemporary Western social theory will be construed beyond Eurocentric frameworks. Second, it points to an intellectual weariness that calls for transcending Eurocentrism by merely circumventing it. An intellectual rush to de-provincialize social theory is significant and it creates suspicion. Hegemonic aspects of the objectivist Eurocentric perspectives are perceived to be persistent in this new trend. Post-Eurocentric counter-hegemonic thinking accordingly takes a defensive position.

From a postcolonial perspective, the de-provincialist viewpoint reflects a typical situation where, seemingly for every attempt to make progress in a project, an actual retrograde performance is achieved. In that vein, it is claimed that the modernization mindset is persistent in the de-provincialist undertaking: the world is divided into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries; countries belonging to the latter two follow the lead of the core countries; since the knowledge is produced in core countries, the postcolonial debate itself was initiated and framed in core countries; and now the core can put forward the idea that the postcolonial discussion is over, lessons are learned and one can be led toward a more scientific approach. If that is the case, the postcolonial critique concludes that the project of de-provincialization will eventually hit the wall. A sophisticated repackaging of good old modernist thinking will not successfully meet the demands of an increasingly globalized world.
Since its publication in the year 2000, Dipesh Chakrabarty's highly influential book *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, as the title of the book clearly suggests, has established the idea of provincializing Europe as the focal point of the ongoing debate on how to approach the social sciences after Western hegemony. By drawing on poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophies, as well as Indian philosophical tradition, Chakrabarty puts forward his dislike and disapproval of the scientism dominant in the investigation of social worlds (Chakrabarty, 2000, 2011).

Chakrabarty uses the concepts such as Europe and the West interchangeably. He does not refer to the particular regions of the northern hemisphere. Chakrabarty’s argumentation is in line with the rest of the important postcolonial thinkers. His main concern is engaging with a worldview which carries the traces of the Weberian view of modernity. He neither conforms to the Occidentalist trends, nor attacks the Western scientific tradition by demonizing it. According to Chakrabarty the discussion of provincialization is important and relevant. Because when it is measured against the particular view of Western modernity, India’s (or any country’s for that matter) backwardness has to follow logically. This particular Weberian perspective, argues Chakrabarty, remains unchallenged (Chakrabarty, 2000, 2011).

Chakrabarty argues that other critiques of Western hegemony are equally important and valuable. But these otherwise impressive theoretical perspectives such as world-systems analysis do not really successfully unthink the fixation on Western conceptions of development (Wallerstein, 1974, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Wallerstein’s macro-sociological systematic analytical framework draws on Braudel’s (1902-1985) historical analysis. The latter offers more of a qualitative sensitivity (e.g., Braudel, 1979/1982a, 1979/1982b, 1979/1982c). Similarly, Chakrabarty reacts to the aforementioned modernization mindset as a historian. He puts forward the point of view of the subalterns.

There are several ways to analyze Chakrabarty’s work. It would not be wrong if one were to translate his concept of provincialization as an act of unthinking Western
capitalist modernity. This view is generally shared by postcolonial thinkers from different disciplinary backgrounds.

What makes Chakrabarty’s point relevant for this work in general and the de-provincialization debate in particular is his seemingly contradictory conviction that provincializing Europe is an unattainable desire. According to Chakrabarty, the Western construction of modernity is an all-encompassing one. It penetrates all aspects of social life. Institutions such as academic ones, therefore, take their share from this ideologization (Chapter 8). Provincialization in the ideal sense is highly unlikely, if ever, to be achieved. To attain complete provincialization, a high level of reflexivity and a full realization from within must take place. And that requires an unthinking process rather than an act of thinking hard. Such a transcendent self-reflexivity is only an ideal. The logical dilemma of setting up an unattainable goal is put forward by Chakrabarty’s objectivist critics who seem to be keen on transcending Eurocentrism by simply circumventing it. This is how a counter-trend, de-provincialization, is legitimized.

All these different interpretations of Chakrabarty’s critique of the universalization of an exclusive Western conceptualization of modernity miss one fundamental point: the discussion here is not about reaching a transcendent and almost spiritual level of self-reflexivity. The desire to attain a state of complete provincialization is impossible. Nevertheless, it is also irrelevant. Chakrabarty argues something else: a fundamental transformation of consciousness has to be preceded by an ontological change. That change is now due to reach its final stage. This phenomenon is coined the rise of the Global South (e.g., Rehbein 2010). Introducing the hypothesis of the rise of the Global South serves two purposes: first, it renders any form of de-provincialization an anachronistic project. This is simple logic. If it is true that Europe and North America are losing power in relative terms (there is all kinds of empirical evidence to support this theory), their ability to assert a globally accepted ideology is mutilated. Second, it helps one to make a strong point: critiques such as Chakrabarty’s do not exist in a vacuum. They share family resemblances with their Western antecedents.
There is an abundance of evidence in history that when a political power (e.g., 18th century Germany) seemingly starts lagging behind in comparison to other actors with which it is organically linked (e.g., 18th century France), the intelligentsia of the former would first take in the hegemon’s philosophy. Only after digesting it, provided that the necessary consciousness for rebellion is already matured, the hegemonized would gradually react against the hegemonizing ideology which it initially embraced. In that sense, Chakrabarty’s or any other important postcolonial figure’s (e.g., Gandhi, Ambedkar) reaction to modernity is not categorically different than, for example, Herder’s reaction to ‘the Enlightenment’ philosophy (Dietze, 2008; Pathak, 2011; Söyler, 2010a, 2010b).

Similarities between Western and non-Western scholars of the respective traditions are not coincidental. When one compares the postcolonial non-Western critiques of the Western social science models with the Counter-Enlightenment critiques one would see that they share essential fundaments. The most important commonality is that Western or non-Western critical traditions alike emphasize that the universal reason of the Enlightenment tradition is not as universal as it has been hitherto understood. The relational tradition of philosophy teaches that, as one’s faculties of reason are conditioned by one’s respective language and culture, reason has to be contextualized. To elaborate by using Bourdieu’s terminology, one’s thinking is not free of one’s habitus and the related dispositions (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 27). If this is so, it logically follows that any type of investigation of social worlds has to be empirically informed. Existence is multidimensional and one’s being in the world has to be grasped in its completeness, not speculatively by applying a set of arbitrary external criteria (Söyler, 2011b).

As was emphasized earlier, acknowledging the role existential conditions play in understanding the interactions in social worlds does not necessarily imply a relativistic philosophy. On the contrary, taking existential dimensions of social life into account encourages one to meditate on the universal aspects of being. However, just as Wittgenstein first targets an ideal theoretical closure of understanding (universal), but settles unwillingly for constructing a representative configuration (particular) in the end,
a relational line of thought emphasizes the lack of the representative quality of the singular and the impossibility of abstracting the universal, so that one bases his or her investigation empirically on the level of the particular (Rehbein, 2010; Söyler, 2011a, 2011c).

Against this background, if one is determined to find a common basis for a comparative study of cultures (and civilizations), placing the existential analytic at the heart of the inquiry could prove to be effective. More specifically, without tending towards sociobiology (e.g., TenHouten, 2007; Turner, 2007), one could focus on the basic dimensions of existence such as emotions (Söyler, 2009b). When a biological fundament is translated into the sociological field, this would mean a focus on emotional aspects of existence such as feelings of happiness and deprivation (Söyler, 2009b). Although these universal emotions manifest themselves entirely differently in different settings in various forms of feelings, every person in the end desires to be happy and overcome deprivation in the most general sense. The key point to grasp here is that although happiness is a universal emotion, what is perceived as happiness in life, that is “the” good life, a specific and personal feeling, cannot be understood in a univocal manner (Rehbein, 2011). In other words, as an old English saying clearly points out, one person’s meat is another person’s poison. However good one might think his or her life is, this view of life does not necessary appeal to the rest of the world. Although this may sound like stating the obvious, the persistence of the modernization mindset renders such an elaboration necessary (Söyler, 2010b).

As far as scientism in understanding social worlds is concerned, there are strong family resemblances between Western and non-Western critiques of the Universalist reason of the hegemon. One can argue that in whatever forms subjectivist critiques might manifest themselves, they have always been marginalized and labeled as anti-scientific in objectivist thought. According to one of the fundamental messages of this work, the rise of the Global South marks a point in history which creates an intellectual environment that favors the subjectivist line of thought. Although both Western and non-Western critiques of objectivist scientism have great respect for the ideas of European
Enlightenment(s) and related scientific achievements, they underline how important cultural differences in understanding social worlds are, and they criticize the idea that the histories of peoples all over the world can be adequately described and measured according to a set of Western norms. This is why a critique of the grand narratives of European Enlightenment(s) is central to both of them, and this is again why they conceive of the investigation of social worlds as mainly an empirical task.

The emphasis of Western theory on equality is significant. Equality must be applied to all peoples of the world at all times. But this cannot be done selectively (e.g., gender equality). Equality has to start at the basic level, which is the equal right to make truth claims. Today one has to be conscious of this development, and without adopting an attitude of indifference, one must support the spread of the subjectivist line of thought, especially in academic settings.

**Conclusive Remarks**

This chapter started out with a contrastive juxtaposition of objectivism and subjectivism, highlighting their antonymic nature while at the same time touching the various levels on which these approaches take a different stance (i.e. ontological, epistemological and methodological differences). The significance of understanding these core principles can be illustrated by the following: emancipatory imagination can only be considered possible if basic assumptions about objectivism and tendencies to discredit subjective approaches as too emotional and individualistic are broken open. The rise of the Global South and tendencies of the emancipatory reshaping of reality as a consequence remind today’s researchers that they cannot adhere rigidly to the objectivist-subjectivist debate but must find new, innovative ways to make sense of and confront the logics of hegemony.
Chapter 2: Post-Hysteria

This chapter deals with the role of social sciences in understanding. It argues that the major role of social sciences is to make substantial contributions to understanding society. The chapter probes into the issue of situatedness of social sciences. It follows Chapter 1 by questioning the objectivist-subjectivist antinomy. It argues that persistence of this separation has led to the generating of a stronger polarization by enhancing limitations and antagonisms in the quest for understanding. In order to problematize this trend, and name it as a threat to emancipatory understanding, the chapter proceeds by looking into the historical development of the social sciences and sheds some light on their evolution from philosophy and their relation to natural sciences. The chapter questions whether or not such categorizations are still meaningful and applicable in the academia of today’s multi-centric and globalized world. It also highlights the trends in the social sciences by pointing at all kinds of cooperation that are taking place in a variety of directions between disciplines that belong to both the natural and social sciences. It concludes by examining the respective problems that can arise when disciplines persist on maintaining an explanatory system that has almost reached its limits.

Bridging

The first chapter has set the background for this chapter by sketching a rather polemical picture. It argued that despite its shortcomings, the objectivist-subjectivist antinomy continues to be relevant for understanding the current configuration within social science circles countering hegemonic aspects of objectivist scientific practice. According to this interpretation, those who want to embark on an emancipatory understanding project must self-reflectively unthink the all-encompassing hegemonic ideology which embeds both objectivist and subjectivist approaches. This is a risky undertaking. It is a discussion about a new knowledge initiative. And this is something that is yet far from being mature.
Thinkers who are fully competent in one tradition may prefer to put forward a more systematical analysis. This dissertation is limited by the author’s scope of knowledge and necessitated by his being in the world. Therefore, from the very beginning of this project, it was clear that the argumentation would have to take the form of a polemic. The polemic in this text is necessary and important. Thinking something new requires dwelling in the frontiers of contemporary thought. One has to clear the way for those thoughts. If one is genuinely interested in countering hegemony and developing emancipatory understanding, one simply has to see the limits of this endeavor.

Objectivist criticism of the discussion in this text would apply to all polemics: they lack clear points of references, draw on weak argumentation and tend to be unconvincing. To an objectivist eye it will set a great example for the symptoms of what one might call a post-hysteria. Since it is very difficult for the subjectivist analysis to put forward a coherent, relevant and systematic set of ideas that might in the future constitute the ingredients for a recipe of an alternative emancipatory vision, the subjectivist criticism has to work under heavy criticism from the opponents. But polemics are not entirely cynical criticisms. They serve the purpose of elevating the discussion by providing the results of their experiments.

One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that social sciences can only benefit from providing enough space for such experiments. If contemporary social theory is hitting some brick walls one can either conclude that understanding has reached its natural limits, or one can alternatively argue that a paradigm shift is due soon. Subjectivist perspective favors the latter. If it were possible to reduce the definition of social sciences to a particular objectivist conception of science, all other perspectives of the investigation of social worlds would have to be diagnosed as different manifestations of what one could provocatively refer to as acute postmodern hysteria.

The choice of the word hysteria is not accidental here. It is perceived as hysteria because from the objectivist point of view, different kinds of understanding (e.g., empathetic and intuitive understanding) cannot nourish a meaningful analysis and these attitudes of understanding can be relevant for disciplines such as psychology and
literature. Therefore, an interpretative and humanistic social science approach is seen as unscientific. And those who are testing alternative versions of investigation are considered to be suffering from heavy hysteria. They exhibit a variety of symptoms of the disease: irrationality, emotionality, sensitivity, nationalism, provincialism, vengeance, dissociation, schizophrenia, romanticism, lack of critical and systematic thinking, and last but not least, a tendency to create discomfort in discussions.

The hysteria is perceived as acute but not chronic. Because it is a disease with a rapid, severe start: although there have always been critiques of the modernization mindset even during colonial times, only after the decolonization period the tone of the critiques became louder. And it loses its initial impact after a short while: post-independence period. Finally, it is supposed to disappear with the globalization wave. Globalization is the last wave of the spread of Western modernity and global capitalism. It is assumed that the postcolonial critique will soon disappear. As argued in Chapter 1, even though at times this is true especially for the popular manifestations of the postcolonial thought, the core principle of these schools of thought should not be overlooked: building an emancipatory vision on the meta-level.

One must now highlight an important point. The persistence of provincializing hegemonic thought practices does not derive from a desire to undo the social scientific achievements. Critiquing science is not equal to rejecting it in its entirety. If one is looking for an attitude concerning science in the Global South, it is rather the opposite. More and more money is invested in the educational system (Chapter 8). While this being the case, opposite views circulate. There is some logic to this trend. If it is argued that there is no affinity for scientific thinking, a pedagogical conclusion can be drawn on the basis of this interpretation: people need to be taught how to think and how to do science. And this is seen just another form of dominance (Nandy, 2012).

With this in mind, it can be argued that although one’s way of understanding the social world in which one lives (more specifically, one’s conception of social science) can be equipped with a set of technical knowledge which one can learn to utilize while pondering social phenomena (such as how to use certain methods and heuristic models),
this clearly does not mean that one can be taught how to think in certain directions. There is no uniform way to think and do research.

Before exploring the more concrete ways in which emancipatory understanding can be developed or even discovered, it is necessary to further highlight the shortcomings of the objectivist camp in social sciences. Such an endeavor will then allow for a more nuanced analysis of precisely how the relations between the objectivist and subjectivist approaches, once deconstructed and then reconstructed, can pave the way for a philosophy of science which nurtures rather than ignores emancipatory understanding.

**Measurement**

Analysts are bound up with the empirical data they draw on. As soon as they start theorizing, the immediacy of the empirical data disappears. Ignoring the problematic nature of the analyst’s relationship with the empirical data will result in a fetishism of rationalism: scientism, method fetishism, and abstracted empiricism (Depraz, 1999).

According to a dominating view of the philosophy of science, there are universal rules concerning what science means. Methodological rules are well-known and universal. They govern the progress of science and growth of knowledge. Empirical science constitutes the most authoritative perspective. Therefore, the most important part of human learning becomes a process mainly structured by working on limited material. Great many perspectives are excluded. This highlights the fundamental problem of the qualitative gap (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). A scientismist tackles the problem of qualitative gap by circumventing it. Rigorous methodology is applied. Factual knowledge is acquired. This would constitute true knowledge about humans and societies (Capra, 1975; Davies & Gribbin, 2007; Goerner, 2004; Grof, 2000; Laszlo, 2004; Sardar, 2000; Wallerstein, 1996).

Abstracted empiricism is the leading form of preoccupation with the method. It focuses on the methodological procedures at the expense of substantive propositions and theories. Abstracted empiricists would project themselves as true scientists. They
perceive that their approach is akin to the scientific procedures of natural sciences. Their approach is determined by a strong desire to acquire reliability, for which sake problems are selected from a variety of options to fit the method. Theory is no longer adequately interrelated with the data. The end result is ahistorical, non-comparative pieces of research that turn a blind eye to the social structural approach (Cascardi, 1992, p.12; Cumming, 1992; McPartland, 2001, p. 149; Putnam & Conant, 1990; Schuster & Yeo, 1986). Study of the human way of being in the world cannot lack ideas. Research must be regarded as a question of creativity as much as of measurement. Therefore, one is compelled to tackle a fundamental question: what does it mean to measure something?

Measurement is a standardized comparison. It provides a framework of references according to which standard properties of things can be compared. Measurement is mainly about quantification. The fields that investigate human ways of being in the world are also affected by quantification. The qualitative aspects of being in the world are objectified as much as possible. Data are collected, clustered and interpreted through a rigorous set of methodological processes. The key is to establish relations between seemingly independent phenomena. It is becoming more and more important in the social sciences to gather large sums of data. Advanced computers are used to process data and establish relations. This is how a substantial base for theorization is constructed. The emphasis on collection of large sums of data plays down the role of qualitative research to maintain scientific rigorousness. When science is defined accordingly, it is only logical to arrive at a conclusion that all other approaches are arbitrary. Even though a lot of relations (e.g., symbolic violence between different social groups in a given society) may be obvious to an analyst who is theoretically well-equipped (e.g., narrators start repeating the very same points in reference to the singularities of their ways of being in the world), unless they show empirically how these relations play out with a large and representative enough empirical sample, their analysis will not be considered scientific (Borgatta & Jackson, 1980; Wheeldon & Åhlberg, 2012).

Social science research becomes more and more about gathering data and processing that data for establishing meaningful relations. In the near future the use of
advanced software will increasingly minimize human factor. Importance of interpretation is de-emphasized (e.g., data speaks for itself). The most important inadequacy of software (i.e., lack of intelligence to analyze the data) is now of secondary importance. One simply feeds the data into the system and lets the software run the data and generate an output. All of these may sound futuristic often for the wrong reasons. It may be unimaginable that advanced software will ever be able to handle a task as well as a human being (e.g., process data, create output, interpret, etc.). The point is that human involvement in research process is not even desired anymore. Latest developments in the field of finance are a prime example. Software products today can undertake multiple and complex tasks: not only they analyze the data; they also generate regular outputs and interpret the output to a point that a convincing article on the topic can be extracted (e.g., Narrative Science from *Forbes*). Since more and more issues related to the importance of *Big Data* are discussed, one can expect a greater role of software designed to process large collections of data sets in order to establish relations for meaningful theorization.

This is one side of the coin. There are still many analysts who are not convinced by new trends. Discussions about the ways large data sets are processed are considered relevant. The primary concern, however, is different. They question whether or not the output generated by such rigorous methods corresponds to any underlying reality. The discussion is more obvious in the social sciences. But one can detect similar discussions in the natural sciences too. Research in the natural sciences can conduct experiments. They can repeat these experiments. Therefore analysts may get their feet on the ground. In the field of the social sciences, there are no experiments in the natural sciences’ sense of the word. The reliability of social scientific work can always be questioned. The best a social scientist can do is to conduct multiple empirical researches for comparison. This way consistency of the results can be checked. The researcher and the research framework will always be kept under scrutiny throughout and after the investigation.

The question of measurement is an insurmountable obstacle for social scientific approaches that claim scientificity equal to the natural sciences. Rigorous empirical research in the social sciences is an effective way to maintain some level of scientific
quality. Nevertheless, the sample is never large and representative enough. One way to deal with this problem is to appeal to ambiguity. When social science theorization is missing desired levels of scientific clarity, it contradicts itself. It does not solve the problem but bypasses it. It does so by hiding behind a phenomenological exclusivity argument: the two-cultures.

The two-cultures argument was put forward by C. P. Snow (1959). Simply put, a separation between investigations of the natural and social world suggested that the two fields were interested in engagements of two different kinds. According to Snow, there was no doubt that the two cultures existed. The division of labor was justified. The main problem was that the two groups did not seem to understand each other. The polarization was counter-productive and posed a danger to progress. Snow was educated as a scientist and he biased in favor of his own scientific affiliation. Scientists had to be given the prestige they deserved. They were a product of modernity and enlightenment. They were undertaking a sacred mission of downgrading the conservatism that dominated fields of knowledge. That was his main concern (Snow, 1959).

Wallerstein took Snow’s categorization of two cultures in order to argue that before the 1500s there were no two cultures as such. The dichotomy of the two cultures and disciplinarization were modern inventions. Science was born out of philosophy. But it now started to dominate philosophy. Wallerstein related this situation to the ascendance of the modern world-system. The intellectual hierarchy was formed accordingly. Science had the greatest value for capitalist world economy. This is to say that discussions about the use of disciplines in humanities and social sciences are not new. According to Wallerstein the debate goes back to the formation of the modern world-system (Wallerstein, 2001, 2004).

Humanities have always led the critique of the hegemonic aspects of scientific dominance. Various schools have participated in the critique (e.g., romanticism). But the critique cannot be reduced to any of these movements. The social sciences, on the other hand, have always had an ambiguous position. They are products (or side products) of the scientific revolution. This explains also why the social sciences have difficulty
emancipating themselves from the natural scientific premises (Thomas, 1979). In one way the social sciences are inherently hegemonic. They are products of a hegemonic transformation. They also prove to be one of the most effective tools to counter hegemony (Oren, 2006).

One must also highlight a certain sense of ambivalence in the overall attitude of the social sciences. Social sciences are often criticized by purer sciences (purer according to a constructed hierarchy of disciplines—applied physics, for example). They defend themselves by accusing the critic of following a positivist agenda (Schwab, 1982, p. 252). The social scientific attitude is altered when a critique is launched by one of the impure members (e.g., humanities). In this case, the social scientific argumentation would see no harm in adapting to the role of a purer science and criticize the humanities for not being scientific enough. The inconsistent defense strategy here is to relativize the concept of science and transform it into a phenomenologically exclusivist conception: social sciences are unique; therefore, they cannot be criticized according to a set of external criteria. The escapism of phenomenological exclusivism is a major hindrance to progress in the fields of knowledge.

Against this background, one can pose a set of important epistemological questions now: are there two cultures (e.g., natural and social sciences)? Should the rest (e.g., humanities) join one of the camps? Is there simply one primary culture (e.g., science) and all the rest should disappear and adopt the scientific approach? Are there three cultures (e.g., social, natural, humanities)? Questions can be multiplied. One can pretend to have found the truth and to have settled the debate for once and all. In reality, there are no definite answers. Critiques of the existing epistemological models are often exaggerated. And as illustrated in this text they take polemical forms. This must be seen as a consequence of the ontological shift that has been taking place. Epistemological indecisiveness points at an ontological uncertainty. It is hard to predict what kind of consequences the rise of the Global South will bring. The attitude of pretending to have found all the answers might sometimes work. It could serve some pragmatic value for a
while too. Time will show how convincing those answers are. The new philosophy has not come into being yet.

**Intermingling**

Today intermingling between disciplines has become a common trend. A good example is cultural studies. It is an interdisciplinary academic program. It rejects the division between the social sciences and the humanities (Barker, 2000; Grossberg, 2010; Lewis, 2008). Environmental studies is a second example. The division between social and natural sciences is relativized. These are signs of another polarization to come.

It is inevitable that the social sciences will have to extend towards the so-called purity (e.g., natural sciences) and impurity directions (e.g., humanities). The current neoliberal tendency is to convince the public that the humanities are worthless disciplines. One must study science nothing but science. There is nothing wrong with promoting and studying sciences. But marginalizing humanities will be a grave mistake. Analysts envy for perfection. And they strive for complete understanding. This is the ultimate desire of humans. Goodness, beauty and truth are universal aspirations. Even though they can be studied separately they are essentially one. Truth, goodness and beauty ideally should complement each other. This is already a work in progress and there are already two camps formed. For the lack of better conceptualization, they are often categorized as harder and softer social sciences (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999, p. 159; Bulmer, 1977, p. 243).

Social sciences consist of the disciplined and systematic study of being in a particular context. Psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and political science systematically study individuals and groups within their situatedness in societies and institutions. Science in the designation social sciences signifies use of systematic and disciplined methods of acquiring verifiable knowledge. According to the harder social science point of view, questions about the scientficity of the social sciences cannot be tackled by conforming to phenomenologically exclusive arguments (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 25-56). The word science in social sciences symbolizes a commitment to aim towards
more scientificity, and the criteria of scientificity have been defined historically. There is no running way from this reality (Lather, 2010, pp. 55-72).

Throughout their development, the social sciences took great pleasure in sketching a history of how the once prestigious field of philosophy has evolved into sciences. The evolution meant that science has acquired a higher status than philosophy. One can put forward an interesting observation by conforming to the very same perspective that the social sciences have long utilized to separate themselves from the field of philosophy: while the social sciences are drawing on their evolvement from philosophy to sciences for sketching their scientific genealogy, they are aiming towards devolvement from a social scientific stance to a philosophical one—an orientation that they have long been snubbing—in order to counterweigh an ontologically challenging scientific criticism. In other words, the social sciences are philosophizing to bypass the very scientific critique they made towards philosophy.

There is always irony in projection. As a typical defense mechanism, people refuse to accept their own unwelcome idiosyncrasies by assigning the same attributes to other people. The solution is rather simple: the social sciences will need to accept what appears to be self-evident. The evolution of knowledge does not stop at a self-defined point by the social sciences. The social sciences will evolve towards natural science (Plotkin, 2003). This is the only way they can successfully attempt to acquire an epistemically convincing status. Even though it may not seem possible from today’s perspective, the social sciences will unite with ‘purer’ disciplines and tackle their inherent reliability problem. There is no way to circumvent this progress. The complexity of human ways of being in the world has rendered the study of human phenomena extremely difficult. Epistemologically speaking, physical sciences are the most convincing. Sooner or later they will start working more closely to make progress.

From their inception onwards, the social sciences have struggled for respect. Some have granted the social sciences a higher status than the others. Some others have regarded the social sciences as premature sciences while attributing a primary importance to the natural sciences. It has been two hundred years since Comte granted
queenship to sociology. Sociology and other social science disciplines are still trying to prove their worth. From the perspective of popular public opinion, the social sciences are in a very difficult position. They do not deserve much credit. The institutional reflection of the public opinion is lack of funding at the universities. While physical sciences get most of the funding, social sciences and humanities are left deprived to the levels of extinction. This is a prime example of majority discrimination of minority group members: the dominant perspective is oppressing the less influential perspective.

When Snow gave his lecture in the year 1959, the intellectual configuration was different from today. Scientists had not yet acquired such an unquestionable prestige. The situation today is very different. The scientific worldview is valued over anything else. The harder, the purer, the better science is. Social scientists are accused of being soft. They generate theories that lack precision and predictive power. They are subject to strong prejudice. The word social science is even sometimes considered to be an oxymoron. According to this view, being in the world—society, its institutions and social relationships—is not susceptible to scientific study. The methods of the natural sciences—the criteria of scientificity—cannot be applied to social phenomena. Therefore, the terms social and scientific do not really sit comfortably together. This point of view was illustrated by the British Government in the 1980s.

The name of the Social Science Research Council was changed to the Economic and Social Research Council. While the word science disappears from the title, the most scientific social science discipline, economics, joins in for compensation (Halloran, 2010). It appears as if the British government symbolically wanted to declare that the discipline of economics is where the bar of scientificity is set (Holt & Pressman, 2007). An optimistic interpretation of the message from the British Government is also a possibility. The name change may not necessarily symbolize a view that social phenomena cannot be tackled scientifically. It could rather be understood as a call to free social investigations from claims to scientificity in the natural science sense of the word. Nevertheless, such a perspective is not convincing. There is perhaps little doubt that the
British government is paving the way for the social sciences evolution into the sciences. There will be either sciences, or socials (humanities), but no social sciences.

If one voices the popular claim that the social sciences are not contributing to society as much as the physical sciences, there could be two ways to deal with such epistemic discrimination: one may challenge the discriminatory practices by exposing them and fight to eradicate them (e.g., demanding an epistemic space for uttering difference); or, one takes discrimination for granted (as a natural phenomenon). Since one cannot avoid it, one may at least try not to get harmed by it. An effective way to minimize the harm for one’s own self (cope with the depressing aspects of discrimination) is to project it to weaker minorities (e.g., humanities). Accepting discrimination (and inequality) as part of life is already problematic enough. But what is more baffling is the implementation of the discriminatory logic at the minority level (minority to minority prejudice), and it deserves more attention.

This is an illustration of hegemony. Rather than challenging discrimination categorically, a minority (e.g., less powerful social sciences) accepts commonsensical norms (e.g., physical sciences are superior and provide the primary definition of science) and self-evidentalize these norms by projecting them to other minorities (e.g., humanities). The game is so well-set in that the norms dictate who should discriminate against whom. Players simply adapt to their roles and do what they need to do. Due to several reasons, people tend to internalize oppressive social norms and pave the way for minority to minority discrimination. Normally, one would expect a minority person to feel uncomfortable expressing prejudice against other minority groups. This auto control mechanism does not function in a hegemonic order. In order to decrease discrimination toward oneself people are motivated to conform to commonsensical norms and validate the hegemonic order. To sum up, rather than aiming for more scientificity, in order to deal with the immense pressure, the social sciences project their frustration onto the humanities. As a result, the humanities are supposedly on the verge of disappearance today.
Humanities might be eventually marginalized in the academia. When this happens, the social sciences will have to work harder to attain a similar scientific status and prestige as the natural sciences. The dilemma is obvious. Projecting pressure only worsens the inevitable end. The social sciences are faced with the dilemma of getting harder or softer. They cannot pretend to hard science simply by excluding the humanities on the basis that the latter can make no claims for doing science.

From the perspective of the humanities, the discussion of scientificity is interesting. They can learn from the debate. Since they are not necessarily after making scientific claims, the discussion for them is not existential. The humanities regard the study of human phenomena as an entirely different field of study. They do not exist in an antagonistic relationship with the social sciences. Even though the configuration has altered and they risk being dismissed, the progress of the social sciences is not considered to be a threat by the humanities. As some things about the human way of being in the world are destined to remain mysterious, the humanities will always be relevant. Similarly, the physical sciences will continue to fuel the imagination in the humanities (Kaufmann, 1977). Hard social sciences are not an alternative to the humanities. They are trying to be too convincing. While the humanities are here to stay, hard social sciences risk being challenged for envying a level of understanding they can never attain.

It is no longer possible for a social scientific perspective to remain relevant if it continues to ignore a large spectrum of scientific fields of research that are connected to the human way of being in the world (e.g., evolutionary theory and genetics). Paying more and more attention to new fields of scientific research is regarded as the way to become truly scientific. A controversial field, sociobiology, can be given as an example (Paquet, 1988).

Simply put, sociobiology makes sense of human behavior in reference to evolution. In the nature or nurture debate, sociobiology favors the former and contends that genes play a major role in human behavior. As a premature attempt to build a new scientific field of research, sociobiology is an easy target. It is attacked as a throwback to social Darwinism and eugenics. The two were perhaps the most injurious applications that have
been done in the name of science. And they can bedismissed on political grounds. But the research in this field does not have to go to the direction of biological determinism. At any rate, as a speculation on human nature, sociobiology is interesting. Human beings are animals of some kind (biological organisms) and a study of the human way of being in the world is incomplete without tackling the biological dimensions of being. Sociobiology perhaps has started its journey on the wrong foot. The desire, however, to understanding humans as biological organisms will persist.

There are many signs that the future lies in this direction. Especially in the English-speaking countries, there is more receptivity for evolutionary perspectives (e.g., evolutionary psychology and evolutionary economics). Similarly, prestige of neuroscience has surged. One can now find disciplinary titles with a prefix of neuro (e.g., neuroeconomics and neuroanthropology). For the hard social scientific view, the ultimate aim is to emulate the hardest of the hardest: physics (along with the precision of mathematics). It is one thing to benefit from theoretical physics for heuristic purposes and trying to be creative, and it is another thing to have fields like econophysics where the main idea is to develop economic activity modeling with concepts borrowed from theoretical physics.

There are those among social scientists who have softer approaches to science. They do not consider themselves to be the poor cousins to the natural sciences. They identify less with the natural sciences and more with the humanities. Against those who strive to be more scientific and adapt models from the natural sciences, softer social scientists tend to rely more on imagination and insight. They do not necessarily make claims to scientificity and hence truth. There are also those who would not really mind if the prefix of science were dropped from the title social sciences. It would not matter if their investigation were regarded as ‘humanistic research’, for example. They acknowledge the limits of social sciences. One can give the case of the social unrest in Turkey in the year 2013 as a representative example (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7).
While the country’s smartest social scientists, equipped with the most sophisticated statistical models, and having great numbers personnel under their command for conducting large-scale surveys on a regular basis, failed to foresee, or even to sense for that matter, the accumulated social dissatisfaction in the society. Non-scientific ways of taking the society’s pulse on the other hand, such as artistic understanding, proved to be more successful and were able to predict the social unrest. The prediction was so accurate that one of the celebrities who participated in the unrest, Mehmet Ali Alabora, an actor, was accused by the government to have staged a theatre play where the unrest was rehearsed. Artistic understanding is no alternative to scientific understanding. But it often proves to be simply more effective at keeping a finger on the pulse of the society.

Limitations

Even when fortified by the latest findings from harder sciences (e.g., neuroscience, genetics, etc.) social science may never get close to the precisional and predictive power of the hard sciences. The basic units of social systems are extremely complex. To be able to simply keep up with the complexity, one should sometimes get more involved with that complexity. Singularities of a person’s life-course cannot be dismissed as trivial details. One can register and treat them as important components of understanding one’s being in the world.

The study of the social phenomena is nothing like physics. The subjects of investigation are not electrons. And one does not work with electromagnetism and gravity. The subject of investigation is human beings who share particularities with each other. This relation takes the form of a family resemblance. The relation between human subjects is not equal to the relation between neutrons. The neutrons are identical. Under normal conditions, electromagnetism and gravity will always work as predicted. This is predetermined. Social life is at best pre-structured. A well informed social analyst can still have high levels of prediction. But the narrator is not an electron. He or she will respond to new life experiences and the analyst’s theorization.
The problem with social sciences is that they are trying to get a complete picture of a configuration that is constantly changing. It is similar to the case of a dog chasing an artificial rabbit in greyhound racing. The dog focuses on a reward that it will never get. Even in the case where the dog catches the lure the results are disappointing: there is no real rabbit. A man-made toy is there to lure the dog’s attention and to make it run. The dog is misdirected. While it thinks that it is all about catching the rabbit, the real trick is coming in first. The dog will continue to run on a track every single time with the same excitement to run after a rabbit that it will never catch. Every race is a failure from the perspective of the greyhound: the rabbit always escapes.

Social scientists are better equipped than greyhounds. They know that they will never catch the rabbit. But they continue to run after taking a great picture of an ever-changing configuration. Social scientists act like greyhounds because their need to know is greater than their desire to be fooled. They want to understand. The rabbit is the trick. It is the distraction. The real trick set up each time is the race towards the finish line. The ego of the social scientist that got them involved with science is what keeps them from seeing that bigger picture.

Another problem with social sciences is that a human being is not as passive as a research subject in natural sciences. A human being can resist to scientific explanation. They respond to theorizations about their ways of being in the world. It is important for the analyst to understand these reactions. The analytical truth of the analyst does not always have to match the emotional truth of the narrators. But if the qualitative gap between the analyst and the narrator is big, this points to a bigger issue. The discrepancy cannot always be explained with a delusion of some kind (e.g., the narrators are deluded and it is only the researcher who knows the truth). The gap probably indicates that a misunderstanding has come into being in the name of understanding. Analysts either persist with the misunderstanding or start the research all over again.

An interesting aspect of the social sciences is that despite being weak from a physical science point of view in terms of predictive power, the social sciences do have a strong effect on people and the social word they live in. Social scientific imagination
alters people’s view of the world. It transforms one’s being in the world. Learning class struggle from Marx, symbolic violence from Bourdieu, banality of evil from Arendt has irreversible consequences. The upside and downside of the transformative power of the social sciences is that one can change the world. Having the ability to change the world by committing to prescribed formulas that are developed out of misunderstanding is scary. And it might result in terrible consequences. Science can make the world a worse place as well as a better one. This is why social scientists ideally should be bearing extra responsibilities (e.g., strict moral codes) as their line of profession is prone to mistakes with immense consequences. Hence social scientists—more than any other scientists—should be humble, or at least modest, in making truth claims.

As the social sciences are not physical sciences, a social scientist may be tempted towards rigorous empiricism in order to deal with the critiques of the social scientific theorization. Empiricism does not necessarily stop one from making universalistic claims. On the contrary, having a supposedly representative sample to back theorization, one may be even more encouraged to make bold truth claims. One can, however, discipline oneself and remain on the level of particularity (as opposed to levels of universality and singularity) in reference to the empirical case. The problem is that a primary focus on the particularity in reference to the empirical case encourages a process of clustering by cutting the rough ends (as opposed to keeping them). Every categorization has to divide the material at hand as trivial and worthwhile and proceed to further steps to be able to say something. If one remains at the level of particularity, and does not claim universality for the respective particularistic theorization, one could tolerate trivialization of important data. However, in principle, an approach is better if it includes rather than excludes. This is one of the key messages of this text.

Phenomenogical exclusivism is epistemically harmful. Social sciences are better when they seek alternative ways to cope with the pressure of scientificity from the natural sciences. The confidence in the social sciences goes back to their advent. Social scientists have long regarded themselves as a distinguished group who could contribute to an intellectual debate. Debates about human ways of being in the world have been carried on
by people from all walks of life (e.g., literary critics, social philosophers, moralists, artists, educators and so on). Social scientists are so preoccupied with developing research techniques and methodological devices that their works either lack immediate social relevance or lag behind social reality. The typical attitude of a social scientist is to concentrate on questions for which they have scientific tools at hand to examine those questions. The most interesting and important questions are left out. Scholars in the humanities, especially, are not bothered with the social scientific critique of the usefulness of evidence produced without the benefit of scientific approaches. The undisciplined nature of the generalizations, interpretations and speculations can be surely criticized. But as long as people continue to be interested in these matters, the humanities will persist (Halloran, 2010).

A couple of points have been discussed so far. First, it has been argued that researchers in the social sciences are bound up with the empirical data they draw on. Second, it has been stated that social scientists lose the immediacy of their data as soon as they start theorizing. Therefore, social science research is about measurement and creativity. Since theoretical creativity is perceived to bear the risk of disturbing the truthfulness of the data at hand, according to some schools of thought, research can be regarded as an activity that is mostly concerned with measurement. Finally, it was pointed out that measurement is nothing but a standardized comparison for setting the background for objectification and quantification of the data at hand, for establishing meaningful relations. Now, a set of final points will be added on this background.

Measurements are meaningful and useful when they are consistent across space and time. After all, this is how one relies on the reality of the world one observes. If one thinks this way, nothing occurs that one can regard as mysterious about the world: the universe is quite comprehensible. In physical sciences one can do experiments and get results. In social sciences, one can base the research on case studies. Surprisingly enough, it works. Science provides results. Scientific results are consistent across space and time. Einstein was quite fascinated about the explanatory power of science. He thought, although scientists work on these principles and successfully generate results, there is
actually no inherent reason for the world to be the way it is. In the case of Einstein, one observes the traces of a key component of measurement and scientific thinking. According to the scientific objectivist way of seeing the world, there is consistency across time and space only because there is always an underlying reality. If one pushes the idea into a metaphysical conclusion, the Absolute comes onto the surface. What is suggested is that the world is the way it is and it is explainable and understandable by humans because the Absolute reflects its presence upon the world. In a very shocking way, scientific disenchantment (humans can free themselves from illusion and mystery) goes back to a different kind of enchantment (humans can free themselves only because The Absolute is reflected upon the world). Quantum mechanics problematizes this awkwardness.

Research in the field of quantum mechanics has generated empirically contradictory results. The results are not always consistent across space and time. If there is anything consistent, it is the consistency of quantum mechanics’ challenge to the existing paradigms. Against this background, one can give voice to a provocative thought: it seems that whenever a researcher is promoting an objective point of view (and dismissing other perspectives in the name of oneness of objectivity), the researcher is in fact sharing a highly personalized subjective point of view. For example, in the case of the social sciences, a researcher often draws on an incomplete, non-representative and methodologically weak empirical basis for surging forward to shelf-theorizing to close the circle of argumentation. A subjectivist partisan eye may be biased in regarding this as cheap magic. For a subjectivist, just as magicians exploit a host of psychological principles in deceiving their audiences (Barnhart, 2010, pp. 1286-1289), the objectivists expect people to believe that their interpretations are based on indisputable empirical material. However, the fact of the matter is that only devoted supporters will mistake deceit and misdirection with actuality. The rest of the audience will only be entertained with the effects of prestidigitation the magician performs.

All kinds of approaches that are developed to understand the world have their merits. One can learn from all of them. The ultimate motivation is to work on a
framework that could incorporate all these perspectives. If, in the case of the social sciences, it is essentially about objectifying subjectivities, one must register that the reality is a complex amalgam of objectivities and subjectivities, and there is absolutely no point in exercising in futility by trying to come up with a purely objective or subjective position. One needs to go beyond these thoroughly disciplined but poorly imaginative frameworks of making sense of the world. Ideally, this is what understanding should aim at.

**Conclusive Remarks**

The chapter has shown that an increasing amount of polarization between subjectivist and objectivist trends has become significant in social sciences, and proved to be incompatible and indefensible for making sense of contemporary ways of being in the world. The chapter has proposed a cure: if one undertakes a close investigation of the relations between the two approaches, one can make way for opportunities for elevating the discussion, and eventually reach a form of emancipatory understanding. The chapter then pointed out that the social sciences have always struggled for recognition in the academia and sought approval in different ways both from natural sciences and humanities. It argued that the inclination of social analyses to identify with either side of the two-cultures has been persistent. It reasoned that the pattern is likely to continue, but it must keep on getting challenged if social sciences want to continue contributing to emancipatory understanding and provide self-reflective insights into society at the outset of a paradigm shift that is already taking place. By discussing differences between the humanities, natural and social sciences, regarding settings, aims and needs for analyses, the chapter has shown that rigorous empiricism, phenomenological exclusivism, and measurement as universal remedies lead to dead ends, if applied to social sciences as ends in themselves. It arrived at the conclusion that an interdisciplinary multilogue and cross-fertilization are necessary for pushing the limits and overcoming the obstacles in the way of making sense of contemporary ways of being in the world.
Chapter 3: Clarity and Opaqueness

This chapter analyses the components of and prerequisites for understanding. It negotiates between the idealistic strive for clarity & truth and the ambiguity & uncertainty. The former desire is rooted in the motivation for making sense of being in the world. The latter one derives from actual events and phenomena which pose a disturbance if not a threat to absolute truth claims and closed systems of understanding. Different kinds and levels of understanding will be examined for various purposes: for their interrelation, the means that bring them forward, obstacles that interfere with them, and finally means and practices to overcome these obstacles.

The chapter responds to the observation that the concept of one-size-fits-all has proven itself to be a failure: there is no actual linearity in development. There is no universally applicable Absolute. The attempt to globally impose one-size-fits-all approach resulted in an uneasy dependence of the non-Western part of the world upon the Western. Through a discussion of the elements of understanding, the chapter shows the gap in pre-structuration: a counter-hegemonic movement can creatively challenge this dependence.

Creativity

Sculptor Carl Andre is an unconventional artist. He is known to be a strong proponent of appreciating meaninglessness. Defying conceptual perception constitutes an important part of Andre’s work (Brockes, 2013; Guggenheim, n.d.; Rose, n.d.). Andre can inspire a variety of artists who are engaging in different types of artistic work. One kind of professional that Andre is unlikely to prompt is the social analyst. Unlike sculptors, analysts do not have the liberty of embracing meaninglessness. They are required, if not obliged, to maintain a certain sense of clarity in their argumentation. They want to be understood by the others; therefore, they regard clarity as a prerequisite to
their analyses. Embracing meaninglessness would be a contradictory act. Clarity proves to be a universal aspiration for those who want to analyze.

Clarity is indeed a primary aspect of a well-grounded analysis. Nevertheless, clarity cannot be regarded as an end in itself. Clarity is nothing but a means to achieving a desired end: building a sound argument. Therefore, analysts remain committed to the principle of clarity and attempt to deliver their respective messages ‘uninterrupted’ (Selinger & Crease, 2006, p. 189). However hard they try, analysts will fail to understand and make others understand unless they regard their analytical frameworks as tentative. In other words, due to the nature of their occupation, while analysts must try to fight against ambiguity, at the same time, they must learn to let the desire of disambiguation go. Analysts must remain open to exploration. They must accept the provisional character of their analyses. Intellectual modesty cannot be regarded as a matter of preference. It is a matter of accepting what is inevitable. Analysts can only make various conjectures about the outcome of their analyses. They cannot make absolute truth claims.

Analysts tend to draw on empirical data for making strong truth claims. Nevertheless, reality is always prone to conceptual difficulties and the phenomena are resistant to clarity regardless of the level of enthusiasm of the analysts (Kateb, 2011, p. xii). This is troubling for analysts who put the highest value on disambiguation. They can no longer escape asking core questions about the contradictory nature of their engagement. Such fundamental questioning will create even more confusion. They are urged to make pragmatic decisions. Pressing issues concerning the processes of analysis are bypassed. The tendency to rely on circular argumentation is enhanced. As a consequence, analysts may not always fully know what they are talking about. But they take refuge in adopting a habit of pretending at all times that they have a clear idea about the topic at hand (Chakrabarti, 1997, p. 208; Desmond, 2008, p. 126; Sutton, 2007, p. 104). Pretentiousness becomes a fundamental characteristic of an inquiry. Despite inherent limitations to making such strong truth claims, analysts assert the possibility of acquiring full transparency. Consequently, they commit epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988). The result is closing the doors for elevating the discussion, and compromising
possibilities for developing emancipatory understanding. In this context, celebration of opacity is put forward as something less pretentious.

The attitude of welcoming opacity points at another irony. Analysts are considered to be open-minded and modest if they do not make strong truth claims, whereas others who try to understand and explain—claim to know something about the truth—are regarded as proud and pretentious. Such logic amounts to claiming that making no truth claims is better than making incomplete truth claims. The plain fact is that both attitudes are proud and pretentious.

There is no doubt that analysts are better equipped when they question attitudes towards knowledge which are commonly taken for granted, but the approach is useful when it is not transformed into pure cynicism and denied all possibilities of acquiring some truth. A doubtful attitude, on the other hand, can promote the idea that all truth claims must be supported by unambiguous evidence that is acquired by suspending judgment in investigations. This is why, when eccentric artists such as Andre seem to celebrate opacity, they also show signs of aspiration for clarity. Andre’s self-dramatization reveals his artistic frustration. The important matter to register here is that due to his dispositions, Andre tends to embrace an overall feeling of frustration. This is an entirely different attitude in comparison to avoiding frustration and making unsubstantial claims for transparency (Brockes, 2013).

With that in mind, analysts may adopt unpremeditated analyzing traits for dealing with the aforementioned issues related to transparency and opaqueness. They may believe that an unpremeditated approach to analysis is the most effective advance in the quest for meaning. Following an unpremeditated approach, they become familiar with the anxiety and the frustration of eccentric artists (Cohn, 2001, p. 112). Therefore, one can argue that the tendency to despise meaning and conceptual clarity is something that is related to the analyst’s level of toleration of ambiguity and uncertainty (Tingle, 2004). One must also take note of the fact that the level of permissiveness of a precarious state of being is related not only to the individual qualities of the analysts (e.g., natural dispositions), but also to their situatedness (e.g., social dispositions) (Bourdieu, 2002).
How natural and social dispositions interact is a difficult question with many variables which need to be explored with a multidisciplinary approach. There are biological factors (e.g., heritability, age, brain structure), group factors (e.g., gender and birth-order), cultural factors (e.g., there is empirical evidence for suggesting that levels of tolerance of uncertainty differ from one culture to another) and social factors (e.g., education and socialization). When these factors interact with each other, individuals are pre-structured in various ways in terms of their attitudes towards ambiguity and uncertainty. While some individuals are pre-structured to be at ease with unstructured and unpredictable situations, and prefer approaches that promote creative thinking, some others will be conditioned to be generically more careful about the general order of things, and make big changes only after elaborate processes of deliberation. Therefore, analysts who are rendered more tolerant of welcoming unpredictable situations will find it easier to embrace uncertainty. They will refrain from being conditioned to focus on detailed processes and structure.

The primary factor for analysts to embrace uncertainty and opaqueness is their conviction that they are looking for a novel approach for understanding the world they are situated in. Under those circumstances, they are obliged to tolerate if not embrace uncertainty. It is a matter of principle. When analysts are aiming to create something they do not yet know, ambiguity becomes inevitable (Žižek, 2012a). And analysts who value predictability and certainty persist in thinking and acting in their own ways because they are urged to do so by their natural and social dispositions (Levine, 1985). All of these issues are related to the question of understanding.

Against this backdrop, the question of understanding will be examined in two sections: bewilderedness and IKEAization. The former takes looks at the bewilderedness of the analyst by focusing on four themes: undivided understanding, the critical mode of self-reflection, pre-structuredness, and disenchantment. The latter looks at what it labels as IKEAization by breaking it down into two issues: ready-to-assemble and one-size-fits-all. The final subsection will give the example of modernization theory to explain how an IKEA model theorization works.
Bewilderedness

In order to argue clearly and thoroughly, one can start with basic premises and build up to more complicated ideas (Shand, 1993, pp. 121-122). Humans are thinking beings, and thinking beings are capable of bewilderedness (Tschemplik, 2008). Human beings are bewildered about being in the world, and this is the primary motivation for analysts to analyze (Jowett, 1997, p. 126). At this basic level, every human being is an unprofessional analyst (Fischer, 2000, pp. 79-110). Bewilderedness is a given, but it may or may not motivate a desire to understand. Therefore, understanding can exist only as a potentiality (Lear, 1988, pp. 60-63). In other words, understanding is not necessarily actualized. It may remain unexplored and the bewilderedness of the analysts may persist. Therefore, understanding can never be taken for granted (Rehbein, 1997).

Understanding is actualized when a bewildered person develops an intention to understand (Britzman, 2009, pp. 94-95). The intentionality will transform a bewildered person into an ordinary analyst who is interested in the physical and the social world. As a social being, one may develop a closer interest in the human condition, which is how a bewildered analyst gets into the social inquiry. Ordinary analysts start the inquiry with a set of basic but fundamental questions: what bewilders me the most? How do I desire to understand? Nobody can be bewildered by random phenomena. People are interested in subjects that are related to their particularities of being in the world (Strauss, 1989, p. 210). Bewilderedness and the desire to understand are pre-structured by the existential conditions they are situated in. Due to the existential situatedness of bewilderedness, understanding at the most primary level is personal and undivided. Self-understanding, understanding others and understanding the world are inseparable (Rehbein, 1997).

The way and the manner in which ordinary analysts desire to understand are determined by their position towards the undividedness of understanding, which is not self-evident and cannot be taken for granted. A lack of attention to the undividedness of understanding will break the dialectical relation between self-understanding, understanding others, and understanding the world (Olkowski & Morley, 1999).
ordinary analysts acknowledge the undividedness of understanding, they realize that not only can there be no understanding of the human way of being in the world in the singular, but also there can be no isolated understanding of the world in the universal, and of people in general (Arendt, 1994, p. 433). When ordinary analysts understand the world in the particular then they become critical analysts. Critical analysts grasp the prestructuredness of being in the world by appreciating particularities and comprehending the undividedness of understanding with critical self-reflection (Flewelling, 2005, pp. 101-102). A self-reflective process does not always have to be critical, and it does not always lead to a critical realization. Self-reflection might have a noncritical character that is appreciative of commonsensical everyday being in the world (Tan, 2009, p. 400).

While the critical mode of self-reflection infuses analysts with critical thinking, an everyday mode of self-reflection informs ordinary understanding. Immersed in the everyday mode of self-reflection, ordinary analysts are either not aware of the prestructuredness of being in the world, or make conscious decisions to ignore it. Understanding in this mode is undivided in the wrong way (Žižek, 2012a, pp. 1-5). The ordinary analyst projects an idiosyncratic self-understanding onto the world (Deranty, 2009; Elliot, 1991). Thusly, self-understanding absorbs understanding. Since understanding is assimilated by self-understanding, it becomes an activity that happens as a matter of course. One understands just-like-that. It is self-evident. Therefore, understanding cannot be a concern (Dahlberg, 2007).

Critical analysts, on the other hand, doubt everything. Their outlook is irreversibly changed. Nothing can be taken for granted. But this is not a radical doubt. Excessive doubt becomes irrelevant (Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 4, 56, 93, 341, 343). “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 114-115). The critical analyst becomes aware that self-understanding precedes and motivates the desire to understand the human condition. Nevertheless, the dialectical relation between self-understanding, understanding others, and understanding the world cannot be broken. Self-understanding is not equal to understanding. If anything, understanding is the aggregate of numberless little streams of self-understanding and understanding others that
are formed to overlap and interlace with one another. Becoming suspicious of self-understanding is the primary condition for critical thinking.

Everyone’s favorite subject is themselves. Things that are supposed to be unique are of primary interest (Wilson, 2007). While considering that, one can make a bold claim and suggest that there is only one plot in all kinds of understanding: who am I? (Buford, 2011). A critical analyst takes this popular yet unanswered question, strips it off from the excessive self-absorption, and promotes it to underline a contradictory point: I could have been someone else. The reality is that one co-exists with others (Heidegger, 1986, p. 114). The individualistic question gains a common character with the realization that one did not choose to be oneself. One is rendered oneself. The critical analyst’s disenchantment can be confusing. Pre-structuredness of being in the world can easily be confused with pre-determination of being.

Pre-structuredness is not equal to pre-determination. A person’s bewilderedness is shaped by the existential conditions but it is not determined. Things are related, not necessitated. Understanding the pre-structuredness of being leads to a primary realization about being in the world, and it is the most basic step for starting to make sense of the world. When one reaches the realization that one could have been someone else, one can no longer take the activity of understanding for granted (Rehbein, 1997). Although according to the self-evident nature of being, understanding happens just-like-that, from a critical point of view it-is-what-it-is thinking cannot be regarded the equal of understanding. It marks the point where thinking stops and idle talk begins (Heidegger, 1962/1927; 1996/1927). When understanding is monotonized, understanding disappears as a concern. The concern of understanding may easily be vacuumed by the carelessness of everyday being in the world. It can be trivialized. Nevertheless, one is not destined to remain in the idleness of everyday being in the world. One can transcend these limitations by avoiding thinking in terms of it-is-what-it-is. One can persist in thinking in terms of could-have-been-otherwise. This is the antidote of taken-for-grantedness (Srubar, 1999, pp. 40-42; Zucker, 1986, p. 58).
Under normal circumstances, taken-for-grantedness dominates in a society (Schutz & Luckmann, 1989). Society tends to maintain a stable condition. And the steady state is not supposed to be questioned by the members of that society. Status quo is legitimized as a protective stability. Until further notice, the state of things is unquestionable (Rogers, 1991, pp. 61-62). Reactions do occur against the taken-for-grantedness. But they often occur at such rates that they cannot be observed. And when they are observed, disturbances are immediately incorporated, regulated and rendered invisible. A critical analyst who aims to go beyond it-is-what-it-is thinking will always be perceived as a dangerous anomaly. The majoritarian it-is-what-it-is thinking is solidly embedded in taken-for-grantedness. It will counter every challenge to the protective stability with an assault of take-it-or-leave-it logic. The critical understander either identifies with commonsensical ways of being in the world (e.g., legitimacy) or thinks otherwise. Many thinkers have worked on this theme (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Foucault, 1975/1977; Gramsci, 2010). What lies at the center of their perspective are social actors conforming to self-evidentialized domination. This can be examined with a business metaphor: IKEAization.

IKEAization

IKEA is a Swedish giant that designs and sells ready-to-assemble furniture. The company has become a widespread phenomenon (Moon, 2004). Popular writers are now talking about a wave of IKEAization (Blackshaw, 2013) hitting the shores of an already McDonaldized world (Ritzer, 2004). There is indeed a certain level of exaggeration with both of the conceptualizations. Nevertheless, they have become popular for good reasons.

One can visit flats in Berlin, Istanbul, and London and experience a strong déjà vu feeling. The familiarity with the furniture is evident. The same types of furniture have spread all over the globe. Soon enough, even in the remotest parts of the world, one will come across a piece of IKEA furniture or accessory. Depending on one’s taste, this could be regarded as progress (e.g., designing a personal space has become affordable), or a
repressive all-encompassing process of homogenization of everyday life (e.g., the personal space is no more personal—it is just like any other space) (Lyotard, 1984, pp. 71-84). A piece of furniture might not necessarily prove to be an interesting topic of investigation. One could argue: ‘if one does not like it, one may refrain from buying IKEA furniture’. But the discussion here is hardly about a piece of furniture. It is not about liking IKEA or not. The emphasis here must be put on the déjà vu feeling generated with the process of IKEAization. There is an apparent antagonism between consensus and dissensus. It is about choosing integration or plurality (Habermas, 1981, pp. 3-14; Lyotard, 1984, pp. 71-84).

A stranger is no longer a stranger. One has become quite familiar with people who one used to regard as strangers. People travel and meet strangers in foreign countries. They realize how astonishingly easy it has become to establish instant acquaintances. One wonders about the source of this familiarity. People try to make sense of this strong sense of existential-affinity. One knows what it means to be that person on the basis of a direct participation in the other person’s way of being in the world. The foreign has already become familiar. This is knowledge based on existential-affinity. And one tries to translate the knowledge based on existential-affinity into properly theoretical and conceptual knowledge by highlighting the transformative power of modernity. There has been an endless debate going on for at least three decades now as to whether or not globalization processes have had homogenizing effects on the economic, cultural and political spheres (Cohen, 1996; Giddens, 1984; Pieterse, 2004, pp. 65-94).

Coming from the same type of global social milieus, people are pre-structured similarly in their respective societies. Their ways of being in the world are perhaps not homogenized so much as synchronized. A process of habilitation in the same minimalist kind of being in the world has generated global IKEA partners with a strong sense of existential-affinity. From a positive point of view, this is a great development in human history. Since the foreign has become familiar, a thorough understanding of each other can now be developed. A consensus and an integration of different ways of being in the world are now possible. From a negative point of view, though, a consensus has become
possible only because particular world-views are gentrified and plurality is lost. One can now take the comfort of the now-familiar exotic. At the same time, one can still enjoy the strangeness that still defines the exotic (Wasserman, 1994, p.104). While material gentrification is easier to detect (when affluent people are restoring deteriorated neighborhoods which are occupied by lower-income people, it is hard to miss) gentrification of the world-views, that is the alteration of mindsets, is less visible (Barnett, 1977, p. 395). So-called deteriorated world-views (e.g., counter-hegemonic ways of seeing life) which are occupied by supposedly archaic ways of seeing the human condition (e.g., emancipatory understanding) are restored (e.g., re-hegemonized). The practice of restoring—transforming could-have-been-otherwise into it-is-what-it-is—is done in a ready-to-assemble manner. For sketching a pictorial imagination of the process of self-evidentalization and trivialization of understanding, the same business analogy of IKEAization can be employed.

A customer purchases a piece of IKEA furniture. If the purchased product requires assembling at home (e.g., bookshelves), the product comes with an assembly instruction manual. The manual typically takes the form of a booklet with additional stand-alone papers which illustrates the assembly process in a nutshell. By looking at the manual and working with the kit (e.g., fasteners, screws, fixings, etc.), the customer is expected to put the pieces together without any difficulty. IKEA has built its entire business strategy around the ready-to-assemble concept. While the company profits from the reduction of extra costs (e.g., storage, assembly, delivery of the pre-assembled furniture, etc.), customers benefit from the cost reduction. To be able to continue with its cost-effective method of conducting business, IKEA needs to oversee one vital matter: the ready-to-assemble furniture must actually be ready-to-assemble. Ironically, this does not seem to be the case most of the times. Despite crystal clear assembly instructions from IKEA designers, the testimonies in the customer forums leave no doubt that things do not work as the company expects. Customers continue to complain that IKEA instructions are totally indecipherable. According to customers, IKEA gives no guidance whatsoever while they are struggling all day long trying to assemble pieces which do not seem to fit.
Under pressure from the customers, IKEA has acknowledged the problem and has begun posting video tutorials on *YouTube* to help frustrated consumers. In these videos, IKEA is guiding customers who are confronted with a real life puzzle, by giving a set of tips which relate what the instruction sketches are supposed to signify in real life.

The more IKEA releases these videos, the more users are supposed to see ahead of time how a particular piece of furniture is assembled (Garun, 2012). Looking at the video, customers can decide whether they are able to take on the challenge on their own. The customer can always ask IKEA to send someone over to do the assembling. Nevertheless, this will bring additional costs and IKEA furniture all of a sudden will cost more than a premium piece of furniture. IKEA also offers guidance through e-mail and telephone. It is not clear, however, how a customer who could not make sense of a video of an assembly would pose an intelligible question on the phone or in an e-mail. Hence, the discussions in customer forums leave no doubt that none of these precautions (e.g., assembling sketches, videos, phone and e-mail guidance) has worked so far. Customers seem to be even more confused. There is a fundamental problem with the ready-to-assemble concept. The more IKEA tries to give guidance to its customers, the more the company generates sets of new signifiers that seem not to make any sense to customers. IKEA designers may persist in being confident about the intuitive quality of their sketches and other materials for guiding the customers. Nevertheless, these signifiers do not possess self-evident meanings. IKEA instructions are not intuitive to global customers. One would expect IKEA to be aware that it is dealing with global customers, and one would suspect that this is essentially why IKEA either avoids using textual descriptions in the manuals or keeps them to a minimum. One would think this is IKEA’s solution against hermeneutical disputes. They must know well enough that badly translated instructions are much worse than giving no translation or instruction at all. This is not the case.

Letters and words are not the only signs which can be interpreted to have different meanings. This is basic semiotics. Graphic sketches are no different than letters. A drawing of a chair (just like a drawing of a letter) is something other than itself (more
than a drawing, less than the object it signifies). For communication to take place between the customer and the company, the customer needs to interpret and decode the signs from the manual accurately (the drawing of a chair must simulate the chair it signifies). This is how a customer can meet the desired end and finally assemble a piece of furniture successfully. From this perspective, IKEA manuals are nothing but albums of signs which work through visual sense to create unintentional meanings.

The IKEA manual is a good example of how a simple task of describing how to assemble furniture may be transformed into a complex task. There is no doubt that social phenomena are more resistant to clarity than a piece of IKEA furniture. No methodology can be simpler than an IKEA assembly instruction manual. Unless the customer is an artist who is not worried about creating a chair-like object from bookshelves, an IKEA customer is quite demanding. Customers want to have in their living room a piece of furniture identical to that which they have seen in the exhibition. Nobody can be more intolerant to uncertainty than an average IKEA customer. If the one-size-fits-all approach does not even work in a business which is solely based on the ready-to-assemble mentality, one can confidently claim that it would not work when applied to the study of being in the world.

There is a basic idea behind manufacturing a ready-to-assemble product. With a related assembly manual, anyone should be able to assemble a product. It is a rigorously premeditated activity. The task might appear to be simple. One just follows the steps and assembles the furniture. Nevertheless, it seems that up until now, IKEA assembly manuals have failed miserably. No matter what solution IKEA executives and designers come up with, IKEA manuals continue to not make full sense to the customers. There is one good reason to argue that IKEA manuals are destined to fail. One-size-fits-all logic does not work. One size simply does not fit all.

IKEA’s one-size-fits-all simplistic, minimalist mentality has family resemblances with the “method-fetishism” of the positivist approach to understanding (Koch, 1981, p. 120; Putnam & Conant, 1990, p. 140). Positivist research guidelines are so preoccupied with the purity of method that they often deteriorate to a kind of methodolatry (Danziger,
Researchers become preoccupied with the correct method at the expense of theory (Chamberlain, 2000). The result is a growing addiction to creating visual aids such as tables and charts (Spicer & Chamberlain, 1996). Just like an IKEA manual, the positivist research framework sketches a rigorous research design, to be followed step by step, and tries to make it more compressible by introducing visual aids.

The IKEA manual claims to guarantee that the customer will successfully assemble the furniture in the end, and the positivist research design assures that the analysts get what they are looking for. Both claim to guide the agents step by step to a predicted end. There are cases where IKEA manuals and research designs have worked perfectly. After all, they are based on simple procedures. One fully commits to following the steps. Improvisation is minimized but allowed as exceptions to be used when they are absolutely necessary. In the end, one will be able to assemble the furniture or the research material without difficulty. Nevertheless, such success stories miss the point that since ready-to-assemble models with a one-size-fits-all logic do not comprise adaptability factors, they are prone to complications.

Adaptability is about changing something to respond to changes. One uses a wide spectrum of methods, tools and approaches for dealing with contingencies. While assembling IKEA furniture, one may face unexpected disturbances. For example, it is not uncommon that the furniture pieces are found to be missing holes for putting the screws through. Therefore, for a successful assembly experience, the manual has to be adaptable within its own algorithm. It should, for example, guide the customer who has no experience in furniture assembly. The manual must contain a troubleshooting algorithm that describes every single step to be followed when unexpected problems occur. Seen from this perspective, adaptability in the limited sense—to the extent that is confined by the algorithm—is an important factor for efficiency (Basadur, 1997; Bordoloi, Cooper & Matsuo, 1999; Clark, 2000).

Depending on their nature, some processes have higher potential for adaptability. In these cases, an inverse proportion between the levels of adaptability and loyalty to a fore-
structure is significant: the higher the adaptability of a process, the lower the attachment to the algorithm. This is adaptability in the more general sense. When environments are marked by high levels of adaptability, preferences do not need to be determined and limited by a pre-structured algorithm. Detachment from the pre-structuredness and customization is possible. The primary concern is no longer remaining loyal to the premeditated algorithm but avoiding the impasse by adapting to the given configuration. While adaptability in the limited sense is concerned with bypassing the impasse (e.g., persisting with working with an approach that contradicts the empirical situation), adaptability in the general sense tackles and solves the problem at hand. The earlier approach is limited. It does not further the problem at hand. And it definitely does not elevate the discussion (Gilmore & Pine II, 1998; Huffman, 1998; Kotha, 1995; Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001).

Adaptability in the limited sense can be signified with another word: resilience. Resilience is about the inward capacity of a process for responding to disturbance. For example, in the case of assembling IKEA furniture, when the flow of assembly is disturbed and there are holes missing for placing the screws, it is a matter of efficiency for the customer to be able to adapt to the new situation. After all, efficiency, productivity and profitability rely on the applicability of the ready-to-assemble principles. The customer needs to solve the problem and the customer needs to solve it with the algorithm of the assembly manual. External solutions can solve the problem at hand. For example, a handy customer makes holes in the furniture for placing the screws. These solutions, nevertheless, are not acceptable as they would only underline the failure: the furniture was not ready-to-assemble in the first place. The sole purpose of the manual is to save the customer from a state of perturbation and provide a state of stability. If the disturbance in the flow of the activity of assembling persists, the sense of security the manual provides is undermined. The customer decides that even if they follow the steps of the manual, they would never be able to put the pieces together (Coutu et al., 2009; Gulati, 2009; Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006). Neither the positivist-objectivist research design nor the IKEA assembly manuals possesses the capacity to absorb
disturbance and reorganize themselves against the challenge of contingency (Shapiro & Bedi, 2007). This is simply because structuring a self-sufficient system which works on circular logic is set as the primary goal at the outset. Responding to the challenge and elevating the discussion by engaging with the problem dialectically is not the main concern. What is supposed to be a means (e.g., method and theory) to reach an unpredictable end (e.g., developing a new understanding) becomes an end in itself (Butler, Laclau & Žižek, 2000; Rorty, 1989).

IKEA continues to publish the same assembly manuals for walking tall on the stage. Similarly, new methodology books that are based on the same positivist principles are published every year. To assure the customers that IKEA manuals and research designs are infallible, IKEA continues to post videos on YouTube suggesting that if the manual did not work, it is the customer who is to blame. The same attitude can be observed in methodology workshops or guidebooks of the positivist school. The student is either not intelligent enough or must have made a simple mistake during the assembling process (Grube & Jonkers, 2008). Against this background, one can argue that while adaptability in the general sense is about adopting a genuine effort to tackle contingencies and encourage progress, resilience is concerned more with maintaining the consistency of the existing approach. Seen from this point of view, there is essentially no difference between IKEA assembly manuals and modernization theories. While, against complaints from all over the world, IKEA does not give up the claim that IKEA manuals are of universal character, proponents of modernization theories persist in claiming that the world can be understood from the perspective of the Western modernization experience. This point needs further elaboration.

Modernization theories have taken different shapes in the last fifty years. The fundamental basis of these theories is the occurrence of today’s modern societies in the Global North. The world as we know it came into being through a fundamental transformation via industrial and political revolutions (Braudel, 1979/1982a, 1979/1982b, 1979/1982c; Hobsbawm, 1975, 1987, 1996; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). In the period between the 1950s and the 1960s, theoreticians tried to explain the
superiority of the developed Western world (Black, 1966; Lerner, 1958/1964; Levy, 1966). Their argument was simple: the West enjoyed a unique success due to the singularities of the Western culture. The period between the 1960s and the 1980s gave birth to critical theories known as dependencia and world-systems theory (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1979). What earlier theories tagged as Western superiority, for the proponents of dependencia, could be translated as Western imperialism and dominance.

The non-Western part of the world was rendered dependent on the Western part and the global system was reproducing itself. The radical Marxist criticism of capitalism in the forms of dependencia and world-systems theory successfully predicted the transition from capitalism to socialism. However, a global socialist transformation did not take place and both strands of thought lost their momentum. Both Liberal modernization theory and the Marxist alternative were dismissed by the new schools of thought as grand narratives. Postmodern critique problematized an essential aspect of early modernization theories: linearity in development.

According to the principle of linearity in development, one could designate a universal developmental process that could obtain its effects through a standard line of progress rather than spontaneous and relational forms of processes. In a standard line of progress, singularities of the localities—the local differences in the economic and socio-structural system—were disciplined by a standard form of categorization. Modernity was a universal aspiration and underdeveloped countries were in the process of industrialization and modernization to progress towards this goal. The modernization process could be disturbed due to internal factors such as religion. Countries without the Protestant ethic were not able to internalize capitalist principles, for example. Influential dependencia theories looked at the other side of the coin without opposing the fundamental ideas that underpinned modernization theories such as differentiation and rationalization. The world could be divided into two as the core and the periphery, and one could accordingly claim that the periphery was underdeveloped as a result of the global expansion of capitalism.
Linearity in development was criticized in terms of adaptability factors. There were indeed family resemblances between countries of the world but singularities could not be pushed into arbitrary particularities, and unconvincing universal analytical categories such as underdeveloped, developing, and developed could not be formed accordingly. Each unit in the global order was significantly different from the others. Therefore, most of the time, the grounds for comparison were shaky in the sense that it was destined to be reductionist, one-dimensional, and ahistorical. The perspective of linearity in development rendered these theories heavily ideological. There were basically two models—the capitalist and the socialist—and a Third World country had to choose between the two. The model for the supporters of modernization theories was the U.S., and the model for the latter was the Soviets. In that sense, the explanatory framework for development was indistinguishable from global politics.

Between the 1980s and the 2000s, postmodern modernization theories came into circulation. These theories tried to deconstruct the earlier categorizations of modernization (Inglehart, 1997). They argued that being in the world in the Western and non-Western part of the world meant different things. The world was hit by a globalization wave and modernity was spreading all over the world without absorbing traditional ways of being (Giddens, 1991). Modern and traditional ways of being were no longer mutually exclusive. One can argue that from the 2000s onwards, the postmodern conceptualization of modernization has been challenged and the hermeneutical circle has been closed. According to this view, deconstruction has completed its mission. Now the mission is to put things back together. This is done in two ways: one can now talk about neo-modernism—a hybrid and a more developed version of early modernism (Alexander, 1994; Tiryakian, 1991). Or, one could supplant deconstruction by a new philosophy that would collect new perspectives and put them together analytically in a kaleidoscopic model. While a neo-modernism approach can be interpreted as a return to Eurocentric theories of modernization, the latter arguably marks the beginning of non-Eurocentric theory. It can be argued that the point at which social theory finds itself today is neither a point of good old Eurocentric modernization worldview nor an emancipatory
non-Eurocentric perspective. Hegemony and dominance continue to remain relevant topics. Even though post-schools might have fulfilled their mission, critical thinking has not. Consciousness has surely been elevated by making an upward spiral, but the process is likely to go on.

**Conclusive Remarks**

Drawing on the model of IKEAization the chapter discussed the shortcomings of one-size-fits-all approaches. It argued that contemporary configuration has been marked by massive changes such as globalization and the rise of the Global South, which rendered one-size-fits-all approaches to understanding inadequate for analyzing different modes of being in the world. The chapter categorized the homogenizing tendencies of such theorizing as being hegemonic, and claimed that such a world-view suffers from a built-in flaw which results in erasing differences of belief, culture, and other factors that contribute to one’s being in the world. The chapter first looked at two types of understanding: the ordinary and the critical and the soils that nourish them. And then it argued that approaching social phenomena in an ordinary fashion is not restricted to professional analysts, but open to and practiced by people from all walks of life; critical understanding requires building up intentionality; therefore, those who question and doubt have the chance for building critical understanding.

The chapter showed that the movement from bewilderedness to understanding is significant, and critical understanding can be identified by looking at how a social analysis answers to drawbacks, uncertainties and disruptions. The chapter explained that critical understanding does not back off from confronting these challenges; instead it displays an awareness of the limitations to understanding, of pre-structuredness, of the possibility to overlook alternatives. While it takes into account particularities, undividedness of thought, and the danger of failure, it does not equate reflectivity with understanding. Finally, the chapter puts forward the idea that critical understanding is always on the look-out for dialectical debate in order to potentially affect change. The
ideas introduced in this chapter targeted the enablement of a meaningful discussion of the types of hegemonic challenges that are seen in the world today. The chapter argued that these are engendering a new type of understanding.
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the process of modernization has been dominated by hegemonic one-size-fits-all thinking that does not, in fact, fit all. This chapter builds upon this idea to argue the rise of the Global South opened up the possibilities for building different ways of understanding the contemporary world. By revealing the artificial framework of hegemonic thinking, the post-schools have enabled contemporary social agents to rethink being in the world. The symbolic sphere has received the greatest emphasis from the post-school critical thinking. The post-schools have clarified that no one and no thinking is immune from faulty thinking. Falling into the circle of conformity is inevitable for both ordinary and critical analysts.

The chapter sets off by screening long-existing theories for their value for critical analyses/change of perspective/paradigm shift. It takes a closer look at the structure-surface model in order to locate the relation between pessimism or optimism towards (social) change and this model, before giving a signifying example, academia, for a dominant structure that is inherently designed to monitor critique.

A Post Configuration

A unique coalescence of evolvements has laid the foundation for a novel intellectual configuration. The phenomenon of the rise of the Global South is the main component of a new social and political order (Rehbein, 2010). This concept may have been popularized by the media in the last three decades, but historians have long been familiar with the re-emergence of the Southern Hemisphere (Findlay & Rourke, 2007; Frank, 1998). It has been a slow, persistent, gradual historical process (Hobson, 2004). One clear signal of the latest stage of this historical development has been the advent of the post-schools (Vazquez-Arroyo, 2008).

The post-schools have created a vast literature which has invited a refreshed way of looking at things (Sontag, 1965, p. 303). The result has been an all-encompassing impact
on the ways that social phenomena have long been imagined. They have been drawing on a strong tradition of suspicion that was not well appreciated until the post-schools shed intellectual light on it (Fisher, 1992). Post-schools have not only motivated different ways of interpreting the history of Western and non-Western thought, but they have also created a related momentum that will extend the respective philosophical impact into the future (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 182-184). In unimaginable ways they have branched out and penetrated into the core of theory generation in contemporary social theory. Even those who openly despise post-schools either unconsciously draw on this collective body of knowledge, or respond to the theorization generated by post-schools one way or another. If today one can dare to systematically unthink politics and social relations—so that one can legitimize rethinking from a kind of point zero—this is because the post-schools have paved the way.

One of the greatest contributions of post-schools to contemporary thinking has been the revitalization of a strong emphasis on the symbolic sphere (e.g., beliefs and value systems) (Mouzelis, 2008, pp. 68-69). The post-schools wanted to turn their attention to the processes that contributed to the self-evidentalization of thought patterns that formed the fundaments of hegemonic world-views. Beneath all kinds of different engagements of post-schools is a sense of urgency about unveiling the hegemonic and conformist nature of everyday thinking and existence so that it can be tackled substantially (Goldman & Papson, 1994, pp. 245-247).

These points can be explained in reference to a prominent approach within contemporary critical social theory: post-Marxism (e.g., Devenney, 2004; Goldstein, 2005; Therborn, 2008). According to the materialist critique, post-schools have promoted different form of speculative idealist thinking by putting the emphasis on the symbolic sphere (Dirlik, 1997). Therefore, post-Marxism is put forward as a specific target for the materialist critique.

Post-Marxism has been criticized for at least five reasons: first, for promoting the idea that socialism as an ideology has outlived its time. Second, for labeling the social class approach as reductionist and harmful to social solidarity by suggesting the
formation of alliances along other lines. Third, for declaring the state as the enemy which oppresses citizenry by means of bureaucracy. Fourth, for undermining the revolutionary utopia by claiming that grand scale social change can alter the social configuration on the surface while reproducing the structures. And finally, for valuing local struggles by detaching them from their global situatedness (Petras, 1997).

Critique to post-Marxism misses a vital point. No type of critical thinking can contain a built-in capacity for self-reflectivity. Thinking and action are intertwined (Kemmis, 1985). As was underlined before, thinking is pre-structured by one’s situatedness in the world. Social structural situatedness and personal history define how people are (Kemmis, 1985). Self-reflection is learned and preconditioned in a variety of social contexts. While introspection plays a significant role in self-reflection (Dewey, 1991), since ideology and self-reflection shape each other (Kemmis, 1985), it is also social.

Thinking about thinking is a meta-level engagement and one does not at all times engage in this activity; therefore one often falls into the category of ordinary analysts who unlike critical analysts avoid meta-level engagements. If self-reflection is about making judgments about thinking prior to action (Tremmel, 1993), then just like children before adolescence think with pre-conventional reasoning about conforming to authority (Revenson & Singer, 1997), ordinary analysts would lack the intention of reflecting and reasoning in complex ways. For them, there is no point in being occupied with the notion of self-reflection; the pursuit of truth for its own sake is not a concern; appealing to circumstances and trying to satisfy the common-sensical taste proves to the main concern.

Culture’s power that is contained in its values and belief systems, and ultimately its history and ideologies must be recognized, but people have the power to shape thought and action. With thought and action one can shape values and ideologies. Inasmuch as reality is a construction, one can build the capacity to transform it (Freire, 1970). Self-reflection is a choice and an ideology (Kemmis, 1985).

From the perspective of critical analysts, self-reflection is necessary for achieving
emancipatory thinking (Carlyle, 1836/1999, p. 22). Therefore, critical analysts contemplate these notions in order to try their hardest to free themselves from enslavement in the forms of injustice, immorality, irrationality and delusion (Cottle, 2001). “The emancipatory interest is aimed at emancipating people from the dictates of taken-for-granted assumptions, habits, tradition, custom, domination and coercion, and self-deception” (Kemmis, 1985, p. 145). For self-reflective critical analysts, there is no doubt that history has affected their way of being in the world, but they also know that they in turn can affect history, though to a limited extent. An exercise in self-reflection proves that one can invent and reinvent and reconstitute oneself, as well as the social world. One can try to live freely beyond the possible (Marcuse, 1964).

Against this background, the greatest contribution of the post-schools is perhaps about underlining a rather self-evident but often ignored fact: nobody and no thought process can be immune to the fallacies of faulty thinking (Rabaté, 2002).

The problems with emancipatory thinking are ontological and they are related to the all-encompassing character of being in the world. This is why post-schools pose foundational questions which promote revisionist readings of being in the world (Rabaté, 2002). Post-schools do not necessarily provide answers, but they at least know where the problem lies (Rabaté, 2002).

In this context, it is of the utmost importance to note that when all social and anthropological relations are drawn from some kind of materialist bases (and more specifically from economic bases), despite an honest intention to launch substantial critical thinking, one will be prone to compromising critical reflectivity. As a result, the analyst will lack the necessary ability and capacity to elevate the discussion.

Post-schools argue that compromising critical reflectivity leads any analyst to conservatism. One must recognize the irony here: while an analyst tries to critically engage with the reality and develop an emancipatory form of understanding, the risk of drifting with the current of conformist thinking is just too high. Therefore, another important lesson to learn from the post-schools is the urgency of developing a more complex understanding of the relation between structure and surface.
Through its continual insistence that everything can be reduced to material relations of production, orthodox interpretations of structure-surface dynamics tend to paradoxically obscure the constellation of hegemonic structures while targeting doing exactly the opposite. By turning their attention more towards the investigation of the symbolic sphere, the post-schools simply show the way out of the vicious circle: The relation between the symbolic and the material requires that imagining occurs in all directions, with no notion of determinism.

The structure-surface dynamic is key to grasping the foundations of conformist and non-conformist thinking and in order to better understand the forces which work against one’s realizing, and hold hegemony on one’s understanding, one needs to investigate this prime dialectic.

Structure-Surface

The social world is complex—much more so than the natural world. This is simply because the object of investigation is fellow human beings: thinking subjects who can respond to the social analyst and challenge the theorization (Breuer & Roth, 2003). Therefore, investigating the social world proves to be a challenging task.

When social analysts who are interested in investigating social worlds are faced with a difficult challenge in understanding complex phenomena, they take refuge in theory (Leitch, 2003; Nealon & Giroux, 2012). A theoretical perspective applies order to a seemingly chaotic world (Lamphere, 2010; Rabaté, 2002). This is why social analysts are tempted to exploit the comfort that theoretical thinking offers (Brenneis, 2010).

Giving in to this temptation may turn into a habit. At times, when all points of reference are fixated to theory, the psychotic temptation may turn into a delusional one. This is why it has been claimed that theory is dead (Eagleton, 2003; McQuillan, MacDonald, Purves & Thomson, 1999).

Breaking free of its moorings, the ego of the social analyst invents new continents for itself. It sets up a new social world with a meaning of its own. Unlike delusional
patients in a mental asylum, a delusional social analyst would not be delusional in a quiet sort of way. They will voice their thinking and force the world they set up to occupy more space in reality.

Delusions on the part of social analysts tend to persist because of a lack of options. If they let go the theorizing, they will be faced with emptiness and meaninglessness. Therefore, every social analyst must go through a self-reflective process (Dewey, 2007; Kemmis, 1985). This is not a matter of ethics or limitation. It is the core of the analyst’s activity. The analyst asks: am I deluded? Am I taking a defensive position by fixing all my points of reference to theory? Is this defensive position keeping at bay a much more invasive delusion? If I let my attachment to theory go, will the circumstances trigger a much more invasive delusion? If my delusion is truly delusional—and it can successfully replace reality—is it not more beneficial for me remain loyal to the delusion? Is failure to set up a truly delusional solution not more damaging? (Abensour, 2008/2013, pp. 1-10).

There are several ways to respond to these questions. There is a likelihood that the delusion could become a habit, which is how analysts may get lost in their desire to develop a universal theoretical framework that claims to explain everything. All sorts of social phenomena can now be comprehended.

The traditional structure-surface metaphor can either be regarded in this Universalist sense (everything in this world can be explained in terms of a structure and surface dichotomy), or in the particularistic sense (some phenomena in this world can be made sense of in terms of a structure and surface dichotomy).

The most known particularistic variation which comes to mind is the base-superstructure metaphor by Marx. As structure-surface and base-superstructure are interrelated, one should briefly take a look at the latter to better understand the former.

The famous base-superstructure model occupies a primary space in Marxist cultural analysis. Being a metaphor, the model essentially draws on what any kind of figure of speech has to offer: a description of similarities between two otherwise unrelated objects or subjects. The charm of metaphors comes from their rich use of analogies. Therefore, metaphors have always proved to be quite efficient heuristic devices used in scientific
argumentation.

The way a metaphor works is that an analyst first finds a subject or an object from which they can borrow a set of attributes. Secondly, the analyst ascribes these attributes to another subject or object (Fischer, 2013). Therefore, as the etymology of the word metaphor suggests, an author builds a bridge and paves the way for some kind of transference to come into being between the two subjects or objects.

Carrying over attributes of one subject or object to another in much simpler forms is a general principle in everyday thinking. Therefore, Marx’s base-superstructure follows this everyday practice (Paananen, 2000). From the very early beginnings of philosophy, thinkers have always conceptualized various characteristics of existence which they tended to regard as foundational to human societies. The key, of course, has always been conceptualizing a substantial explanatory model. Only through that model can one offer a new vision for others to make sense of the world. From this point of view, there is no doubt that Marx’s contribution has been truly revolutionary.

Marx posited production and related relations as the foundational elements of any given society (Creaven, 2000). According to Marx, the differentia specifica of human beings is the fact that they produce their means of subsistence. In other words, human beings create and recreate the world they are living in (Marx, 1953, p. 574). Humans can be imagined as social agents who are thrown into a set of historically determined existential conditions. They are, nevertheless, not automatic results of the historical processes. They always transform the conditions they live in. This is the main reason why Marx has put the primary emphasis on production to be able to make sense of human existence in the world (Cohen, 1978).

The point Marx put his finger on was so fundamental that since then it has been misunderstood. Being thrown into the world, into a complex network of social relations, humans have always undertaken activities that have shaped their existence. Human activities are part of a larger production scheme that is historical. It originated in the past, and it has developmentally reached the present. The production scheme is future-oriented. Humans exist in societies where they are required to undertake some activities that are
produced by the material conditions by which they are surrounded. Therefore, human beings always produce and reproduce these material conditions. Marx argues that this is what lies at the bottom of human existence. This is the primary base that has to be regarded as the ontological structure, and anything else has to stand on this base (Miller & Siedentop, 1983). Marx’s view on consciousness follows this theorization.

A social being’s consciousness, his or her awareness of being in the world, is already part of that very being (Marx, 1953, p. 517). From this point of departure, Marx arrives at his fundamental thesis: one cannot give primacy to consciousness in understanding the human way of being in the world. Analysts cannot set consciousness as the primary aspect of the analysis. If they did so, this would be equal to a dog chasing its tail. Although undeniably entertaining to watch, nonetheless, the constant repetition of the same action becomes a regular habit that constitutes a major part of the dog’s activities in the world. Therefore, argues Marx, if one desires any change in the way that people exist in the world, one needs to adapt to a new way of looking at things, which is about focusing on what is not immediately visible: the base.

The base is not invisible, but it requires an educated eye to recognize it. Novel ideas are not key to achieve social transformation. And neither is strong superhuman determination (though it can be of use). To make a difference, one should simply look at what lies under the surface: the structure, the base, the real locus of existence.

Now the structure-surface model will be employed for referring to a relational nexus identical to that of the base-superstructure. The difference, however, will be that the structure-surface model will not put a primary emphasis exclusively on the material aspects of being in the world. Rather, it will highlight the relational nexus with the symbolic.

The advantage of putting a bolder emphasis on the symbolic sphere serves the purpose of illustrating that human beings can and must develop a kind of personal reflexivity in order to be able to imagine alternative ways of being. Unreflective determinism cannot be relied upon against conventional belief (Cohen, 1978; Miller & Siedentop, 1983).
There are various ways to imagine and order the relation between the structure and the surface. When clustered, one may arrive at four main categories that can be classified in two pairs that, for the sake of argument, will be called Pollyanna-Cassandra and Fox-Hedgehog.

The classification is based on how each group is inclined towards ordering the relation between the structure and the surface, and is not intended to make exhaustive claims. Pollyanna-Cassandra and Hedgehog-Fox pairs shed illuminating light on the division between people who think that today is different from yesterday and tomorrow will be different from the present and the past, and those who believe there is never anything new under the sun. This is why it is relevant to think in these terms (Gould, 2003).

From business administration to philosophy, and from psychology to linguistics, various disciplines have studied and developed theories, models and techniques to understand the nature of the concept and the conceptions of change (e.g., Blatt & Ford, 1994; Fried, 2010; Mansfield, 2010; Melchert, 2011, pp. 57-76; Paton & McCalman, 2008; Poole & d. Ven, 2004). Of the infinite number of variations of ordering the relation between the structure and the surface, one can identify two main approaches concerning change: Pollyannas and Cassandras.

Those who belong to the first group are inclined towards arguing that there is always change in life. According to this approach, there are always new forms coming into being. Those who belong to the second group will tend to emphasize the surface-level manifestation of change. What exists as visible and ready for our immediate perception on the surface cannot be seen as change per se. Those surface-level manifestations should be regarded as nothing but detached fragments of the structure. This overall conclusion can be extracted from different takes on change (e.g., Berndtson, 1981, pp. 70-82; Blenkin, Edwards & Kelly, 1992, pp. 1-28; Hood, 2002, pp. 31-35; Jacobs, 2004, pp. 45-72; Márquez, 1970).

The visible change on the surface and the invisible persistence of the structures underneath can be regarded as two inextricable parts of the collective societal
imagination. Singularities of one’s existence play a great role in shaping one’s inclination towards different readings of change (Blenkin, Edwards & Kelly, 1992, pp. 1-28). Those who tend to respond more easily to the popular and superficial pattern of continuous change in life can be imagined as protagonists who are symbolized by the name Pollyanna.

Pollyanna is a character from the best-selling novel by the American novelist Eleanor H. Porter (1913/2008). Pollyannas passionately and sometimes naively believe in human progress, and the transformational power of personal and societal development. The essence of the Pollyanna-argument can be extracted from one of the key mottos of the protagonist Pollyanna: if disappointment is what one is looking for in the world, one will surely find it. The naiveté of the Pollyanna-argument points at the crisis of modernity. This naiveté is also what legitimizes hegemonic Universalism and domination (Brandtstädter, n.d., p.2.; McBride, 2001, p. 98; Byrne, 2003, p.96).

The second perspective on change takes its name from Greek mythology (Dowden & Livingstone, 2011). Cassandras see change in life, but their view of change tends to be more sophisticated than the simplistic Pollyanna-argument. Acknowledging surface-level change, Cassandras would foresee that the seemingly unprecedented change always brings seemingly unprecedented woes. In other words, while not ignoring surface-level change, Cassandras would give primary importance to the persistent character of structures which determine and redefine the former.

Being immediately labeled as pessimists by Pollyannas, Cassandras would refuse to internalize the ungrounded optimism of the conformist Pollyannas. Despite the fact that their prophetic insights are often obscured by their rather unconventional and non-conformist ways of being, the Cassandras’ disjointed statements are fully comprehensible when the right time comes, at the threshold moment where the structure fulfills its deterministic mission and manifests itself on the surface.

Pollyannas are normally known for defining themselves as having indestructible faith in change. Nevertheless, they alter their attitude when it comes to structural change. The ontological shift that takes place before their eyes goes unnoticed. With that in mind,
one wonders why Pollyannas are over-enthusiastic about appreciating surface-level change while they reject the possibility of structural change taking place. An immediate answer could be that while surface-level change is momentary, temporary, visible, and evident, structural change expands to *longue durée*, and is continuous, historical, and not readily available to ordinary perception.

One’s outlook on life—which comprises everything, including one’s take on the nature of change—is inexorably related to the existential conditions one is thrown into. Thus, the Pollyanna outlook on life would almost perfectly fit the dictionary definition of conformism. Uncritically and habitually conforming to existing customs, rules, and the styles of society, Pollyannas take it for granted that there is one self-evident way of being in the world, and they regard any effort to imagine something out of this framework as a senseless practice.

If that is the case, then the conformist take on change is akin to what one can call the CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) mentality: a lame make-up to save the day without addressing the underpinning structural reasons behind the contemporary issues. Of course, this is not accidental. Getting to the core of the issues would mean challenging the existing configuration. A key stakeholder in the system has no gain in revolutionizing current relations of production.

The devotion to pointing at surface-level change is a manifestation of one’s ideology. It is a subconscious confession of the lack of ability or desire to register deep-level change. Since a superficial ideology goes perfectly with a superficial way of making sense of the world, it could be both.

While Pollyannas are keeping a certain sense of optimism in a zone of comfort, Cassandras, on the other hand, who are normally labeled as pessimists and conservatives by Pollyannas, would take this ontological change very seriously, and regard it as a dynamic which is transforming the way that humans exist in the world.

Of course, the real picture is much more complex. There are “believing Cassandras” (AtKisson, 2012) and “cynical Pollyannas” (Robbins & Carlson, 2013). While a grown up Pollyanna (Porter, 2009) finds it difficult to keep their faith, a senior
Cassandra may learn to grow some faith (Walton, 2012).

One must understand that the debate between Pollyannas and Cassandras is existentially related and emotionally charged. Therefore, one often observes strong antagonisms which inevitably destroy whatever sense may exist in the whole interaction.

A typical example of the miscommunication can be observed in the Pollyanna critique of the Cassandras which reads thusly: if one underlines the persistence of old forms, it will only enhance a conservative standpoint, and in return promote reactionary politics.

The miscommunication highlights the great rupture in understanding. Even though there are instances where the critique might be regarded as valid, the truth is just the opposite. The idea behind emphasizing the underpinning structural factors is to clarify the vision for a realistic emancipatory roadmap (Herman Schwengel, personal communication, May, 2007). Since it is in the nature of Pollyannas to be optimistic and passionate, they would perceive the rather dark view of Cassandra as pessimistic, fatalistic and destructive. The contradictory nature of the assessment can be best exposed in reference to Pierre Bourdieu.

Bourdieu has been criticized on similar grounds (Goldthorpe, 2007; Jenkins, 1982; King, 2000; Santoro, 2011; Werfhorst, 2010). Reading Bourdieu can indeed be a disturbing experience. Like any other good thinker, Bourdieu is cruel. If readers are convinced of Bourdieu’s framework, they quickly become deracinated readers. They can no longer avoid having a complicated relation with their being in the world (Rey, 2007). Prior conceptualization of being in the world which was taken for granted collapses. Bourdieu can then be regarded as an exemplary Cassandra. He may be a sophisticated objectivist, and his sociology may tend towards semi-determination (Robbins, 1991, p. 171), but one cannot deny that his sociology has a liberating effect (Hilgers, 2009; Rey, 2007).

Bourdieu was aware that what he essentially did was to illustrate limitations to social change so that one can start with a substantial and realistic base for change (e.g., Bourdieu, 1990, p. 15). He explained how regularities are produced and reproduced.
Since one’s being in the world is shaped by one’s activities (Reay, 1998), experiences generate a multiplicity which cannot be fully grasped by deterministic explanatory frameworks. There is always a high “degree of indeterminacy, of openness, of uncertainty” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 78).

Concerning the nature of his work, Bourdieu always stated what appeared to him as the obvious: as a sociologist he was after grasping particularities (durable), not universalities (eternal) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133; Rehbein, 2010). He talked about “dispositions,” “permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking,” “long-lasting schemes,” “structures of perception, conception and action” (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 27).

Bourdieu is not alone in his success of transforming one’s understanding about being in the world. Western and non-Western philosophy is full of thinkers who have questioned how reality is constructed and self-evidentalized. Ever since the pre-Socratic philosophers, thinkers have been trying to explain that the world is not as it appears. One’s view of change is inexorably situated in one’s particular existence.

Against this background, the Fox-Hedgehog pair relates to the Pollyanna-Cassandra one. It gives a mirrored reversal of it. Highlighting the irony in this mirrored reversal is possibly the best way to define Fox-Hedgehog characteristics.

Foxes and hedgehogs, as will be seen, are two good classificatory terms into which to divide people and help complement the concepts of Pollyanna and Cassandra (Berlin, 1953/1966; Gould, 2003).

British philosopher Isaiah Berlin is known for popularizing the expression Fox-Hedgehog (1953/1966). Berlin never meant his classification to be regarded as more serious than it actually was, but as a sign of his rhetorical competence, his mental exercise and his coining of the matter have gained popular acceptance.

The words Fox and Hedgehog are, of course, just mnemonic tags. They are not meant to be descriptive. It is difficult to trace a broad and varied range of distinct ways of being within two groups. So one should not take tendencies to be sharply honed and well-developed classifications. Despite these terminological inconsistencies in the Fox-
Hedgehog classification, one can look at what a typical member of each approach would say about their vision of the world, and also what they would say about the alternatives.

There are several ways to interpret the Fox-Hedgehog pair. While a fox is known for its resourcefulness, cleverness, and adaptability, a hedgehog, not being as skillful as the fox, is known for having one big trick, such as rolling itself into a ball of spines when threatened, which defines its major character (Berlin, 1953/1966). A fox represents someone who knows many things (alternative ways of being in the world), while a hedgehog represents someone who knows one big thing (conforming to the self-evidentiaлизed order of things).

Despite the fact that foxes have many tricks (challenging the hegemonic order of things in all possible ways), and they must be appreciated because of their extraordinary skills, hedgehogs are hard-working no-nonsense animals (they are productive in the given order). They are the ones that one must take more seriously and show respect to. After all, they have been on this earth longer than any other mammal (due to the persistence of hegemony), and most definitely they are the masters of their game.

While Pollyannas regard themselves as hedgehogs, they would classify Cassandras as foxes. The split is a matter of particularities of being in the world, and is closely related to several factors which constitute an individual, such as one's temperament and one's political and religious affiliation, which play a great role in someone's different attitudes.

Against the background of Pollyanna and Cassandra and Fox and Hedgehog pairs one can evaluate the post-schools contribution to emancipatory thinking. Three points can be made respectively.

First, the post-schools drew on underappreciated Western and non-Western sources, promoted new perspectives, generated new ways of imagining social phenomena, which in turn started a process of transformation of social theory into a counter-hegemonic form. Second, a revitalization of interest in the symbolic sphere underpinned the new philosophy. Third, the new philosophy has put a special emphasis on self-reflectivity, problematized the material base of social relations, and encouraged re-imagination of the
complex relation between the structure and the surface. In order to account for these three points, conclusive points can be made.

For building a genuine effort to counter-hegemonic thinking, it is of the utmost importance for analysts to register that the oppressive structures have a rather strong mental presence in human societies (Mullaly, 2010, pp. 161, 179). They are those internalized ideas which create the materiality of the hegemonic structures (Itzin & Phillipson, 1995). Therefore, if analysts have genuine desire to undo the hegemonic structures and counter hegemony, they should rather focus on the interior—and not easily perceivable, the impalpable—elements of oppression (Schubert, 2002).

The attitude of putting a special focus on the unperceivable elements of hegemony by no means aims to undermine—or relativize—the importance of social struggles against the palpable exterior (Thompson, 1984). The whole point here is to highlight the possible problems that might occur when one puts an exclusive focus on the material world. One important consequence of such an exclusivist perspective would be that one inevitably runs the risk of discharging the epistemic struggle by misguiding the counter-hegemonic consciousness (Varela, Dhawan & Engel, 2011).

This is mainly why a good number of people who are interested in a more just world today are engaging in investigations of the symbolic sphere, so that they can find ways to prevent mutilating emancipatory consciousness in its embryonic forms (Haugaard & Lentner, 2006). The results of their work are evident. More and more questions that had been either ignored or underdeveloped by earlier intellectual movements are being raised today. Investigations of the symbolic sphere (e.g., sacred, religious and political) have enabled a new generation of thinkers to develop a renewed comprehension of the present world constellation. This is how politics today has been recharged with alternative ways of thinking.

In this context, one can learn a twofold lesson from the post generation of thought: First, even though at times analysts momentarily transcend their ordinary consciousness and reach a level of self-critical understanding, they inevitably get into the vicious circle of conforming. If one does not grasp this dilemma, one starts generating seemingly
oppositional and emancipatory ideas without recognizing that one is actually becoming a conformist (Bachelard, 1938/2002).

Second, the reason why one feels at times that one has not come across a new idea in years is because that person is deeply mired in what has been presented to them as self-evident or natural. The suggested solution to this generic problem is the practice of re-imagining the relation between the structure and the surface. One needs to open, close, tighten, and loosen the relation between the structure and the surface until one finds out how the mechanism of the constellation operates in that particular case.

**Self-Sufficient Systems**

The Post-schools have created their proponents and opponents. They come from intellectually diverse backgrounds. Various bodies of thought are not clear-cut, but contradict and overlap in multiple ways. Persistent patterns can be accounted for, without, however, any pretense at offering an exhaustive analysis. In this vein, one can now talk about two categories, Realists and Skeptics, which are closely related to Pollyanna and Cassandra, and Fox and Hedgehog pairs.

Any student of social sciences and humanities will be familiar with the two categories of Realists and Skeptics. Both come with heavy conceptual baggage. In order to avoid getting into a philosophical debate on what realism and skepticism stand for, one can alternatively invent two rather value free categories in a Platonic manner. Plato liked to use names for his characters that suggested the nature of their personality. Thus, for the purposes of a pictorial representation, within the confines of this section, the likeness is made to Hawks and Doves with the hope to add additional significance to the discussion.

The classification of Hawks and Doves serves heuristic purposes. Hawks signify those who argue that the post-schools have fulfilled their job (i.e., provincialization-Chapter 1) and they have made enough noise so far, but it is now time for intellectuals both in the Global South and in the Global North working together for constructing a
globally applicable analytical framework (i.e., de-provincialization, Chapter 1). They claim that there is a general historical framework of thought that all parties can agree upon (i.e., a post-Eurocentric Western explanatory framework that incorporates non-Western empirical data) and must remain within. If all parties work within the boundaries of this intellectual framework, every single perspective can be registered and can contribute to an analytically convincing new philosophy.

Doves tend to be more skeptical and they surely do not share the optimism of the Hawks (i.e., re-provincialization). They are convinced that the latter lack the capacity for registering the singularities of the lived experiences of those who are left on the margins of their respective societies. Therefore, the willingness of the Hawks to take the intellectual lead can be interpreted along the lines of hegemony. A universal and global analytical framework that is supposed to represent every single perspective in the world can only translate into intellectual hegemony.

Second, Hawks argue that the chances for living in a rational, logical world in which the wrongdoings of the past have been eradicated are higher than ever. The predicaments that have bred those crimes are no longer at work. They claim that critical thinking not only allows them to make violence disappear but also defends against it taking other forms. There is no longer a reason for being overwhelmed by a collective guilt. This is why Hawks would react defensively even to a modest connotation of collective guilt.

They are confident that all issues have been tackled and all problems have been solved. The world has become free from violence now. Doves are still driven by the vivid memories of the colonial past. They have developed strong epistemological and political sensitivities out of sheer experience and historical awareness. They are not willing to be guided by the aggressive intellectual campaign of the Hawks. They cannot embrace what has been promoted as an emancipatory intellectual agenda. From the perspectives of the Doves, in different forms, all these analytical proposals aim to rush the reconstitution of a new philosophy. The dismantling process of the hegemonic thinking that has long dominated the world is not complete (i.e., re-provincialization).
There is no doubt that this typology is at best a caricature. Such a categorization may have journalistic flair but is destined to lack academic rigor. It does come very close to the informal fallacies of straw man and false dilemma: two alternative states are presented as the only possibilities when in fact more possibilities exist and one side is attacked by being misrepresented. These are all valid critiques and one must take note of them. Despite the obvious shortcomings though, there are good enough reasons to persist with this categorization. The rationale can be best explained with a quote from a famous Dove, Ashis Nandy: “Better to be a comical dissenter than to be a powerful, serious but acceptable opponent” (Nandy, 1983, p. 111). This statement deserves some extra explanation.

Nandy argues that, according to the dominant discourse of freedom, all sorts of critiques are welcome. Nevertheless, there is a criterion which accompanies the freedom that is provided for dissent. The critiques have to come from a legitimate opponent (who is already an internal part of the system) in an appropriate (i.e., diplomatic) form and manner (the former guarantees that the latter is the case) (Nandy, 1983, p. 111). In other words, not only dissent is tamed and prescribed at the outset (and therefore stripped of its genuine qualities), it is also continuously monitored. Therefore, genuine dissidence (i.e., who is already left out the game) can never find itself a place in this game. In other words, the system creates its own opposition, so that it can pretend as if it is following a dialectical progress, whereas in reality it simply is strengthening its hegemonic inner core by making primary adjustments to the system (i.e., incorporation). This way the system can always keep itself away from foundational critiques.

When a critique is forced to render itself symmetrical, it inevitably loses its essential nature. A foundational critique cannot be legitimized within an illegitimate order of things. It is only logical that an attack on the inner logic of the hegemonic system has to be asymmetrical. This is the only way to shake the consciousness of the opponent to make them realize the possibility of thinking otherwise. Against this background, it is indeed true that the terms Doves and Hawks come with conceptual baggage. They are pre-motivated concepts. This is because they are rendered by an
emancipatory fore-structure.

**Conclusive Remarks**

This chapter has shown the importance of the introduction of the symbolic sphere to analyses. The symbolic constitutes an instrument that possesses the power to shake material-based explanatory systems which claim self-sufficiency, thus rendering themselves locked towards critical reflection. Almost inevitably, the instrument especially initiates an investigation into the structure-surface relation. At various levels, the chapter has looked at different attitudes towards and perceptions of change, and extracted two major systems of belief: an optimistic point of view that mistakes surface change for structural change insofar that it equals the surface with the structure (be it consciously or unconsciously) and takes change for granted; and a pessimistic point of view that has the prospect of a painstakingly slow change (if taking place at all), since it ascribes the possibility of substantial change to the structure only. The chapter proceeded by arguing that although the latter attitude bears the danger to be unrewarding due to a likely disillusionment regarding change, the only opportunity to actuate substantial change is to flexibly extract elements of the structure that are open for change, focus and work on them and disregard the rest. The chapter closed by pointing out the damage that can be done if the first set belief is applied.
Chapter 5: The Impact of Post-Schools

If this work had to be divided into two parts for making the job of the reader easier, the fifth chapter had to be the first chapter of the second part of this work. To explain within that framework, while the first part introduces the main concepts and arguments, second part takes these concepts and ideas and extend them by delving into specific issues of interest. In the first part of this work it was explained at length how difficult it was to transcend the inherent limitations to emancipatory thinking. Since analysts who strive to develop a counter-hegemonic thought cannot escape from an all-encompassing hegemonic prestructuredness, they seek ways to get into situations where the stability of this totalizing system is disturbed and opportunities for different ways of thinking occur. As it was explained in the introduction, there are mainly three situations in which analysts can find some limited space for thinking creatively in terms of emancipation.

In the first situation, stability of the local conformist configuration is challenged by an external global pattern, from which the local configuration cannot escape (i.e. re-emergence of power centers in the Global South or rise of the Global South in short). It is argued that this global historical tendency is not reversible, thus hegemonic thought patterns such as Eurocentric thinking will have to adapt to this ongoing change. The second option that could be given for analysts for developing emancipatory thought was to get into an alien configuration voluntarily and challenging their presuppositions about being in the world. Even though in theory the approach could work, the Orientalist literature abundantly illustrates that this was rarely the case and in the name of researching ‘the other’ even more hegemonic structures were formed. Therefore, one must approach researching other cultures more cautiously as a way to develop counter-hegemonic thought. Finally, a third approach was put forward, and it could be seen as one of the main original contributions of this work to literature: even though the rise of the Global South as the engine of fundamental change is massive, the process is slow, therefore, more immediate challenges that are needed for developing sparks of emancipatory thinking must be found elsewhere: events. Since this point will be
developed sufficiently in the coming chapters, only the backbone of the argument will be stressed here. Emancipatory understanding or counter-hegemonic thinking exists as a potentiality and remains inactivated for most of the time. Social events which come into being spontaneously every day and which are charged with counter-hegemonic potentiality, can fuel critical thinking if they are first recognized and second interpreted in the right direction. Chapter 5 looks at the impact of the post-schools from this particular point of view with a particular focus on the relation between the structure and symbolic.

Chapter 5 starts explaining the impact of the post-schools on thinking with an analogy: figuring out the right relation between the structure and the symbolic in a given configuration is similar to finding the right setting for the exposure in a camera. The first thing amateur photographers should learn is to configure various combinations of shutter and aperture settings. Photographers learn that the configuration of various combinations drastically affects the outcome. When a group of photographers is provided with the same equipment, and asked to take pictures in a given configuration—the same setting and an object to be photographed within the same spatial and temporal dimensions—each photographer will create a different picture. Every single photographer will manage to see the world differently, even in a strictly controlled environment (Bate, 2009; Gelder & Westgeest, 2011).

The uniqueness of the perspective is indisputable. The relevance of the uniqueness, though, is a different question. If two photographers happen to use the same aperture and shutter configuration, as well as an identical angle for taking the photograph, the outcome—two photographs from two different photographers—will bear a resemblance one to the other. In this case, particularities in the pictures will be more relevant than insignificant differences. The photographer imagines a picture—an embryonic picture—before hitting the button. The brightness or the darkness of the final product might come close to the embryonic picture, but it will surely depend upon the aperture and the shutter speed of the camera (Costello & Iversen, 2010; Sontag, 1965).
Exposure Settings

The post-schools have encouraged intellectuals to experiment with a variety of combinations of aperture and shutter settings by relying on their particular ways of being in the world. Their approaches are characterized by their emphases on the tradition of suspicion. As the curiosity for the symbolic sphere has its own set of themes, one should try to systematically explore related ideas. However, as evidence for its character and breadth, the investigation of the symbolic spans the ideological spectrum from right to left and makes it incredibly difficult to explore. Under these circumstances, one must make a practical decision, and categorize the material at hand to find out whether or not one can present a meaningful picture.

Categorization is useful but it is never wise to force ideas into a direction against their natural inclination, and impose an arbitrary order not originally there (Wittgenstein, 1953/1958, Preface, para. 2). In order to avoid the invisible relations being crippled, one can try to string together some of the interesting and significant points of the symbolic interpretation in an album of ideas (Wittgenstein, 1953/1958, Preface, para. 2). Sometimes thoughts proceed from one subject to another in a rather natural way, and sometimes not. This is why the section will have a wandering structure. The points of interest and the conclusions are not predetermined (Ökten, 2014). The supposed relations are not necessarily locked into the machinery of the narrative. A dialectical situation will be presented now.

As has been argued, symbolic aspects of domination must be tackled in order to counter hegemony. Nevertheless, to do this, the exposure settings must be set carefully. Against this background, first, consequences of a theoretical exposure problem will be presented. The New Right wave is given as a self-explanatory case. The case of Turkey proves that a re-imagination of the relation between the structure and the surface may end up in distortion and in the disappearance of emancipatory thinking. Second, three key principles for successful exposure compensation will be listed.

When understood poorly and pushed in the wrong direction, there is an extremely
important downside to the current intellectual climate that is favoring the symbolic approach: it could sever the already-hurt, traditional class consciousness. This is a vital exposure problem. In order to elaborate on the exposure problem, one must look at the empirical cases.

The exposure problem has become a global pattern that is valid all over the world, and one can give examples from different parts of the world. Since the author is considerably more familiar with the context of Turkey, examples are chosen from Turkey to substantiate the points which have been made so far.

For the last decade, there has been a popular trend of intellectualized politics among conservative circles in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—hereafter referred to as AKP) (i.e., the ruling party which was founded in the year 2001 and has been in power since then) has become the flagship of what one might like to call the New Right in Turkey (Türe, 2005).

AKP’s traditional base comprises members and followers from provincial backgrounds. That base has enabled AKP to be an exemplary case of what sociologist Şerif Mardin famously coined as the assertion of the Turkish periphery to the center (Mardin, 1973). AKP has been promoting a formula which is well-known to those who are familiar with global patterns of politics: a rather unconvincing and superficial philosophy of cultural essentialism which has been marketed as an anti-racist ethnopluralism. Against such a cultural essentialism background, one can make sense of the practice of persistent references to the ethnic composition of Turkey from popular right-wing political figures of the AKP government.

According to the discourse of cultural essentialism that the AKP has been promoting since it first came to power, decades of nation building efforts have miserably failed in Turkey. The Turkish version of homogenization (i.e., Turkification) took Turkishness as the superior national identity, and all other identities and belongings were to be regarded as inferior to this highest identity (Ülker, 2005). Although homogenization policies do not really fit into the realities of an ethnically diverse population (a large population with rich multicultural background was inherited from the Ottomans), the
modern Turkish state insisted on standing behind this ambitious nation building policy. An extremely heterogeneous population has not evolved into a constructed uniform body of a nation overnight. With its Ottomanist tendencies, AKP has been drawing on this theme since its foundation.

The critique of nation-building has been traditionally part of the leftist discourse in Turkey. AKP seemingly adopted the critique. For an educated eye, it was obvious that a popular right wing party could not go that far, neither in Turkey nor elsewhere, nor go against the grain of conventional right wing thinking. AKP has not only taken over the critique, but also claimed to have invented it by trivializing its content. The discourse was clearly suspicious. But political groups that could be categorized under the Liberal left umbrella were easily convinced. They decided to support the AKP government to stand against the common enemy. The core ideology of AKP has always been twofold: a mix of Turkish nationalism and a somewhat moderate version of Islamism. But the AKP leadership had made a strategically pragmatic decision to appear to despise all sorts of nationalisms (Türe, 2005).

Pragmatic politics gained AKP political power. Looking at the voting patterns in the local and general elections for the last decade, there are good enough reasons to argue that the AKP convinced even the traditional oppositional milieus (e.g., Kurds). A new constitution would guarantee an umbrella conception of citizenship. And that would transcend a limited national understanding of the concept. A forced unity on a big issue (i.e., citizenship and building a new constitution) and against the common enemy (i.e., Jacobinist state and nationalists) has made the two unconventional groups (i.e., AKP and the Kurdish politicians) work together. The citizenry in Turkey have overwhelmingly accepted a new understanding of equal citizenship, and have supported constructing a demilitarized constitution, while the partisan camps have become visible on other matters (Tuğal, 2009).

The entire scenario is flawed. This is so even for a pragmatic right-wing politician. A political strategy such as cultural essentialism could easily prove to be a double-edged sword. For example, it is essentially a paradoxical approach to promote pluralism and
tolerance at home, while passing aggressive comments abroad (e.g., Germany) on the integration of Turkish migrants. The attitude of showing a Left face abroad and a Right face at home (or vice versa) is a well-known right-wing dilemma. While one seems to be appreciating and promoting differences—a politically correct thing to do—one actually legitimizes arguments for social exclusion on the basis of differences. This is why, when the AKP government adopted multiculturalist rhetoric, they should have immediately created suspicion about their intentions.

It is only recently that the citizenry has started questioning whether AKP has ever been genuinely interested in tackling matters of social exclusion. So far they have been successful in putting all the blame for Turkey’s ills on the once-hegemon secular tradition of the Jacobinist state. However, it is becoming evident even to those who are hard to convince that AKP’s policy of promoting a superficial ideology of equality based on cultural essentialism comes nowhere close to tackling social exclusion. Even though the configuration on the surface level seems to have been radically altered, at the bottom of things not much has changed. The system continues to favor the hegemons at the expense of the excluded (Tuğal, 2009).

There is an important point to be gained from elaborating on the case of Turkey: one can dispute the secularist self-satisfying idea that AKP’s rise to power is related to cyclical developments in the world-economy and their local consequences (e.g., Turkish Stock Market Crash of 2001). One must understand that the political philosophy which is exemplified perfectly in the case of AKP is not accidental. It fits the spirit of the times. And only in that sense can it be regarded as cyclical.

It is a direct result of broader developments in the world-system. All over the globe, an influential philosophical and political thinking came into being as a result. Thus, one can easily give similar examples from other countries. It cannot escape one’s attention. The spirit of the times has been favoring discussions of self-management and democratic ethos. Only against this background have AKP in Turkey and other right wing parties in the rest of the world been able to successfully incorporate intellectuals from every pocket of the society who otherwise would have remained in their comfort zones.
As has been illustrated in the case of Turkey, social milieus on the left of the political spectrum—which represent an ideology that is primarily oppositional to the conservative governments and their inherent neo-liberal tendencies—may find themselves in a hitherto unimaginable position of giving support to a hegemonic government for the purposes of countering hegemony—getting the once hegemonic Jacobinist state transformed into something more democratic. It is not the first time that one has witnessed how the rhetoric of democracy and the realities of everyday politics puts social groups which otherwise could not work together under the same roof. As was seen in the case of Turkey, the mostly provincial and conservative ruling elite of the AKP—which formerly belonged to the periphery, now to the center—seems to have found an effective way to exploit the growing anti-totalitarian sentiments of the urban left (Mardin, 1973).

One must recognize a great problem with this unconventional marriage: right-wing cultural essentialism as a political strategy is a double-edged sword; so is left-wing anti-totalitarian sentiment. No doubt there is nothing essentially wrong with the egalitarian desire to expand civil society and human freedoms. Nevertheless, such political compromises for the so-called common goal inevitably relativize the psycho-social bases of class relations. In the media, one comes across dozens of examples everyday underlining this danger (Aladağ, 2013).

A growing number of people today like to preach that there are no legitimate reasons left (other than those related to irrational ideological sentiments) for opposing the bourgeois society. The liberal left seems to have dropped counter-hegemonic notions in its entirety (Aladağ, 2013). An all-encompassing hegemonic discourse invades the collective psyche.

Before the Gezi upheaval, one was able to present a caricaturized representation of the political configuration in Turkey for heuristic purposes. The picture can be rendered thusly: if there is no perceptible risk of Turkey becoming a totalitarian Islamic Republic (e.g., people are allowed to drink alcohol publicly in middle class neighborhoods in İstanbul); if the private sector is socially responsible (e.g., building schools here and
there, supporting education in general); if regulations are strict against deforestation and pollution (e.g., planting trees here and there, having the blue flag for the beaches where the middle classes go for their beach holidays); if some level of democratic progress has been achieved (e.g., Kurds start speaking their own language freely, people can publicly state their opinion against compulsory military service); most of the members of the left spectrum in Turkey can live with what they already have. This is no longer the case. And it is a matter of utmost importance to register the new configuration: with the Gezi upheaval, the collective consciousness in Turkey has reached a threshold (Güler, 2013; Jepson & Söyler, 2013; Özbank, Özcan & Paker, 2013; Kongar & Küçükkaya, 2013; Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c).

It is possible to arrive at the same conclusion for the rest of the world. One can argue that resistance has become a global pattern. The most recent protests in the year 2013, in Turkey, Brazil and even Sweden, have proven this point (Žižek, 2013). Nevertheless, especially in countries like Turkey, where the left has been systematically exterminated (Samim, 1981), and class consciousness has not fully matured and spread enough, a misinterpretation of the symbolic approach could have disastrous consequences. All segments of the society, regardless of which particular social milieu they belong to, may be urged to have a psychological reconciliation with the hegemonic capitalist order.

The current configuration encourages an arbitrary formation of clusters. Social agents who supposedly share basic values and aspirations are clustered into the same groups. The fact of the matter is that the very same people used to belong to antagonistic political positions. This means that a superficial reconciliation between social groups is imposed upon them. This can only result in the destruction of potential counter-hegemonic thinking. This is why, while the symbolic approach attracts people from all kinds of milieus, it also agitates an equal number of them. The problem is not the symbolic approach per se, but how it is interpreted and implemented by different approaches. All this complexity makes a coherent discussion of the symbolic approach quite difficult (Souza, 2013; Söyler, 2014c).
Exposure Compensation

This section discusses how, through the lens of a theory-guided spectacle, one can interpret the past in a creative manner, become equipped for studying the present meaningfully, and imagine the future creatively. A comparative study of societies is a necessity in the understanding of human nature and the ways and forms in which it is rendered throughout time and space. Economic motives can no longer be seen as the key elements of the material base that determine the surface. Every aspect of one’s being (e.g., imagination, dreams, activities and so on) can now be conceptualized as segments of one’s existence ruled by an historical symbolic subconscious order of things. Developing mutual understanding and constructive problem-solving are what are needed today. The principle of doubt is needed as an everyday reflective practice. To achieve these goals one can benefit from a creative form of archeology.

The expressions of symbolic aspects of life are dominated by high levels of abstraction. The particular configurations that embed symbolic aspects of life are complex. This is why expressions of the symbolic sphere cannot be observed directly. An analyst faces immediate difficulties while trying to interpret this complexity in a meaningful way. A part of the difficulty is sticking exclusively to the present for understanding the world.

The symbolic emphasis promises a new way of thinking; such a new outlook on life and existence cannot be limited by the boundaries of the present. For reinterpreting the present, one must change how one sees the past. This is why the notion of historical continuity is of primary importance for the symbolic approach. Continuity can only be established by extending to the past and future (Brien & Lyman, 2000).

Under these circumstances, it is an absolute necessity for the analyst to trace the present manifestation of a symbolic expression to its ancient form. The fundamental step is to construct a life-course for the symbolic element, and then the analyst looks at the symbolic expression and evaluates it with the spectacles of theory. This is how they become equipped to see beyond the immediacy of the present configuration. The
theorization aids the analyst in determining an embryonic manifestation of the symbolic aspect which constitutes the starting point. From that embryonic point onwards, the analyst puts the symbolic elements forward as parts of a big sequence, until the present time and space of the most current configuration is reached. The sequential analysis will illustrate how the form is transformed in various temporal and spatial dimensions until it reaches the latest form (Chartier, 1997).

At any rate, the analyst has to work closely with the archeological remains of the ancient dynamic. This is what forces the analyst into working essentially with a meta-level construction. Due to its nature, a meta-level construction can never be completely free from speculation. The best the analyst can do is to test meta-level framework, not only against historical evidence, but also with contemporary empirical evidence (Little, 1986). To repeat one of the overall messages of this text, this is why the analyst should aim lower than traditional metaphysical philosophy, while not limiting the imagination purely to descriptive empirical work. A broader interpretative framework is an absolute necessity.

Through the lens of a theory-guided spectacle, one can interpret the past in a creative manner, and become equipped for studying the present meaningfully, and imagining the future creatively. By connecting and interlinking the past, the present, and the future, one can successfully conceive of a given society as a totality. As a symbolic world, that society transcends time and space. It is an all-encompassing dynamic framework. All these singularities exist under one symbolic roof which is constantly changing. It comprises different ways of being in it, all possible varieties. If this is so, and all kinds of being in the world can at least be theoretically grasped, the curiosity of the analyst will inevitably be provoked. Can one actually sketch an inventory of human ways of being in the world?

The desire to sketch an inventory of being in the world is an interest developed towards a general ambition: understanding human nature and the ways and forms in which it is rendered throughout time and space. Setting the bar high does not prevent one from working with a rather limited framework: a comparative study of societies proves to
be a necessity (Houben, 2013; Ingold, 2008). This is perhaps the most general framework that underpins any research project. When one gets to the bottom of things, seemingly unrelated research topics (e.g., caste in India, global Pentecostalism, global inequality, understanding, etc.), will appear to be about the same topic: they are essentially trying to investigate the same phenomena from a certain perspectival point. All contribute to one broader investigation. One must, however, break the overall philosophical topic into pieces, and most of the time pretends to be working on something more specific.

When the gross undertaking of an inventory of human nature is done as suggested—and different ways of being in the world are registered—this would constitute an all-encompassing framework of understanding that would comprise all possible spheres of human being in the world (e.g., political systems, societies, economic systems and so on). Against the background of such an interpretative framework, one can, for example, trace all kinds of political and social arrangements to their embryonic forms (e.g., early-modern kinship relations). Similarly, economic systems can be imagined to be strongly modeled and regulated by the related anthropological system.

Without ignoring the validity of various important critiques of the anthropological approach aside, one can generically grasp how the symbolic sphere provides an invisible and an unconscious frame to what has been hitherto imagined as a rational and calculating *homo-economicus* (Anderson, 2000). This new look alters the ways one can imagine human ways of being in the world. One would now have to start unthinking the important role of economic motives that was attributed to understanding human ways of being in the world. Economic motives can no longer be seen as the key elements of the material base which determine the surface.

The relation between the material and the symbolic can no longer be imagined as a monologue or as a weak dialogue dominated by the material structure imposing itself on the symbolic surface. On the contrary, not only is a true dialogue now constituted, but at times one has to conceptualize the material as being built-in into the social. It is not difficult to imagine the kind of consequences that might follow from such a radical transformation in thought. In plain words, this equals relativizing the importance and the
place of the material in the material-symbolic configuration. None of this is likely to change the fact that the past lives are embodied in the present bodies, but the nature of that very embodiment is now radically transformed. Every aspect of one’s being (e.g., imagination, dreams, activities and so on) can now be conceptualized as segments of one’s existence ruled by an historical symbolic subconscious order of things.

The symbolic interpretation is essentially a meta-level construction; it only aims to elevate one’s understanding. It is a way of looking at how the world is configured. This is an all-encompassing framework of interpretation that has come into being as a result of the work of the people who have been professionally involved in investigating the social worlds. Such a broad meta-level construction can be criticized on the meta-level, or it can be challenged by the presence of contradicting empirical or historical evidence.

Neither of the critiques is vital for the analysts. After all, they have nothing emotionally and ethically at stake in this discussion. It is, of course, difficult for analysts to change their perspectives after investing so many years in their respective fields of research. But such an emotional challenge is not primary. It is more about adjusting to the new intellectual configuration. However, from the perspective of the narrators—the people to whom the theory is applied—there is something at stake. They are the ones who are being investigated. They can prefer to resist these categorizations.

The analyst’s reaction to the resistance of the field at its extremes might result in either objectivist frameworks which tend to omit a great amount of qualitative empirical material, or purely descriptive narrations of the researcher’s personal observations. There is a lot of space between these two extremes, and the middle ground is filled in with approaches which take the good sides of both approaches. As far as the symbolic investigation goes, the primary data is primarily qualitative. Therefore, it demands a high level of research sensitivity. This is why, when researching sensitive topics (e.g., caste inequality and Pentecostal religiosity) one is likely to experience serious amounts of resistance from the field.

Countering the resistance, analysts will face two options: first, they may prefer to remain confident about their framework of understanding, and interpretation, and dismiss
the resistance from the field. A common way to do this is to frame the reactions of the narrators as emotional. This might lead one to separate the emotional truth from the analytical truth. The act of prioritizing the importance of the analytical truth might imply that, from the perspective of the researcher, emotional truth is secondary, or even irrelevant.

A second option for a researcher is adopting an opposite approach, and making a conscious effort to understand the narrators. Such sensitivity could be ethically and epistemologically motivated. Researchers who have the inclination to choose this option are likely to remain extremely doubtful of their own research designs.

The discussion of doubt is extremely important. Under today’s circumstances, the role of doubt and debate in understanding has been trivialized. There is no time for a Socratic dialogue anymore. This is arguably why analysts are trying to build the skills to utilize what is known as the brutality of argument: the desire to win at all costs. It is no surprise, then, that academia today is suffering from an overproduction of opinionated opinions.

In a configuration where students do not seem to question the value of having strong opinions, competitive values become common currency. There are good enough reasons to regard having strong opinions as one of the most dangerous things for the intellectual production and the society at large. If the accumulation of information were the ultimate goal, then a simple internet check which could validate or deny the desired information would be enough; but given today’s multi-centric configuration, developing mutual understanding and constructive problem-solving are what are needed today. Depending on how much the analyst prefers to doubt, two camps are respectively formed in academia: objectivist and subjectivist, and one may witness endless discussions between them.

The discussion is likely to persist because there are no universally applicable principles to be followed uniformly by all researchers. Researchers tend to go for one way or the other because of largely idiosyncratic reasons. Those who would like to remain loyal to their original research proposals would argue that, on their account, any
other approach would render the analyst immobilized, and the analyst is eventually likely to be defeated by personal doubt. For those who are committed to the principle of doubt as an everyday reflective practice, self-destruction is not inevitable. Perhaps a doubtful person will fail to conform to society, but there is, after all, no convincing evidence to suggest that the opposite is more desirable.

The contemporary configuration is shaped by the (re)emergence of the power centers in the Southern Hemisphere (Dargin, 2013). A series of historical processes has created the increasing influence of the countries of the Global South. The contemporary shift in the configuration has several consequences. One issue that will surely prove to be persistent is that of an epistemological challenge: good old ways of understanding the world can no longer be taken for granted (Santos, 2007a). One can take issue with three kinds of reactions that one can expect to witness or experience when one is confronted with a massive transformation.

The first reaction is entirely emotional, and this is why it is the most common. One can deny that a transformation is taking place, and refuse to act upon it. The attitude is related to perceiving the rise of the Global South as a traumatic event. Just as one gives a strong emotional response to a terrible event like a natural disaster, and copes with shock by means of denial immediately after the event, those who have difficulty moving on with their lives by accepting the new reality are likely to deny it. Wayward thinkers can still squander their intellectual inheritance and get away with it, but one must acknowledge that the stakes are getting higher. A couple of decades from now, prodigal thinkers will find out that there is no home to return to where they will be forgiven. One will not be able to deny the massive transformation taking place without being ridiculed.

Alternatively, one can try to control the emotional turmoil, and think rationally. One can simply acknowledge that change is ever-present, accept that it is taking place, try to understand it, and adjust to the new configuration. Even though resisting is counter-intuitive and accepting is a better coping mechanism, as it requires a mental discipline, this has proven to be the most uncommon approach so far.

Finally, one can prefer to maintain a self-imposed ignorance and remain indifferent
towards the transformation. One may think thusly: it may or may not be taking place, and it may or may not have an impact on one’s being in the world. In any case, consequential change does not seem to be imminent. Therefore, one still has the option of turning one’s head in the other direction when signs of change come across one’s path. This is neither denial nor acceptance. It is not based on a colossal denial of the tectonic shift. Nor is it a realist perspective. Unequivocal scientific evidence is not rejected, but neither is it fully grasped.

The aforementioned behavioral patterns explain how the new configuration impacts ways analysts in the Global North conceptualize being in the world. The behavioral patterns in the Global South are a mirror reflection of those of the Global North. One can again take issue with three types of reactions.

The first reaction is the most common and emotionally driven. The ontological transformation is taken for granted and exaggerated. Those who fall into the provincialist trap portray the rise of the Global South as a heavenly event. It marks the revival of the golden times. They assume that there is nothing more to learn from other parts of the world, and that reviving the provincial traditions would suffice. The rise of the Global South rhetoric is accordingly fueled by nationalist provincialism by the populist right-wing politicians in these countries.

The second reaction is determined by a strong sense of cynicism, and it counters the first reaction. For many of the residents in the Global South, there is not much to envy in their glorious past. One will find it difficult, for example, to convince an ordinary Indian citizen that India is likely to be one of the most important factors in the world economy. This person would point at pigs eating garbage in the city center in Calcutta, and state that if there is something emerging in India, it is street pigs. Regardless of whether one takes it with provincialist arrogance, or with modesty, economies that are known formally as emerging economies have today already emerged.

The third reaction keeps a safe distance both from groundless provincialist arrogance and modesty. It accepts that the most promising part of the rise of the Global South has been the transformation of the ontological landscape, and that the ontological
shift triggered an epistemic shift. The likelihood of developing a novel imagination increases. Multiple slots are opened for forming counter-hegemonic thinking. The chances for unthinking the persistent hegemonic thought patterns that have drawn thinking into a contemporary impasse have never been as good as today. Even though alternative possibilities for imagining different ways of being in the world have always existed, today’s configuration is more favorable than any other time.

**Lessons**

Against this backdrop, one can argue that two persistent obstacles to novel thinking have been relativized today: First, even though there is some prevailing resistance, even the most reluctant ones today realize that one cannot reduce the inexhaustible diversity of human experience arbitrarily by ignoring obvious uncertainties and contingencies.

Second, almost all understand today that one cannot set a standard for the good life in reference to an extremely arbitrary interpretation of the theory of history. Universalist fixation on Western modernity and development—the so-called end of history thinking—has now come to an end.

All of this can be examined within the framework of post influence. The post-schools have come into being as a consequence of the aforementioned shift in the world configuration. As long as the rise of the Global South remains a relevant topic, post-school thinking—criticizing old forms of thinking and promoting new ways of thinking—will continue to be a matter of discussion.

Forging a bridge to the previous chapter, one can point out once more three significant features of the post-schools that claim one’s attention: first, the post-schools have been drawing on Western and non-Western sources of a tradition of suspicion. This allows analysts to unthink politics and social relations, and start their analyses from a point of zero.

Second, the post-schools have been putting a special emphasis on examination of the symbolic sphere. Looking at belief and value systems, analysts have been encouraged to analyze how oppressive thought patterns are self-evidentialized and hegemonic world-
views are rendered commonsensical.

Third, the post-schools have questioned the relation between the structure and the surface. They have emphasized that if there has been a persistent assault on emancipation, it has to be understood as an ontological assault. The last point informs the previous two and needs further elaboration.

In this context, it can be argued that structure-surface analysis is an effective way for making sense of complex social phenomena, and this is also why one must be careful about it. Social phenomena are much more complex than natural phenomena, which is why approaching social phenomena with theoretical spectacles is convenient. This way, one can easily make sense of social complexity. It is then important for analysts to question to what extent they conform to theoretical thinking. Analysts must adopt a self-critical approach to the theoretical perspective.

Marx’s analysis of base-superstructure is an effective and self-critical form of structure-surface analysis. Marx argued that production and productive relations were foundational elements of existence in any given society (Marx, 1953, p. 514). Not only are humans thrown into pre-structured social situatedness, but they also intervene in this pre-structuredness by means of their activities in the world. Therefore, according to Marx, human activities within the confines of social-structural situations must be examined historically for an understanding of the most current social configuration. This is what lies at the bottom of human existence. This is the primary base, the ontological structure.

The post influence can be best understood in reference to Marx’s base-superstructure thinking. In Marx’s original thinking, the primary base is the ontological structure, which means that everything else stands on that base. The social agent’s consciousness is also pre-structured. Therefore, the consciousness of the analyst cannot be given primacy for understanding the social world. For change, one must adapt to a new way of looking at things, and more specifically, looking at things that are not immediately visible. The analyst must look at what lies under the surface. That is the real locus of existence.
The base does not have to be understood as one of material. Therefore, the post emphasis on social and anthropological relations cannot be denounced as speculative thinking. The symbolic critique does contradict orthodox interpretations of Marxist thinking but not the Marxist analysis itself. According to Marxist thinking, analysts are obliged to develop stronger personal reflexivity for imagining alternative ways of being in the world. This is the main point of the symbolic critique, as well. Against this background, one can adopt a critical approach, and structure different variations of the relation between structure and surface. One can categorize the variations with the Pollyanna-Cassandra pair, alias the optimist and the pessimist.

The optimists have a strong belief that there is always change in life and new forms will continue to come into being. Their naïve belief in human progress makes them focus primarily on popular and superficial patterns of continuous change in life. For the pessimists, while there is visible change on the surface, structures persist underneath. Surface-level change is determined and redefined by structures. The pessimistic perspective is often misunderstood, as it claims to be defending a conservative standpoint and promoting reactionary politics. The truth is the contrary. It draws on the insight that shedding some light on structural limitations will point to an emancipatory roadmap. The pessimistic perspective is best presented by Pierre Bourdieu who is a sophisticated objectivist.

Singularities of one’s existence decide whether one aims towards a Pollyanna or a Cassandra way of thinking. This is an existentially related and emotionally charged debate. Inevitably, an antagonism comes into being between the two groups. The optimists conform to hegemony by self-evidentalizing it-is-what-it-is thinking. They do so by giving all their attention to surface-level change, which is momentary, temporary, visible and somewhat evident. The pessimists, on the other hand, counter hegemony by focusing on structural-level change, which is continuous, historical—comes into being in longue durée—and not readily available for ordinary perception. They challenge the taken-for-grantedness of life. They promote it-could-have-been-otherwise thinking. One’s affinity for optimism or pessimism is not random. It is a matter of ideology, and is related
to one’s being in the world.

In reference to one’s take on the ontology of change, the Pollyanna-Cassandra dichotomy can be paired with a Fox-Hedgehog dichotomy, a mirrored reflection of the former. The optimists can be likened to hedgehogs, thinkers who have one big trick: conforming to the conventions. Drawing on well-established conventions, they can promote themselves as hard-working no-nonsense minds. They are masters of their game. Pessimists, on the other hand, can be likened to foxes. They are known for their resourcefulness, cleverness, and adaptability. They know something about many things in varying degrees. They have extraordinary thinking skills but, lacking the support of a well-established tradition, they lack the capacity to revolutionize thinking.

For building counter-hegemonic thinking, it is important to understand that oppressive structures have a strong mental presence in human societies: Internalized ideas create the materiality of hegemonic structures. For countering hegemony, therefore, one must focus on the interior elements of oppression. This does not mean undermining social struggles against the palpable exterior. One must go beyond the material world. Otherwise, one could discharge the epistemic struggle by misguiding the counter-hegemonic consciousness. The analyst must engage in the symbolic sphere for developing emancipatory thinking. This way, they can prevent mutilating revolutionary consciousness in its embryonic forms. More and more questions that had been either ignored or underdeveloped by earlier intellectual movements are being raised today. This is how politics today has been recharged with alternative ways of thinking.

**Conclusive Remarks**

In this chapter the field of photography is visited for stimulating theoretical imagination and making a point about the relevance of post-schools to formation of counter-hegemonic thought. In many ways post-schools follow the tradition of Critical Thought and must be seen as a continuation of this tradition rather than a temporary hype of thought. It is argued in this chapter that one could learn a twofold lesson from the post
generation of thought: first, even though at times analysts momentarily transcend their ordinary consciousness, and reach a level of self-critical understanding, they inevitably get into the vicious circle of conforming. As the first generation of Frankfurt School tended to argue (as opposed to the new generation of thinkers of this school of thought, such as Habermas who argued against the all-encompassing effect of hegemonic structures) critical thinking cannot be a simple matter of choice: one cannot decide to adapt critical thinking and become a critical thinker just like that. The first step for developing critical thinking is to know that most of the times thinking is uncritical. If one does not grasp this dilemma, one thinks and acts critically only in name: one generates seemingly oppositional and revolutionary ideas without recognizing that one is actually becoming a conservative revolutionary (enforcing supposedly emancipatory ideas without realizing the contribution that is being made to the reproduction of hegemonic thought). Second, the reason why people feel at times that they have not come across a new idea in years is because they are deeply mired in what has been provided to them as self-evident or natural. Against this background, the chapter argues that a solution to this generic problem is a re-imagination of the relation between the structure and the surface for every single case. One needs to open, close, tighten and loosen the relation until one finds out how the mechanism of the constellation operates in that particular case. To explain all of this with an analogy, figuring out the right relation between the structure and the symbolic in a given configuration is similar to finding the right setting for the exposure in a camera.
Chapter 6: Counter-Hegemonic Perspectives

After the fifth chapter took a brief excursion to the field of photography for making a point about the contribution of post-schools to emancipatory thinking, the sixth chapter substantiates the idea that was introduced in the previous chapter by looking counter-hegemonic events and their relation to emancipatory understanding. A specific event, June 2013 protests in Turkey, is used to fulfill the purpose of this chapter. The chapter argued that together with the rise of the Global South and international comparative and collaborative research and work, investigation of the social events can serve as one of the sources of counter-hegemonic consciousness. The chapter looks at the question of emancipatory understanding and argues that majoritarian thinking is threatened by emancipatory thinking, even as emancipatory thinkers, such as critical analysts, need to alter their embeddedness in order to overcome the inherent limitations of emancipatory understanding.

The chapter considers how one is to understand a counter-hegemonic event at the moment that it occurs as well as approaches to understanding when one looks back on such an event. It discusses that events do not occur in a vacuum and must be understood within a larger historical context. Participants in these supposedly unexpected events participate mostly impulsively without any concrete awareness of all the factors that motivate their participation to the event. The event may be perceived as unexpected at the first look, but it is hardly unlikely, given the historical and intellectual forces at play. The perspective is distorted because agents of social change themselves are limited in their understanding by the hegemonic order. Their emancipatory energy derives from earlier events which, in their minds, have been rendered archaic, and therefore the new event is perceived as unexpected when it was only unlikely.

Analysts who aim to understand the event also face obstacles that are related to not suspending the perspective that is charged by the all-encompassing order of things. Their ability to understand both the event and the reaction to the event is hampered by the fact that, in social analyses, fragments of being are not analyzed. It is explained that
one way for the analyst to overcome the inherent limitations to understanding and interpreting the event is to get phenomenologically sensitive and pay close attention to details that might have caused the event. Therefore, it is stressed that analyst can develop critical perspectives against the background of a counter-hegemonic event which charges the configuration as a condition for emancipatory thought.

**Hegemony and Commonsense**

The critical nature of a critical analyst is a matter of identification. Critical analysts cannot easily identify with commonsensical ways of being in the world. They are inclined to keep a safe distance from what they regard as potentially oppressive (Tedlock, 1983, p. 196). The order of things—a symbolic system outside of which cognitive functions cannot be performed—has an all-encompassing character. It is a hypothetical absolute that can be grasped by complete understanding (Peperzak, 2001, p. 44). This is why critical analysts intentionally or unintentionally subject themselves to self-imposed isolation. The isolation creates a fundamental conflict between the critical analyst and the society. One cannot remain part of a whole by being away from it. Critical analysts are destined to be stigmatized as outcasts.

At its extreme, the situation of a critical analyst who lives in self-imposed isolation is similar to someone who is suffering from a heavy psychosis: thought (e.g., could-have-been-otherwise) and reality of life (e.g., the supposedly self-evident nature of commonsensical order of things) are so impaired (e.g., could-have-been-otherwise appears to be self-evident) that the analyst can no longer internalize the taken-for-grantedness (e.g., it-is-what-it-is). As a matter of fact, general desire to go against established limits of thought and conduct can end in psychosis. To a mind in this condition, all-round destruction may seem to be the only road to a radical transformation of society (e.g., destructive anarchism). The Dostoevskian notion can resemble Durkheim’s idea of anomie: A self-conscious anomism which aims at the perfection of society through the demolition of established forms of thought and conduct. The egoism
of the critical analyst, the anomie and egoism have much in common and can combine with any thinker (Riley, Miller & Pickering, 2013, pp. 99-102).

Having isolated themselves from the commonsensical order of things, critical analysts gain extemporaneous character of being that is free of foundations (Žižek, 2012b, pp. 1-5). There are no more fixed foundations that ground their being in the world and understanding. This is how extemporaneous analysts develop an affinity or ability for generating unpremeditated critical thinking, by which they can criticize the self-evidentalized status quo. Unpremeditated critical assaults to the self-evidentalized status quo are of a foundational character, and bear the possibility of bringing out unfamiliar perspectives for understanding (Peer, 2008, p.12).

The process of generating unfamiliar perspectives for understanding is related to the critical analyst’s self-imposed isolation from the rest of the society. Unfamiliarity is a result of the critique’s idiosyncrasy. Due to the nature of the critique, it is mostly unintelligible to the rest of society (Žižek, 2012a; 2012b). After all, a perspective for an alternative way of being cannot be readily intelligible to the majoritarian way of thinking. Therefore, because to a large extent it has to remain unintelligible, the emancipatory perspective has to remain a potentiality. Whether or not this emancipatory potentiality will be actualized depends on a future alliance of consciousness coming into being (Therborn, 2014; Žižek, 2012a).

Actualization of critical understanding is related to the intelligibility factor: it has to be understood to be acted upon. The unfamiliar critical perspective can sometimes be registered by others, and gain a somewhat intelligible character. This kind of intelligibility brings forth a challenge: The foundational critique of critical analysts (which by definition is unfamiliar) is incorporated into the familiar. Such incorporation is likely to result in trivialization of the critique. The same sets of questions (mostly based on methodology) will be posed again and again (as if the critique is exclusively about the methodology). Therefore, the quest for investigating the unfamiliar with the tools of the familiar (the ready-made intellectual instruments of premeditated thinking) is destined to fail. Since the critique cannot be grasped and handled in terms of commonsensical
expectations (simply put, since it is not understood), it has to come under assault. It will be countered by a destructive self-defense mechanism of majoritarian thinking. Wrong questions will be asked (Alatas, 2010; Boike Rehbein, personal communication, April, 2009). Depending on the degree of immediacy and threat of the critical assault—impending, imminent or threatening—the self-defense strategy will take particular forms. The ultimate aim of the self-defensive reflex is to render the critique trivial (reducing it to a simple methodological preference) or irrelevant (categorizing it as unscientific). As a consequence, critical analysts will either be left in isolation or be rehabilitated according to the commonsensical norms; or the will be disciplined and punished (Fumerton, 2001).

Critical analysts who are aiming for emancipatory understanding are aware that foundational critiques can only gain a momentary emancipatory advantage that will immediately be negated and thwarted by the taken-for-grantedness. Since taken-for-grantedness will always regain the lost intellectual ground, intellectual efforts at developing counter-hegemonic thinking will persistently prove unavailing. In the face of such a desperate emancipatory configuration, critical analysts may conclude that since humans are social beings, a certain amount of commonsensical identification goes with the territory (Macomber, 1967, p. 172). The critical analyst’s decision to identify with commonsensical aspects of being in the world has consequences. The two conditions under which ordinary analysts are transformed into critical analysts will be at risk: critical analysts may not be able to primarily focus on could-have-been-otherwise, and preserve the undividedness of understanding. Critical analysts legitimize the act of taking this risk by drawing on a self-justified confidence: Critical analysts can control to what extent they identify with commonsense (Žižek, 2012b, pp. 1-5).

Critical analysts can be self-confident, which is important, but the risk of getting lost in the conformist order of things can never be put on the back burner. Identifying with commonsense bears the risk of self-evidentializing the arbitrary equality between consensual truth and truth. Having identified with the commonsensical order of things, analysts now start validating majoritarian ideas (When the majority of people share certain ideas and feelings, they become true and valid) (Fromm, 2001). By willingly
attending to that majority for practical purposes, critical analysts go through a gradual internalization of the self-evidentialized consensus. When the process is complete, critical analysts are incorporated and rendered system-friendly. This is how critical analysts are transformed back into ordinary analysts. The dilemma is obvious. Analysts may refrain from identifying with commonsense, or they may try to keep a safe distance from the commonsensical order of things. In any case, the critique of the analysts will be compromised. Analysts will either be excluded or assimilated (Santos, 2002).

The dilemma of identification with commonsense has one important consequence: for bewildered self-reflective analysts who take understanding seriously, and who think critically, there is no escape from symbolic violence. The only option critical analysts have is to choose from the two types of violence: Assimilative-violence and exclusive-violence. In the case of the former, one takes being in the world as it appears to be (e.g., it-is-what-it-is). In the case of the latter, one problematizes the commonsensical order of things (e.g., could-have-been-otherwise). Therefore, in order to counter-balance symbolic violence, one is required to develop an alternative type of relation with common-sense. That relation can best be understood as an absolute threshold: the minimum intensity of commonsensical stimulus at which the current order of things can just be perceived contextually without the risk of immersion. In principle, one should keep a safe distance from the all-encompassing power of the symbolic order without being totally detached from it (Žižek, 2012b, pp. 1-5). There is hardly any dispute about what ought to be done. Nevertheless, the operationalization of that very principle is problematic. How can one criticize the symbolic order of things while being immersed in it? The impasse is fundamental. It points at the possibility of developing a counter-hegemonic understanding with the tools provided by the hegemonic order (Spivak, 1988).

One can approach the problem of hegemonic impasse methodologically or ontologically. The methodological approach is practical in the sense that it aims at solving the problem (by trivializing it). The ontological approach is impractical in the sense that it argues what analysts need is more than a solution. The methodological approach is a logical consequence and the direct result of the human condition: analysts
are social beings and through existence they are shaped by their inevitable situatedness. Since assimilation is inevitable, the methodological approach urges one to focus on controlling the conditions of the assimilative process. The methodological approach promises a set of guaranteed formulas for controlling the assimilative process. It claims that, within limitations, one can develop analytical rigorousness and form a guaranteed roadmap for understanding. According to the promises of the methodological approach, if analysts commit to self-discipline of this kind, not only can they successfully avoid misunderstanding, but they can also make modest contributions to their respective fields of interest (Weiß, 2011). The methodological approach’s conviction is that limited forms of understanding are the only forms of understanding. Therefore, they bear absolute legitimacy (Gonzalez, 2012).

The practical benefits of the methodological approach are undeniable. It reduces a massive problem to a small manageable scale. Nevertheless, a fundamental shortcoming is evident. The methodological approach leaves the problem of absolute threshold—the obstacles against emancipatory understanding—unresolved. Therefore, the problem must be perceived and tackled as an ontological one. Otherwise, analysts risk contributing to the trivialization of understanding. The ontological approach throws the self-confidence of practical critical analysts into question: Since analysts cannot strip out of their skins, it really cannot be entirely up to critical analysts to develop emancipatory understanding. Analysts cannot seek an ontological solution independently of the external conditions that force themselves upon analysts’ consciousnesses. The conclusion to draw is rather simple: for an emancipatory understanding to come into being, the embeddedness of analysts—the configurations in which analysts are situated—has to be altered. Only through such a transformation can analysts be provided with an emancipatory threshold, and only by registering that threshold can critical analysts bypass the inherent limitations to emancipatory understanding.

Neither analysts who get lost in an intense self-reflective process and start lacking the necessary familiarity with common-sense nor analysts who pass the absolute threshold in favor of common-sense, and identify with it more than necessary, are...
capable of developing emancipatory understanding (Žižek, 2012b, pp. 1-5). While antisocial enlightenment is negligible, sociable extraversion tends to conform and conserve. Although they can be methodologically disciplined, both approaches are too bright for their own good. They cannot be used for imagining an alternative order of things. This is the problem with phenomenological exclusivity and phenomenological sensitivity, and it is related to emancipatory understanding. The attitude of phenomenological exclusivity is related to the decision analysts take: By delving into a self-imposed isolation from common sense, analysts hope to learn things indirectly—a complete understanding through direct access. Phenomenological sensitivity is about taking the concerns of phenomenological exclusivity seriously and tackling phenomenological positivism self-reflectivity. This results in emancipatory understanding (Bridges, 2009, pp. 105-123).

Unlocking the Hegemonic Impasse

Common sense dictates that one understands oneself better than one understands others. However, a stand-alone sense of understanding that cannot be communicated is of little use. Critical analysts always need to look out for the social relevance of the activity of understanding. The most important difference between the attitudes of phenomenological exclusivity and phenomenological sensitivity is seen in the idea that the immediacy of locality and spatiality do not have to be binding: time and space can be imagined differently (Lindón, 2007). Immersed in an idealistic view of understanding, analysts may be tempted to try and discover an order that holds among things-in-themselves. The idealistic view proves to be persistent as it assumes an inner structure that determines the intelligible world. Nevertheless, ideals by definition are unattainable goals. The higher one sets the bar of understanding, the more likely they are to be confronted by insurmountable difficulties. This does not mean that ideals are entirely irrelevant. There are unobtainable goals that are still worth pursuing. The discussion is more about practicability. Human reason can neither penetrated into things-in-themselves
nor have direct access to phenomena. Since things beyond possible experience will lead to contradictions, skeptical analysts will have to refrain from investigating the ultimate causes of experience.

Things that can be experienced—the phenomena, the information at hand—are also mediated and do not allow direct access either. Analysts’ being in the world never permits uninterrupted perception. In other words, transparency will always be missing. This is a fundamental limitation and it is discouraging for idealist analysts. A complete understanding may be unfeasible but an idealist analysts might persist in framing unworkable schemes for understanding. This is the basis for idealist misunderstanding: While one tries to understand everything, one fails to understand even a limited number of things. If idealist analysts decide to disengage from unattainable goals of understanding and direct their attention to reengage with alternative and manageable goals, they can form a limited but substantial understanding (e.g., phenomenologically sensitive understanding) (Chin, Dweck & Hong, 1993, pp. 644-656; Weiß, 2011).

Although the primary limitation to understanding (lack of transparency) is rather obvious, it is often ignored. The negligence is apparent in the case of self-understanding. There is no way for one to know with certainty that one can understand oneself better than others. Yet, the lack of transparency factor in self-understanding remains widely unrecognized. Ordinary analysts are prime examples. Lost in the commonsensical ways of being in the world, ordinary analysts cannot be convinced to mistrust what they have always regarded as self-evident: one understands oneself better than one understands others. The commonsensical conviction is so strong that ordinary analysts never doubt the presupposed transparency between being in the world and the understanding of it. The commonsensical fallacy of attributing unlimited trust to self-understanding translates into a philosophical attitude that can be labeled as phenomenological exclusivity, and it reads thusly: understanding is nothing but self-understanding (Neumann, 1999, pp. 207-228).

Limitations to understanding are then of primary importance. If self-understanding is a primary human concern, and it underpins the desire to understand others and the world they all live in, analysts are obliged to inform themselves about the limitations to
self-understanding. It is possible that some analysts have developed a sense of self-understanding. Nevertheless, no matter how impressive one’s self-understanding is, if it cannot be shared with others it cannot be of relevance to the general concern of understanding. In other words, the notion of undividedness is of primary importance (Kapoor, 2004, pp. 627-647).

It is true that a standalone personal enlightenment is valuable, but one must acknowledge that it is undeniably socially irrelevant. Therefore, it must be regarded as negligible. Antisocial personal enlightenment can never qualify as worthwhile understanding. Self-understanding does constitute the primary motivation for any inquiry, but it can only be relevant if it is part of a broader form of understanding. Exaggerating one dynamic of understanding (e.g., self-understanding) over the other (e.g., understanding others) is typical for ordinary analysts and it will only result in misunderstanding (e.g., phenomenological exclusivity). The social relevance of understanding cannot be neglected. Critical analysts always need to look out for the social relevance of the activity of understanding. Self-understanding becomes tangible only when it is socialized.

Since understanding is not about a transcendental personal enlightenment, it can be much less ambitious. Insurmountable obstacles against complete understanding do not have to matter. Understanding is about acknowledging these limitations and generating tangible frameworks within the realm of these limitations. The limitations do apply to self-understanding. One cannot know with certainty that one can understand oneself better than one understands others (Vazire & Mehl, 2008, pp. 1202-1216), and one cannot know with certainty whether or not one understands oneself. There is always an activity of understanding that takes place, and it is impossible to know for sure who understands what. Phenomenological exclusivity relies on a naïve assumption: one knows oneself better. The assumption draws on a rather superficial criterion: one knows oneself for a longer period of time. Therefore, to dismantle the attitude of phenomenological exclusivity, one has to shed some light on what conceptions of knowing and time entail.
According to ordinary analysts who are immersed in the commonsensical way of being in the world, there is no point in questioning whether things and living beings exist in a certain time and space dimension: it is self-evident that analysts observe the phenomena within a specific time slot and in a particular location. The nature of time and space is commonsensical. It-is-what-it-is and it could-have-not-been OTHERWISE. Self-reflective analysts, however, step back and get out of the conformity of the taken-for-grantedness. Self-reflective analysts think: the immediacy of locality and spatiality do not have to be binding. Time and space can be imagined differently. Therefore, the activity of knowing can be relativized. The suspension highlights the most important difference between the attitudes of phenomenological exclusivity and phenomenological sensitivity (Woolgar, 1988).

Self-understanding is based on an undisciplined self-reflection, and it draws on the singularities of one's lived-experience; therefore, it cannot generate tangibles that transcend that singular experience. Thus, as far as understanding in the form of a research practice is concerned, this constitutes a major problem, that is related to the disputable relation between tangible and intangible aspects of being. The problem is obvious in fields of research where a high level of phenomenological sensitivity is required (e.g., religiosity). Not all tangible aspects of being have an actual physical existence (e.g., activities), but the level of abstraction in tangibles is not as high as in the case of intangibles (e.g., dignity). Professional analysts (e.g., researchers) who are phenomenologically sensitive will be primarily interested in collecting the intangibles. They will explore whether the intangibles can be expressed in the form of tangibles. This is how a phenomenologically sensitive analyst targets elevating the discussion (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991).

Ideally speaking, elevating the discussion is the only reason one does research. It is, however, inevitable that the research practice diverges from this goal. By focusing exclusively on the tangibles, researchers often aim for a safer path to understanding. Leaving the intangibles out of the equation is a practical method. It is not clear how yet another exclusivist attitude in favor of tangibles may result in elevating the debate.
Analysts who want to be on the safe side justify the exclusivist attitude in research by claiming that one should work only on what is understandable (e.g., tangibles), and keep silent about the rest (e.g., intangibles). This is how analysts can secure a narrow but safe view of understanding. In order to avoid the risk of losing hold of realities, it is advised that one should keep silent about intangibles. The attitude of phenomenological sensitivity is driven by the desire to push these limits.

Pushing the limits of understanding is about problematizing self-evidentialized reality. Phenomenologically sensitive analysts aim to establish higher standards. This is a matter of distinction. This is how they single themselves out and snatch something away from phenomenologically exclusivist analysts who tend to put greater emphasis on the intangibles and from the positivist analysts who primarily focus on the tangibles. Phenomenological sensitivity aims to have a safe distance from the God-complex of metaphysical philosophy, from the descriptivist obsession of the phenomenological exclusivists, and from the Universalist dogmatism of the phenomenological positivists.

In either of the aforementioned three cases (phenomenological-sensitivity, phenomenological-exclusivity, or phenomenological-positivism) the investigation of being in the world is destined to be limited. All three are restrained approaches. They are kept within certain bounds. Such restrictions are required for analytical rigor. Nevertheless, analytical rigor cannot be applied in a monophonic way. Analysts’ conceptualization of the relation between tangibles and intangibles informs analysts’ approaches to the relation between the narrator’s emotional truth and analytical truth. Analytical truth cannot be fully expected to match emotional truth. While phenomenologically exclusivist analysts stick to the conformism of self-understanding, and draw their analyses on intangibles, and persist in giving the primacy to the emotional truth of the narrators, a phenomenological positivist would typically focus on tangibles, and claim to put forward an analytical analysis.

In the case of phenomenological exclusivism, narrators’ self-understanding constitutes their emotional truth, which equals the analytical truth. Therefore, analysts who do not grasp the emotional truth of the narrators are considered to be deluded
In the case of phenomenological positivism, analysts establish a hierarchical relationship between the observer (researcher) and the observed (narrators), and claim to possess a kind of analytical truth that transcends the idiosyncrasies of the deluded narrators. The narrators cannot lose touch with themselves, thus their emotional-truth cannot sway others, nor contribute to mutual understanding. Phenomenologically sensitive analysts cast doubt on the convictions of the former two approaches. The judgment of the narrator and the analyst can be both deceived. Their feet are never on solid ground. Therefore, they must both curb their enthusiasm.

Against the background of the arguments in the earlier chapters, it can be argued that epistemic violence is related to a lack of phenomenological sensitivity. Therefore, epistemic violence can be toppled down by developing phenomenological sensitivity. Although this is certainly the case, phenomenological sensitivity cannot be regarded as a methodological issue. In other words, one does not make a methodological decision to become phenomenologically sensitive. Similarly, one does not develop positivist tendencies because it is methodologically more convincing. The decision is made way before the methodological reflection. It is ontological.

There are enormous obstacles to counter-hegemonic thinking. For emancipatory understanding to take place, symbolic violence must be counter-balanced. Understanding is emancipation. One can develop emancipatory understanding by means of limited forms of understanding. Yet, one does not need to be fatalistic. Critical analysts cannot regard understanding as an equal of limited understanding and legitimize hegemonic misunderstanding. Analysts are necessarily in favor of emancipation. This is how critical analysts understand understanding. The whole purpose of understanding is to imagine an alternative emancipatory order of things. Counter-hegemonic thinking is a logical consequence of understanding.

The emancipatory threshold—the event—occurs when the societal system can no longer maintain in a stable condition. In this situation, the current order of things is stressed, which signals an all-encompassing but undeclared desire for an alternative order of things. The configuration is now pregnant with change. Critical analysts make all their
investment into remaining sensitive to such perturbations. This is how they can register societal disturbances that may occur on such a small scale that may be unobservable to an unconditioned eye. When a seemingly stable and relatively constant condition of things seems to change, analysts are finally provided with the possibility of benefiting from the unusual dynamism in the equilibrium. After long intervals during which nothing may seem to have happened, a space is opened between the former and the latter hegemonic states of being in the world. Analysts need to act before the interval is closed and the reactions are reversed through adjustment and regulation mechanisms in favor of the new status quo (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 176-183).

Within this brief transient state, a predictably emancipatory understanding framework—which surely suffers both from the deviances of analysts’ arbitrary introversions and societal extraversions—can be cross-checked against the evidence. This transient state provides the only legitimate ground where an emancipatory framework of understanding can be improved. This is perhaps the only state in which critical analysts can truly think critically. Reactions certainly do occur, but often not in an observable manner, and when one individually observes the reaction, it is not so much valuable as it is a collectively observed perturbation. This is why large-scale societal changes provide significant transient states to be collectively examined.

**Embryonic Counter-Hegemony**

An event does not come into being out of thin air. It may not always be possible to predict the occurrence of the event, but one knows that an event always comes into being out of a societal situation. Therefore, theoretically speaking, one can claim that an event can always be tracked to an empirical case. Such a case will present an eventful configuration in its embryonic form. But foreseeing an event in its embryonic form requires a theoretical intervention from analysts. The societal situation, the empirical case, and the embryonic configuration are not self-evident. Analysts need to construct these components of the analysis on the meta-level. This is how analysts cluster
seemingly independent fragments of being in the world and form an intelligible framework for understanding. The Gezi Protests in Turkey in the year 2013 are an example (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 193-197). Now the focus will be put on a theoretical point related to the occurrence of the event.

The Gezi upheaval was triggered by disproportional use of police force. The government’s decision to use excessive police force was the most important determinant of public reaction. The very first resistance at the park paved the way for the birth of the upheaval. The authoritarian tone the government officials took during their press releases and their use of police as a means of dismantling the protest motivated the protest to grow like a weed. Such a rapid growth became possible because an event based imagination was not absent on the eve of the police intervention. The small environmentalist group that occupied the park to prevent the construction vehicles from leveling out the park was not free of a strong desire for eventfulness. They were intellectually well-informed, politically conscious citizens who had been keeping a close eye on all kinds of discussions in the intellectual, artistic, and academic fields. They were pre-motivated for an eventful configuration (Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Jepson & Söyler, 2013).

There is, however, an apparent risk for analysts to commit a typical post hoc fallacy here, and it must be avoided for a convincing objective analysis. Post hoc fallacies are common for a good reason. Analysts can reason to a causal conclusion by basing the logical thinking on a set of supposed causes. The necessary condition causation relies on is rather simple: causes precede the effects. Therefore, relying on post hoc evidence, analysts can confidently put forward hypotheses that are based on constructed causal relationships. This framework of understanding is flawed. It can never provide sufficient evidence on its own. At best, it could provide a circular argument by sweeping off the subjectively selected empirical evidence. Such argumentation is still useful as it pre-motivates and pre-structures further discussions. When tested empirically multiple times, the discussion can be elevated. When applied to the case of the Gezi upheaval, the problem with the implementation of this logic will be evident (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. 79-100).
A core component of the unrest—the primary motivation of the first wave of protestors—is often put into the shadows: Saving the trees and the historical park. “This is neither about the park nor about a couple of trees,” commentators have been arguing ever since the protests took place (Uzgel, 2012). This is a grave mistake. The protest was about the park and it was about a couple of trees. The protest will not drop off the counter-hegemonic radar when it becomes also about the park and about saving trees. Besides, from an unmotivated reading of the protest, a counter-hegemonic perspective can learn important lessons and reach a higher level of self-awareness. An unpopular observation of the analysts must be stated head-on: there were no plans at the end of the first wave of protestors to push their peaceful environmental protest into an unprecedented public unrest. They did not anticipate the protests to come. For them, it was about the park and it was about the trees. It is a matter of utmost importance to underline the unpredictability of the event. It was of a spontaneous nature.

Accepting the spontaneity of the event does not debase the dignity of the protests. It can safely be argued that the occupation of the park on environmental grounds, the subsequent police intervention, and the public reaction to the police violence have constituted a great proportion of a counter-hegemonic configuration which paved the way for a spontaneous occurrence of eventfulness. Quite a number of other factors, such as the ongoing gentrification processes and alcohol restrictions, contributed to the formation of this embryonic form of eventful configuration (Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). One can argue that Turkey was on the verge of a major eruption that could have transformed the political field. One must then try to understand why public reaction by a society that was charged for over a decade against a government was regarded as unexpected by virtually all parties (Arango, 2013).

The notion of unexpectedness is regarded as an important factor that plays a great role in generating public emotions. Giving some attention to the concept should highlight why one often witnesses global failures in counter-hegemonic performances. Unexpectedness is very much related to a failure to adequately examine various aspects of social agents’ being in the world. In other words, it is about qualitative gap. In a
period of ten days, the Gezi protests grew in maturity. Facing an historic event, something modern Turkey was perhaps experiencing for the first time, even the most ideologically informed protestors had to pause for a while and question themselves self-reflectively: Had a counter-hegemonic attempt—something they all had always dreamed of—caught them off guard? How did they regard the protests? Did they take the upheaval as unexpected? Despite the fact that they were ideologically informed and motivated, could it be possible that they never considered a counter-hegemonic reaction likely? (Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Such a self-reflective analysis forced them into separating two concepts from each other: unlikeliness and unexpectedness (Ete, 2013, pp.15-25).

Likeliness is about an overall condition where events—specified outcomes—appear more probable. Unlikeliness is about improbability. Take the example of ordinary Gezi protestors who have been living in Turkey under a neo-liberal regime for over a decade. This type of protestor is politicized. They are not indifferent to the system. They have first-hand experience of what neo-liberalization means. They witnessed how the market penetrated into the everyday lives of the citizenry. They always thought that the current order of things (the neo-liberal Islamist configuration) was not sustainable. Politically active protestors participated in protests, signed petitions, and raised their voice against what they regarded as an authoritarian and an oppressive regime. Even so, after long discussions with like-minded people, they often arrived at the same conclusion: The masses were deluded; they were apoliticized; nothing could be done; things would remain as they had always been; the best approach would be letting it go. This is how a counter-hegemonic anger is always transformed into leftist cynicism. A counter-hegemonic upheaval on the scale of the Taksim protests was therefore not likely (Žižek, 2002).

One must understand the mental constellation of an ordinary politicized Gezi protestor. They have been entertaining the possibility of doing something (e.g., “something can be done and something must be done”) but they have been concluding each time that doing something successfully (e.g., “making a difference”) was unlikely.
In other words, they were receptive of both possibilities from the very beginning. So when the Gezi protests spread all over the country, the protestors were surprised. They knew that this could have happened but the protestors had never really believed in it. Self-reflective protestors were ready to confess: their expectations were violated. As contradictory as it may sound, they were almost disappointed to witness that a counter-hegemonic upheaval had actually taken place. The degree of their surprise was determined by what one might call the likelihood variable—how likely they thought it was to have a social protest of this scale taking place in Turkey (Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c).

Notwithstanding how disappointing this realization already was, the reality was even worse. Politically charged protestors who belonged to the traditional oppositional milieus were completely caught off-guard by this event. They realized that it would have been a gross understatement to state that they regarded the Gezi upheaval as unlikely. If they were to label it with anything, that had to be unexpected. To regard something as unlikely, one should already be in a position to envision the event. How could any of these protestors visualize a confrontation with the police which would take place only a few meters away from the Prime Minister’s office in Beşiktaş where the Beşiktaş supporters’ group, ÇARŞI, would use an excavator to capture a police anti-riot water cannon vehicle, and put an ad in the newspaper the next day: “second hand police anti-riot water cannon vehicle for sale by owner”? Or, would anyone really believe (forget about being capable of ideating) a protest could take place where a Turkish ultranationalist and a Kurdish rebel would protest against government oppression side by side? (Güler, 2013; Laçiner, 2013; Sancar, 2013). This is why conscious protestors came to the realization that it was not that they regarded the protests as unlikely. These were, in fact, unexpected sequences of events. The difference between the two is huge and must be highlighted (Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001, pp. 22-23).

For evaluating an event in terms of the likelihood, the social agent must have an embryonic imagination of an eventful configuration. The more they are aware of this vision, the more likely a future event becomes. In the case of unexpectedness, the
configuration does not equip the social agent even with the slightest sense of expectation of a counter-hegemonic event taking place. An event would catch the social agents completely unprepared. They would be surprised, not because they had misestimated the configuration, but because the social agents would have attached no subjective likelihood to the event. In an unexpected configuration, there would be no anticipation of events, and there would be no forward-looking either. Therefore, as would be the case with any unexpected event, the Turkish protests could be assessed only after the event, an evaluation that is necessarily backward-looking.

Against this background, it must be noted that eventfulness cannot be thought of simply in terms of retrospective judgments about subjective probabilities. In any case, events possess subjective equiprobability: eventfulness and uneventfulness are both a probability. Social agents would make affectively relevant judgments as a function of how they perceive the normality of the configuration. One can always make a theoretical argument and claim that potential eventfulness in a country where a neo-liberal regime is in power is more likely than eventfulness in a country where basic equalities are dealt with. This argument can be somewhat supported by interpretative historical evidence. It has again become evident in the case of the Gezi upheaval that judgments about transformative social irregularities are misguided. The consciousness of the social agents who are motivated by the idea of a counter-hegemonic order are limited by the hegemonic order. Their consciousness is at best pre-structured by a form of emancipatory thinking that derives its energy from an earlier event. In the course of time, such categorizations are inevitably rendered archaic and a contemporary eventful configuration is perceived as unexpected. One way to tackle this problem could be to keep a close eye on the spontaneous formation of multiplicity. Attachment to empirical reality is important, but the way of interpreting the empirical reality is even more important. Categorizations must be made in an event based manner. This is where the heart of the problem lies: in social analyses, fragments of being are never examined thoroughly. This is a key problem that informs the persistent discussion of aiming towards a complete-understanding (Baars, 1995).
Complete Understanding

Building a complete-understanding is an ideal. It is never set as a practical goal. One inevitably fails while striving for a complete-understanding: absolute perfection is not attainable. This weakness is in fact the strength (Rabaté, 2002). This does not necessarily mean that anything that falls below the standard of absolute perfection can be regarded as of the same quality. There is still a hierarchy among different types of incomplete understanding.

Perfectionists may be advised to learn to curb their enthusiasm and aim for one type of incomplete understanding. Often, analysts are forced to commit to a disciplined and limited form of understanding. A predetermined prescription will be imposed upon the analysts. The choice is often drastic: take it or leave it. Analysts will be provided with a false choice, which is yet another form of hegemony. Understanding becomes a game where players are already chosen and their roles are determined. Analysts are given the option of keeping their curiosity and their desire to understand but exclusively through a strictly prescribed way (Dompere, 2009, pp. 31-36).

The desire for complete-understanding inevitably drags the analyst into the meta-level. The affection for working on the meta-level is related to the desire to transcend empirical boundaries. As nothing is random, the tendency of the analyst to aim for a complete-understanding signals a particular way of being in the world. This type of analyst tends to be phenomenologically more sensitive. They tend to mind the qualitative gap more than usual.

If one is keen on evaluating the possibilities and adequacies of emancipatory-understanding, one needs to bear in mind at least three points: first, events are the prerequisites for constructing an emancipatory-understanding. As discussed above, eventfulness may not always mark a configuration. Second, in the absence of eventfulness, one has to work with the fragments of being in a given configuration.
Third, while doing so, one must be extremely careful with the material at hand. This is practically the only source for imagining the unimaginable.

This may appear to be a methodological discussion, but it is not. The discussion here is not about carefully using qualitative research methods. The discussion is poly-dimensional and it is about several other things: knowledge (e.g., reflexive knowledge as opposed to instrumental knowledge); attitude (e.g., trans-disciplinary critical engagement as opposed to disciplinary substantive professionalism); role (e.g., academia as a place for personal development as opposed to academia as an amalgam of colleges for training students occupationally); and so on. This multiplicity of seemingly unrelated topics is closely related to one another and points to the spirit of the times. Without a thorough examination, it is difficult to know why some analysts would aim for one approach but not for the other. The question is of an existential character; the bodily and socio-structural pre-structuredness of the individual must be probed. People attribute different meanings to their existence. Particularities of their being in the world would shape what kind of affinity they would develop to different sorts of understanding (Heidegger, 2005, pp. 176-183).

Human beings exist in the world in all kinds of ways. Different types of being in the world pre-structure affinities for different types of understanding. The multitude of understanding is covered to some extent by the academic disciplines. However, one can imagine a great number of other ways of understanding. Some approaches to understanding may not be easily clustered into conventional categories (e.g., analysts who are equipped with capabilities of the artistic sort. They may have personal power to imaginatively enter into another person’s feeling-world. Such qualities would be irrelevant for academia).

Numerous alternative approaches to human bewilderedness have persisted over time. Since one cannot delimit human bewilderedness by a limited number of approaches, they are likely to persist in the long run. Alternative approaches are regularly subjected to pressures of discipline and punishment. This is a struggle for intellectual space. People will persist in expressing their need for having a space where
they can embrace, share, and develop their own emotional and intellectual way of reading being in the world. A good example is artistic introversion.

Artists channel their introversion into extroversion by attributing their feelings and thoughts to works of art. This is how they reach the highest level of expressiveness. This sort of artistic power provides a level of satisfaction that cannot be gained by other approaches. This is not about an artist seeking a personal kind of satisfaction. It is more about communication. For example, when art enthusiasts encounter pieces of art, due to their existential connectedness (e.g., having similar types of pre-structuredness as the artists), they might feel that the artists are empathetically and sympathetically stimulating them. Seeing that one can communicate certain aspects of being in the world to a total stranger through a work of art, one inevitably questions the limitations of other approaches to understanding.

Questioning the limitations of understanding does not have to mean disregarding the importance of other ways of understanding. Communication and understanding can come into being through rigorously structured scientific work as well (Hyde, 1994, pp. 179-195). For many, scientific understanding is the model for understanding. This is the dominating approach. Alternative approaches to understanding aim to pull the attention towards questioning the usefulness of conventional categories. Under these circumstances, it is important to work on alternative approaches. This is essentially about a contradictory engagement. It is about aiming higher than sciences and lower than traditional philosophy.

**Conclusive Remarks**

Chapter six with four sections follows the two separate introductions that were made in this work and investigates them further: first, the chapter revisits the general introduction of the work also by relating itself to the first chapter. This is where the objectivism and subjectivism dichotomy is implicitly visited again. Second, it not only
follows the introduction that is made in the fifth chapter for the second part of his work but also pushes it into a conclusion. Against the backdrop of this explanation, the conclusion of chapter six summarizes the relevant points that are made in this chapter.

Concerning the general points that were made at the introduction of this work, a guiding principle of emancipatory understanding was put forward at the outset: there is no substantial basis in any given situation for making universally valid knowledge claims. A couple of statements have to follow from this main principle: the desire to put forward all-encompassing knowledge claims is closely related to objectivism. If the counter position can be defined as subjectivism, objectivism and subjectivism must be understood as simplifications of a more complex reality. But it is argued that they are necessary categorizations for launching a critical approach dialectically. The dialectical process in the end overcomes the preliminary dichotomy and reaches at emancipatory understanding which has become possible in the present configuration. As it was explained before, re-emergence of power centers in the Global South has put the hegemonic position of the Global North into question and provided the analysts who strive for developing a refreshed form of critical thinking with an opportunity.

Even though social sciences are positioned in the Eurocentric tradition, prevailing social science ideology is objectivist and Universalist, and it is a product of western capitalism and it is expanding with the dissemination of western capitalism to the rest of the world which in return causing an inherent hegemonic distortion in the perspective rendering claims to universality appear as fully legitimate by self-evidentizing truth claims, even under these circumstances developing a critical perspective should be possible. If perspectives which do not draw on the conceptual tools of the prevailing order are deprived of possibilities for expressing themselves legitimately, what matters is altering the conceptual tools for generating emancipatory thought as using the same conceptual tools one can only end up with the same conclusions. This is how the general introduction and first part of this work links to the introduction that was made in the first part.
As it was explained before, there are three major ways for analysts to step out of an all-encompassing hegemonic order of things for being able to sketch a critical perspective. First approach was linked to a macro historical trend, the rise of the Global South: while the global configuration has been transformed fundamentally, counter-hegemonic perspectives which have not given enough space up until now are favored by this transformation. Second approach was to study, work, live in other contexts and research these ‘alien’ configurations comparatively. And the final approach was to focus on events which represent temporary disruptions within the stability of conformist order of things. Concerning the emancipatory opportunities that are presented by eventfulness, three points were listed: first, analysts must understand that their capacity for understanding and interpretation is inherently limited. In order to develop a legitimate social scientific perspective they have to accept restrictions. Second, even after accepting the inherent limitations to understanding and interpretation under a strict scholarly discipline, analysts must accept that for developing a genuine form of critical thinking, even this limited perspective requires a counter-hegemonic event to set the background for it as a necessary condition for critical thought. Third, even when analysts make peace with the first two principles, and remain loyal to them; understanding and interpretation are destined to remain unfinished in the hermeneutical sense, and complete understanding can only remain as a desire.
Chapter 7: Understanding as Emancipation

Since the last chapter of this work is dedicated to a practical suggestion, transforming the social science education at the universities, and the conclusion takes the form of a more general discussion than a simple restatement of the points that are made throughout this work, and chapter seven in many ways comprise the key ideas of this work, this introduction to chapter seven not only provides an outline of this particular chapter, but also connects to the main argument of this work and gives a general conclusive overview.

The main concern of this work is critical thinking. It suggests that critical thinking is an effective way to succeed at transforming social world into a better one. It puts forward a project and coins it as emancipatory understanding. This project is related to examining social events. It argues that since thought is limited by existential conditions, critical thinking can only be possible by stepping out of uncritical situatedness, and social events provide one of the rare opportunities for being able to do so. While the first part of this work (Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) sets the background for the discussion on events, the second part (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) are dedicated more directly to the discussion with the final chapter (Chapter 8) discussing the same issue in relation to higher education. The seventh chapter which is key to this work in this regard, is divided into three sections: subalternity, qualitative gap and event driven and event based thinking.

The first section visits the concept subaltern and uses it in a certain way that it would signify social agents who are supposedly outside the world of the hegemon and are participating to this world only by being hegemonized. It argues that for an analyst who has critical inclinations the category is important as clustering people into social groups and investigating their collective critical consciousness is an effective way of finding out emancipatory potentiality in its embryonic forms. By doing so, a critical analyst can recognize a social atmosphere of counter-hegemonic eventfulness and interpret the social events accordingly for shedding some light on the contemporary political constellation. And it is discussed that despite the contrary effort it makes, because of lack of
phenomenological sensitivity, the category of subaltern does not take the issue of relative deprivation serious and arbitrarily chooses what type of social groups to comprise and exclude. The desire for objectification ends in ignoring the qualitative gap between the analyst and the social agent. The 2013 Gezi upheaval is given as an example to substantiate these points and deconstruct middle class categorization and liberal democracy discourse.

The second section follows from the critical perspective of the first section on liberal democracy and starts with taking another example, Dalit assertion in India, to elaborate on what is coined as qualitative gap. It is argued that a supposedly self-evident just cause of clustering counter-hegemonic tendencies under one category (i.e. subaltern) proves to be another form of objectivism. Concepts such as polyphonic mechanics, egalitarian epistemic ambivalence, and egalitarian spontaneity are introduced to underline the importance of a justifiable social categorization. Two distinct approaches by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Ernesto Laclau on equality of differences are provided to exemplify the specific stance the section takes. It is explained that while the approach of equality of differences can be criticized on logical grounds (the category of difference cannot exist without the category of totality), it cannot be based on an imaginary conception of totality which is made up from supposedly empty space either. Against this background, an important question is posed: if totality can be imagined as a particularity with empty space to be filled in each time within a configuration, how could the process of filling this empty space in be free of hegemonic distortion? It is argued that for an emancipatory dialectical process taking place, a perfect symmetry between the multitudes of singularities is needed. Since this is not the case and not all perspectives for each singularity are presented, the politically charged pre-configuration will always dictate in what terms the interpretation will be made. Against the backdrop of this discussion the section delves into the issue of counter-hegemony and bridges the discussion to events.

The third section which is closely related to the second section is dedicated to explanation of eventfulness, event based and event driven thinking. It is argued that once the relation between hegemony and counter-hegemony is portrayed as a problem of
segregation, it will be understood why emancipatory thresholds, where moments of consciousness leap can be observed and the possibilities for emancipatory understanding be detectable, are rare incidents: they occur in the border between hegemony dominated and counter-hegemony dominated spheres of being; and since counter-hegemonic perspectives are segregated and isolated, they are rendered invisible; thus only when the confrontation between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic perspectives takes place, emancipatory understanding becomes possible. With events, it is discussed, come certain forms of configurations, in which one’s being in the world can be transformed; and depending on the level of this person’s involvement in the event, an a consciousness leap can come into being. Therefore, emancipatory thinking is closely related to occurrence of events. It is emphasized that a distinction must be made between two types of event related thinking: event driven and event based thinking. While event driven thinking is comes into being as a consequence of an event, event based thinking is about furthering a conscious reflection of that event. Even though both types of thinking are essential for developing critical thinking, mainly event driven thinking is responsible for furthering critical thought.

The end of the third section is dedicated to closing the debate that is introduced in the first section: critical analysts must acknowledge that the reality is much more complex than analysts’ simplified theorization of it; because of the immense difficulty analysts experience when trying to grasp egalitarian spontaneity, they tend to conform to pragmatic approaches; the debates of power, hegemony and violence persist not because of some postmodern hype but because of empirical reality; since the alteration of consciousness comes into being not only in political spheres but also in artistic spheres, the discussions on unconventional ways of thinking are nourished with analogies and metaphors; this however does not signify a lack of scientific rigor, but a strong desire for a paradigm shift.
The term subaltern is derived from the work of Gramsci (1971). Gramsci used the concept in a specific way. For a proper use of the concept one must review its genealogy. Otherwise one is likely to misuse the term. A common failure is to take it for granted that Gramsci used the term as a synonym for the term proletariat (Green, 2002). This is not true. Gramsci used the term in a much more innovative way (Morton, 2007, p. 96). But reviewing the term subaltern from its philosophical routes to its present day applications in the social science debates is a research project on its own. This chapter will not undertake such an exhaustive analysis. The term subaltern will be used here in the following sense: it will identify and describe a person who is existentially outside the hegemon’s world. This is surely a distortion of the original meaning. But the argumentation in the chapter should justify this choice.

The subaltern is out of the hegemon’s world; plays practically no role in practicing hegemony (other than being hegemonized); is only an unwilling participant to the hegemonic system; is not dominated (i.e., forced into the hegemonic system) but hegemonized (i.e., manipulated to play part in the system); symbolically dominated (Nandy & Kothari, 2004). Against this background, subalternity can be attributed to too many people in a large spectrum of social groups. From the perspective of an emancipatory analyst such a category is impractical. An emancipatory analyst is primarily concerned with clustering social milieus into larger groups (for seeing embryonic emancipatory potentiality for counter-hegemonic eventfulness). Therefore an emancipatory analysis requires a meticulous categorization. The category of subalternity must be defined in a stricter manner.

The category can be delimited by leaving out the least relevant social groups. The criterion of relevance can be determined in reference to the particularities of one’s social situatedness: subalternity is about being completely outside the hegemon’s world. Against this background, a large spectrum of identity driven social groups can be left out of the categorization. Identity driven social groups may claim the status of subalternity.
And some forms of identity politics can be employed to challenge the hegemonic discourse from within (e.g., strategic-essentialism) (Spivak, 1990, pp. 1-16). But identity driven social groups are a substantial part of the hegemonic order of things. They claim subalternity for the wrong reasons. Therefore, an emancipatory analyst cannot attribute subalternity to these groups on the basis of identity related exclusion (e.g., ethnic origin). The opposite approach will be a contradiction with the emancipatory agenda (e.g., combatting against racial discrimination can only be part of a bigger emancipatory project).

There is a pre-structure that informs the analyst’s categorization. The categorization constitutes the pillars of the analyst’s theorization. They all together have political consequences. And they all together are politically charged. Therefore, self-reflection is vital for any research practice. Analysts need to determine their stance by responding to a set of fundamental questions. Some of the questions related to the particular topic of this Chapter can be listed as: should analysts take matters of relative deprivation serious? How far would analysts go in registering the self-perceptions of the narrators (e.g., expressed singularities)? What would be the threshold for analysts to stop paying attention to the singularities in the narrations and push them into particularities? At what point should analysts conclude that they have paid enough attention to the principle of phenomenological sensitivity? How could analysts refrain from confusing phenomenological exclusivity with phenomenological sensitivity? Is there any objective way for analysts to know whether they have tackled or bypassed the qualitative gap?

The aforementioned questions are important for the research practice. Self-reflective analysts must bear all these questions in mind. This is especially the case with sensitive research topics. Conceptualization of subalternity is a delicate issue. Identity driven social groups have strong identity consciousness. They perceive themselves as minorities of some kind. They are discriminated against. Therefore, they claim the category of the subalternity. The Gezi upheaval (2013) can be provided as an example to elaborate on this point.
A wave of protests hit Turkey in the early summer of 2013. On May 27, protestors started gathering in a historically important central park in İstanbul: Taksim Gezi Park. The park is one of the few green places in the city center. Protestors were opposing to the demolition of the park. Shortly after police intervened. Excessive use of force by the police had a snowball effect. A peaceful environmental protest changed its character. The first week of the unrest in İstanbul gave a clear idea about the social composition of the protestors. One could recognize five waves of protestors. Five groups can be named after their characteristic slogans (viz., 1. this-is-our-park, 2. enough-is-enough, 3. you-will-never-walk-alone), in reference to their undisputable political affiliations (e.g., 4. neo-nationalists) and overall social psychology (e.g., 5. solidarity-feels-good) (Jepson & Söyler, 2013; Özbank, Özcan & Paker, 2013; Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). A close look at this constellation will shed some light on Spivak’s point.

The first group was rather small. It mainly comprised environmentalists. They were primarily interested in opposing the government’s urban development plan. The second group was much greater in number. These were the people who flowed to the Taksim Square after the solidarity call from the first group. They shared the environmental concerns of the first group. But their primary motivation was twofold: protesting against the police violence and increasing authoritarianism of the government. The resistance at the park now gained a symbolic character. The third wave inherited the psychological victory of the first two waves. For the first two waves, police intervention was an imminent threat. From the third group onwards (until the evacuation of the park), a confrontation with the police has become less likely (other than local struggles at various city quarters). Police intervention never ceased to be a possibility. But it was important that the protestors gained confidence (they could resist against the police).

The third wave comprised protestors who were driven to the square by a significant political emotion: loneliness. They were genuinely surprised to reach at a realization that they were not alone. They found out that they could in fact protest against the government. They did not need to raise their voice alone. For an ideologically informed and politically active protestors, all of this is evident. What is important here is that a great
many people with less political engagement have reached at this realization. They were ideologically uninformed but emotionally very receptive. Following their emotions against apparent injustices they participated to the event. They lacked mature political consciousness. But they learned through participation. Embryonic emancipatory political consciousness appeared in their collective psyche. They were partly educated within that timeframe.

The fourth wave of protestors marked the disappearance of the emancipatory perspective. It comprised the greatest number of participants. The fourth wave signaled that the protest has reached its limits. Neo-nationalists comprised an important part of the fourth wave. Their archaic militarist slogans were significant. These shifts in the composition of the protestors highlighted the fact that the core principles of the protest were about to dissolve. Finally, the fifth wave comprised a massive crowd of apoliticized milieus. These were not protestors as they were not protesting anything. There was no longer an apparent risk of police intervention. They were driven by sheer curiosity to see what had been going on for days. They simply wanted to witness a historic event. A great number of these protestors felt the necessity to express head-on that they were apolitical.

Against this background, it can be argued that the first group ignited the upheaval; the second wave publicized it; the third wave helped it reaching the large masses, and the last two waves trivialized it (Kongar & Küçükkaya, 2013; Özbank, Özcan & Paker, 2013; Jepson & Söyler, 2013; Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). One can accordingly construct a hierarchical pyramid of social groups which participated to the upheaval. The first two groups (and to some extent, the third group) occupies the top layer of the pyramid. They are the smallest in number. They had the deepest ideological awareness on social-structural matters. They were protesting against Islamist neo-liberalism. They called for collective emancipation. From the top layer to the bottom, the emancipatory perspective dissolves. For the last two groups, Taksim Gezi Park protests served the purpose of an emotional discharge. It did not have any counter-hegemonic component. At best it was a protest against authoritarianism (in the particular sense that the last two waves of protestors perceived authoritarianism). And at worst the demonstrations served as a
political anti-depressant for the less politicized oppositional groups (Özbank, Özcan & Paker, 2013). Against this conceptual understanding, plenty of empirical evidence can be provided to support the thesis that the unrest gradually turned into an identity driven real middle-class movement and lost its critical essence (Güler, 2013; Jepson & Söyler, 2013). And precisely from this point of view, the protests in Turkey indicate family resemblances with the Brazilian protests (Souza, 2013) if not with others (Therborn, 2014).

One can now reflect on Spivak’s (1990) point: identity driven real middle-class movements are not fancy-looking political gestures which in reality are all vine and no taters. But one must recognize their system-friendly nature. They clearly lack the will to question self-evidentialized rhetoric in a given configuration (e.g., rhetoric of liberal democracy). Such movements provide great space for addressing surface-level phenomena (e.g., identity issues). But one cannot miss the apparent reality that they do not aim for tackling social structural issues (e.g., inequality). Therefore, argues Spivak, for having a more focused and a more disciplined counter-hegemonic understanding, the groups who suffer simply because they do not feel that they are rewarded by the system must try to solve their issues otherwise. They could join other frontiers of social struggles but they must definitely refrain from attributing an emancipatory motivation to their identity based struggles. There is no doubt that they are suffering, but one must understand that they are suffering for the wrong reasons. This is a kind of a reflective perspectival gap (i.e., the distance that social agents have with their own reality).

Both in the case of the unrest in Turkey and in the case of the 2013 protests in Brazil, there were clear signs that the real middle class hijacked the movement from the precarious middle class. Nevertheless, and at the same time unsurprisingly, when the real middle class protestors were informally interviewed, the narrators had the tendency to persistently put forward an alternative reading of the events. They expressed strong feelings of stigmatization and humiliation, and refused to accept that there was a demarcation between their situatedness and that of the precarious middle class. They self-defined an identity that was informed primarily by the singularities of their self-
understanding. Even though sociologically, there was compelling evidence for analysts to argue that the members of the real middle class belonged to an ideologically vacuumed social category, and therefore, the nature of their protests was qualitatively different from ideologically informed social groups such as the precarious middle class, it proved to be a difficult endeavor for analysts to argue against such strong conviction. After all, the narrators were suffering. And even if analysts argued that they were suffering for the wrong reasons, their pain indeed seemed very real to them. Therefore, every single time, analysts had to return to the point of the qualitative gap (Güler, 2013; Laçiner, 2013; Sancar, 2013).

Spivak argues in a provocative fashion that social groups such as the real middle class are the least interesting and the most dangerous groups of the oppressed (Kock, 1992). They are the least interesting because even though they cry—and they genuinely do so—the triggering point for their emotional outburst is misguided. Spivak implies that the main reason for identity groups to make a lot of noise is simply because they cannot participate in the system as much as they desire. In other words, their concerns are more related to the configuration of the power blocks in the system rather than the power itself. When their social situatedness is taken into account, they seem to have no reason for being genuinely critical of the system. When the power blocks shift and the configuration is altered, their deprivation will be undone and they will be left with no reason to protest. This is why, between the time of the upheaval and the election period, the real middle class focused primarily on attacking the government on the basis of corruption. Even though there is always a possibility for a critique of corruption to gain a systemic character, the real middle class tends to ignore the banality of evil and demonize political figures that they regard as citizens without morals (Güler, 2013; Jepson & Söyler, 2013; Söyler, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).

The 2013 protests in Turkey and elsewhere must be analyzed to understand the consequences of preferences while launching an analytical categorization. In the case of Turkey, for example, it must be noted that the majority of the protestors who belonged to the real middle class were primarily concerned about the government interference in their
lifestyles. Top government officials consciously attacked the secular real middle class values for transferring the humiliation and stigmatization which they claim to have experienced under a secular regime. Therefore, putting aside a minority of ideologically well-versed social groups who constituted the backbone of the initial waves of protests, and guided the precarious real middle class protestors, the protests were about serving a psychological function of emotional discharge: had Prime Minister resigned, they thought, all of their problems would have been solved the next day (Jepson & Söyler, 2013). As the participation of the misguided social milieus diverts the counter-hegemonic attention, this is precisely why Spivak argues that a misguided anger against the hegemon is much more dangerous than having no anger at all. Identity driven groups trigger an unnecessary amount of internal disagreements and miscommunication between large conglomerates of self-proclaimed subalterns (Güler, 2013; Laçiner, 2013; Özbank, Özcan & Paker, 2013).

**Qualitative Gap**

One can easily provide Spivak’s approach with supporting material. Another illustrative example is the case of Dalit assertion in India. There are two aspects of Dalit politics that especially seem to prove Spivak’s point: first, the relationship between Dalits and other excluded groups in India (e.g., OBCs and STs) is quite ambiguous. A majority of Dalit narrators—Dalit leaders or common Dalit people alike—would state that they are primarily interested in Dalit assertion, and they would only make a passing reference to other deprived groups, which highlights the lack of a strong sense of solidarity. One can even recognize aspects of competitiveness between Dalits and other groups. Second, Dalits have an ambiguous relationship with Western modernity. Being Indian, they perceive colonialism as oppressive. Being Dalit, they might appreciate some aspects of British colonialism as it brought rights to Dalits. One can subjectively observe that the latter feeling (embracing modernity) is stronger among Dalits.
There is no convincing body of arguments for an average Dalit to criticize Western modernity. This is simply because Dalitiness constitutes their primary aspect of being. Indianness comes second. Therefore, it is understandable that Dalits in general see adapting to the democratic liberal state formula as a cure to all social ills. To give an example, in the big cities of India (a prominent example is Mumbai) one would recognize numerous Dalit business organizations promoting the rapid liberalization of the Indian state. In a configuration where Dalits see integration to the liberal economy as a key strategy for survival, it is indeed difficult to create a common enemy which would convince Dalits as much as it convinces other oppressed social groups. This point might be seen as the main obstacle against the assertion of deprived groups in India.

One can provide many more examples to support the thesis that identity driven social groups do not essentially pose a counter-hegemonic critique. It is evident that in most of the cases, identity driven groups proved to be quite pragmatic. Being pragmatic also implies that they cannot (or they do not) imagine an alternative ideology, and tend to support political strands that promote the reproduction of the system. Progressive political actors sometimes try to explain this phenomenon with a psychological condition: Stockholm Syndrome, a psychological phenomenon where the captured identifies with the captor. Many abduction victims, no matter how badly they were treated, become attached to their tormenters and suffer from the syndrome.

Of course, there can be several other reasons for the oppressed not supporting progressive candidates. One obvious reason self-proclaimed progressive candidates never seem to consider is that they might not be perceived progressive enough by the oppressed. Therefore, in an ideologically-vacuumed system, people are left with no choice but to vote along the line of their economic interests. In view of such information, although the unrest in Turkey might have given a counter-hegemonic image, one can understand why most of the protestors will continue to vote for mainstream parties (i.e., center-right and center-left) in the next elections. This is why, Spivak argues, people who cannot transcend the provincial limits of their identities should not qualify as subalterns. They simply do not occupy what one can call a space of difference. Subaltern is, then, in
the way it is used by Spivak, an umbrella term that comprises all kinds of social groups that fulfill one primary condition: being at the margins of a society.

It is equally easy to dispute the aforementioned arguments with Spivak. The core issue that needs to be discussed here is the approach Spivak follows while clustering the social groups under the category of subalterns. She draws on one criterion which is a rather ambiguous statement: social groups that are to be classified as subalterns need to be located outside of the hegemonic structures. In order to disambiguate this statement, Spivak states that those who are originally part of the hegemonic system (i.e., social groups that used to be situated in the core of the system) but suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune and are left out of the core for one reason or the other, cannot belong to the margins. In other words, Spivak asks the analysts to trail behind their personal category of genuinely excluded without providing a convincing rationale. Spivak’s motivation is to bring the genuinely excluded under the same roof as quick as possible; and then make a claim of having established an authentic source for countering hegemony.

If understanding is a philosophical matter and it ideally aims towards alternative ways of imagining the world (i.e., emancipatory understanding), the ultimate aim of emancipatory understanding should be bridging the qualitative gap. Other ways of dealing with the gap (e.g. ignoring, bypassing, etc.) will not adequately tackle the problem. On grounds of practicality, one may be inclined to (e.g., Spivak) take the issue of polyphonic mechanics lightly (conforming to destructive production rather than productive destruction). One may decide against paying attention to relative deprivation (e.g., hearing each social actor presenting a personal account of what deprivation meant for him or her). And one may assume that singular accounts quickly dissolve (and take on a particular meaning of existence as opposed to a singular meaning). The unwillingness to let things happen of their own accord is not specific to Spivak or any other analyst. Most social science research is based on disturbing egalitarian spontaneity (e.g., objectivism). In the example of a critical analyst, the critique of the analyst is already pre-structured and ideologically informed. Therefore, the analyst tends to be extra-motivated
for cluster family resemblances in relation to this preconditioning (begging the question). The discussion may be elevated at the end. But one must remember that this happens at the expense of compromising egalitarian epistemic ambivalence.

One can give several more examples. Research topics (e.g., struggle against inequality, social exclusion and global capitalism) tackle different research questions on the surface, but it could be suggested that underneath the surface they all have one fundamental concern: coming up with a global milieu categorization. In other words, the main effort is forming alliances for fighting against the hegemonic order of things. In the end, one would recognize that analysts primarily investigate ways to respond to a fundamental question: How can one cluster counter-hegemonic practices? As discussed above, Spivak is of the opinion that one should construct a hierarchical pyramid and decide accordingly who belongs to subalternity. Spivak represents one of the two approaches to the problem of categorization. To elaborate further, one can exemplify the two approaches by briefly presenting the argumentation of sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Santos, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2010), and political theorist Ernesto Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990, 1994, 1998).

Santos proposes a normative framework for an equality of differences between allies against the common enemy (i.e., hegemonic globalization). Laclau argues that equality of differences is a contradiction in terms. According to Laclau, there is an inherent contradiction in the practice of appreciating difference (i.e., particularities of clustered singularities). This is because one can talk about two options for the particularities. First, all particularities can demand equal rights. Second, all particularities can be considered already equal. If it is the former and all particularities demand equal rights, there needs to be a scale (e.g., universal rights) according to which equality can be demanded. People with different particularities would aim towards these universal rights (e.g., equality). If it is the latter, and all particularities are already considered equal, this would only mean that there was already a universal scale (e.g., equality), and it was realized, so that it has become possible to talk about equality in the first place. As far as the issue of equality is concerned, following Laclau’s logic, one realizes that if one denies
universality (e.g., totality) in favor of particularity (e.g., difference), one inevitably ends up with a contradictory position of denying particularity (as it cannot exist without a concept of universality), while trying to defend it. In other words, it is only logical to take totality for granted (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990, 1994, 1998; Santos, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2010).

Laclau attributes a self-evident character to totality. His argumentation appeals to nature: universality is natural; therefore, it must be valid, inevitable and justified. Laclau is right. The category of totality (or universality for that matter), is necessary for a logical construction of singularities and particularities. But totality as a generic logical concept has never been the real problem. Totality is indeed part of the logical universe. Nevertheless, particular conceptions of totality (e.g., the Hegelian one) constitute the real source of the problem. To save Hegel from the critics, Laclau develops his own reading of Hegel. According to Laclau, if one reads Hegelian totality as an empty space, the problem with Hegelian totality disappears. This brings forth some questions.

Laclau argues that Hegel’s conception of totality can be read as providing an empty space that still needs to be filled. In this way, Laclau tries to save Hegel’s self-enclosed system. Seeing totality as an empty space to be filled each time is equal to imagining totality as a particularity within a configuration. Laclau’s creative reading tries to tackle most of the issues with Hegel. One must examine to what extent he succeeds at this undertaking. There are two issues worth the attention: first, seeing totality as an empty space; and second, imagining the empty space to be filled within a configuration. Some light will be shed on this issue in the coming paragraphs. Without pursuing the investigation, however, a related question can be posed: how can one explicitly describe the processes (e.g., dialectical and kaleidoscopic) that fill the empty space? This is one important issue that needs disambiguation. It does seem inevitable that during these processes take place in a hegemonic configuration. Hegemony might be persistent despite ways that are offered to bypass or counter it.

Laclau’s construction of Hegelian totality assumes an empty meta-space. Laclau argues that an empty space allows one to take snapshots of reality in the form of
particularities that will each time be related to a particular configuration. The question one must pose is whether or not Laclau’s assumed empty space is in fact empty. Laclau’s meta-space is politically and ideologically pre-charged. In other words, while particularities are formed, the process does not take place in a neutral zone. Particularities are inevitably ideologically-charged. If this is the case, one cannot assume that an objective dialectical process is at play each time when particularities are formed. For such a dialectical process to take place, there has to be a perfect symmetry between the multitudes of singularities. As there are no corresponding perspectives for every other perspective, this is not the case. The conditions for the pre-configuration dictate in what terms the configuration will take place.

If the pre-condition were perfectly symmetrical, hegemonic perspectives would meet with the counter-hegemonic perspectives, and they would annihilate each other. At the end of this process, most of the insight the counter-hegemonic perspectives have brought will be lost. In this world, no counter-hegemonic perspective will be observable. There will no longer be a chance to argue that it-could-have-been-otherwise. From the perspective of an ordinary observer, the world would look as it is (it-is-what-it-is). All forms of alternative ways of looking at being in the world will be lost. In this scenario, counter-hegemonic perspectives will be rendered invisible. They will be forced to remain under the surface. It is true that in the meta-universe there will always be regions that are more hegemony dominated and regions that are counter-hegemony dominated. This is stating the obvious. It is evident that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic perspectives are segregated. The dialectical relation between hegemony and counter-hegemony has never been a problem of balance. It is more about segregating and isolating oppositional perspectives.

In any case, counter-hegemonic perspectives will appear from a distance indistinguishable from hegemonic perspectives. This is because only in the border between hegemony dominated and counter-hegemony dominated regions will the possibility for counter-hegemonic emancipatory understanding be detectable. This borderline phenomenon could perhaps best be defined as a threshold. The threshold is the
environment where moments of consciousness leap can best be observed. One can take the example of social unrests. Although it depends on the nature of the social unrest, in the case of any social unrest, social actors are exposed to more possibilities for reaching the threshold. One’s relative distance to the socially transformative event, and the density of one’s involvement, will decide whether or not, and to what extent, one registers the possibility for a consciousness leap.

Against this background, it could be argued that Laclau simplifies a much more complex process for the purposes of theorization. Laclau does not describe the processes through which the empty space is supposed to be filled. Power, hegemony and accompanying violence will always be present. It is not clear how under these circumstances a dialectical or a kaleidoscopic approach can avoid being hegemony-dominated. Spivak is right. Suffering is not enough. One must suffer for the right reasons. The same applies to this particular case: Counter-hegemony is not enough; one must counter the hegemony in the right way. If hegemony is an existential reality, one has two options. First, one can adopt a pragmatic approach. Hegemonic nature of existence is taken for granted. Therefore, clustering is done in this manner. Second, one can adopt a more ambitious approach. One desperately tries to grasp egalitarian spontaneity. One will face two options. One waits for an event. Events provide the moments and the conditions where possibilities for consciousness leaps are plenty. Waiting for the event might prove to be a good investment. Or, one again waits for an event, but this time actively. Events do not come into being out of thin air. One can therefore work on them imaginatively. In the case of the former, in moments of eventfulness, social actors are charged (e.g., emotionally and politically). They know that they are experiencing a moment of opportunity. They may read the configuration accurately and learn the necessary lessons. Or, they may get lost in the excitement and surf on the surface of the eventfulness. In either of the cases, they have the opportunity to make a step forward and have their level of consciousness elevated.

If everything is related to the occurrence of an event (or preparation for an event), limitations for emancipatory understanding are immense. One has, of course, the latter
option too. One can actively wait for an event. There is always the chance that one reads a book one day and one’s whole life changes. Some books might possess the power to strike the reader with the very first sentence. But this is not comparable to the impact of an event. It is much harder to create the thresholds for consciousness leaps on the meta-level. A good book, a good idea may leave a mark in one’s memory and soul. But an event transforms one’s being. This is why events are an absolute necessity. Emancipatory understanding is very much related to the impact and effect of events. Subalternity as a source of counter-hegemonic thinking has limited potential. If subaltern consciousness fuels events, it will be a different story. Limitations to counter-hegemonic thinking are related to the occurrence of events. This is the biggest and the primary problem. One must recognize that the desire to have a complete understanding of being in the world is related to this problem. This can be translated as a desire to mind the qualitative gap. Doing so, one can foresee the possibilities of an event (the event in the embryonic form), before the event actually comes into being. The discussion here is closely related to Alain Badiou’s key conception: the event. A few words need to be said on this theme before bridging the discussion.

**Event Driven and Event Based Thinking**

Against the background of the discussion above, one can argue that there are mainly two forms of thinking that fuel emancipatory understanding: event driven and event based thinking. Event driven thinking is consequential (as a consequence of an event). Event based thinking is relational. Both types of thinking inform emancipatory understanding. The impasse is obvious. When there are no event related phenomena, there can be no eventual circumstances. This would mean that the configuration in the lack of eventfulness will be hegemonic. Logically speaking, it is difficult if not impossible for a hegemonic structure to give rise to counter-hegemonic thinking. Event
based thinking has inherent limitations. This is why emancipatory thinking can be developed mainly by event driven thinking.

According to Badiou an event is a significant eruption in human activities (Badiou, 2003). An event is equally related to practice and theory. It can be portrayed as a point of no return. It is a threshold. Crossing that threshold one simply has to reconfigure his or her consciousness. A new configuration necessitates new thinking. An event is a microcosm of opportunity for testing alternative forms of being. It comes into being in a hegemonic universe (Bensaid, 2010). Nevertheless, it opens up possibilities for counter-hegemonic thinking, which, in a hegemonic universe, is unprecedented. This is why there is no immediate vocabulary to describe the phenomenon (Žižek, 2012a). It is indefinable. One cannot describe it until it is fully matured. For the same reasons, it is entirely contingent and unpredictable. One cannot know it before it happens. An event occurs and a consciousness leap comes into being. Only then a great number of people will be able to acknowledge what has happened. Without the consciousness leap, people will continue to misdescribe what they observe. This is because they have to draw on what they already know.

Classical examples from the political sphere are global scale revolutions (e.g., French, Russian). They have altered the world. There are also local scale revolutions (e.g., social unrests such as the Turkish and Brazilian ones). They play the role of altering the consciousness of the people. Nevertheless, events cannot be limited to the political sphere. There are other fields where eruptions can come into being. Artistic and scientific fields are good examples of where eruption often comes into being. This is an old cliché but what can one do when it is the truth: the artistic field is extremely sensitive to popular consciousness (Ihde, 2009). It often provides a mirror image of the society. That is why it is often the case that political ruptures are preceded by artistic ones (Söyler, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Nevertheless, these ruptures (if they are detected at all) can only be interpreted retrospectively (by the academic and intellectual fields). Scientific innovations provide the possibility to think otherwise and reconsider the current order of things. This is why those who are interested in events as opportunities for alternative
ways of thinking draw quite extensively on artistic and scientific fields for analogies and metaphors as much as they draw on historical analysis for mapping how things played out historically. It is, then, no coincidence that counter-hegemonic thinking comes into being via unconventional ways of thinking.

In the most general sense possible, events are defined as things that happen. As far as everyday human perception goes, there is no doubt about the nature of events. It-is-what-it-is. For example, when one drops a book on the floor, neither the book nor the act of dropping is disputable. This is commonsensical knowledge. One may doubt such events. But empirical verification is easy and direct. There is little point in disputing such events with other observers. Nevertheless, it could-have-been-otherwise. The seemingly self-evident nature of things can be questioned. The metaphysics of perceiving the world and the semantics of natural language are not undisputable. No one can claim to be providing an uncontroversial characterization of events. Events are not things (and things that happen). Things exist in a rather clear spatial dimension, and they occupy a spatial location, but they do not have clear temporality. Events on the other hand, do not exist in clear spatial dimension, they lack spatial clarity, but they have clear temporality. They are time-bound. Therefore, argues Badiou, events are not just things that occurred. They involve all kinds of human phenomena (e.g., desires, dreams and thoughts) (Badiou, 2003). The commonsensical nature of the event can easily be relativized.

For an event to be an event (to exist) enough people with great amounts of influence should recognize and grasp the event (consensual validation). Therefore, interpretation plays a large role in the recognition of an event. From this point of view, while it is important for a social actor to participate in political demonstrations, it is equally important to making sense of what is happening and in what one is participating. To recognize an event is equal to recognizing a potentially life-changing (and society-changing) threshold. A whole new line of thinking and practice will follow from it. Thus there are three steps: first, a societal phenomenon (e.g., unrest) needs to be declared an event; second, it needs to be recognized as an event; and finally, such consequences should follow that the eventfulness of the event can be verified. For those who recognize
the event, it is something that will shift their perspective on the world. It will open up a whole new landscape (Steele, 2008). This is the point where one begins a process of rethinking and acting. One relates to the world in terms of this event (Badiou, 2003).

A new subject comes into being through a new philosophy. This new subject is anyone who can make the basic decision to follow the event. Following the event, this person will relate to the situation. The new subject’s life will not be the same after the recognition of the event: The occurrence of the subject is related to the event. Therefore, the subject is social. The new subject is interested in a truth-process. They are mainly concerned with creating new truths. This is a vital point to understand. According to Badiou, there is a sharp distinction between knowledge and truth. Knowledge is, more or less, explaining the current order of things (explaining it-is-what-it-is), and truth is the enunciation of something new (could-have-been-otherwise). For Badiou, thinking is a truth-process. It is about seeking alternative perspectives. The truth-process is born out of events and it generates truths. Being forward-looking is a matter of utmost importance. One should ever push forward and develop new ideas. This is the new subject’s indebtedness to the event. For example, in the case of the unrest in Turkey, at least for the left fractions in the country, one can argue that they will have to think and act in fidelity to the unrest in the coming years. After the unprecedented unrest, politics in this country can never be the same again. This is the importance of an event, and for the importance to be persistent, one should remain loyal to the cause (Badiou, 2003).

In a world where following the conventions and not questioning the self-evident nature of things prove every single time to be most efficient and the most productive, it is no doubt a risky business to seek alternative perspectives. There are no guarantees of being successful. Even when one believes one has arrived at a new consciousness, unless one is able to express oneself in the old vocabulary (clothe new ideas in old forms), or be somehow consensually validated by people who share similar consciousness, one will not spark any attention. It is almost inevitable that one will be condemned as self-righteous (phenomenological exclusivity). There are no assurances in this venture. An event is a threshold, and when one crosses the threshold, things can never be the same. The
previous order of things dismantles and order becomes undecidable until it is reordered. Therefore, a question coming from the other side of the threshold will never be satisfied with the indecisive nature of the answer. A question of the old paradigm cannot be answered with a response from the new paradigm. To put it in other words, a hegemonic question cannot be answered by a counter-hegemonic response.

Without an event there can be no truth-process. Indeed, without an interpretative intervention, there can be no event. By recognizing an event, one—the new subject—initiates a truth-process: a new philosophy. For seeking the truth, the new subject has to remain loyal to the new philosophy and the event. None of these is necessitated or determined: it is a matter of the new subject’s choice and active intervention. The new subject takes a risk and gambles, and all the risk the new subject takes is related to a conviction that an event has taken place. A threshold has been crossed. The new subject has to remain loyal to this feeling. The discussion brings forth an important question: do contemporary times favor eventfulness? In other words, are there any real opportunities for new subjects to reimagine the world? The most recent events have proven that this is the case. There is no reason to believe that today’s configuration is hostile to eventfulness. If there are public cries for fundamental change, this is proof enough that necessary grounds for events exist. If there is the possibility for events, this implies that the chances are high for a redefinition of terms. There is no doubt that there is a longing for a breakthrough. The discontent is not only limited to those who see themselves as oppositional or revolutionary. As a matter of fact, while many self-proclaimed revolutionaries seem to have made peace with the current order of things, yesterday’s so-called apoliticized milieus seem to be taking over the resistance. The unrest in Turkey has been a prime example of this.

If the argument that is made here is valid and the current configuration favors events, a question follows: How should the actors—social agents—react? If there are really events taking place, the formula should be rather simple: Social agents participate in the event both practically and theoretically. If there are no apparent events, one then has to first imagine the events to come into being. After all, what composes an event is
always extracted from a situation (Badiou, 2004). Therefore, there is always a singular multiplicity that the event can be related back to (Badiou, 2004). Imaging the event refers to looking for that particular embryonic configuration. This configuration will comprise a multiplicity in a certain state. This multiplet comprises a number of fragments of being (Badiou, 2004). Then, in the absence of events, one may look for future events in their embryonic forms by examining the fragments of being in their present forms. If the event is a spontaneous amalgam of fragments of being, then the question is essentially about bridging the qualitative gap.

**Conclusive Remarks**

Before the seventh chapter, a few themes have driven the text: the dialectic of understanding, self-reflectivity, existential embeddedness, self-evidentialization of life, different ways of being in the world, the importance of understanding understanding, limitations to understanding, the new philosophy of understanding, phenomenological inclusivity and phenomenological exclusivity and last but not least, epistemic ambivalence. Some of these themes needed more developing. Since an emancipatory understanding of events is put forward as one of the most effective available tool to transcend conflicting approaches and epistemologies with the aim to confront hegemony, this chapter approached the subject matter as a philosophical discussion with concrete examples from social events such as June 2013 upheaval in Turkey.

The chapter discussed that counter-hegemonic events are vital for emancipatory understanding. May this be the case, they do not gain this quality without theoretical intervention. For a counter-hegemonic event to become a condition for emancipatory understanding, and lead the way for a possible consciousness leap, counter-hegemonic aspects of the event must be recognized, understood and interpreted in an emancipatory way. The chapter works with this idea in relation to the notion of subalternity by Spivak. The chapter argued that Spivak’s two-fold claim that subalterns are situated outside the hegemonic structure and therefore they can be the engine of counter-hegemonic thought
and action, is a perspective that is firmly located in the objectivist tradition of the ruling social sciences as it does not pay enough attention to the fact that subalterns are dominated symbolically and unwillingly manipulated into participation in their own hegemonization. Therefore, the chapter discusses, there is no legitimate reason to give primacy to the subaltern for developing a counter-hegemonic consciousness.

Against a critique of normative approaches such as the subaltern perspective, a set of conclusive points can be listed now. If hegemony is an existential given fact (i.e., an inevitable component of being in the world) limitations against emancipatory understanding are discouraging. Subalterns are good candidates for providing the ground on what counter-hegemonic thinking may develop. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that their voices will be heard. Subaltern type of being in the world may lead to eventfulness and event driven thinking. It is, however, not an automatic process. Subalterns cannot be granted a privileged status. History is full of examples, where different social groups, for a variety of reasons, unexpectedly led the way for an eventful configuration. Whether or not there is a strong presence of subaltern consciousness, events are a rarity and they cannot be predicted. This is why counter-hegemonic thinking cannot be fixated to event driven imagination. In the absence of events, it is vital to develop event based imagination. This is a much more difficult engagement. The Taksim unrest in the year 2013 is a telling example.
Chapter 8: Instrumentalization of Higher Education

Throughout the previous chapters, this study has focused on the movement from human bewilderedness to understanding. It has argued that understanding can be limited by the hegemonic way of seeing one’s being in the world, although emancipatory understanding can still occur, either by self-reflectedness or by means of a threshold event. This chapter concludes this discussion with a critical look at the institution that historically has claimed to form thinking human beings, capable of self-reflective analysis and non-hegemonic understanding, in order to analyze, reflect upon, and research movements in the social fabric: the universities.

Assault on Higher Education

Social Higher education is under massive assault. The assault takes the form of instrumentalization. The process of instrumentalization takes at least three forms: politicization, commercialization, and rationalization (Burawoy, 2013). Politicization of higher education is one evident form of instrumentalization (Henig, 2008). It is not unusual for governments to ask universities to conduct research along the lines of governmental needs. This is especially the case with countries in the Global South where basic equalities in society are not established (Pamuk, 2011). For example, in India, the institution of caste is a primary issue. Universities do not have the luxury of doing research for the sake of research (Surinder S. Jodhka, personal communication, March 28, 2012). They are obliged to work on issues for which the public needs intellectual input. Therefore, research in India is intertwined with politics.

In the Global North, where basic inequalities are dealt with (in the sense that there are greater social problems facing the South which make instrumental research all the more imperative), politicization of higher education is less likely (Pamuk, 2011), but other pressures are at work. As a consequence, while on the discourse level academics can talk about intellectual autonomy, in reality they are anything but autonomous. Under
immense pressure to secure funding and get university posts, young researchers unwillingly participate in an exhausting race and risk compromising their intellectually autonomy (Ritchie & Fischer, 2012). Other stakeholders such as NGOs, think-tanks—other important sources of funding—join the governments in instrumentalizing higher education.

Commercialization is another form of instrumentalization (Bok, 2003, 2013). Government is indeed a major player, and NGOs and think-tanks are auxiliary players. Nevertheless, one must grant that in a liberal economy the market is arguably the most important, and businesses are the major players. As a consequence, universities are obliged to keep the business interests alive (Tuchman, 2011; Washburn, 2006). For example, if a graduate program is considered to be a promising educational program by major players in the market, it is more likely to receive financial support. In a configuration where government funds are diminishing, funding from businesses is an undeniable source of finance. The commercialization of higher education dictates rationalization (Kirp, 2003).

Higher education used to be a field where quality of thinking, intellectual spontaneity, artistic creativity and the desire to understand were valued. Such values no longer seem to occupy an important place in academia. Rationalization seems to have no visible limits. Even though it appears to be an ideology of managing academia, it proves to be more than that. It has an all-encompassing character and it goes beyond actors’ personal characteristics. In a configuration where ambiguity is eliminated, performance is standardized, managerial control is implemented, educational processes are reduced to producing measurable outcomes. It is all about being able to make a cost-benefit analysis (van Vught, 2009).

The assault on higher education is undeniable. Even though history has repeatedly shown that rationalization is not harmless and value-free, the current global order of things continues to promote rationalization as a universal ideology (White & Lowenthal, 2009). There is no doubt that universities need to work with a bureaucratic apparatus. And bureaucracy of course works with rational and logical systems. This is the only way
the bureaucratic machine can function. But one has to recognize the problem with the
lure of systems that operate efficiently: the ultimate goal of higher education is not
efficiency (White & Lowenthal, 2009). The mission of higher education is education.
There is no doubt that the rational and efficient aspects of human nature are undeniable,
but the academia has to address all aspects of human nature (Burawoy, 2013).

Higher education, especially research, requires phenomenological sensitivity on the
part of the teachers to the differences among young researchers. This could be best done
by adopting an emancipatory pedagogy (Lissovoy, 2010). Emancipatory pedagogy is an
important part of the intellectual self-defense strategy. This can be done through
combining of formal and informal education. It is an undeniable fact is that there is an
increased focus on formal rationalization within higher education. There is a strong
emphasis on impersonal rules and measurement of outcomes. This is nothing but a
straightjacketing worldviews in accordance with the asocial economic logic of neo-
liberalism (Margison & Naseem, 2007).

Human beings are social. Informal sociality constitutes a major part of being in the
world. Therefore, informal education should be promoted by education management.
When emancipatory pedagogy is practiced in a higher educational scheme where formal
and informal education is combined, the assault of instrumentalization of higher
education can be counterbalanced by reflective knowledge (Burawoy, 2013).

Control of Knowledge

Instrumentalization has long become a common trend in higher education all
around the world. From a negative point of view, the rise of instrumentality signals the
end of academia. The struggle is over the control and thus both the content and use of
knowledge (Brecher, 2011). Such pessimistic views belong to academics who have taken
shelter in academia. They have become part of higher education because they did not
want to work for other government agencies or businesses.
Although government influence is more visible, the real power belongs to capital. The government is after all controlled by the market forces. Therefore, the pessimists perceive that the traditional university model is in danger. According to this model, higher education cannot be determined by an occupational perspective. Education is about growing capable and cultivated human beings. This is a vision that is regarded as idealistic and romantic today. Nevertheless, it is still regarded as relevant and meaningful for those who are not happy with the current transformation of academia (Brecher, 2011). It is perceived to be unrealistic as one of the key matters for a society is to make sure that everyone has a job and everyone contributes to the economy. This is why big universities today all over the world are giving birth to occupational colleges. In less than two decades, it is highly likely that universities will be reduced to umbrella institutions that comprise occupational colleges.

Against this background one can understand why the term over-qualification is oft-used. For those who think that education is about growing capable and cultivated human beings, the term over-qualification would not mean anything. After all, how could one think and learn too much? In the contemporary market economy, Human Resources managers tend to think the opposite. Higher education is adopting itself to market forces accordingly (di Paola & Moullet, 2013). The irony with all of this is that today’s unprecedentedly flexible economy requires an over-qualified work force. This is, after all, why governments are restructuring their educational systems.

An interesting example is University of Delhi in India (Farooqui, 2013; Kumar, 2013; Trivedi, 2013). The University of Delhi administration decided in the year 2013 to shift the undergraduate program from a three-year track to a four-year track. According to the proposed reform, there will be no more degrees of Bachelor of Arts (BA) or Bachelor of Science (BSc). The university will now offer degrees within a single track: Associate Baccalaureate (after 2 years), Baccalaureate (3 years), and Baccalaureate with Honours (4 years) (Amin, Bhattacharjea, Datta, Deshpande, S. Kumar & K. Kumar, 2013). The core of the reform is to provide students with a set of foundational courses in the first two
years. Regardless of their previous training (or choice of subject), all students are obliged to take foundational courses in the first two years (Pushkarna, 2012).

Critics argue that since the current pre-college schooling system in India makes students choose a subject (and have a related training) before college, a two year standard education will not match the educational background of every student (Pushkarna, 2012). The supporters of the reform, on the other hand, argue that in a flexible economy the university needs a well-established interdisciplinary approach to education. Students with strict disciplinary education are vulnerable in the new economy (Menon, 2013).

Interestingly enough, the system that the University of Delhi administration is trying to promote is almost identical to some of the faculty organizations in Turkey. For example, a student who is pursuing a B.A. in International Relations at the Faculty of Economics takes a two-year Economics-track with the students from the other disciplines (e.g., Economics, Business Administration, labor economy and industrial relations). And then students focus in the last two years on their own disciplines. Today, the Turkish government is worried about the demands of the flexible economy. The government has plans to reform the system. However, their approach is entirely different than that of the Indian government. The Turkish government promotes the idea of switching to a three-year track B.A. program. Prime Minister Erdoğan remarked several times in his speeches that the new economy needs young entrepreneurs who must join the workforce as soon as possible. All of these reform plans signal the birth of commercial-university as opposed to an utopia-oriented university. A look at the global picture of universities will support this idea.

**Economies of Education**

Two examples from the higher educational system of the two emerging economies, India and Turkey, have been mentioned. The two countries have interpreted the pressure of market forces differently and have started to adapt their higher educational systems
accordingly. In order to see the singularities and particularities of the developing and
developed economies, one must take a look at the global configuration.

One can start with the post-industrialist economies. The U.S. from North America
and Germany from Northern Europe appear as two prominent examples. In post-
industrialist countries like the U.S., the state has almost taken its hand off the universities
(Burawoy, 2013). State contribution has been reduced to a half in the last decade. Under
an immense pressure of instrumentalization, universities now have to operate just like
any other businesses and reevaluate their financial posture according to a cost-benefit
analysis (Bok, 2003, 2013; Tuchman, 2011; Washburn, 2006).

A cost-benefit analysis works with a simple logic: When there is lack of finances, a
business opts for raising money and cutting expenses. The best way to raise money is
self-financing, and the first place to look for funds is students. Students are the natural
candidates for extracting more money. The case of England is a dramatic example. In this
country, the fees have gone up immensely in the last years. British higher education has
proven to be a persistent topic of media discussion in the last years (Coughlan, 2010,

There is one quick way to cut expenses: implementing austerity measures. There
are mainly two activities at the universities: teaching and researching. The fastest way to
cut teaching expenses is to reduce the number of tenured academics to a bare minimum,
and to fill in the gap with ad hoc teachers. As a result, while students are motivated by an
ideology to demand more and more from their teachers, the teachers are given less and
less. The system is prone to conflict; the quality of teaching undeniably declines
(Burawoy, 2013).

For cutting research expenses a similar logic is applied. Research is costly, but it is
not possible to take a decision to close down all research programs; therefore, research
programs are strictly controlled. This is the story behind today’s research assessment
procedures. Researchers are spending vast amounts of time writing research proposals
and project reports. They are provided with reduced amounts of funds and they are
expected to complete their research in brief periods of times. As a result, no novel
research comes into being. Career oriented scholars are focusing on their personal goals and reproducing existing research with new empirical material (Burawoy, 2013).

Rationalization of the university is also becoming the dominating trend in the advanced economies of Northern European countries. A good example is Germany (Keim & Keim, 2010). Although one can, to some extent, still talk about free education in this country, one cannot ignore the fact that until recently increasing amounts of fees have been introduced every year. Even though general fees have just been abolished by law, it is meaningful that in a country like Germany where there is a long tradition of free education, there is a strong current to view students as a source of finance by the universities.

For the same reason one can see that the state auditing mechanism in Germany is one of the strictest. The state is keeping a close eye on how the money is spent and urges the university administration to aim for more efficiency. The pressure for efficiency and productivity translate into standardized assessment.

As is the case in the U.S., there is less and less money in the German system of higher education. Academics are evaluated according to their performance, not only in terms of publications but also in terms of fund-raising and research performance. Therefore, they have to invest more time and energy into research assessment. Quality teaching and in-depth research are compromised.

Non-Western Educational Patterns

In the previous section, two examples from the more developed part of the world were considered in order to understand the global crisis in the system of higher education. Now the non-Western parts of the world will be examined to show that a similar pattern is persistent all over the globe. First the case of the African Continent will be examined. In this part of the world there is an obvious mismatch between the rhetoric and the reality. Then, briefly, the situation in the Middle East, Latin America and Russia will be highlighted. Finally, China will be examined.
If one considers South Africa as a good exception, it will be no exaggeration to argue that universities are disappearing on the African Continent in the traditional sense of the word. The popular rhetoric that has long been circulating in the media argues the opposite. According to this populist discourse, since African economies are growing, and more and more universities are opening, it is assumed that the world has entered into the African age (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

Putting the obvious exaggeration aside, there is some grain of truth in this statement. There is indeed an increase in the number of universities in Africa. Nevertheless, one must understand that the increase in quantity is related to the mushrooming of vocational colleges. And there are good enough reasons to argue that the phenomenon of increasing numbers of vocational colleges cannot be considered an improvement per se (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

This rapid spread of vocational colleges is best viewed as a further reflection of predominant ideology, rather than heralding any real advances in African higher education. The logic of vocational colleges is based on a reduced and focused attention on teaching and research. As far as intellectual pursuits are concerned, occupational colleges are not necessarily appealing for young researchers (Universities in Crisis, n.d.).

It is true that there are hardly any vacancies at these universities. But it is important to interpret this data correctly. One must understand that since young researchers have to bear unbearable debts during their studies, they are forced to take any job that is available. Once young researchers clear their debts and feel more secure, they tend to leave their universities in Africa and join research-friendly academic establishments elsewhere. Alternatively, they find jobs at private or public enterprises. It is a fact that the mushrooming of vocational colleges is accompanied with an inflation of think-tanks. Vocational colleges and think-tanks are underpinned with the same logic: producing knowledge for clients. This is why the relations between vocational colleges, think-tanks, government agencies and businesses are getting stronger.

Similar processes are taking place in different parts of the world. For example, the Middle East is a region that is known for large universities that comprise thousands of
students (e.g., Egypt). On the surface level, there seems to be no change in higher education. The universities still have strong presence and distinct posture. Under the surface, however, their souls are poured out by creating a greater number of colleges. In the countries of the Middle East, NGOs are trying to compensate and adopt the role of producing research-based knowledge (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

The case of Latin America is no different. Just like the Middle East, Latin American universities are large and they recruit thousands of students. What is different in Latin America, however, is the strong tradition of political autonomy in higher education. Compared to other places in the Global South, one can claim with confidence that Latin American universities are still relatively autonomous. The university system tries to remain democratic. Latin American universities are more open to experiments. This does not mean that Latin American universities are immune to the global trends of rationalization and commercialization (e.g., Chile). But the resistance to global trends is much stronger in Latin America (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

From the perspective of autonomy, the post-Soviet universities are perhaps the worst. Since these universities never had a tradition of autonomy during the reign of the former regimes, the liberalization period has resulted in adoption of a ruthless profit maximizing mentality. Putting the two major cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow aside, Russian universities operate very much like businesses (e.g., They rent their conference rooms to some entrepreneur for a business meeting or for the launch of a new media campaign). This surely happens in other parts of the world as well. But the case of post-Soviet universities constitutes a prime example of the detachment of the university from its public role and its metamorphosis into a profit center (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

According to a commonly accepted perception, the emerging powers (e.g., China) are pouring money into higher education. This statement is somewhat true. This is, after all, why big Western universities are setting up colleges in China. As is the case with India and Brazil, Chinese investments in education are expanding rapidly. A visit to one of China’s coastal cities impresses foreign visitors. Coastal Chinese cities are still different from the cities of the Global North but they share strong family resemblance
with the major cities of the region (e.g., Seoul and Singapore). Nevertheless, it is really hard to know what is happening outside Beijing and the coastal zone. The coastal line is where much of the country’s trade and investment is concentrated. A visit to a village in China’s interior will surely be striking. This part of the country hardly looks any different than the poorest sections of the world. To some extent, Brazil, India and South Africa are no different. All these countries are trying to fix their development plans so that they can focus on reducing the huge wealth gap that is troubling their economy. Therefore, as far as China is concerned, one should not rush into conclusions by looking at the prosperous coast (Burawoy, 2011, 2012, 2013).

University Structures

Examples have been given from different parts of the world. It is indeed difficult to talk about particularities on a global scale (Universities in Crisis, n.d.). But one can underline four crises: budgetary, governance, identity and legitimacy (Burawoy, 2012). They will be discussed in turn.

The budgetary crisis has already been discussed. Universities all around the world are now expected to make money and finance themselves. Students are heavily in debt and under great pressure to get into a labor market that is more precarious than ever before. There is more and more differentiation among the universities. The elite universities are benefiting from the trend. To survive in this competition, other universities open the majority of their academic posts on short-term contracts. Universities are employing fewer tenured scholars so that the university does not have a long-term commitment to the professor. Universities are employing external lecturers to do the teaching. External lecturers work without job security. They often have shorter contracts. This configuration creates hostility between tenured and non-tenured teachers (Bok, 2003, 2013; Tuchman, 2011; Washburn, 2006).

If the university is no longer a place to disseminate knowledge and it has become more of a place of business, it is only logical that it will require a new administrative
structure. For governing the university, there is no longer a need for academics with scholarly backgrounds. Good fundraisers are given the administrative posts. If the universities operate like any other company, university administrators are required to behave like marketing managers. They advertise the university to donors, to alumni, and keep the appeal alive (Burawoy, 2013). Under these circumstances, if one persists in believing that the universities have a utopian function—thinking and researching about alternative ways of being in the world—one is likely to get into serious questioning: What does the university stand for? Are universities nothing but businesses? Is the primary duty of the university to produce knowledge for governments? Does the university have a supply and demand type of a relationship with enterprises?

For an intellectual who believes in the utopian function of the universities, these are difficult questions to answer (Burawoy, 2012), and they will draw one into an identity crisis. University administrators are contributing to this identity crisis. They have strong beliefs. They are convinced that they are the ones who are making the money. Therefore, they are naturally entitled to make the decisions (Bok, 2003; Kirp, 2003). This is why, depending on the context, medical schools, law schools and other professional schools continue to have more power in the university administration. There is obviously a flawed logic at play here. The facts are evident: most of the funding is accumulated from student fees. Therefore, as far as finances are concerned, if there are more students, there will be more fees. When one looks at the numbers, one will recognize the reality: humanities and social science departments take the lion’s share of responsibility of the teaching duties. However, they cannot participate in administrative decisions. Even though other schools do much smaller amounts of teaching, they have more say in the administrative decisions. This inevitably leads to an identity crisis. Therefore, this is not only a budgetary and a governance issue, but also an identity one (Burawoy, 2013).

The identity crisis points at the question of legitimacy. It is not clear anymore what the university stands for. It has become increasingly ambiguous what kind of contribution a transformed university can make to the society. If the transformation goes on, it will be impossible to convince the public about the important role of the humanities and social
sciences. The public must be convinced that the function of the university is to contribute to understanding. And if the process of instrumentalization and rationalization of the university continues to go on, the university will be about everything but understanding. The taxpayers must be convinced that the universities are a public good. And a process of over-rationalization can only harm the universities (Burawoy, 2013).

**Concrete Steps**

Burawoy argues that if the academy transcends itself and engages with the public more openly, the crisis at the university can be tackled (2013). Burawoy’s perspective can be criticized (Holmwood, 2007; Brady, 2004). Nevertheless, despite its flaws that need to be addressed, the perspective of public sociology must be taken seriously (Calhoun, 2005; Light, 2005).

Burawoy discusses that four concrete steps can be taken to counter budgetary, governance, identity and legitimacy crises in the university: a new definition of clientele, formation of new forms of knowledge, promotion of interdisciplinary approaches and launching a public discussion about the role of the university (Burawoy, 2011, 2013).

First, the so-called clientele of the university has to be defined broadly. The university cannot focus only on demands coming from the market economy. There are other stakeholders (e.g., state institutions, trade unions, NGOs and so on). Research cannot be imposed externally. It has to be developed within the university. In the end, all stakeholders can benefit from research (Burawoy, 2011, 2013).

Second, new forms of knowledge have to be developed. This is the primary goal of the university. Research programs, paradigms and new frameworks of thought are the natural products of universities. The university cannot be concerned primarily with policy solutions. The university produces knowledge and understanding, and it is up to others to decide how to implement this knowledge. Academics need freedom. Without intellectual freedom they cannot work (Burawoy, 2011, 2013).
Third, within the university setting, disciplines must talk to each other. The strategy of divide and rule makes academics vulnerable and powerless. For example, here is an often ignored fact: the humanities and social sciences are on the same side. They do not need to compete. To establish a community of critical discourse, social sciences and humanities should not be involved in discussions about the epistemological hierarchy (e.g., which discipline is more scientific). The academic field is occupied by balkanized disciplines and academics. The game and the players in the academic field are strictly defined by the disciplines. One has to name the game at play here. This is a game of survival and it can bring no good (Burawoy, 2011, 2013).

Fourth, all parties must contribute to the discussion about the role of the university in a society. The discussion cannot be limited to faculty members, students, administrators and funding agencies. It must be a public discussion. The legitimization crisis is serious and academics have to double their efforts to communicate and engage with the world beyond. Academics have always found it difficult to engage with the public. But in this case, unless they create a community of critical discourse, they will one way or the other be absorbed (either by the state or by the market or both). State-oriented research (e.g., on matters related to national security), or market oriented research (e.g., social scientific research that aids marketing departments, or political parties to x-ray the social groups they are dealing with) can only limit the intellectual imagination. The only way to maintain relative academic freedom is to convince the world that the activities of academics are still worthwhile. Communication with the students is vital. The pedagogy which academics are using must be transformed. The students who are coming to the classrooms are changing every day. They come with globalist lived-experiences. They cannot be addressed with an archaic pedagogy (Burawoy, 2011, 2013).
Conclusive Remarks

The final chapter has given a rough, pessimistic but meaningful overview of the major influences that have triggered an ongoing process of a shift in the role of academia and universities all over the world by looking at representative examples. It has started by pointing out political and economic interests as key reasons for universities to transform into factories that produce human beings for either governmental or economic use, subsumed under the terms efficiency and productivity. It has been stated that this trend is altering the ways higher education is regarded and defined, and that it is not unlikely that academic freedom will vanish from the university platforms. Large parts of this chapter are based on the respective analyses of sociologist Michael Burawoy who identified four crises and a four-step tutelage for overcoming these crises. In accord with Buroway, the chapter closed by emphasizing that the role of academia has to be turned into a public discourse that enables the public to perceive non-profit academic activities as relevant, as well as with an appeal to transform and open teaching practices/paradigms according to an ever-changing clientele that might yet discover the benefits of not bowing to political, social or economic pressure.
Conclusion

This dissertation can be read and interpreted in various ways. The simplest interpretation would be the correct one as it engages with a fundamental question. Can there be different ways of being in the world? Despite the fact that the dissertation neither states nor addresses this question head on, it forms the backbone of the argument. This is a matter of contemporary cultural critique and it explores possibilities of social existence beyond dominant ways of being in the world. The dissertation gives a positive answer to this rhetorical question of not only can there be different ways of being in the world, these forms of existence can be observed in their microcosms. The dissertation does not conclude an alternative way of life, but it explores how such an inquiry can transform the earlier mentioned question of cultural critique to a meta-level one. How can one imagine a different way of life? One has to step out of an all-encompassing ideologization to be able to envision an alternative order of things. The dissertation names this critical perspective as emancipatory understanding. It puts forward the claim that one can propound alternative ways of life by thinking in terms of emancipatory understanding.

This dissertation rejects the idea that the desire to imagine an alternative order of things is a post-modern peculiarity. It argues that the only reason for critical analysts to undergo the risk of testing the boundaries of knowledge is to think afresh and start thinking from a point of zero in order to find a way to counter hegemony. The dissertation does not regard thinking afresh a project in its own right; rather it sees this as a subtask of an emancipatory project of launching a new knowledge initiative. Such an enterprise is stimulated by making different forms of existence available and imaginable. It is then a matter of definition that the project is about researching the unknown, understanding that the undertaking is immense and tiresome. Embryonic forms of knowledge pursuits have to be continuously made without expecting immediate results. The dissertation strongly suggests that such uncertainty is tolerated in the face of imminent threats to human existence.
The dissertation asserts that contemporary social configuration has become prone to existential stress. Threats to human life have reached a critical level. This situation makes the research for emancipatory understanding likely the most important process happening in the social world right now. The dissertation contends that a realistic review of the overall situation does not have to amount to drastic pessimism. The negative view can be alleviated by acknowledging that a new thought atmosphere is being created, and chances for emancipatory advancement are coming about. It is in this context of discussion that the dissertation’s inquiry into the articulation of ideas in which critical analysts may be able to step out of an all-encompassing ideologization must be understood.

The dissertation undertakes three tasks. First, it identifies emancipatory understanding as an antidote of a pessimistic view of social change. Second, it claims that although internal and external factors of change are intertwined, they cannot be imagined without one another. Change becomes visible when external developments can no more escape being internalized. Third and finally, it distinguishes three major types of external change that could guide consciousness out of conformist configurations. The following is a brief summary of this discussion starting with a generic point about the argumentation.

The dissertation starts by tackling the issue of social change in a simplified dialectical manner, by marking out optimistic and pessimistic views on social change. It uses the shortcomings of the dialectical approach to its own advantage, maintaining a clear argumentation without violating the complexity of the reality. The argumentation benefits from a formulaic and crude categorization until it immediately dismantles, as when perspectives which do not perfectly fall into either of the categories are included. This widens the context of the debate for the purpose of creating a conceptual pool of infinite number of third positions. As an overall attitude the dissertation always aims at that third position.

In the viewpoint of the dissertation, the pessimistic view on social change is founded on the presupposition that nothing changes. The argument follows from a basic premise that the basic condition of the social world is stability. It develops in a way to
connect to the debate on the relationship between consciousness and configuration; there is a tendency for a conformist equilibrium in the social world. While one can observe change on the surface, the structure proves to remain the same. Hence a conclusion can be formed that since the relationship between consciousness and configuration is stabilized, a given configuration will always lack future freedoms and possibilities of emancipation. Therefore, consciousness can never transcend the limitations of the configuration.

The optimistic view on social change is founded on a theorization that is in stark contrast with that of the pessimistic view: everything changes. The argument does not have a standalone character; it flows as a response to the pessimistic perspective. Even though there is a tendency in the social world for stability, it is prone to disturbance. After each temporary disturbance, a given configuration will return to a new form of stability, thus behaving in a way to conform to both perspectives. Therefore, a third interpretation which had existed within initial dialectical simplification is implied, and the configuration that tends for stability cannot be conceptualized as a stationary equilibrium. The transient character of stability must be acknowledged by registering its transformative life course—stability shifts from one form to another without developing an inherent tendency for positive progression. Since the continuous movement to new positions on the scale of time could take a negative character, the optimistic view of change does not have to omit the possibility of negative consequences. Thus the optimism signifies the positive view on the possibility of change but not on the consequences.

This is how the discussion on views of social change connects to the topic of the dissertation. Emancipatory understanding can be seen as an antidote of a pessimistic view of social change, which can lead to progressive consequences if consciousness is positively elevated at the end of an emancipatory process. It is therefore argued that the major task at hand is working to create ways to develop emancipatory understanding. First, the dissertation handles the initial task and puts the emphasis on emancipatory understanding, transcending the false dilemma of pessimistic and optimistic views of
social change. It then proceeds to the second task, dismantling the opposition between internal and external factors of change by arguing that consciousness is always part of the configuration. Such unity renders a strict distinction illogical.

The dissertation then tackles the second task by following up a claim from the earlier discussion, that the stability in a given configuration is always disturbed, pushing to its logical conclusion, that the factors of change must be investigated. For the sake of argument, two factors in a simplified dialectical opposition with internal and external characteristics are introduced. In the viewpoint of the argument, internal factors of change are related to consciousness, while external factors of change are related to configuration. The two together can be utilized for explaining how disturbance to stability comes into being. The dissertation does not ignore the fact that configuration and consciousness are inexorably linked, rather it acknowledges that it would be logically incoherent to put weight on one factor over the other for understanding the prime cause of change in a given situation. But the dissertation suspends the inherent relation between the two for the purposes of analytical clarity.

The difference between internal and external factors, between consciousness and configuration, can be explained in relation to the Newtonian view of the material universe and that of quantum physics. While the former allows a stark division between the material and the immaterial, the latter is forced to accept a situation which seemingly violates the law of contradiction of classical logic. At the most basic level, material is immaterial. Therefore, at least at the most basic level configuration and consciousness are connected to each other in an inseparable way. If immaterial consciousness and material world are configurationally intertwined, this would mean that even in the field of natural sciences it would be possible to argue that reality is socially constructed. It can then be argued that human consciousness influences the configuration as much as the configuration shapes consciousness. This discussion then begs the question: if consciousness and configuration are inseparable, what would be the purpose of separating the two on the meta-level?
The dissertation provides a clear answer to this question, and the two categories can be kept in an anti-foundationalist manner. This approach would allow analysts to explain not only how consciousness interacts with the configuration, but also embeds it. When configuration changes, it encroaches upon consciousness and becomes visible in the sphere of discourse, while repetitive and more immediate types of oscillations within the discourse reveals that the external change is embodied internally. It may also appear as if overall change in the social world happens as a result of shift in consciousness. It could be suggested that change begins when an external development is perceived internally. The following discussion on three major types of external change that are claimed to have the potential of guiding consciousness out of conformist configuration should be understood against this background.

After accepting that there could be multiple ways of interpreting major shifts in the social world and posing cultural critiques, the dissertation puts forward three positions to which analysts have the option to adhere. First, analysts can acknowledge the fundamental shift and interpret it in a restricting manner; that manifestations of the contemporary order of things are monitored and selectively organized. Second, they accept that the current configuration is quickly being altered, thus try to manage and direct it. Third, one welcomes the massive change and puts it to good use by proposing an alternative order of things. From the perspective of emancipatory understanding, the third interpretation of change is given the primary attention. It is in the context of this framework that the dissertation identifies three types of external change which have the potential of elevating consciousness positively if they are interpreted correctly. These are the rise of the Global South, researching non-native social contexts, and events. They are summarized briefly as follows:

First, the configuration can be altered and thought adapts to the new configuration as a response to change. According to one of the assumptions of the dissertation, the re-emergence of power centers in the Global South constitutes the main engine of such transformation. Since the world today is being fundamentally transformed on an everyday
basis (Pieterse, 2011, pp. 1-3), academics and public intellectuals are being challenged, now more than ever, to respond to some of the key issues of contemporary social theorizing (Rehbein, 2013). The ultimate aim of these efforts is to find out what kinds of impact the shift in the ontological will have on the epistemological and methodological realms (Beck, 2003, p.23). In this vein, efforts are being made to establish a post-Eurocentric form of thinking as this is seen as an opportunity for developing critical thinking.

Second, analysts who strive to be critical can voluntarily put themselves in a configuration that appears to be substantially different than the original configuration to which they belong. In this case, change does not come to analysts, but analysts go and seek change voluntarily. Analysts stimulate their thought mechanisms to provoke transformation in their thought patterns. Compared to the former approach, there is an obvious problem with seeking change this way. Since the analysts voluntarily get into a different configuration, they can always step out of this alien setting. Change is not fundamental in the sense that analysts continue to have an original home for their native thought to return to. The noble part of the undertaking should not go unnoticed, because not many dare to challenge their own suppositions about being in the world. But when analysts voluntarily put themselves in a different configuration, the challenge that comes into being does not take an existential character. It is therefore destined to have limited impact on consciousness.

In the third case, analysts do not try to get out of their native configuration, and their native configuration is not challenged externally by a macro-historical transformation, but the stability of their native configuration is challenged temporarily by spontaneous events. In this case, analysts must recognize the event since it may just go unnoticed. Therefore, they must have the intention and the desire to recognize the event as transformative and interpret it with emancipatory potentiality. This is when a window for emancipatory thinking opens, temporarily and for a brief period of time. The emancipatory window would close again and the configuration would go back to an uncritical mode of being. Before the return to stability takes place, possibilities for
consciousness leap are plenty. This is the only time analysts who strive to think critically are finally able to develop an event driven critical thinking. When the event lives its course and comes to an end, event driven thinking will set a new basis for future critical thinking. This is how it is transformed into event based thinking, which has now become the new critical norm until it is challenged again, and consciousness is elevated by a successful interpretation of a new event.

The discussion on three types of external change which have the potential of elevating consciousness positively brings back the discussion to the main concern of the dissertation, making a modest contribution to the contemporary discussion on critical thinking. The dissertation offers a tentative framework of ideas which can be developed further and operationalized. This way a new emancipatory knowledge initiative can be actualized. Such an initiative would allow critical analysts to step out of an all-encompassing hegemonic ideologization. The concern is linked to the two fold goal of the dissertation, which are bringing a dynamic interpretation to critical thinking and pointing at a possible direction how higher education can evolve.

While seeking the aforementioned goal, the dissertation has tried to remain loyal to its own logic and made no claims to have recognized, much less exhausted all possible—thinkable, unthinkable and yet dared to be thought—ways in which emancipatory understanding can come into being. The dissertation neither claims that critical thinking can happen only within the aforementioned three forms, nor omits the possibility that self-reflective thinking without these three conditions setting the background can sometimes overcome pre-structuredness of thought. It accepts what in many ways can be seen as the obvious, that other forms of critical thinking will always exist. This is because the configuration that pre-structures thought may still leave enough space for critical minds to develop counter-hegemonic thoughts. But the dissertation remains skeptical. In the viewpoint of the dissertation, it could be possible to talk about an individual leap of consciousness only if the individual’s flow of life is radically altered as a result of a micro form of eventfulness (e.g. a life changing event). However, the dissertation has not set as its goal to explore all possibilities for critical thinking, therefore does not pursue
these ideas further. It limits itself to the lived and research experience of the author. Against this background, the following final section brings forth some future directions for research and conclusion.

The dissertation worked with four themes. Relation of prevailing science to the capitalist order of things, event driven and event based emancipatory social transformation, creating new thinking with a new knowledge initiative and finally reforming higher education. What the dissertation has shown in separate chapters is that despite inherent limitations to forming emancipatory understanding, possibilities are created especially by eventful acts, and careful understanding of these events will provide critical analysts with the possibilities for refreshing their counter-hegemonic consciousness. This is how betterment of life remains a viable goal.

The dissertation also has one major point with several parts. Analysts cannot simply decide stepping out of an all-encompassing hegemonic pre-structuredness, because hegemonic structures are laid in thought and their perspectives are distorted. But when a counter-hegemonic configuration comes into being, it creates possibilities for counter-hegemonic thinking. However a counter-hegemonic configuration is tied to an event. Critical perspective in a hegemonic order can only be possible when counter-hegemonic events charge the ordinary configuration with emancipatory potentiality. Therefore, emancipatory understanding can be possible under two conditions. First, the analyst understands and acknowledges that understanding is inherently limited. Second, this limited perspective can be legitimately critical only if a counter-hegemonic event sets the background for it. A third point could be added that even when the two conditions are provided, understanding will always remain unfinished in the hermeneutical sense. As an overall conclusion, emancipatory understanding is a critical understanding which takes the form of an upward spiral by active searching, questioning and interpreting all given presuppositions.

With its four themes and one major thesis, the dissertation reaches a point where it poses an open ended question without answering it. What does happen exactly when
consciousness escapes from hegemonic embeddedness? By this way the dissertation points at a future assignment, since new thought cannot be adequately expressed with the conceptual categories of a given order, inventing a new language or new categories of thought for describing future ways of being in the world proves to be an absolute necessity. The dissertation, however, does not explain explicitly how this major task should be handled. Nonetheless, the dissertation implicitly talks about three clear projects; reviving humanities and philosophy, studying mystical consciousness and comparing and contrasting thought traditions of Global South and Global North.

Since the prevailing science is closely related to the capitalist order of things, the objectivist tendency must be reversed by saving humanities in general and philosophy in particular from their marginalized positions. It is implied that the difficulty with inventing a new language and conceptual categories is a result of self-imprisonment to objectivism and quantification. The second project can be deduced from the discussion on surface-structure relationships, event driven, and event based emancipatory social transformation. Mystical consciousness must be closely examined so that it would be possible to find out how intelligible forms of hope for better life are mystified. The idea follows that when the processes of unintelligibilization are grasped, it would be possible to develop tools for critical consciousness for undoing these processes.

Finally, it is suggested that as a third project, analysts can effectively use the current global transformation as a solid base, by comparing and contrasting ignored and prevailing thought traditions of the Global North and the Global South, combining similar patterns of thought that are becoming increasingly visible in different parts of the world. Meaningful progress on the assignment of inventing a new language will depend on such dialogue. A key element of that dialogue should be the construction of a common framework through which Western and non-Western interpretative traditions of thought can together confront the global hegemony of objectivist thought. Despite an important number of contextual differences, Western critiques of objectivist thought share family resemblances with non-Western approaches. And this provides a good starting point for thinking about the future of thought in a multi-centric world (Matusitz, 2011, pp. 291-
These three projects constitute the fundamental steps towards forming a new knowledge initiative and consequently reforming higher education.

The dissertation stands on four pillars, puts forward one major thesis and points at a threefold assignment to be undertaken in the near future. In order to gain more precision, the work will be tuned in five ways. First, even though the ideas expressed in the dissertation are linked to the Western hermeneutical tradition, the connection has not been sufficiently explored. Rooting these ideas in this tradition and showing the links clearly may help develop the perspective further. Second, the suggested framework could be compared and contrasted with the Critical Theory tradition. Third, this embryonic form of new Critical Theory can be strengthened by comprising a Heideggerian form of existential understanding. Fourth, the research program can be tested sociologically in relation to the sociology of Bourdieu. Despite the fact that there is a clear connection between existential understanding and the sociology of Bourdieu, the link has not been adequately examined. Finally, all of these efforts will amount to a type of existential sociology that needs to be empirically tested by global comparative fieldwork.
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