Martin van Creveld

Where 9–11 Fits in

Over the last year the events of 9–11 have been discussed from every possible point of view, beginning with the psychological effects on people around the world and ending with the impact on the way they dance in discotheques.[1] This paper will not follow the participants in the debate into such esoteric places: instead it will seek to keep our feet on the ground by focusing on some of the military and political aspects. First we shall ask what 9–11 actually represents. Second, we shall ask how we got there. Third, it is necessary to say something about what can be done. Fourth, we shall try to understand where it is taking us.

I.

To put it as briefly as I can, the events of 9–11 have been the culmination – so far – of a fundamental change in the way wars are fought.[2] Such shifts have not been uncommon in the past. Think, for example, of the transition from the infantry-based forces of the Roman Empire to the much smaller, cavalry-centered, ones fielded by medieval principalities; or, *mutatis mutandis*, of the military revolution that was triggered by the introduction of firearms from about 1400 on. Each of those, and many others, were accompanied by far-reaching political, economic, and social changes. Though it took time, each helped create, and was in part created by, an entirely new world.

In marked contrast to the recent past, the new kind of war is not fought by states against each other. Al Qaeda, which stood behind the events of 9–11, neither claims to be a sovereign entity nor is recognized as such by the remaining states of the world. Unlike them, it does not have a solid piece of territory over which

to exercise its sovereignty; nor is its flag among the 190 or so that decorate the square in front of the United Nations in New York. Rather it is a loosely organized group of people whose members, instead of being recognized as citizens by the I.D cards they carry, operate in cells that are isolated from each other out of security considerations.[3] Communication inside the cells is carried out on the basis of personal acquaintance and trust. Communication among the cells is carried out by means of intermediaries who are only aware of the missions with which they are charged and are deliberately denied insight into everything else. Much reliance is placed on mobile telephones (which are discarded every week or two), personal computers, Internet cafes, and coded messages that only the initiated understand. The organization is said to have cells in no fewer than fifty different countries; many of its members, including the leaders, are not tied to a single country but keep moving from one to another. Now they form links with similar organizations, now they break them in search of new alliances; too often, the difference between insiders and outsiders only exists in the imaginations of those who try to trace them or write about them. Compared to traditional war-making entities, i.e. states, they are like gnats buzzing around an elephant.

Second, in the new kind of war symbolized by 9–11 the traditional division of labor between a government that directs, armed forces that fight and die, and a civilian population that pays and suffers does not exist in the same form; instead, all three are mixed together. As the famous videotape of Bin Laden playing with an assault rifle showed and was undoubtedly meant to show, to a large extent political leadership, military command, and fighting overlap. For the same reason, many other leaders of non-state fighting organizations like to strut about in uniform; it is as if they deliberately try to show that, not taking the orders of any state, they are neither civilian nor military but some hard to define mixture of both. Similarly their followers may put on uniform when it suits them, especially when posing for propaganda purposes as members of Latin American guerrilla organizations like to do. Most of the time, though, they do what they can not to be

conspicuous and merge with the surrounding population. As indeed they have to if they are not to be wiped out by the various state-owned agencies, from the police to the military, that are arrayed against them.

Third, since the organizations that wage them do not have regular, uniformed, bureaucratically-managed armed forces, the wars in question do not see the use of large numbers of heavy, advanced, weapons. Not making use of large numbers of heavy, advanced weapons, they do not rely on extensive lines of communication. What is needed are not huge numbers of ships, trains and lorries moving to the front and away from it but money and small amounts of other equipment, much of which can be had almost anywhere. As a result, the wars in question tend to be everywhere and nowhere; as the Americans in Vietnam used to say, they were waging a war „without fronts". This proposition has a reverse side that is equally important. The absence of fronts to attack, and of lines of communication to cut, means that both heavy weapons and strategy as traditionally understood are largely useless against them.

Fourth, the wars in question tend to take place not along some „front" but in the midst of the civilian population which, indeed, is often deliberately subjected to attack in order to intimidate, provoke, of simply inflict as much damage as possible. For this reason the new wars, for all that they do not usually involve large numbers of heavy, sophisticated weapons, tend to be at least as bloody and destructive as the ones whose place they took. 9–11, of course, is a perfect point in case. The number of casualties was roughly equal to that which the Japanese inflicted in their attack on Pearl Harbor; though the U.S Government, in the form of the White House, and its military, in the form of the Pentagon, were both targeted, the vast majority of them were civilians. The same is even more true of other struggles of the same kind. Take the number of people who died during the Algerian Civil War – which, contrary to what we thought, appears to be ongoing still – the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka, the Uprising in East Timor, and many similar conflicts around to world. All of them failed to dis-

tinguish between combatants and noncombatants. With the result that, by comparison, it would almost be true to say that the 1991 Gulf War was little but a picnic.

During the first few decades after 1945, the new kind of war was limited almost entirely to what, at the time, was known as „The Third World". Being very strongly governed and not having colonies, states belonging to the „Second World" (also known as the „East Block") escaped them almost completely. By contrast, so-called „developed" or „First World" states had a certain freedom of choice; in so far as outbreaks were limited almost entirely to their colonies, they were in a position to either defend those colonies or to withdraw from them. What set the period since 1990 or so apart is that the geography has been changing. From its original abode in the Third World new kind of war has been spreading into the Second World, playing havoc with the former Yugoslavia as well as parts of the former USSR. Now, as the events of 9–11 have so dramatically proved, it has reached the First World as well. Even that part of it which considers itself to be the most progressive, most disinterested, and most righteous on earth; is separated from the rest by the two largest oceans on earth; and had long considered itself invulnerable. Nor is there any chance that our children and grandchildren will ever again be free from the terrorist threat.

II.

How did we get to this point, and what factors are responsible for the rise of the new kinds of war over the old? While historical processes of the kind we are dealing with her are never simple, one could start the discussion by considering the progressive delegitimization of conventional interstate war. The process, which can be traced to the years immediately following World War I, operated roughly as follows. First, there was a growing feeling that modern war was too deadly and too destructive to be left to the whims of sovereign states. This led to the establishment of the League of Nations; the latter's Covenant was the first formal

document that recognized territorial integrity and political independence as a fundamental international norm. Second, 1928 witnessed the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the U.S and France renounced the right to use war as a national instrument against each other. To be sure, neither the Covenant nor the Pact made any difference when it came to preventing the outbreak World War II. Nevertheless their significance as indicators of the way public opinion was going was considerable, which explains why the latter was ultimately signed by almost all of then-existing states. As it gathered signatures, the Pact acquired legal force much greater than its originators had ever hoped for. Which, in turn, enabled it to be used as a basis for prosecuting Nazi War Criminals at Nuremberg.

After the end of World War II, the movement towards de-legitimizing interstate war accelerated. First came the establishment of the United Nations whose Charter, signed by every member state, prohibited „aggressive" war and permitted it for self defense only. The same Charter also prohibited the annexation of territory by force, a prohibition that was later repeated several times by Security Council Resolutions. As a result, terms such as „subjugation" and the „right of conquest" disappeared from international law; by now they sound as if they were taken from some ante-deluvian language more suitable to the state of nature than to today's civilization. As if all this were not enough, in 1950 for the first time the United Nations for the first time formally declared war. For forty years thereafter there was no repetition; in 1990, however, the next step was taken when the Security Council voted in favor of War against Iraq. Since then, in theory at any rate, *any* use of force by one state or another requires the prior approval of that body. States which chose to ignore that fact stood in danger of being regarded as international pariahs and paying a corresponding political price. Even, some would say particularly, if they were strong.

As Thomas Hobbes once wrote[4], covenants without swords are but words. In this case, the damocles' sword that backed up the evolution of international law was the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. The first, and most awesome, introduction to what nuclear weapons could do came in August 1945 when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped out, leaving approximately 200,000 people dead. The devices in question represented the culmination of a centuries-old quest by states towards more and more powerful weapons; however, once they had been tested and proven it soon turned out that the results were very different from what had been intended. In the words of the greatest post-1945 strategist, Thomas Schelling[5], what nuclear weapons really did was to cut the link between victory and survival. Instead, they created a situation whereby a state could win a very great „victory" and *still* be turned into a smoking, radioactive desert. Worse, even; the more decisive the defeat suffered by the losing side, the more likely that side was to bring down the Temple on himself and his enemy as Samson did.

At first nuclear weapons were only available to one country, the United States, which once or twice threatened their use in order to advance its interests in Iran and Berlin. After the Soviet Union also tested its bomb in 1949, though, stalemate ensued. This was not for want of trying. Between 1949 and the end of the Cold War, and on both sides of the Iron Curtain, immense fortunes were spent in an effort to make nuclear weapons usable. Countless technologies were developed, scenarios written, and war-games held. All had as their ultimate objective finding ways in which one might use nuclear weapons against an opponent without necessarily blowing up the world.[6] As far as we know, none was ever able to produce convincing ways of doing so.

In time, what was true of the superpowers turned out to be even truer of other states. First, fear of escalation meant that the superpowers' close allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact became almost as secure against major conventional warfare as were the superpowers themselves. Next, the Soviet Union and China found themselves with their horns locked; in fact, one of the very last things Michael Gorbachev did before surrendering power was ratify a border-treaty with China. From the nineteen seventies on the process reached China and India, causing relations

between them to stabilize if not to become cordial. It prevented anything larger but skirmishes from taking place between India and Pakistan, and even brought some relief from interstate war to that most strife-ridden region in the world, the Middle East.[7] To be sure, nuclear proliferation did not go so far as abolishing interstate war completely. However, already now it has brought the world to the point where such war is only possible between, or against, rather weak states; of which Iraq, a third world country of twenty million, anxiously waiting for an American attack, provides an excellent example.

While interstate war was being made less acceptable in theory as well as much more dangerous in practice, other developments facilitated the emergence of the forms of non-state war discussed above. Or those developments, the most important by far was globalization. As with every major historical process, deciding on the exact date when globalization got under way is difficult and indeed some would argue that the world has always constituted a single global system in which every actor interacted more or less closely with many of the rest.[8] Be this as it may, for our purposes globalization may have started in the nineteen sixties with the advent of wide-bodied passenger jets. Other technological advances such as the containerization of maritime transport, cheap (later, portable as well) electronic communications, computers, data-links, the Internet, and of course videotape satellite TV accelerated the process. All provided unprecedented opportunities for moving people, merchandise, money and ideas at a speed, and with a facility, never before achieved. All were also backed up by an economic theory that emphasized the need to avoid being tied to a single location in order to use opportunities wherever and whenever they might occur.

Locked-in as they were within their traditional borders, which they jealously guard, states by definition were only able to exploit these advances to a limited extent. Other organizations, being non-territorial by nature, did much better. The nature of the organizations in question differed greatly. Perhaps the most important ones were known as corporations, engaged in industry,

and had as their objective the maximization of profit. Others were ideological, others humanitarian, others criminal, and others still criminal serving some political or religious cause, which qualifies them as terrorists. Terrorists, in other words, were in some ways better positioned to make use of some of the most important technological developments of our time than were traditional war-making entities, i.e. sovereign states. If only in the sense that, in order to fly over a country or set up bases in it, they did not have to ask for permission first.

Once again, the events of 9–11 provide a perfect illustration of what is happening. As far as we know, the attacks on the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and the White House were planned by a very small number of people who, at the time, were hunkering in some remote Afghan cave. The enterprise – the term itself is ironic – was financed by money coming from several Gulf States. It was prepared by a small group of dedicated fanatics who, while they resided in Hamburg, went to Afghanistan in order to obtain training; at other times they did their best not to stand out too much from their fellow students. Not content with what they learnt in Afghanistan, some training was procured – on a purely commercial basis, and without breaking any law – in Florida where a few of those involved attended flight school. The final effort at coordination took place among the casinos and whore-houses of Las Vegas, after which the terrorists, having consulted with Afghanistan for the last time, left for their designated airports. The operation was sophisticated in some ways, but very simple in others; at the point of impact all it took was readiness for sacrifice, very strong nerves, and a few box cutters. None of it would have been conceivable if Bin Laden and his organization had not been able to make use of the ordinary communications- and transportation technologies freely available to any citizen in the developed countries and to many in the less developed ones as well. Simple or sophisticated, the terrorists' modus operandi stands in sharp contrast to the hopeless inefficiency of the U.S Immigration and Naturalization Service. Which, three months after the event, was still busy issuing visas to terrorists who were long since servicing virgins in heaven.

The final factor behind the shift from conventional interstate war to terrorism is the evolution of military technology itself. By and large, the ability of states to monopolize violence in their own hands was closely associated with the introduction of heavy, crew-operated weapons, first cannon and then, after a long interval, aircraft and tanks. Technological advances that have taken place in recent decades have begun to reverse that trend, permitting small parties of suitably trained men to wield vast destructive power. Some forms of the power in question may be had off the shelf, as it were, in the form of simple chemicals and electronic components. Some may be deployed by way of a telephone link located thousands of miles away, as in the case of hackers waging information warfare aimed at disrupting computer networks and the countless facilities that depend on them.[9] Some take the form of chemical and biological weapons. Such weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere and are easily be transported from one country to the next; although, fortunately and as experience in Tokyo and other places suggests, spreading them in such a way as to lead to many casualties is not as simple as it sounds. The most frightening possibility is that terrorists will lay their hands on one or more of the thousands of nuclear weapons now in the hands of several countries. And use them, say, to blow up New York harbor after transporting them in one of the countless containers that arrive there every day.

III.

Given what is happening, what is to be done? One thing seems abundantly clear: in fighting the new kinds of war, the armed forces, doctrines, training methods and weapons that have been developed for waging conventional war by one state against another are only of limited use. New forces and methods will have to be adopted, and the sooner the better. Naturally their exact nature will vary from one country to another and also according to the precise nature of the perceived threat. Even more than before, many of the specific measures taken will have to remain classi-

fied in order to minimize vulnerabilities. Still, by and large they may be classified as follows.

First, a list of the most sensitive targets should be drawn up and the targets in question hardened, as is already being done in the case of airports, nuclear power plants, computing centers, and the like. Such protection may be provided either by the military, the police, or, which is most likely, some new organization that will combine elements of both. In so far as protecting everything at the same time is impossible, such a force cannot guarantee against major attacks of the kind launched against the Moscow theatre where thirty or so terrorists reached the building and took it over. On the other hand, it can and should deal with many other threats. For example, the hijackings of 9–11 could easily have been prevented if there had been one or two sky marshals on each aircraft. Crew members could have been made to carry weapons and trained in their use; the doors between cockpit and passenger cabin could have been reinforced and kept locked at all times, as I myself suggested at the time I was working for Federal Aviation Authority/Security. While the possibilities are infinite, the essential point to keep in mind is that terrorists can only carry out their operations by concealing their preparations. Accordingly, even the deadliest attacks tend to be made by small parties of more or less determined persons using weapons light enough to be carried by hand or, at most, a single vehicle. This, of course, is just what makes them so hard to detect; but it also means that, quite often, simple measures can save many lives at trivial cost.

Second, specialized intelligence organizations should be set up to detect terrorist attacks ahead of time and prevent them from taking place. As configured at present, neither military intelligence nor the police are exactly suitable for the purpose. The former date back to the late unlamented Cold War and tends to focus on the regular forces of foreign countries, counting tanks, locating bases, and stealing plans. The latter are geared to dealing with crime and normally come into action only after it has been committed and reported. Either those services will have to mend their ways, or new ones will have to be established, organized and trai-

ned in such a way that they can take pro-active action. Once this is done, it will also be necessary to make sure that they coordinate with the existing organizations rather than obstruct them or duplicate their work; as always, problems of command and control will be critical.

Third, dealing with terrorist incidents is not a job that any soldier or policeman can do. Instead, it demands specially trained and equipped units. Most countries, Germany included, already have such units, but much more could and should be done. Once again, careful thought should be given to the question of command and control, i.e. the kind of authority that will run and activate the units in question. Equally important, it is vital to have them at hand where and when needed; in other words, the necessary vehicles, helicopters, and communications should be considered and made available.

Like any other special craft, waging the kind of war that terrorism represents requires specialized tools. Buildings may be altered to make them harder to enter, aircraft modified so as to provide better protection against hijackings or anti-aircraft missiles, and medical facilities prepared to receive and treat injured people. For example, the gas used by the Russian forces to neutralize the terrorists may have been too powerful for the purpose at hand. However, the idea of using an anesthetic in order to deal with hostage taking situations is sound. If 100 hostages died, this was less because of the means used than because the rescue forces were apparently not prepared to deal with so many incapacitated people; neither having ambulances ready, nor informing doctors what measures they should take, nor preparing sufficient quantities of antidotes.[10] Other measures might do their work by subjecting terrorists to noise, blinding light, and the like.[11] At a minimum, the knowledge that the security forces possess such means will make the work of terrorists more complicated; it will force them to prepare countermeasures and thus reduce both their effectiveness and their endurance. Accordingly, such weapons should be made the object of a well-funded, well-organized, sustained, and secret program of research and development.

To enable the various anti-terrorist units to do their work, the existing legal framework of democratic countries in particular may have to be modified. Governments and the intelligence services they employ may have to be given greater powers to monitor communications, search for evidence, and arrest suspects not after they have acted but before they can do so; attempts to modify the law in this direction are already under way in many countries.[12] However, there is a catch. The obvious dangers to democracy and freedom apart, experience shows that laws which ride roughshod over human rights will only alienate people. In extreme cases they may even drive them into the terrorists' arms; as in all things, it is a question of striking a balance.

Finally, all of the above measures depend on very close international cooperation. As already noted, in today's globalized world one of the main advantages terrorists enjoy is the fact that they are not tied to any specific location or country but are able to move from one to another as their safety and operational needs require. If they want to succeed, the forces deployed against them will have to be equally mobile and equally cooperative; operating across borders, resolving disputes over sovereignty, setting up common communications and command systems, and so on. All of this requires considerable preparation, and little of it can be improvised in a hurry. One might, indeed, argue that of all obstacles facing counter-terrorism this one is the most difficult one to overcome.

As the newly established American Department of Home Security with its $ 38 billion budget shows, combating terrorism will not be cheap. On the other hand, doing so will hardly be more expensive than maintaining today's conventional armed forces, the Bundeswehr included, with all their highly paid generals, large units, heavy weapons, enormous logistic infrastructure, exercise grounds, and the like. States should therefore ask whether those armed forces are still relevant and which parts of them can be dissolved; whether, for example, it is the Eurofighter or a new generation of machines capable of detecting explosives, chemical agents, and radioactive materials that is needed most. As they

manage the shift from one kind of force to the other, it is important that governments look after the people they discharge. Or else, driven to penury, some of those people may well become terrorists themselves.

IV.

To end on a slightly more optimistic note, none of the above is meant to say that civilization will be washed away in mighty waves of anarchy. Throughout human history, for reasons that are rooted deep in our nature and almost certainly cannot be eradicated, armed struggles have broken out now here, now there. Some of the struggles in question lasted for a long time and were extremely deadly to participants and bystanders alike. Think of the Hundred Years War or, in the German speaking part of Europe, of the Thirty Years War. The former caused entire districts to be laid waste; the latter is supposed to have killed off as many as one third of the population. While the fate of the people involved was often almost too terrible to contemplate, few if any geographical regions have been permanently in a state of war, let alone reduced to the point where they could no longer sustain human life. After all, after the Romans had strewn its soil with salt even Carthage ended up by being rebuilt. As has been said[13], not the least surprising thing about 9–11 is the fact that, 24 hours after it took place, 99.5 percent of all Americans were going about their business, more or less.

As things gradually change, compared to the period 1945–2000 life in the most advanced countries will almost certainly become less pleasant. It will also become less secure, and more preoccupied with security. Much of that security will take the form of petty harassment. Immigration procedures will be, indeed already are being, tightened up as form is piled on form, check on check, and bureaucrat on bureaucrat. People will be asked to produce documents and punished if, in the ones they do produce, the name of their grandmother is mistakenly spelt in the wrong way. They will be searched upon entering movie houses and super-

markets, made to take off their shoes and deprived of their nail-cutters as they try to board an aircraft, and so on. Much of this will be both time-consuming and pointless; after all, every queue formed by people waiting to have their persons and belongings checked is also a target. From time to time, they will watch a terrorist act taking place somewhere else. Some who happened to be in the neighborhood will call their relatives to assure them that they are OK, an experience I actually had as I was working on this paper. Others will stop for a moment, tell themselves how sorry they feel for the victims, offer silent thanks for the fact that they and theirs were not involved, and get back to their business as usual. As our children grow up they will take all of this very much for granted. For good or ill, they will be used, not to say inured, to the suffering around them; told about a time when people could enter restaurants, banks, and other public places without being searched first, they will shake their heads in disbelief. Most of the time, and barring terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, compared to what most of those same countries went through in 1914–45 it will probably not be too bad. If it is true that 3,000 people died in 9–11, it is also true that during the six years of World War II 20,000 people died *every day*; what can be worse than Hiroshima, or Hamburg, or Dresden?

While many people have much to lose from the brave new world now emerging, it is important to emphasize that many others have equally much to gain. For example, anyone who can provide security against terrorism, or looks as if he can do so, will see demand for his products and/or services skyrocketing; military men who fear unemployment owing to ongoing budget cuts, take note. Even at present, people who can talk well about terrorism are certain to attract listeners both inside universities and outside them. There are millions, perhaps more, to be made out a kit that is able to identify anthrax and perhaps other biological agents quickly and at a cost most people can afford. Already now, several companies are racing one another to see which of them will put the first devices on the market; the same is true of automatic face-recognition systems, foolproof I.D cards, and much more. There are more millions to be made, and any number of jobs to

be created, by protecting everything from skyscrapers to water-reservoirs and from private residences to entire neighborhoods.

As is always the case during times of profound upheaval everything will change, yet at another level everything will remain much the same. It therefore seems appropriate to end this essay by quoting a verse by Mao Tze Dong, referring to what would happen in the aftermath of nuclear war:

> *The sun will keep rising*
> *Trees will keep growing*
> *And women will continue to have children.*

Notes

1   See Th. L. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11, New York, N.Y., Anchor Books, 2003.

2   See among many others M. van Creveld, Die Zukunft des Krieges, Munich, Gerling Akademie Verlag, 1998; M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999; H. Münkler, Die Neuen Kriege, Reinbeck, Rowohlt, 2002.

3   On Al Qaeda see P. L. Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror, Pasippanyi, N.J., Alpha, 2002.

4   Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, M. Oakeshott ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1946, p.109.

5   Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 1965, chapter 1.

6   See e.g. H. A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: the Need for Choice (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) pp. 174–83; R. van Cleave and R. W. Barnett, „Strategic Adaptability", Orbis, XVIII, 3, autumn 1974, pp. 655–76; and L. Etheridge-Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the new American Doctrine (Adelphi paper No. 121, winter 1975–76; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976); C. S. Gray, „War Fighting for Deterrence", Journal of Strategic Studies, 7, March 1984, pp. 5–28.

7   For a short summary of these processes see M. van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York, N.Y., Free Press, 1993).

8   E.g. I.M. Wallerstein, Processes of the World System, Beverly Hills, CA, 1980.

9   An excellent, and chilling, account of the principles of information warfare is R. G. Molander and others, Strategic Information Warfare, Santa Monica, Ca., RAND, 1996, pp. XIII, 6–9; Gregory J. Rattray, „The Cyberterrorism Threat", in James E. Smith and William C. Thomas, eds., The Terrorism Threat and U.S Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, Colorado Springs, Co., USAF Academy, 2001, pp. 98–99.

10 For international criticisms of the operation see Department of State, „Moscow Hostage Crisis: 30.10.2002", available on http://www.cdi./org/russia/229–10.cfm.

11 For some of the weapons now being considered or developed see J. B. Alexander and C. H. Heal, „Non Lethal and Hyper-Lethal Weaponry", in R. J. Bunker, ed., Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 13, 2, summer

2002, pp.121–32.

12 See, for some of the possible implications of the so-called „Patriot Act“ signed by President Bush on 26.10.20, http://www.village voice.co/specials/civil_liberties; also T. Brockaw, NBC, on http://www.msnbc.com/news.

13 R. Peters, „The New Warrior Class Revisited“, in Bunker, ed., Small Wars and Insurgencies, p. 17; Th. L. Friedman, „After the Storm“, New York Times, 9.1.03.