The Limits of the Wahlverwandtschaft
Images of Germany in the Main Swedish Conservative Organs 1945-48
Johan Östling

Zusammenfassung

Johan Östling ist Student der Geschichte und Ideengeschichte an der Universität Uppsala.

Introduction

On May 7th and 9th 1945, the unconditional surrender of the German Reich was signed. The Nazi millennium had ceased to exist. In the devastated Germany Stunde Null began.

The Allies divided the country into occupation zones. A kind of restoration began, materially as well as morally. However, the human suffering remained. “Re-education” and “denazification” would vouch for a democratic and safe Europe. Instead, Germany became the first battlefield of the Cold War.

These events were thoroughly analysed in Sweden, whose relations with Germany had been full of changes through history. Since the 1870s, the united Germany had been the dominating cultural, economical, and military power on the Continent. In Sweden, Germanophiles could be found in different political and ideological groups. During the interwar period, and in particular after 1933, the number of Germanophiles was heavily reduced. This affinity survived longest in conservative circles, where Germanophiles could be found even after the outbreak of the Second World War.

This paper will therefore focus on attitudes towards Germany in the main organs for the conservative Swedish opinion 1945–48. What did they write...
about? What did they think about Germany's future and the war guilt? Could Goethe and Schiller still be read or were their names forever dragged into the dirt?

The German history gives the chronological limits; hence the study covers the time from *Stunde Null* to the Berlin blockade. After that, the classic phase of the Cold War began and other questions came up for discussion.

**Method**

The method is above all qualitative. Fundamentals concerning the articles, for example the number that was published a specific year, are noted, but the textual interpretation is much more important. The analysed articles have been divided into three categories according to their content. These categories, which correspond to three parts of the empirical examination, can be described through questions:

A. *The question of guilt.* Who or what had caused the war? Did they separate Nazis from Germans? What did they think about the collective guilt?

B. *The historical Germany.* How was the classical German culture valued? Could a historical continuity be traced between the Third Reich and earlier phases of German history?

C. *The future Germany.* In what light was Germany’s future seen? What kind of attitudes existed towards the occupation powers? Which questions did the Cold War raise?

This categorization is not the only possible one. For example, questions concerning the war guilt were often discussed in connection with German history. This is, however, one way to categorize the material, and certainly a way that gives us a fair and true picture of the subject.

**Sources and Literature**

The source material consists of 73 articles from the newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet* (SvD) 1945–48 and 20 articles from the periodical *Svensk Tidskrift* (SvT) from the same period.

The selection of publications must be explained. The purpose is to examine attitudes in the main conservative organs. Therefore, *Svenska Dagbladet* is especially appropriate, since it was the leading conservative newspaper in Sweden at the time. During the Second World War, the newspaper had defended the policy of neutrality and for the most part supported the Swedish coalition government. Pro-Nazi sympathies among the writers had been actively suppressed. *Svensk Tidskrift* was the main right-wing periodical and was published ten times a year. Among earlier editors, Eli F. Heckscher and Gösta Bagge are famous; the conservative political scientist Elis Hästad was editor-in-chief 1935–48. During the first post-war years, there was no major political-ideological debate in the Swedish newspapers. The Cold War was not publicly discussed before the beginning of the 1950s. Until the 1960s, the cultural sections of the dailies were mouthpieces of different ideologies, but during this decade, they opened up for individual debaters.
For Svenska Dagbladet’s part, the analysis includes only articles on culture and editorials. These have been filed at “Pressarkivet” in Uppsala. I have systematically examined the cuttings labelled “Germany.” For Svensk Tidsskrift's part, all kinds of articles have been studied.

Among the varied literature that has been used, I can only mention a few. The historian Anders Berge’s *Det kalla kriget i Tidens spegel* and the press researcher Elisabeth Sandlund’s *Svenska Dagblads historia, del III* have been used to give a picture of the public opinion.6 The historian Alf W. Johansson’s *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, the historian Jörg Lindner’s *Den svenska Tysklands-hjälpen 1945–1954*, and the professor of German Helmut Müssener’s *Deutschsprachige Belletristik in schwedischer Übersetzung 1870–1979* have been indispensable for the understanding of changes in Swedish-German relations.7 For the same purpose, the intellectual historian Svante Nordin’s essay *Tyska utsikter 1871–1995* and the historian Sverker Oredsson’s *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget* have been read.8 The philologist Barbro Eberan’s dissertation *Luther? Friedrich „der Große”? Wagner? Nietzsche? ...?...? Wer war an Hitler schuld?* has been useful when discussing the *Schuldfrage*.9

**The State of the Art**

Only a few comprehensive studies of the Swedish-German relations exist.10 The anthology *Schweden und Deutschland. Begegnungen und Impulse. Tyskland och Sverige. Möten och impulser* embraces thousand years of history, but without scientific claims.11 Another important work is *Skandinavien och Tyskland 1800–1914*, which includes many historical essays but lacks penetrating analyses and syntheses.12

However, many relevant monographs have been written. Helmut Müssener has carried out a great deal of research on the history of the Swedish-German cultural and intellectual exchange.13 Klaus Misgeld has written several times about the Swedish social democracy and Germany, but he has mostly focused on realpolitik and official relations.14 The same can be said about the historical anthology *Neuanfang: Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Deutschland 1945–1954*.15 In the essay *Tyska utsikter 1871–1995*, Svante Nordin writes about the changes in the Swedish images of Germany.16 Despite the title, he has almost nothing to say about the post-war years. Nordin’s essay includes interesting observations, but it is written in a popular way. In the history of Lund University 1933–45, Sverker Oredsson gives examples of conservative, academic and Germanophile circles.17 Alf W. Johansson astutely writes about the attitudes towards Germany both among the leading politicians and the conservative groups before and during the war.18

As the only work that has a direct bearing on the subject of this paper, Jörg Lindner’s *Den svenska Tysklands-hjälpen historia* is of special interest. Primarily, he concentrates on the Swedish aid contributions, but he also examines “old and new images of Germany.” In connection to this, Lindner has analysed *Svensk tidsskrift* (1945–54) to show how Germany was seen by the Swedish Right. However, this is almost a digression in his dissertation and the result is presented only on a few pages.19
Background and context
The Swedes and Germany

The geographical factor has meant that the Swedish history always has been interspersed with German elements. Since prehistoric times, however, the relations between the two countries have been full of changes; dissension and disunity have been turned into military alliances and Wahlverwandtschaft, missions and war have been followed by trading and intellectual exchange.

It is impossible to depict the complete history of the Swedish images of Germany. This sketch will instead focus on the years from Bismarck’s unification of the German Empire to the end of the Second World War and will primarily concentrate on the cultural and ideological connections.

The German Empire was founded in 1871 and became the dominating power on the Continent. At the same time, the Swedish public opinion changed; the Francophile and Scandinavistic currents weakened sharply while the pro-German ones were strengthened. This was officially confirmed in 1872, when Oscar II succeeded his brother Charles XV on the throne.

The period from the Reichsgründung to the outbreak of the Great War was the golden age of the Swedish Germanophiles. It is, however, important to stress that these sympathies could be found among all strata of society, even if the grounds for the Germanophile leanings differed. For the conservatives – who traditionally represented the classical Germanophiles – the appeal was in the discipline, the military strength, and the cultural superiority. But also radicals and socialists could see Germany as the leading progressive country. Here they could not only find the mother party of all social democrats, but also important pioneers of theory and agitation. Scientists and industrialists did the same as erudite scholars and artists – they all gravitated towards the powerful southern neighbour.

Other aspects that should not be underestimated, are knowledge of the language, military connections, and personal relations. Directed against those who want to equate conservatism with Germanophilia, Svante Nordin calls our attention to the Swedish radical leftist and pan-Germanist Bengt Lidforss, who at the beginning of the twentieth century emphatically demanded that Sweden should apply for membership in the German Empire.

In this respect, the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 must be seen as a dividing line. Among Swedish conservatives, the great majority probably sided with the Central Powers. Germany was seen as guarantee for social order and as a bulwark against Russian barbarism and subversive radicalism. In the periodical Svensk Lösen, edited by Sven Lidman, the pro-German activism found its forum. The phrase “the ideas of 1914,” which was formulated by the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, expressed the necessity of order, culture, and moral at the expense of liberty, equality and fraternity. While the rightists continued to be pro-German, the liberals and socialists, whose education was as German as the conservatives’, were forced to reconsider their convictions. Politically, these groups distanced themselves from Germany. Instead, they resorted to the democratic stability of Great Britain or the revolutionary Russia.
Until the 1933 Machtübernahme, the old order in Sweden was only partly restored. The Anglo-Saxon influences grew stronger but in Swedish textbooks the Germans could still be characterized as “dutiful” and “energetic.” However, the harsh Treaty of Versailles converted some of those who had taken the side of the Allies. The Scandinavians, and above all the Swedes, got German credit for the humanitarian aid after the Great War. Many Germans saw in the people of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII their sister nations, whose virtues were strongly admired: bravery, primordiality, noble-mindedness, and a true relationship to nature. The so-called Nordische Gesellschaft which during the interwar period propagated for the moral and spiritual superiority of the Nordic race, certainly contributed to the spreading of this idea, the Nordische Gedanke.

The admiration was mutual, however. In the decadent and politically unstable Weimar Republic, both the leftist and rightist could see a forthcoming Schlaraffenland, sometimes as a communist Soviet republic, sometimes as a resurrected empire. Germany had, notwithstanding that, lost some of its lustre and was unable to without hindrance attract Swedes from different social strata. The demilitarization, democratization, and general levelling of society evoked disgust and loathing among the Swedish admirers of imperial Germany, such as the literary critic Fredrik Böök, the author Per Hallström, and the explorer Sven Hedin. Nonetheless, they continued to respect Germany. In Sweden there were furthermore a couple of Nazi-infected Swedish-German societies, whose purpose was to strengthen the connections between the two countries, for instance Svensk-tyska föreningen and Riksföreningen Sverige-Tyskland.

The 1920s were in other words a decade which included both fascination for and dissociation from Germany, but for many of the intellectual groups a strong fascination for the leading country of European modernism remained. 1933 is, however, a distinct divider in the history of the Swedish images of Germany. “The dark on the horizon,” as the Swedish minister of finance Ernst Wigforss wrote, became an important memento for the young social democratic government to force socialistic and democratic reforms. But even the liberals and the conservatives clearly marked their distance, the latter when they in 1934 detached their Nazi-fraternizing youth league from the main party. The picture has nevertheless some nuances. For example, the conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, due to their Communist scare, initially proved understanding to Germany’s new leadership.

To be German-friendly and to be Hitler-friendly increasingly became more or less the same during the second half of the 1930s. Despite the strong cultural and ideological links, there were remarkably few Swedes who transformed their sympathy for Germany to sympathy for Hitler. In the conservative and agrarian (Bondeförbundet) parties, a geopolitical and historical inspired Germanophilia survived through the 1930s, but the Kristallnacht and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact strongly weakened this current. When the war broke out, only a minority rallied round the Third Reich. During the war years, Alf W. Johansson wants to separate an attitude of real-politik from an ideological attitude towards Germany. The former, which primarily was cherished by the Right, saw Germany from its position in the current European system of states. The latter view, which was
emphasized by liberals and social democrats, meant that Germany should be judged according to the moral standard of the regime.\cite{37} According to Johansson, the politics of the Swedish coalition government became more and more pro-Allied and pro-Norwegian after the autumn of 1941, i.e. before the fortune of war changed.\cite{38}

In a study of the University of Lund during the Second World War, Sverker Oredsson uses other concepts than Johansson and he also reaches different conclusions. According to him, Lund university was in the years 1940–41 very much adapted in an ideological way to the new world order. The great majority among the leading professors and members of student’s union were right-wingers, often with special feelings for Germany. 1942 was the year of change and this should be understood as a direct result of the war. After this year, the number of Germanophiles decreased drastically. This characterization cannot, however, be generalized to the whole academic milieu in Sweden, since there were more pro-Nazis in Lund than elsewhere.\cite{39}

The picture becomes even more complex if a study of Helmut Müssener is included. In his examination of Swedish translations of German literature, he concludes that the Third Reich did not mean a *Kulturkatastrophe* in this respect; in some regards, the publication of translated German fiction even increased during these years. Instead, the absolute low point was reached 1945–49, when the translation of light reading literature in particular decreased sharply.\cite{40}

On the whole, 1933 must be seen as an important divide. Social democrats, liberals, and most of the conservatives emphatically repudiated “the new Germany.” When the war broke out, the number of openly confessing Germanophiles was indeed reduced, but they could still be found in certain political, military, and academic circles. By the end of the war, pro-German sympathies had long since ceased to be *comme il faut*. The German culture, compromised and fallen into disrepute, was finally degraded when English became the first foreign language in the Swedish schools during the second half of the 1940s.\cite{41}

**Conservatism and National Socialism**

Social democracy saw National Socialism as an authoritarian ideology which tried to annihilate all democratic and genuine socialist ambitions. The Liberals for their part reacted against the permeating racism and the disrespect for human dignity.\cite{42}

The relationship between conservatism and Nazism is more complex. There were, as Alf W. Johansson has noted, certain features in National Socialism which could appeal to a conservative mind: hierarchical structures and traditional family values as well as anti-Communism and hostility towards the Labour Movement. On the other side, the traditional conservatives took offence at the plebian manner of National Socialism and their disregard for the generally accepted conception of justice.\cite{43}

In Sweden, this ambivalence resulted in an ideological grey zone between conservatism and Nazism during the 1930s. In this field, older,
anti-democratic elements, that had survived in parts of the established Right, could flourish. The publicist Rütger Essén, who later was one of the editors of the pro-Nazi newspaper Dagsposten, is perhaps the most renowned representative of this tradition.44

Even in the parliamentary organized Right, which 1938 changed names to Högerns riksorganisation, a conflict emerged between a German-inspired, organic attitude towards the state and a more democratic, British attitude. The latter won the day, essentially because of the repulsive examples which were to be seen on the Continent between the two wars.45 Among the Swedish parties in the Riksdag, the agrarian party was probably the most inclined to incorporate National Socialist ideas.46 In addition to this, there were of course also the Swedish Nazi parties, led by for example Birger Furugård and Sven Olof Lindholm.47

During the first years of the Second World War, the spirit of the time was authoritarian and nationalistic. The conservative bastions – the monarchy, the church, and the army – were strengthened.48 By the end of the war, the situation was quite another. The German historian Martin Broszat has presented an interesting interpretation. According to him, the knowledge of the Nazi barbarism had also led to the simultaneous destruction of many traditionalistic values. Hitler destroyed, so to speak, the base for all conservative opposition against modernity and liberal democracy.49 At any rate, the Conservative Party received the lowest number of votes ever in the late 1940s, while the Liberals became the largest non-Socialist party. Not until the 1950s did the more liberal profile win acceptance. With this, the Right was able to regain lost ground.50

**Images of Germany**

**General Characterization**

This study is based on the analysis of 93 articles. Approximately four fifths of them, i.e. 73 articles, were published in Svenska Dagbladet; the rest are from Svensk Tidskrift.

The daily paper Svenska Dagbladet published most articles about German issues during the first year of the study, 1945 (28). This is not surprising, since the dramatic end of the war, the first winter of peace, and the question of the German war guilt were exhaustively commented upon. However, the result for the next year is more surprising; in 1946 only 7 articles were to be found. This can perhaps best be explained by the relative calm in top-level politics that year; beside the Nuremberg trials, the main issue was the deinstitution in post-war Germany.

The following year, in 1947, the German issues were again under discussion (17 articles). The external explanations for the renewed interest are obvious: the approaching Cold War. This tendency is also strong during the last year of the study, 1948, when 21 articles were published. The gap between East and West, illustrated in the Berlin blockade, was in focus.

For the periodical Svensk Tidskrift, the situation was partly another. During the first two years, the publication included 8 and 5 articles, respectively, on German matters. The war guilt and parallels between the Third Reich and
earlier German epochs were discussed. For the following years (1947–48), the number of articles was even lower, 2 and 5, respectively. It is to be noted that the stress was on issues concerning guilt and historical continuity, while the absence of the Cold War was conspicuous.

The Question of Guilt

In what follows, I will focus on the Schuldfrage. This is, in many respects, a question of the causes of the war and the rise of National Socialism. This was discussed extensively both in occupied Germany and in the occupying powers during the first two years of peace, but after 1946 it lost a good deal of its interest. The Vergangenheitsbewältigung was for two decades overshadowed by the Zukunftsbewältigung.51

In this case, it is relevant to analyze if the articles were concerned mainly with actors or structures. The first perspective sees changes of history as a result of individuals or groups of individuals. The other stresses the structures, for example social or economical conditions, in explaining history. This division is of course artificial; in reality, the borderline cases are much more common.

In connection with this, the concept of “Vansittartism” must also be scrutinized. This idea, named after the British diplomat Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart, states that the war and Nazism could be explained only by the craving for power which imbued the German Geist. The Germans, who were deeply anti-democratic and militaristic, should therefore be collectively condemned.52

A general feature in all articles is the strong and categorical condemnation of National Socialism. The descriptions of the Third Reich and its leaders took, with a few exceptions, the form of moral denunciations. In a few cases, the economical and social progressiveness of Nazi Germany was pronounced, but this meant nothing compared to the suffering of the occupied people and the heinous treatment of Jews and political opponents.53

When it came to the issue of individual versus collective guilt, the consensus was broken. “The Führer’s way led to destruction,” a writer concluded in April 1945.54 The other Nazi leaders, included “the Robespierre of Darwinism,” Himmler, were Hitler blindly devoted. In an article from the same year, the following was said about what Hitler had done to Germany: “A completely drained and entirely defeated nation, in a devastated and conquered land.” He was described as a militarist in the worst sense of the word, whose elixir of life was the brutal and nihilistic war.55

The same images reappeared several times during the first years.56 It was Hitler himself, the embodiment of evil, who had evoked the chaos. With other words, the attention was paid to actors and not structures.

However, this explanation was not the only one. Instead, “the Nazis,” i.e. an ill-defined collective, were made the scapegoat. During the Nuremberg trials of 1946, for example, the Nazi leadership was seen as the root of all evil, while collaborators and party officials had made “the triumph and survival of the brown plague” possible.57 In a contribution to the debate on the war criminals, the following was stated: “Foremost among the war criminals
stand the German leaders, the creators of the spirit from which the German outrages have originated.”\textsuperscript{58} In another example, the blood-guilt of the regime was mentioned. The guilt was attributed exclusively to the Nazi leaders.\textsuperscript{59}

The examples are manifold, but it suffices to draw one conclusion: the actors could shift, but the actor perspective did not change. Sometimes the war was seen as one man's work, sometimes the whole movement, above all the leaders, was blamed. In many respects, though, the actors seemed to be interchangeable.\textsuperscript{60} The name “Hitler,” for example, was more of a symbol for the regime than a solitary personage. “The necessary victory over Hitler,” it was noted, “is at the same time the defeat of Germany.”\textsuperscript{61}

Nonetheless, there were a few articles that viewed the problems from a structural angle. In an article from 1945 about the democracy in the future, the social circumstances of the interwar period explained best why many discontented, desperate ex-soldiers became fascists.\textsuperscript{62} In a review of Friedrich Meinecke’s \textit{Die deutsche Katastrophe}, the critic Erich Wittenberg polemized with the author. To a much greater extent than Meinecke, he wanted to seek structural explanations. “In fact”, Wittenberg wrote, “the explanation of this [i.e. the political success of the Nazis] is the international world-economic crisis of 1929, which paralyzed the Germans’ resisting power to National Socialism.”\textsuperscript{63}

The advocates of Vansittartism took up an extreme attitude to the issue of guilt. They meant that the name of the barbarism was not Nazism but Germany. The Germans were demonized. From this point of view, the idea of a collective guilt followed, an idea that could evolve also without a Vansittartistic conviction.

The Vansittartistic mode of thinking was not received very well by the conservative opinion. On a comparison with the Soviet Union, the following was written:

> But the great majority of German citizens are individually no more criminal than their killed Russian brothers [...]. However, the responsibility must be put on the German leadership, which more or less willingly contributed to the rise, exercise of power, and war crimes of National Socialism.\textsuperscript{64}

In many articles, a clear distinction between the German people and the Nazis was made. The Germans were even seen as the first victims of the regime.\textsuperscript{65} In Germany, as the Danish historian Aage Friis noticed, there lived millions of respectable men and women, who all had the same hatred of Hitler as the non-German anti-Nazis.\textsuperscript{66} For those who desired a democratic Germany, “the rabid recipe of Vansittartism” was even counter-productive: the worse the Germans were treated, the easier the crushed ideology could emerge again.\textsuperscript{67} Also in the more explicit discussion about the collective guilt, for example in connection with the Nuremberg trials, the critical contributions were in the majority. Most of the writers found it absurd – psychologically as well as legally – to demand any kind of collective confession of guilt.\textsuperscript{68}
However, even here there were some exceptions. Above all in Svensk Tidskrift, proof to the contrary could be found. According to one text, it was "the Germans as a people, not as individuals," who were ladened with guilt. And the explanation was quite simple: The German upbringing "had made the Germans fundamentally different from other peoples." This kind of obvious Vansittartism was, however, unusual.

To sum up, the origin of the war was explained by referring to different actors. Sometimes nobody but Hitler was guilty of the heinous deeds, sometimes the whole Nazi movement was blamed. Examples of Vansittartism in the articles were uncommon; in fact, this kind of ideas seemed to be counter-productive for democratization and Entnazifizierung. The concept of a collective German guilt was rejected.

### The Historical Germany

The examination of the conservative ideas of the historical Germany is divided into two parts. First, the notion of the Germans as "a people of writers and thinkers" is brought into focus. The main questions were often related to the value of Germany as a Kulturnation. Had the Nazi outrages perverted and discredited the classical German culture? Was it possible to write poetry after Auschwitz? In short, had "the other Germany" survived? The second part focuses on continuity versus discontinuity in history. The problem can be summarized into a question: Was the Third Reich a negation of the Germany of Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck – or its logical completion?

In these lines the trauma was caught:

> No dramatic writer could actually ever have portrayed the contrast between the old and the new Germany, between its good and evil genius, in a more horrifying way than the coincidence that the prison camp of Buchenwald lay only a couple of kilometres from Weimar. […] Presume that all those, who spiritually have prospered at this court of muses – Goethe, Schiller, Wieland, Herder, and others – had become aware of the atrocities which have taken place nearby. They would have turned their faces away in disgust. They would have fled their destiny of belonging to a people which was enable to commit such systematic outrages.70

The other Germany, for which “nothing was more alien than narrow-minded nationalism and brutality,” was now confronted with its antithesis. However, the author of the article had hopes of a renaissance for the humanistic virtues and exclaimed: Back to Weimar!71

Everyone was not so enthusiastic, but all contributions to this subject took the part of the classical Germany. The essential difference between the Third Reich and the other Germany was emphatically stressed. The Nazi era was characterized by a return to barbarism for a civilized nation.72 Hitler was described as “the arch-enemy of the classical German ideals and the conservative outlook on society.”73 Friedrich Meinecke’s book about the German catastrophe was reviewed in a feature article. The critic paid
special attention to one of Meinecke’s theses: “Since the days of Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, two different spirits have lived within the Prussian state: ‘eine kulturfähige und eine kulturwidrige.’” During the 18th and 19th centuries, these forces were kept at bay. But now, in the 20th century, the latter of them has prevailed. The outcome of this Manichaean battle will determine the German future.  

Among those who embraced the other Germany, no dissociation from these virtues was to be found. On the contrary, the classical ideals were still undoubtedly desirable; to this testified many articles about celebrated men from the past which were published 1945–48. Seldom, if ever, did they discuss the problem of continuity in German history. Others, however, were preoccupied with this question.

Both the continuities and the discontinuities were debated, but in different manners and in different kinds of articles. Those who wanted to see 1933 as a dividing point often took the new legal system which came into force this year as their point of departure. “Twelve years of Nazi regime have uprooted the […] civil rule of law,” one writer stated. With similar arguments, 1933 could be seen as a moral and cultural retrogression, as an atavistic relapse into a more primitive stage of development. Many of these interpretations were, however, based on superficial analogies and never sought to problemize. The explanation of this is probably quite simple: it was obvious for the early post-war generation to see the discontinuities between Nazi Germany and older German precursors, for example the Weimar Republic.

In other articles, though, more interesting and penetrating lines of argument were followed. In the discussions of the problem of continuity in German history, a couple of distinctive features frequently recurred: the dutifulness, Prussian militarism, the heritage from the Bismarckian policy of expansion and so forth. But they disagreed about the exact relationship between the periods. The relations between the Prussian spirit and Hitlerism were discussed in an article from 1948. A kind of congeniality was admitted, but the connection was not simple, since characteristics of Hitlerism have, according to the author, their roots in the nationalism of the early 19th century, which was hostile to Prussia. Hitler was seen as Bismarck’s antipode, not as his reincarnation. Others, who were less balanced, could conclude: "A very specific kind of upbringing has been fostered by the Germans. It is called Prussian militarism." In the years 1871–1918, the writer continued, this ideal got a foothold in all German states. His conclusion was: "National Socialism has again dressed the German ideal of upbringing in uniform, from which it was exempted during the Republic." The idea of the Sonderweg has here an early upholder. A partly different opinion was published two years later in Svensk Tidsskrift. The demagogy Hitler, whose essence did not include anything Prussian, had disguised “his tyrannical lust for power and his nihilistic philosophy in the forms of […] German patriotism.” Finally, the author denied any spiritual relationship between Hitler on the one hand and Frederick the Great and Bismarck on the other.

The result is partly ambiguous. Some texts preferred isolating the Third Reich from the rest of German history, but in most of the more ambitious surveys similarities to other epochs were pointed out. Continuity could above
The Future Germany

The attention will now be called to the future. The very precarious situation in Germany during the first post-war years was given fairly large attention in the conservative publications. The poverty, both materially and spiritually, was focused on. The articles were not primarily formed as distanced reports; on the contrary, they were passionate contributions to the debate on Germany's future. During the first years, the social, economical, political, and moral restoration was intensively discussed. But soon, at least from 1946, the approaching Cold War was a major theme when the German future was on the agenda. The attitudes to both these issues – the restoration and the super power conflict – will now be examined.

In a pessimistic analysis of October 20 1945, the following could be read:

The news from Germany becomes more and more unanimous in their dreary description of the consequences of the terrible defeat. The political problems which surround Germany's future and the question of "the re-education" of the Germans are more and more eclipsed by the urgent worries for the homeless masses and their supply problems. The outlook for the winter is dismal.82

In truth, this article was representative. Whenever the civilian population was mentioned, the tone became gloomy and the atmosphere dark. The smouldering ruins of today were compared with the devastation after the Peace of Westphalia. The conclusion was depressing: No matter how devastating the Thirty Years' War was, the situation today was much worse.83 It is true that the conservative organs did not have a reporter as Stig Dagerman to send, but they nevertheless published sympathetic stories from the demolished Germany.84

Indeed, the majority of the articles dealt with other subjects, but during the first years the famine and poverty returned many times. To relieve the suffering, the German economy must gain new strength. On this point all agreed, even if some of them had their doubts about the possibilities to succeed. The conservative opinion objected decisively to the so-called Morgenthau Plan, whose instigator, the American Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, wanted to transform Germany into a harmless, demilitarized agrarian society through deindustrialization.85

The Swedish conservatives were of one opinion. They concluded that a radical reawakening of the industry was needed, since "the factories now fall into decay at the same speed as the work capacity of the people yields and demoralization increases."86 Morgenthau and those who shared his views obviously thought that European peace could only be bought at the cost of German deindustrialization. His critics, among them the Swedish rightists, were convinced that peace could only be safeguarded if the German
economy was rehabilitated. Destitution and human degradation were furthermore a perfect breeding ground for revanchism and newly awakened fascism. As a logical consequence of this, the Marshall Plan was received favourably 1947, even if commentaries occurred only rarely during this period. (The American reconstruction program was first realized 1948–52.)

It was, however, not only the material destitution that must be relieved. A kind democratic “re-education” of the whole German people was also necessary. Some of the writers spoke about a spiritual Enttrümmerung, which above all was important for the rising generation. But many were disillusioned: “The Germans are so paralyzed by all misery and so indifferent to all politics, that at least the Anglo-Saxons doubt the possibilities to realize the desired ‘re-education.’” This particular mentality – the disillusioned, paralyzing mentality – was seen as an impediment to the Germans.

The conservatives fulminated above all against the occupying powers. Their inability to formulate and realize a powerful, constructive reconstruction program was lashed. The British German-policy was mercilessly condemned, sometimes explicit directed against Labour’s “meddlesome planned economy.” But all Allies were blamed. The Western Powers were in 1946 accused of not having a common plan for Germany’s future and their procedures up till now had been “an amazing proof of incompetence.” Irresoluteness and large organizing problems had lined their way.

The Western occupation policy was unanimously criticized during the first two years. After that, the blame was toned down, albeit relatively. When the Cold War went into its classic phase, the focus shifted. The American, British, and French achievements were interpreted according to the new political logic.

The second part in this conflict, the Soviet Union, had, however, in a different way been closely observed since 1945. Anti-Communism had at this time a solid position in the conservative circles, in Sweden and elsewhere. In spite of anti-Communism, the Soviet German-policy was not indiscriminately condemned by the opinion, even if distance always was kept. The Russians – this incorrect term was used almost without exception – were for example more successful with their aid contributions. To their credit, the rightists had also to admit their ability to act. But apart from this, the criticism of the Soviet policy was unsparing.

Already when the war came to an end, a flag of warning was hoisted: the Bolshevistic manifesto was spread at the speed of light east of the Oder-Neisse Line. Many articles entertained apprehensions that Eastern Germany would fall under Soviet jurisdiction. The German political indifference and many years’ experience to a dictatorial regime would make way for “the Asiatic hordes.” The fight against Germany was over. The fight for Germany had started.

By and by, the criticism increased. Sometimes, the eastern occupation zone was criticized for its lack of the legal rights of the individual. Sometimes, the ruthless socializations and the collectivist land reforms were blamed. But also the Soviet reparations were decried, while these only had “sabotaged every endeavour to economically reconstruct Germany.”
All these articles saw Germany as the first battlefield of the Cold War. The term “the Cold War,” coined in April 1947, is almost not to be found in the sources, but the characteristics of the conflict – the bipolar world order, the strong ideological antagonisms, and the immediate danger of a third world war – are clear. Of course, this is even more obvious during the Berlin blockade from 1948.

Comparing Communism with Nazism was another way of condemning the Soviet system. Talking of “the re-education” in the eastern zone, a writer concluded that “the conversion from brown to red goes as easy as the opposite during Hitler’s first years.” Sometimes, the ideologies were more explicitly placed on an equal level, as when a discussion about the Soviet Union was ended with the words: “every collectivist state has the same totalitarian claims as the Third Reich.” Notably, the lowest common denominator for these comparisons was the word “totalitarian.”

Noteworthy, great, all-embracing visions about the German future were seldom discussed. On the agenda stood questions about French-German co-operation and the new German constitution. The dreams of a united, peaceful Europe, in which the Germans were ordinary citizens, first reached Sweden at the end of the 1940s. But then, however, Konrad Adenauer’s, Alcide de Gasperi’s, and Robert Schuman’s ideas were favourably received by the Swedish conservative opinion.

To sum up, the pessimism was overwhelming in many of the articles that concerned Germany’s future. Initially, i.e. 1945–46, the misery and the lack of aid contributions were alarming. Later, the Cold War became the overriding problem. The conservative opinion saw reindustrialization and denazification as the best remedy for Germany. Indeed, all occupation powers were criticized, but the most relentless diatribes were launched against the Soviet Union.

**Results and Conclusions**

The general images of Germany in the conservative Swedish opinion has been analyzed. It is time to relate these results to the greater whole. Were these views representative of the whole ideological spectrum?

Anders Berge has studied the interpretations of the Cold War in the social democratic periodical *Tiden*. According to the author, *Tiden* viewed 1945–47 a future co-operation between the great powers in the occupied Germany as a possibility. On the whole, the journal was fairly positive these years and its attitude towards the Soviet Union was less rejecting than *Svenska Dagbladet’s* and *Svensk Tidskrift’s*. On the contrary, *Tiden* denied the threat of a future Russian expansion westward. However, the periodical changed sides by the autumn of 1947. Then, the gap between East and West was incontestable.

In his gradual thesis *Den svenska Tysklands-hjälpen 1945–1954*, Jörg Lindner has studied different kinds of texts to find examples of images of Germany. His analysis is partly unsatisfying and his selection of periodicals seems to be arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn things from his work. *Tiden* has not lost its interest in Germany after the war.
Vansittartistic ideas seemed to have been more common than in its conservative sister publication. On the other hand, the German working classes had not, according to the dissertation, been attracted by the Bismarckian ideals. Instead, the arguments for the prevalence of a German militaristic elite are fairly common in the social democratic organ, an idea whose counterpart is not to be found in the conservative press.\(^{112}\) Lindner also examines the leading business magazines – Affärsvärlden, Finanstidningen and Industria. In many respects, these publications took up a pragmatic attitude, where the trade political aspects were most important.\(^{113}\)

In one respect, Jorg Lindner’s dissertation is especially interesting. He reads Svensk Tidskrift, which according to him is the main organ of “a traditionally Germanophile group.”\(^{114}\) His results agree partially with this paper’s. It is more or less impossible to find traces of Vansittartism, Lindner concludes. The Third Reich was furthermore seen as the antithesis of “the other Germany.” This correlates with my results. On the other hand, he concludes: “According to the Right, the Third Reich was an ahistorical parenthesis which was the result of the Treaty of Versailles and the special socio-economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s.”\(^{115}\) This is not true. I have showed that two disparate explanations to the rise of Nazi Germany could be found in the sources. Neither of these corresponded with Lindner’s. First, there were many rightists, in Svenska Dagbladet as well as in Svensk Tidskrift, who clearly saw a historical continuity between the Third Reich and earlier German epochs. Nobody spoke of “an ahistorical parenthesis.” Secondly, only very few used structural explanations, as the socio-economic conditions of the interwar period, when they tried to understand what had happened. Hitler or the Nazi leaders were the only responsible.

In her dissertation about the Schuldfrage, Barbro Eberan comes to some conclusions that are irreconcilable with mine. According to her, it was above all the rightists who cherished the Kollektivschuldthese, while the leftists were critical. She makes her statement valid for all Western European democracies.\(^{116}\) This paper has rejected any such generalizations. On the contrary, Jorg Lindner’s work shows that the opposite must be true for Sweden.

It has been asserted that a “dislike of everything German” was spread after the war.\(^{117}\) This must be repudiated. As a matter of fact, nothing in the examined sources can confirm this thesis. The conservative anti-Nazis could continue to read Schiller at the same time as they took pity on the needy in the devastated Hamburg.

According to a common view, the German cultural dominance in Sweden was turned into an Anglo-Saxon ditto after the Second World War. On the whole, this is a quite trivial statement, but nevertheless has the exact nature of this change never been thoroughly described. However, this characterization is probably more correct for the Swedish mentality on the whole than for the conservative groups. For many humanistic educated scholars and publishers, German was still the first foreign language, albeit some of the leading social scientists – Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal – gravitated towards the Untied States. Moreover, the general Swedish
image of America was very positive until the beginning of the 1960s. In the light of the history of the Swedish-German relations, the early post-war years must be seen as a new phase. Germany was interpreted realistically, as if it was a normal European nation but with an abnormal history. The factual matters dominated the agenda. The German return to the civilization was necessary and must be realized through industrial restoration and civic education. Aversion neither to Germany nor to Germans could be found. But the Nazis were seen as the embodiment of evil and barbarism.

The break with the German tradition was perhaps not so complete, the historian Nils Runeby has said. For example, many Swedish students continued to travel to Germany after the war. “The conclusion is,” Runeby writes, “that Germany’s influence on a long view decreased, especially in the cultural sector. But its position in science, technology, and business has remained strong. The continuity is notable.” Nothing in this paper is contradictory to his conclusion.

1 This article is a revised, translated, and abridged version of a paper, which was originally written in Swedish at the Department of History, Uppsala University. The title was Valfrändskapens gränser. Bilder av Tyskland i den konservativa svenska opinionens huvudorgan 1945–48 (October 2000). I have mainly abridged the introductory chapter, i.e. the technical and methodological aspects of the paper.

2 In the original paper, a quantitative, statistical part was included in which the articles were categorized according to their content. This part has been left out. Nevertheless, the survey of the articles (see “General Characterization” below) as well as the division of the empirical examination into three parts are based on these statistics. See footnote 1.


7 Johansson, Alf W.: Den nazistiska utmaningen. Aspekter på andra världskriget. Fifth revised edition, Stockholm 2000 (the first edition was


13 For example, see Müssener, Helmut: *Exil in Schweden. Politische und kulturelle Emigration nach 1933*. München 1974. (= Stockholmer Germanistische Forschungen, 14) and Müssener 1985, see footnote 7.


16 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8.

17 Oredsson 1996, see footnote 8.

18 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7.

19 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4.

20 See *Schweden und Deutschland* 1999, see footnote 11, and Henningsen (ed.) 1997, see footnote 12, for earlier epochs.

21 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8, 57. Also Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 219, sees the 1870s as a new phase.

22 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8, 58.

23 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4, 31

24 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8, 58.

25 Ibid., 64-67.

27 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4, 31.


29 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8, 67-68.

30 Thulstrup 1962, see footnote 28, 219-30, and Oredsson 1996, see footnote 8, 48 ff.

31 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 218. Even in a European perspective, 1933 seems to have been a dividing year. See Eberan 1983, see footnote 9, 18.

32 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 218.

33 Oredsson 1996, see footnote 8, 21.

34 Nordin 1995, see footnote 8, 71.

35 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 219.

36 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4, 32.

37 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 232.

38 Ibid., 236.


40 Müssener 1985, see footnote 7, 7 and 52-53.

41 Oredsson 1996, see footnote 8, 215.

42 Johansson 2000, see footnote 8, 218.

43 Ibid., 218.

44 Ibid., 349.


46 Johansson 2000, see footnote 8, 218.

48 Johansson 2000, see footnote 8, 223.

49 Brozat is referred in Johansson 2000, see footnote 8, 147.


51 Eberan 1983, see footnote 9, 7–11.

52 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4, 30-31.

53 SvT 1945, 151–52.

54 SvD 25 April 1945: „Führerns väg stupade i fördärvet.”

55 SvD 2 June 1945: „En hårt åderlåten och i grunden besegrad nation i ett förött och härtaget land.“

56 SvD 21 September 1945.

57 SvD 2 October 1946: „den bruna masspestens maktåtkomst och fortvaro.”

58 SvT 1945, 120: “Främst bland krigsförbrytarna stå de tyska ledarna, skaparna av den anda, i vilken de tyska ogärningarna ha sitt upphov.”

59 SvD 1 February 1945.

60 SvD 2 October 1946 and SvT 1945, 120–22.

61 SvD 21 September 1945: “Den nödvändiga segern över Hitler är samtidigt Tysklands nederlag.”


64 SvD 20 October 1945: „Men det stora flertalet tyska civila medborgare åro individuellt icke mera brottliga än deras avlivade ryska medbröder […] Ansarets måste däremot drabba den tyska ledningen på olika områden, som mer eller mindre villigt medverkat till nationalsocialismens uppkomst,maktövning och krigsförbrytelser.”


66 SvD 14 March 1947.


68 SvD 22 March 1946.

69 SvT 1948, 59: „hade gjort det tyska folket grundligt olikt andra folk.”

70 SvT 1945, 291: „I själva verket skulle ingen dramatisk diktare kunna på ett fruktansvärda sätt framställa kontrasten mellan det gamla och
det nya Tyskland, mellan dess goda och dess onda genius än
tillfälligheten att Buchenwalds fångläger låg blott ett par kilometer från
Weimar. [...] Antag att alla de, som andligen blommat vid detta museums
hov – Goethe, Schiller, Wieland, Herder och vad de heta – fått vetskap
om de gräsligheter, som tilldragit sig i deras omedelbara närhet. De
skulle ha vånt sig bort med fasa. De skulle ha flytt undan ödet att tillhöra
ett folk, som var i stånd att begå sådana systematiska våldsdåd.”

71 SvT 1945, 291–94: “ingenting var mer främmande än trånghuvud
nationalism och brutal råhet.”

72 SvD 20 October 1945.

73 SvD 31 October 1945: „de tyska klassiska idealens och den
konservativa samhällsäskädnings ärkefiende.”

74 SvD 14 March 1947: “Allt sedan Fredrik Wilhelm I:s och Fredrik den
stores tid levde i den preussiska staten två själ: ’eine kulturfähige und
eine kulturwidrige.’”


76 SvD 29 March 1945: “Tolv års naziregim har ryckt upp den borgerliga
[...] rättskulturen med rötterna.”

77 SvD 2 June 1945 and SvD 20 October 1945.

78 SvD 13 April 1948.

omhuldats av tyskarna. Det kallas den preussiska militarismen.”

80 Ibid, 116–19: “Nationalsocialismen har sedan åter klätt det tyska
uppfostringsidealaet i uniformen, från vilket det var befriat under
republiken.”

81 SvT 1948, 578–79: “sina tyranniska maktsanspråk och sin nihilistiska
världsäskädning i den tyska patriotismens [...] former.”

82 SvD 20 October 1945: “Nyheterna från Tyskland bli mer och mer
enstämmiga i sin dystra skildring av nederlagets fruktansvärda följder. De
politisca problem, som röra Tysklands framtid, och frågan om det tyska
folkets ’omsköning’ pressas mer och mer i bakgrunden av de trångande
bekymren för de husvilla massornas härbärgerande och nödtorftiga
försörjning. Utsikterna för den kommande vintern ärö ödesdigra.”

83 SvD 4 October 1947.

84 SvD 1 October 1945 and SvD 19 April 1948.

85 Johansson 2000, see footnote 7, 131.

86 SvD 4 October 1947: ”nu förfalla fabriken i kapp med befolkningens
sviktande arbetsförmåga och tilltagande moraliska förvildning.”

87 SvD 27 July 1947 and SvD 30 May 1948.
90 SvD 23 November 1945: “Tyskarna själva äro så bedövade av alla olyckorna och så likgiltiga för all politik, att denna apati åtminstone inget anglosaxernas starka farhågor för den eftersträvade omskolningen.”

91 SvD 24 April 1947.

93 SvD 22 March 1946: „varit ett häpnadsväckande inkompetensprov.”


96 SvD 12 September 1947.

97 SvD 20 June 1945.

98 Ibid.

99 SvD 3 September 1945 and SvD 23 October 1946.

100 SvD 12 September 1947 and SvD 15 December 1947.

101 SvD 11 July 1948: „saboterat varje strävan att ekonomiskt återuppbryga Tyskland.”


104 SvD 5 October 1945: „övergången från brunt till rött sker lika lätt som motsatsen under Hitlers första maktår.”

105 SvD 20 May 1947: “varje kollektivistisk stat har samma totalitär maktsanspråk som Tredje riket.”

106 SvD 20 May 1947 and SvD 27 October 1946.

107 SvD 11 June 1948 and SvD 11 February 1948.


109 Berge 1990, see footnote 6.

110 Ibid., 49–54.

111 Lindner 1988, see footnote 4.

112 Ibid., 40–42.
Ibid., 48–49.

114 Ibid., 49: „en traditionellt tyskvänlig grupp.“

115 Ibid., 49–51: „Enligt högern var Tredje Riket en ahistorisk parentes tillkommen på grund av Versaillefördraget [sic!] och 1920- och 1930-talens speciella socioekonomiska förutsättningar.“


