Imported or Homemade?

On Bayly's account of nineteenth century nationalism as global phenomenon

Anna Kleuser

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18452/20176

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Inhalt

Introduction

Struggling to overcome the dichotomy between "the West and the rest", approaches of global history have recently tried to move beyond the Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism of previous academic approaches.[1] Among the broad range of research associated with global history, its application to theories of nations and nationalism have proved particularly fruitful. Instead of analyzing individual national histories independently of each other, researchers in this tradition investigate global aspects of nationalism as well as nationalism's relation to imperialism. Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World* considers this global approach as one of its main agendas. Stressing the interconnectedness of world events, he argues that "all local, national, or regional histories must, in important ways be [...] global histories."[2] This resolution has implications for the methodology he chooses to explain the changes taking place between 1780 and 1914. Holding that "[n]either a ‚diffusionist' nor an ‚endogenous' explanation of intellectual and social change is satisfactory,"[3] he attempts to prevent mono- causal explanations. Instead he discusses how structural, contingent, external and internal aspects worked together within the cultural, political, social and economic sphere.

This essay will focus on Bayly's position concerning the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Within this context, he refutes the thesis that nationalism was diffused from Europe outwards. He argues that explanations of the spread of nationalism should focus on the interrelation between nationalism and imperialism and emphasize the impact local conditions had on its global emergence. I will attempt to provide a critical analysis of this account. I will first outline the existing discourse on the diffusion of nationalism to provide some context for Bayly's argumentation. Afterwards, I will introduce his position by analysing his "vague" conception of nationalism and his argumentation against the "diffusion model". In the last chapter, I will argue that the lack of clarity of Bayly's main thesis restrains its explanatory value. On the one hand, it prevents Bayly from asking which other forms of anti-colonial resistance were caused by imperialism. On the other hand, it causes him to neglect the influence international discourses about the legitimization of power had on the global emergence of nationalism.

To be fully convincing, Bayly's "anti-diffusionist" account should therefore be clarified and augmented: It is true that the content of nationalist ideologies was not "exported" unalteredly into the colonies. Local traditions and collective identities pre-dating modernity as well as

existing political structures, old forms of state patriotism and the colonial experience itself had

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1   Cf. Dominic Sachsenmaier, Global History. Version 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte,11.2.2010, URL: http://docupedia.de/zg/Global_History?oldid0123220.

2   Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World. 1780–1914, Malden, Oxford/Carlton 2004.

3   Ibidem, p. 295.

an impact on the formation of anti-colonial nationalism. Thus, Bayly rightly criticizes the Eurocentrism of some nationalism theories. However, including the agency of "non- Europeans" should not be conflated with reading "nationalism" into their actions. To prevent teleological narratives of imperial decay, an analysis of the influence of imperialism on local agents should be careful not to subsume all forms of opposition against suppression under the label of "nationalism" and instead include historical alternatives to nationalist agitation. Concerning specific cases of nationalism, it should ask why nationalism – and why this particular form of nationalism – developed instead of other possible responses. I will argue that, to provide answers to these questions, it is necessary to examine the interrelation between the legitimization of power on an international level and individual local conditions.

1. Conflicting views on the diffusion model

In line with his overall approach of stressing how the "force of events ricocheted around the globe"[4], Bayly lays emphasis on the non-European origins of anti-colonial nationalism. He claims that:

The more vigorous stirring of nationality in the late nineteenth century was a global phenomenon. It emerged contemporaneously in large parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, rather than first in Europe, later to be exported "overseas." In many cases, the tide of nationalism also drew on indigenous legends, histories, and sentiments about land and people, rather than being a malign imposition of the West.[5]

One of Bayly's central argumentative aims in this chapter is to debunk accounts which argue that nationalism was spread from "the West" to colonial countries. He associates "modernization theories" of nationalism with this view[6] and charges these theories as well as Eurocentric accounts of intellectual history[7] with neglecting the importance of the agency of local agents. To provide a critical analysis of his "anti-diffusion model" it is therefore helpful to locate his account within the existing literature on the origin and diffusion of nationalism.

Theories of nationalism are often differentiated into two ideal types.[8] The first one is pro-

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4   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 86.
5   Ibidem, p. 119.
6   Cf. ibidem, p. 203.
7   Cf. ibidem, p. 237.
8   Apart from being commonly referred to in debates and research on nationalism, this differentiation can be found in most introductions of nationalism theories. Cf. Erika Harris, Nationalism. Theories and Cases,

vided by accounts which either depict nations as natural, objective unit or stress the continuity between nations and earlier forms of human collective identities like "ethnic" communities. Despite important differences between such accounts, scholars in this tradition tend to focus on bottum-up factors of national mobilization like existing local traditions, ethnic ties and

forms of collective identity predating modernity.[9] The other ideal type sees nationalism as an intrinsically modern phenomenon and emphasizes the disruptive character of nationalism compared to pre-modern forms of collective identities. While sharing the conviction of the novelty of nations and nationalism in modernity, these theories differ concerning the explanatory key factors they identify. While some focus on economic transformations[10], others emphasize political[11] or social/cultural changes[12].

The mentioned ideal types have implications concerning the diffusion model of nationalism. While theories stressing the impact of modernity tend to support different variants of the diffusion model, the opposing ideal type stresses the impact of local cultural traditions predating modernity. However, it is important to differentiate between theories which support the diffusion model. They differ in their understanding of "nationalism" as well as concerning which aspect of the diffusion of nationalism they analyze. Theorists focusing on nationalism as ideology have examined how "Western" ideas of national sovereignty were spread through an "imitation-reaction mechanism"[13] by colonial elites. Kedouri provides an example of this line of argument when claiming that "nationalism in Asia and Africa […] is neither something indigenous to those areas nor an irresistible tendency of the human spirit everywhere, but rather an importation from Europe clearly branded with the mark of its origin."[14] In theories focusing on political, social, cultural and

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Edinburgh 2009; Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism. A Critical Introduction, London 2006; Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction, London 2010.

9   For examples of this line of reasoning: Cf. John Alexander Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, Chapel Hill 1982; Azar Gat/Alexander Yakobson, Nations. The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism, New York 2013; Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge 1997; Aviel Roshwald, The Endurance of Nationalism, New York 2006; Anthony Smith, The Diffusion of Nationalism. Some Historical and Sociological Perspectives, in: BJS, Vol. 29 No. 2 (1978), pp. 234–248.

10   Cf. Eric Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford 1983; Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain. Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London 1981[1977].

11   Cf. John Breuilly, Dating the Nation. How Old is an Old Nation, in: Atsuk Ichijo/Gordana Uzelac (eds.), When is the nation?, London and New York 2005, pp. 15–39; Eric Hobsbawn/Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge 1983.

12   Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1983; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism.

13   Smith, The Diffusion of Nationalism, p. 237.

14   Ellie Kedouri, Introduction, in: Ellie Kedouri, (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, London 1970, p. 29; See also Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, Princeton 2014, p. 465.

economic aspects, the diffusion is explained by the development of industrialization, the growing power of the modern state and the influence of the printing press.[15]

Theorists supporting the diffusion model have been criticized on various grounds. According to essentialist accounts, nationalism wasn't exported but is a consequence of the strong emotional bonds between members of a nation. In the realm of nationalist historiography, calls for national sovereignty do not need any explanation because the nation as reified cultural unit functions as driving factor of historical change.[16] While opposing essentialism, Gat agrees with these accounts when claiming that examples of nationalism and nation state

are ubiquitous in world history[17] because of the "innate human [and thereby global] preference for one's kin-culture group."[18] Similarly, Roshwald explains that "national consciousness and its expression in nationalism aren't exclusively modern."[19] A more nuanced criticism has been forward by Anthony Smith. While conceding that the ideology of nationalism and the international system of nation states are modern phenomena, he criticizes modernist accounts because they ignore the relevance of local ethnic ties and can therefore not explain "why an ideology, however revolutionary, could manage to overturn hitherto stable hierarchies and traditions."[20] What these forms of criticisms have in common is that they argue for the importance of continuity between pre-modern and modern forms of collective identities on a global level.

Diffusion theories have also been criticized from a post-colonial perspective. In this tradition, Chatterjee criticizes prevailing theories of nationalism for denying non-European people real agency by depicting them as mere objects of manipulation by the "developed" West. Next to Kedouri's diffusion thesis,[21] he criticizes Anderson's "modular" account of nationalism according to which forms of nationalism which evolved in Europe, Russia and the Americas served as "blueprints" for subsequent nationalist movements in Asia and Africa.[22] His argument has a descriptive as well as normative component. On the descriptive level, Anderson's modular account is depicted as inaccurate because anti-colonial nationalism was based on difference rather than identity with

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15　Anderson's modular model of nationalism only applies to the spread of nationalism to the Asian and African colonies. He holds that nationalism evolved earlier in the Americas than in most European states which is why his inclusion within the diffusion model should be taken with a pinch of salt. Cf. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 50.

16　Cf. Lars-Erik Cederman, Nationalism and Ethnicity, in: Walter Carlsnaes/Thomas Risse/Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi 2002, pp. 416–417.

17　Cf. Gat/Yakobson, Nations. 2013, p. 132.

18　Ibidem, p. 42.

19　Roshwald, The Endurance of Nationalism, New York 2006, p. 10.

20　Smith, The Diffusion of Nationalism, p. 239.

21　Cf. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. A Derivative Discourse, London 1993 [1986], pp. 7–10.

22　Cf. Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 80–81.

Anderson's "blueprints".[23] From a normative perspective, it is necessary to question the power relations behind the prevailing discourse on the nature of nation and nationalism which restricts the imagination of the "once-colonized".[24]

Considering the great extend of research on nationalism, an outline of existing theories is necessarily sketchy even if restricted on its impact on the question of the diffusion of nationalism. However, having introduced important distinctions and positions, it is now possible to turn to Bayly's argumentation. In the next chapter, I will introduce his "vague" notion of nationalism and examine how he supports his criticism of the diffusion model.

2. Bayly's criticism of the diffusion model

Although the differentiation between the two ideal types of nationalism theories can serve as helpful orientation, it has been argued that the primordial/perennial versus modernist dichotomy is misleading.[25] While scholars belonging to oppositional sides of the before mentioned ideal types might disagree concerning specific propositions, they agree on other important aspects. The representation of complete schools of thought as contradictory and incompatible is therefore oversimplified. Furthermore, the apparent incompatibility of the two ideal types decreases when considering that they differ concerning their object of study as well as their explanatory objective. It might also be asked whether differences concerning what is meant by "nationalism" and "nation" within individual theories cause incommensurability problems. Therefore it is important to analyze specific claims instead of oversimplifying theories by ordering them into clear cut categories. Bayly's argumentation is connected to this criticism when suggesting a vague understanding of nationalism. Having sketched the debate between "cultural" theories of nationalism and modernist theories,[26] he does not attempt to provide an own working definition of "nationalism" for his chapter and instead argues for sticking to a vague understanding of the term. According to this understanding, theories of nationalism are used as "tools of interpretation rather than theories proper […] they have no predictive value, and none of them taken separately can possibly explain the nature, still less the timing, of the emergence of nationalism."[27] Like this, different theories can be applied to case studies where fitting. Consequently, it is not possible to categorize Bayly into the "primordial" or "modernist" camp or to clarify his main thesis by providing criteria on when it is

23   Cf. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, p. 30; Partha Chatterjee, Whose Imagined Community, Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed.), Mapping the nation, London and New York 1996, p. 217.
24   Cf. Chatterjee, Whose Imagined Community, p. 224.
25   Cf. Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, p. 170.
26   Cf. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 202–204.
27   Ibidem, p. 202.

valid to call a political movement or ideology "nationalist".

Instead Bayly takes an intermediate position in which different nationalisms have various causes. He combines features of theories typically labeled "modernist" and "primordial". On the one hand, he discusses the influence of European rights theories in forming the language of global nationalist movements[28] and suggests that the rise of nationalism was supported by exporting the "apparatus of the European state and its territorial rights over space and citizens."[29] On the other hand, he claims a strong continuity between earlier forms of collective identities and the nation when stressing the importance of "[l]iving traditions of language, law, religion, political ethics, and deportment"[30] and arguing that "nationalism […] drew

on more profound desires and aspirations […] which had in earlier times often been attached to family, clan, or religious group."[31] Additionally, the interrelation between nationalism and imperialism serves as his main explanatory factor. He argues that the causal connections between nationalism and imperialism should be studied instead of treating both phenomena separately.[32] While expansion overseas served as tool for internal state building, imperial expansion and occupation also created and strengthened the nationalism of those invaded. Despite his reluctance to fully embrace post-colonial research,[33] he agrees with Chatterjee when arguing that colonial subjects started to define their own nation against colonizers who were represented as hated "other".

This multi-causal and differentiating approach is continued in his criticism of the diffusion model of nationalism. He argues that it is useful to distinguish between tree different types of nationalism because "some nationalisms […] had more pronounced navels than others."[34] The first type is a nationalism emerging out of "old patriotism" so that nationalists of the late nineteenth century in these regions could make use of already existing forms of identification and did not have to invent a nation "out of nothing."[35] As the counterpart to this form, he describes nationalisms created by states where nationalism was young and constructed. Cases of nationalism which developed in large empires in which rulers were not sure whether nationalist feelings should be suppressed or supported are counted into an intermediate category.[36] Having introduced this differentiation, he claims that the categories provide evidence against a dichotomy between nationalism inside and outside Europe. Instead examples of nationalism similar in "timing or nature"[37]

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28 Cf. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 114.
29 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 237.
30 Ibidem, p. 280.
31 Ibidem, p. 280.
32 Cf. ibidem, p. 217.
33 Cf. ibidem, p. 8
34 Ibidem, p. 219.
35 Ibidem, p. 207.
36 Cf. ibidem, pp. 207–208.
37 Ibidem, p. 219.

can be detected on a global scale.

Examples of nationalism developing out of "old patriotism" cannot only be detected in England and France, but were also present in northern Vietnam, Korea, Japan and Ethiopia. In all these cases "old patriotic identities, religious and linguistic homogeneity and compact ethnic homelands coincided"[38] so that a strong continuity between earlier forms of identification and nationalism as suggested by ethnosymbolist approaches seems convincing to Bayly. Considering types of the opposite side of the spectrum, he concedes that forms of nationalism developing in Latin America largely followed the creation of the state and were

top down processes. Here the diffusion model seems more convincing, but there are also European examples belonging to this type like Belgian and British nationalism.[39] When discussing the third, intermediate type, he considers examples from China, Russia, Austria- Hungary, the Ottoman empire and Africa and argues that in these cases "international war and colonialism drove intellectuals and publicists to adopt the language and practices of modern nationalism."[40] According to Bayly, expansion overseas served the colonial powers as tool for internal state building. Within the colonies, it created and strengthened nationalist mobilization. However, it remains unclear which explanatory role imperialism and war are supposed to play within his account. Are they supposed to account for the "more vigorous stirring of nationalism"[41] - which would presuppose the existence of nationalist activity before the end of the nineteenth century within these areas – or are they supposed to explain the "rise"[42] or "emergence of nationalism"[43]? In the next paragraph, I will argue that Bayly's argumentation against the diffusion model faces several problems which mostly arise out of its lack of clarity.

3. A critical analysis of Bayly's anti-diffusion model

Many aspects of Bayly's argumentation seem valid. His claim that the same standards should be applied when judging whether "nationalism" was on the rise independently of which geographical region is investigated is convincing. If, for example, mass support is posited as a necessary precondition for an instance of "nationalism" few of Europe's 1848 movements should be called "nationalist."[44] Regarding the emergence of nationalism belonging to his first type, he rightly ad-

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38   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 202.
39   Ibidem, pp. 207–208.
40   Ibidem, p. 218.
41   Ibidem, p. 199.
42   Ibidem, p. 212.
43   Ibidem, p. 218.
44   Cf. ibidem, p. 205.

verts to the entanglement between older forms of state patriotism and nationalism on a global scale. Besides, his skepticism towards Eurocentric research enables him to include the interrelations between imperialism and nationalism in his analysis. This aspect – which has been emphasized by recent contributions of post-colonial historians – seems especially important. It provides helpful insights when analyzing how anti-modern national identities have been formed through opposition to a colonial "other" as well as in considering the impact colonial "divide and rule"-strategies and categorizations of "tribes" had on the evolution of perceived difference.[45] It can also help criticize Eurocentric approaches of intellectual history in which the populations of non-European regions are

treated as "history-less peoples."[46] Especially concerning the content of individual forms of nationalism, local traditions could have an important impact on whether and to whom specific ideologies seemed attractive. Besides concepts from "Western" intellectual history acquired new meanings when fused with indigenous intellectual traditions.[47] Thus, within one reading, Bayly's refusal of the diffusion model is appropriate: "European" nationalism was not exported and rebuilt unalteredly around the globe. Especially concerning the content of individual nationalisms, the influence of local agents should not be underestimated. The conflict and cruelties, as well as the frustration of ruling elites correlated with imperialism can contribute to an understanding of how identities were formed through demarcation from enemy stereotypes. Besides, this interference should be conceptualized as working in both ways from the colonizers to the colonized as well as the other way around.[48] Nevertheless, his criticism of the diffusion model needs to be clarified as well as augmented to be fully convincing. Since Bayly focuses on his intermediate type of nationalism, I will carry this prioritization over into my criticism. However, I will first turn to the two opposing types of his categorization.

3.1. "Constructed" nationalism and the continuity between patriotism and nationalism

The type of nationalism Bayly classifies as "constructed" is widely excluded from his argumentation. He introduces this type of nationalism as one of his three categories and explains that "the-

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45 Cf. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, pp. 464–465.
46 Geoff Eley/Ronald Grigor Suny, Introduction. From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation, in: Geoff Eley/Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), Becoming National. A Reader, New York 1996, p. 28.
47 Cf. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 285, 305–307, 314.
48 Cf. Eric Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System. International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions, in: AHR, Vol. 113 No. 5 (2008), p. 1315.

re had been little sense of being a 'Colombian' or 'Venezuelan'"[49] before the creation of independent states in Latin America. Afterwards he proceeds to analyze the two remaining categories without considering the impact a deeper analysis of these cases might have had on the validity of the diffusion model. Since Bayly's main thesis only consists in the claim that not all cases of nationalism were "exported", it cannot be falsified by providing cases in which it was. Asserting that "historical writing is a question of assigning emphasis"[50], he should, however, know that including cases which do not fit into his paradigm would have rendered his analysis more balanced.

Concerning cases of the opposite side of the spectrum, he argues that global examples of nationalism developing out of patriotism provide evidence against the diffusion model. According to Bayly, these cases show a strong continuity between nationalism and earlier

forms of collective identities because nationalism could be "rooted in an already existing

sense of common purpose, reflected in common language and culture and old regional connections."[51] However, it can be argued that he underestimates the rupture between patriotism and nationalism. Certainly, existing conditions constrained the choices available to nationalists in specific circumstances and pre-existing ties can play an important role in explaining why a national ideology was able to mobilize the masses. Nevertheless, individual agents had to decide which structures to include within their ideology depending on their present political context. Instead of treating the discourses of politics of earlier periods as mere preliminary stages to later evolving nationalisms, they should be understood in their own terms.[52] If patriotism wasn't transformed naturally into nationalism, specific local, as well as global contextual aspects need to be included in an analysis to account for the causes of this transformation. Since Bayly focuses on the "intermediate" category of nationalism in the middle of his spectrum, I will now analyze his account of these cases in detail.

3.2. Intermediate cases

Bayly's "intermediate" cases of nationalism cases are especially important because of their connection to narratives of historical change from the existence of large empires to an international system of nation states. Scholars arguing for the diffusion model, especially Kedouri, can be criticized for being empire nostalgics: In arguing that the colonized were manipulated by a dangerous Western ideology, they indirectly depict old, imperial systems as favorable to the new nation

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49   Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System, p. 208.
50   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 398.
51   Ibidem, p. 7.
52   Cf. Eley/Suny, Introduction. From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation, p.
       10.

states. Underestimating the agency of local forces, they explain the change towards nation states in former colonies solely through external, top-down factors. Scholars criticizing the diffusion model from a perennial, primordial and ethnosymbolist standpoint have, on the other hand, tended to explain imperial decay through specific internal reasons. If the world is divided into nations or similar forms of collective identity, nationalism didn't have to be exported. Instead multi-national political units appear as "prisons of its subject peoples" whose break-up was highly probable if not inevitable.[53] This apparently automatic step from cultural diversity to political action is questionable because it presupposes the consequent. It focuses on examples in which cultural diversity led to fragmentation and then explains this fragmentation by the existence of cultural diversity.[54] Explanations of historical change should account for the contingency involved in the evolution of nations. Instead of treating nations as reified units, it is necessary to investigate

how these collective identities were constructed and how local contingencies and interests influenced this process. It can therefore be asked if Bayly's determination to refute the diffusion model suggests that he is buying into a teleological narrative of imperial decay and national liberation. As I have argued, he leans towards a "primordial" reading in some passages. However, other passages indicate that he does not follow teleological accounts of imperial decay: He stresses how important it is not to ",read back' the form of today's nationalisms into the later nineteenth century, let alone an earlier period"[55] and devotes a whole chapter to an analysis of the persistence of empire in the nineteenth century. It thus seems as if he attempts an intermediate position by combining internal and external aspects. As will become clear on the following pages, the vagueness connected to this approach faces causes serious theoretical problems.

3.2.1. Preventing a teleological account

In his account of the emergence of nationalism in different colonial settings, Bayly argues that "there were large tracts of former agrarian empires where vociferous nationalist leaderships emerged quite rapidly after about 1860."[56] The examples he analyzes in this section are supposed to support his claim that nationalism wasn't "exported" from Europe into its colonies. However, one of the major flaws of his account is its lack of clarity. He does not specify whether the diffusion model applies to nationalism as a feeling, a social movement, an ideology, a form of identity or as his-

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53   Following this line of argument Gat asks: "If nationalism wasn't grounded in ethnicity, why did it involve the disintegration of multi-ethnic empires as one of its most distinctive manifestations?" Cf. Gat/Yakobson, Nations. 2013, p. 8.
54   Cf. Cederman, Nationalism and Ethnicity, pp. 416–417.
55   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 206.
56   Ibidem, p. 212.

torical process.[57] Consequently the evidence he collects in this section ranges from examples of social movements, like the Egyptian and Indian movements against economic exploitation, over the writings of pan-African intellectuals and educational measures promoting the Turkish language to a sense of Libenese identity and Chinese anti-Quing ideology.[58] Bayly at no point explains by virtue of what these cases should be called "nationalism". This causes the impression that his main argument consists in picking different historical instances whose only commonality consists in their opposition to political suppression and merging them under the "nationalist" label. He suggests that "a sense of sacred and historical geography"[59] in Syria, "a sense of separateness"[60] in Egypt, a North African "sense of solidarity"[61] and South African "peoplehood"[62] were transformed into nationalism through war and conflict. It appears questionable to subsume all of these different phenomena into one chapter titled "from community to nation" without providing any explanation of why these cases should be perceived as undergoing this kind of transformation. This claim resembles the argument that conflict causes people to fall back into "ethnic" allegiances without questioning how the boundaries of "ethnies" are constructed and why "ethnic" rather than other identities should be chosen in times of conflict. It remains unclear why "a sense of conflict and economic and racial disadvantage"[63] should cause nationalist rather than other possible responses.

This point is connected to another problematic inaccuracy in Bayly's account: He does not attempt to distinguish between anti-colonial nationalism and other forms of resistance against colonial rule. Depending on one's understanding of "nationalism" it could therefore be argued that he commits a "Wilsonian" conflation between calls for autonomy, equality and democracy on the one hand and nationalism on the other.[64] This broad conception of nationalism can mislead to arguing teleologically for a "natural" development of nation states after colonial rule. Demands for radical change do not necessarily consist in demands for a change towards the political structure of a nation state and demands for specific group rights are not necessarily "nationalist" demands. Nationalism was not the only way to oppose colonial cruelties: "activists aspired to a better life, they asked to be treated as equals, they defended religion, and they proposed a variety of

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57 Hearn distinguishes between these different „assumptions" underlying definitions of nationalism. See: Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism, pp. 6–7.
58 Cf. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 212–218.
59 Ibidem, p. 213.
60 Ibidem, p. 215.
61 Ibidem.
62 Ibidem, p. 216.
63 Ibidem, p. 217.
64 For a more detailed discussion of this conflation, Cf. Alen Sharp, The Genie that would not go back into the bottle, National Self-Determination and the Legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement, in: Seamus Dunn/Thomas G. Fraser (eds.), Europe and Ethnicity. The First World War and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict, London and New York 1996, p. 13.

solutions to the injustices of colonial rule, including federal arrangements and incorporation."[65] Thus, it is important to ask which alternatives are ignored or wrongly labeled "nationalist" in Bayly's account. Lawrence argues that it is helpful to stick to Gellner's definition of nationalism as an ideology demanding coincidence of nation and territory/state to prevent this sort of "conceptual stretching."[66] Following this definition, the Egyptian "national movement" should not be conceptualized as national movement because it was "by no means anti-Ottoman in ideology."[67] Applied to nationalism as identity, the Ottoman example shows the ambiguity involved in the formation of identity. Simultaneously to their Egyptian identity, the insurgents widely sustained their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire which reveals that identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Even if the broad range of definitions of nationalism complicates conceptual clarity, the example of Egypt indicates the problems involved in Bayly's vague understanding of nationalism. Considerations about the characteristic claims made within the nationalist discourse are not inconsequential controversies on words. They enable researchers to distinguish between nationalist and other, similar discourses. Even if an "objective" definition of nationalism has proven impossible, it is important to distinguish between different forms and aims of movements to prevent equivocation and mono-causal explanations of historical change.[68] Since the meaning of "nationalism" within the diffusion model influences its validity, Bayly can be criticized for using conceptual vagueness to immunize himself against counterarguments.

3.2.2. Legitimizing political power

In *Nationalism and Ethnicity* Cederman argues that a missing clarification of the ontological status of key concepts can prevent researchers from including relevant factors within their theory.[69] The same applies to Bayly's account for the rise of nationalism in the end of the nineteenth century. Focusing on the interdependence between imperialism and nationalism without specifying the meaning of his key terms, he does not ask why and when agents chose to mobilize using nationalist rhetoric. His analysis of the impact of conflict and imperialism in forming the colonizer as hated "other"[70] provides important insights into how the content of national ideologies was formed. However, the impact of conflict on forms of opposition and enemy stereotypes

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65   Adria Lawrence, Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism. Anti-Colonial Protest in the French Empire, New York 2013, p. 4.
66   Lawrence, Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism, p. 16.
67   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 215.
68   For a proposal of a characterization of nationalist discourse, cf. Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 208–209.
69   Cf. Cederman, Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 412.
70   Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 242.

does not explain why agents opposing colonial rule should choose nationalist rather than other possible forms of mobilization. Smith has a point when asking "why it should be nationalism that has so much appeal."[71]

In my opinion, the existing literature on the discourse[72] of nationalism as means of legitimizing political power provides helpful analytical tools to overcome this gap. Weitz examines how the language of international treaties, like the Berlin Treaties 1887 and the Berlin West Africa Conference 1884–1885, changed from dynastic legitimization of political power to legitimization through national sovereignty. Since political power was more and more legitimized through the will of "the people" the importance of population politics increased significantly.[73] Fabry detects similar tendencies in his analysis of the recognition of

new states within South America and Europe in the nineteenth century.[74] Although it was assumed that the principle of national self-determination didn't apply to colonial subjects because of their alleged lack of civilization, the language of these treaties provided "statesmen, revolutionaries and reformers [on a global scale] with powerful rhetorical tools."[75] Similarly, Suny argues that the stability and fragility of empires depends on how power is legitimized on an international level. That the "discourse of the nation became the dominant universe of political legitimization"[76] therefore adds to an understanding of why local agents dissatisfied with their individual situations chose to mobilize along nationalist lines. The described nationalist discourse emerged, on an ideological level, from a "connection drawn between populations conceived in national or racial terms and sovereignty."[77] In the sphere of political power, it was largely "Western" statesmen who were powerful enough to shape the outcome of international treaties.[78]

The dominance of the colonial powers does, however, not imply that events and agents in the colonies were unimportant. As Weitz argues, experiences made within formal colonies and informal zones of influence affected the content of the evolving treaties.[79] Besides, stressing the

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71   Smith, The Diffusion of Nationalism, p. 240.
72   In the following I use the term „discourse" not as „a disembodied collection of statements", but as „groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted in a social context, which are determined by that social context and which contribute to the way that social context continues its existence." Sara Mills, Discourse, London and New York 1997, p. 11.
73   Cf. Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System, p. 1322.
74   Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States. International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776, New York 2010.
75   Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System, p. 1322.
76   Ronald Grigor Suny, The Empire Strikes Out. Imperial Russia, "National Identity", and Theories of Empire, in: Ronald Grigor Suny/Terry Martin (eds.), A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, New York 2001, p. 34.
77   Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System, p. 1315.
78   Cf. Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century, Cambridge and Malden 2001, pp. 61–62; Fabry, Recognizing States, chapters 2–3.
79   Weitz, From Vienna to the Paris System, p. 1316.

importance of the will of "the people", nationalists have to be responsive to local circumstances to fill their nationalisms with meaning. Therefore, "the very colonial situation leads to [nationalisms] indigenous reinvention and reinforcement"[80] which shows that Bayly is right to call for an analysis of the interdependence between nationalism and imperialism. Nevertheless, his vague conception of nationalism prevents him from perceiving how relevant the availability of the international discourse of nationalism was for anti-colonial agents. Rather than treating "ethnies" or "nations" as unified entities with common interests and agency,[81] a critical position towards the diffusion model should investigate how and why individual agents chose to adapt the nationalist rather than other possible discourses of legitimization to their purpose. This will include an analysis of which advantages individuals expected from nationalist activity. A recognition of the peculiarities of each creation of a "nation" will also enable researchers to ask how nationalisms were filled with contextually attractive content.

The previous criticism suggests that Bayly's anti-diffusion model needs to be amended to be fully convincing. Certainly not all aspects of nationalism were "exported overseas" from Europe. Local traditions and collective identities pre-dating modernity as well as existing political structures and old forms of state patriotism had an impact on the formation of anti- colonial nationalism. However, "it is the nationalist discourse which takes pre-existing cultural materials and turns them into nations."[82] Understanding that this discourse was, in its beginning, largely shaped by dominant Western agents does not have to be tantamount to depicting "non-European peoples [...as] passive recipients of Western bounty or, alternatively, simply the West's supine victims."[83] As I have argued before, respecting local agency should also consist in considering possible alternatives to specific forms of nationalisms. Concerning an analysis of the emergence of individual cases of nationalism, an adequate position towards the diffusion model needs to include the impact international political discourses had on specific local contexts.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that, despite its many advantages, Bayly's account of the global emergence of late nineteenth century nationalism lacks clarity. A satisfying explanation of the diffusion of nationalism should attempt to make transparent by virtue of what phenomena are subsumed under the "nationalism" category. Furthermore, it should attempt to be specific about which factors serve

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80　Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Buckingham 1997, p. 108.
81　Cf. Roger Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, in: EurJSoc., Vol. 43 No. 2 (2002), p. 164.
82　Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, p. 213.
83　Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 3.

as explanations for which phenomena. Conflicts connected to imperialism provide explanations for a variety of opposition against colonial rule. To prevent teleological narratives of imperial decay, an analysis of the influence of imperialism on local agents should therefore include possible alternatives to nationalist agitation. As an attempt to explain the global emergence of nationalism, Bayly's account fails to recognize the impact of how power was legitimized on an international level. An inclusion of this international discourse would have helped explain why nationalism instead of other possible forms of opposition was chosen by individual agents. However, the merits of his account should not be underestimated. He is rightly emphasizing the influence local traditions and enemy stereotypes of the colonizer had on the content of nationalist theories. A satisfying approach towards the diffusion of nationalism should therefore "identify the common rhetoric of the nationalist imaginary, without however overlooking the distinctive and unique features of each nationalism."[84]

The considerations of the previous pages are strongly connected to questions about nationalism theories on a meta-level. Bayly is right when he criticizes the dichotomy between "primordial" and "modernist" approaches. The insights and methods of both schools of thought should be used in explaining individual cases of nationalism where fitting. However, theoretical difficulties concerning the nature of nationalism should not cause researchers to retreat into vagueness within their own account. Being clear within one's conceptual and explanatory framework is important because the decision whether to call a historical phenomenon "nationalist" is not merely connected to pedantic semantic fights about terminology, it can have implications on which historical developments appear "natural" in retrospect. To prevent teleological narratives of historical change, a convincing position concerning the diffusion model should ask why and how "alternative configurations of identity, past and territory that are available at any given moment"[85] were suppressed by specific instances of nationalism.

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84   Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, p. 205.
85   Cf. Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, p. 210.

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