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The Federal Republic of Germany and Norway

Bilateral relations in the context of European integration (1966–1973)¹

Robin M. Allers

Zusammenfassung

Mit dem politischen Wechsel in der BRD 1966 und 1969 verbesserten sich die deutsch-norwegischen Beziehungen. Willy Brandt und seiner engen Verbindung mit Norwegen kam hierbei eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Gleichzeitig intensivierte sich auch der Kontakt zwischen Norwegen und der EG, indem die Erweiterungsfrage neue Impulse erhielt. Von der Vorbereitung des zweiten norwegischen Antrags auf Mitgliedschaft 1967 bis zum negativen Referendum 1972 und dem Abschluss eines Freihandelsvertrages 1973 konzentrierten sich die deutsch-norwegischen Gespräche auf europapolitische Fragen. In diesem Beitrag werden die zentralen Problemstellungen und methodischen Herausforderungen eines Dissertationsprojektes diskutiert, das sich mit dem Verhältnis von bilateralen und multilateralen Ebenen der deutsch-norwegischen Zusammenarbeit auseinandersetzt und die Bedeutung von Bürokratie, Parteien und individuellen Akteuren darin zu erfassen sucht.

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The aim of this research report is to discuss the main ideas and the methodological challenges of my dissertation project. In my thesis I will analyse the bilateral relations between Norway and West Germany in the context of European integration.² I will concentrate on the implications of the European integration process for the bilateral relations, rather than of focusing on other aspects of common interest for the two countries, such as their co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance or the work for better relations with Eastern Europe. In this research report I will argue, moreover, that in the age of Internationalisation and Europeanisation of politics, an historical analysis of a bilateral relationship has to go beyond narrative-based and chronologically organised description. Analytical methods should not only be used but should also be made explicit.

Five aspects make the German-Norwegian case an interesting example of the “Europeanisation” of bilateral relations.

1. The relation between Germany and Norway is historically ambivalent, shaped by a long tradition of cultural and economic exchange, as well as by the negative experience of nazi-occupation.
2. The relation is an unequal one between a “small state” and a “central

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European power”.

3. The relation is one between a member of the European Community and a non-member (applying for membership).
4. The political relation could build on a well-established partnership between labour parties in both countries, a partnership that had a bilateral as well as a multilateral dimension.
5. The relation had a personal dimension through the influence of one major individual actor at the highest decision-making level in Germany who had a close relation to Norway – Willy Brandt.

In the period 1966–1973 the five aspects named above gained a particular significance.

1. The bilateral problems caused by the years of occupation became less preoccupying, due to extended functional co-operation.
2. West Germany entered a period of more self-confident foreign policy. This expressed itself most of all in a new approach towards Germany’s East-European neighbours, the so-called “Neue Ostpolitik”, but had also an impact on the contact with its Western partners and allies.
3. The integration process took a large step forward; as well in matters of reinforcement of the union through new proposals concerning currency co-operation and institutional change, as in matters of enlargement. The second appliance for membership in 1967 and the opening of negotiations in 1970 – made possible by General de Gaulle’s resignation and the Hague-summit in 1969 – put the European question high on the political agenda in Norway.
4. The coming to power of the social democrats in Germany, first as a junior partner in the Grand Coalition (1966) then as a senior partner in the social-liberal coalition (1969), offered the elite-levels in the social-democratic movements in Norway and other applying countries a more direct contact to relevant decision-making levels in the European Communities.
5. The central role played by Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the Federal Republic not only changed the nature of German-Norwegian relations, but guaranteed the Norwegian government a steadfast support in the membership negotiations.

Three questions are central to my project:

- What impact did the process of European integration have on the bilateral relations between West Germany and Norway?
- How were the exchange and the co-operation on the bilateral level supplemented by or even interconnected with the co-operation on the multilateral level?
- To what extent could political parties and individual actors play an active role in furthering co-operation on both levels?

These questions indicate that my thesis is not going to provide a chronologically organised description of the relations between West Germany and Norway. I am rather opting for a systematic approach distinguishing different levels of analysis. I do so because I consider the classical diplomatic history approach insufficient to grasp the whole range of

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interactions in international relations. This seems particularly evident to me regarding questions of European integration. Globalisation and Europeanisation of international relations after 1945 have been accompanied by a retreat of the nation-state's dominant role and the appearance of new actors, i.e. international organisations, integrated institutions and multinational companies. This change in the role of the Nation-state as an actor in international affairs should have an impact on the analytical examination of these affairs.³ The more European states co-operate on a supranational level, the more an analysis of this co-operation is forced to distinguish between the national and the supranational level.⁴ Nevertheless, it has been observed that the connections between theory of integration, organisation of integration, and history of integration remain largely unexplored.⁵

In addition to the distinction between a national and a supranational level, we have to consider – also in a historical analysis – the fact that the nation-state is a collective actor, and that its foreign policy is the result of a number of internal interactions that lead to specific decisions.⁶ The external activities and relations of political parties, for example, represent a significant factor in German-Norwegian relations after 1945. To find out how parties interacted with bureaucratic and political institutions at the national and international level, we need to analyse them on a separate level. The same is true for individual actors.

However, even if analytical fragmentation and dissection is necessary, empirical documentation, thorough description and coherent presentation – situating the topic in space and time – should remain an essential element of historical research. The question of whether a combination of these two approaches is necessary and how it can best be achieved has occupied many scholars in the field of history and social science.⁷ In fact, since the early 1970s there has been an ongoing controversy among German historians about the methodology of diplomatic history or “modern political history”.⁸ This discussion was recently revived by the appearance of a history of German foreign policy from 1871 to 1945 which was praised for the breadth of its documentation and the elegance of its speech, but criticised for Neo-Rankeanism and orthodox historical methodology.⁹ A comparable debate has been provoked in Norway by criticism towards the official history of Norwegian foreign policy.¹⁰ Here, criticism was directed mainly against an almost exclusively empirical and narrative approach, neglecting more analytical methods and showing little interest in new theoretical currents.¹¹ Both controversies can be placed in the larger context of interaction between the fields of history and social science.¹² All the same, independently of their belonging to different fields, both the history of international relations and the international relations theory in political science have to face some of the same questions.¹³ Is it sufficient to focus only on the state level of analysis, or must other levels of analysis be taken into account? Should these different levels be integrated in the narrative, or should they be made explicit and treated separately?

The choice of a multi-level approach encounters a certain number of decisions on the distinction of levels, the choice of evidence and the organisation of the results. My own approach is based on the encouraging

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conclusion of Eckart Conze, “[d]aß sich Theorieorientierung und historisch-empirischer Zugriff nicht ausschließen, sondern, im Gegenteil, einander ergänzen können[...]”.¹⁴ Moreover, I will try to respond to a demand by Hans Branner concerning the analysis of foreign policy:

We need both the well-documented historical inquiry revealing the distinctive character of the foreign policy of an individual state and how this policy has evolved over time, as well as the construction of concepts, models, and theories able to show how the behaviour of a specific state fits into a larger pattern enabling the analyst to draw more general conclusions valid for other states.¹⁵

But Branner also warns that the ambition to reach a comprehensive foreign policy analysis by “combining empirical findings and theoretical endeavours” will be problematic.¹⁶ By analysing and describing the relations between Germany and Norway, I will not try to develop any new theories, models or concepts of common value for the interpretation of neither International Relations nor Europeanisation. I will, however, use certain approaches of international relations theory as a frame of analysis for my research. This use of concepts and theories from other sciences is far from being new or revolutionary. It has been suggested, among others, by the “school” of the late Jean Baptiste Duroselle.¹⁷ Indeed, as Colin and Miriam Elman have pointed out: “Many historians may already rely on the same kinds of causal theories as international relation theorists, but for mainly aesthetic reasons prefer not to make this reliance explicit.”¹⁸

The methodological concepts or approaches that seem to fit the questions asked and the problems addressed in my thesis are the following:

I will use theories of political culture and the concept of foreign policy tradition to analyse the attitudes of Germany and Norway towards European integration and to discuss the changing role of the nation-state in international relations.

I will rely on the concept of historical institutionalism (or administrative history) and on the analysis of decision-making processes to see if there was institutional adaptation to increasing Europeanisation in both countries.

Finally, I will use concepts discussing the role of elites and individual actors in foreign policy, to see if different groups inside the nation-state – e.g. political parties – can develop a dynamic of their own in relations between states, and to what extent individual actors dispose of a “marge de manoeuvre”.

I will come back to these concepts throughout this report. I will start, however, by discussing further the different segments of the title i.e. the terms “bilateral relations” and “European integration”, as well as the choice of this particular period. Next, I will present the order in which I am planning to analyse the different parts of my study, outlining at the same time the basic ideas they will contain. Finally, I will comment on the literature used for this project. I will also make some remarks on the additional evidence I am planning to use, with particular attention to the archive situation in Germany

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and Norway.

Discussion: Bilateral relations, European integration and periodisation

My first question is the following: How important were bilateral relations between Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany during the chosen period? By asking this, I am implicitly questioning the importance of bilateral relations between the two countries as a research topic.

Looking at the hitherto published material on German-Norwegian relations, the importance of this topic doesn't seem to be too evident. Take the statements of German top-politicians at the time for example: "Heute gibt es keine wirklich schwierigen Probleme zwischen unseren beiden Ländern", Chancellor Willy Brandt told Prime minister Per Borten during his state visit in 1970, adding that there were, however, enough interesting things to discuss.¹⁹ His successor, Helmut Schmidt, who was Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance in the Brandt-Government, is even more explicit in his memoirs: „Bilaterale deutsch-norwegische Fragen, die ein Gespräch zwischen den Regierungschefs hätten notwendig machen können, hat es nicht gegeben.“²⁰

These statements can be explained in three non-excluding ways. One explanation could be that at the end of the 1960s, the relations between Norway and Germany had evolved from very problematic to relatively normal. Bilateral questions or problems that had weighed upon the relations had become less. Another explanation could be that for a central power like Germany, bilateral relations with a small state like Norway didn't represent an important factor in the construction and management of postwar Europe. A third explanation could be the reluctance of Norway to participate fully in a project that was essential to the Federal Republic's existence as a sovereign foreign policy actor – namely European integration.

That Norway hasn't been on the top agenda of West-German Foreign policy is clear enough. This impression is reflected in the literature on German Foreign Policy and European Integration history, where Norway hardly ever appears, not to talk about bilateral German-Norwegian relations.²¹ This was also confirmed to me by the almost complete ignorance of the subject by Brandt's advisor on European affairs, Katharina Focke, or by Historians who have published major works on German postwar history such as Arnulf Baring.²²

How important was West Germany to Norway? The Federal Republic certainly represented a bigger problem to the Nordic State than the other way round. The historian Rolf Tamnes states that in few countries in Europe the memories from the years of occupation lived longer than in Norway.²³ Hans-Otto Frøland gives a detailed account of how the political co-operation was overshadowed by Norwegian mistrust until 1967.²⁴ Even if the more psychological problems ceased to dominate in the mid-1960s²⁵, the fear for a revival of German aggression was for many people replaced by a fear for German dominance in economic matters.²⁶ In addition, the unresolved "German question" weighed heavily upon the general questions of foreign and security policy in post-war Europe.

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The continued sensibility in Norway regarding the “German trauma” was not always perceived in Germany. German top politicians, such as Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, could during a visit to Norway in 1966 state that the atmosphere of the talks was “ausgezeichnet”²⁷, whereas his Norwegian counterparts were, at least in retrospect, not enthusiastic at all. Foreign Minister John Lyng writes in his memoirs that the talks took place in a “correct but not too heartily atmosphere”.²⁸ And the Norwegian newspaper *Morgenbladet* wrote that:

Unser Verhältnis zu Deutschland ist nicht ganz normalisiert – auf psychologischer Ebene. Noch gibt es Erinnerungen, die ihren Schatten werfen, wenn sie auch immer weiter zurückliegen und schwächer werden.²⁹

Nevertheless, apart from atmospheric disturbances on the psychological level, at the end of the 1960s Norwegian governments were also able to state: „Zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Norwegen gibt es keine großen bilateralen Probleme.“³⁰

The lack of problems in the bilateral relations is, of course, not reason enough to abstain from research on the topic. Firstly, because there is an apparent need to describe the relations between neighbours and allies however important or unimportant they might have been. Secondly, because the topic “bilateral relations” itself leads to questions that are of general interest for the study of international relations. For example: Was the lack of high-level interest in bilateral problems a characteristic of relations between a small state and a bigger one? Yes, one might answer, when looking at the importance of Franco-German relations for the process of European integration – and vice versa!³¹ Looking at the Anglo-German relations, however, one may find statements like the following, found in a letter from Prime minister Edward Heath to Willy Brandt in 1971:

Our talks [in Bonn], which I believe came at a particularly timely moment, were for me of the greatest interest and importance. The degree of understanding between our countries is now such that, as you remarked, there were really no bilateral matters that called for discussions between us. On the other hand, with regard to the wider issues of European unity and relations with the East, and indeed the whole future of Western Europe, we have interests and concerns in common of the most profound significance for us both. [...]³²

The last sentence in Heath's letter points at two important elements in the relations between European states in the chosen period, which can actually be found in the relations between small states and central powers as well as between larger states. On the one hand, a feeling that the need to rebuild confidence through good bilateral relations after World War II had reached a somewhat satisfying stage.³³ At the same time, the well being of the nation-state was not any longer manageable unilaterally. Ludwig Erhard underlined this, when he stated after his visit to Oslo in 1966 that, contrary to a visit in 1958, he had the strong impression that common problems, as the bridging of the gap in European trade, had gained much more

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prominence.³⁴

The question about the importance of bilateral relations has therefore to be asked in a different way: How did European integration and the multilateralisation of Western European foreign and economic policies influence bilateral relations? This question calls for the comparison of a number of different case studies inside the EEC. I have already mentioned the special case of the Franco-German axis. Another interesting case is the role of the small states that were founding members of the European communities and their relations among themselves and with the larger states.³⁵ Given the strengthening of the Community, the strictly bilateral questions seemed to be more and more difficult to distinguish from the multilateral ones.³⁶ Yet the national identity of each country, meaning its special conditions, motivations and interests, continues to make its relations to another country unique and important.³⁷

When it comes to the relations between the member-states of the EEC and the non-members, the question of the EEC as an actor in foreign and trade policy has to be discussed in addition. How strong was the role of the community compared to the role of each individual member-state in the external affairs? On which level were which questions to be discussed? Which questions were strictly bilateral, and which had an impact on the other EEC-members and the community and had therefore to be discussed on a multilateral level? Consider the impact of Franco-British bilateral relations for the question of Britain's entry in the EEC.³⁸ Consider also the US-German relations and the wide range of bilateral and multilateral problems arising from the USA's role as an occupying power in Germany, the balance of payment deficit, and the EEC's growing role as a rival to the USA in trade questions. Most of these questions were closely linked to each other, and concerned the FRG as well as its European partners.³⁹ In his review of recent studies on post-war diplomatic history, the historian Eckart Conze points to the consequences of this "multilateralisation" of bilateral relations for their analytical examination.

Keiner dieser Politikbereiche [Entspannungspolitik, Deutschlandpolitik, Handelspolitik, R.M.A] ließ sich noch in traditionelle Schemata bilateraler Beziehungen hineinpressen, und infolgedessen muß auch die geschichtswissenschaftliche Analyse über die Untersuchung rein bilateraler Staatenbeziehungen hinausgehen.⁴⁰

Let us revert to the question whether the German-Norwegian relations are worth extensive research. It is certainly true that the interest for German-Norwegian relations cannot match the interest historians have in, say, the Franco-German relations. Nor could the problem of Norwegian membership ever gain the same prominence as the British membership-question or the Currency crisis between the USA and the EEC. But the German-Norwegian relationship represents a specific case, which, considered its own set of historical and contemporary ambiguities and problems, is worthwhile studying in more detail. We are talking about the relations between a "small state"⁴¹ and one of the major European powers (at least in the sense of geography, population and economy), between an occupied and an

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occupying country during WW II, and between a country condemned to integration and one heralding national sovereignty. These conditions alone make German-Norwegian relations an interesting case. If one looks at the bilateral relations in the context of European integration, the German-Norwegian case is also a good example of how EEC members managed their external affairs to non-members, which, like Norway, applied for membership or another form of closer co-operation.

This brings me to my second question: How to define “the context of European integration”? First we have to consider that the European context was very different for Norway and for the FRG. While both were affected by the outcome of World War II and by the general context of the Cold War, they chose – or had to choose – contrasting ways leading to different contexts in questions of economic cooperation. Norway’s relation to the European integration process was determined by its difficult geographical situation, by its strong wish for national independence, by Nordic cooperation and by its attachment to the United States and Great Britain. This led the country to follow Great Britain’s European policy and to favour loose trade cooperation through participation in the EFTA.⁴² Germany’s European policy was determined, among other factors, by its incomplete sovereignty, its division, and its dependence on liberal trade, which together placed it at the heart of the integration process.⁴³ These backgrounds couldn’t be more different, and one could argue that this difference limited the number of contacts between the two countries and thus the number of interesting questions to study. But from the early sixties up to the early seventies, Norway together with Denmark, Ireland and first of all Great Britain, applied for membership in the EEC, where West-Germany was already established as a core member. The process of appliance brought both contexts together. After this process ended with a negative referendum in 1972 and the negotiation of a free-trade agreement in 1973, Norway and Germany were once again operating in their respective context of European co-operation.⁴⁴

This is why my third question points to the problem of periodisation (which, by the way, was one of three major themes during the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, that took place in Oslo in August 2000). More generally, periodisation is about defining a time period such as “contemporary history” (Zeitgeschichte) or the “Cold War”. On the other hand, the historian has to make a reasonable choice with regard to the time period he is going to analyse more closely. The questions with regard to my research topic are the following:

- How can one periodise the West German-Norwegian relations after 1945,
- how does this periodisation fit in with the periodisation of the two countries’ history and of the process of European integration,
- and what justifies the restriction of the analysis to the specific time period of 1966 to 1973?

I have already mentioned the special momentum that the process of European integration gained at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. The end of the chosen time period is justified by Norway’s “no” to membership in 1972 and its Free-Trade Arrangement with the EC in 1973.

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The year 1966 as a starting point is justified with the renewed British pressure for membership negotiations and Norway's reaction to this. But the bilateral context seems to be equally important. Though not particularly explicit on the reasons, causes and consequences, most studies on West German-Norwegian relations recognise an important change in this relationship with the coming to power of Willy Brandt's SPD. This change is mainly seen as a transition from a functional normalisation, the re-establishment of co-operation in the areas of trade and defence matters, to a "political normalization".⁴⁵ The latter, being of psychological and symbolic nature, is much more difficult to grasp. This is nevertheless an important aspect in international relations. The change that took place is most often described with the words of John Lyng who was Norway's Foreign Minister from 1965 to 1970. He characterised Norway's communication with the German government, now represented by Brandt, as "en helt ny tankeverden", a completely new world of thoughts.⁴⁶ This links the amelioration of bilateral relations to one person, Willy Brandt, with his special relation to Norway and Scandinavia. This explanation is very tempting and it is possible to speak of the chosen period as "the era Brandt". An explanation like this is certainly not unproblematic, given the questionable importance of individual actors in international politics (I comment on this in part two of this report). Nevertheless, the coming to power of the Social Democrats represents a major change in West-German politics after 1945.⁴⁷ Its impact on international relations can be found at the bipolar, the European as well as at the bilateral level.

Looking at the German-Norwegian relationship in a wider time-perspective, the year 1972 represents a turning point in the bilateral and multilateral relations. Moreover, the period from 1966 to 1973 stands out as a period of intensified contact and exchange on both levels of co-operation.

Organisation of the results / Structure of the thesis

Having outlined the central problems I am going to discuss in my thesis, I will now explain how I intend to organise the results. I have already argued that there is a need for a thorough description of the bilateral and multilateral relations between Norway and West Germany, as well as for a systematic analysis of the different levels on which these relations were organised. Following this idea asks for a twofold approach, combining chronological-descriptive elements with systematic analysis of structures and processes.

The research is going to take place on three different analytical levels – the bilateral level, the multilateral level and a third and fourth level taking up the role of parties and personalities – and will be presented in three different parts. A discussion of the relevant theoretical concepts will introduce each part.

Part one: The FRG and Norway in Europe – bilateral relations on the basis of their respective foreign policy tradition

In the first part – focusing on national foreign policy and bilateral relations – I will discuss Norway and the Federal Republic as actors in the international system and its Western European subsystem. This does not mean, however, that I shall present them only as actors in the sense of the realist theory of

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international relations, focusing mainly on their national interests and the external factors which constraint them. Following other theoretical concepts (e.g. constructivism), I will complete the realist approach by stressing Germany and Norway's foreign policy tradition, as a part of their "national identity".⁴⁸ More precisely, I will examine the different conditions and motivations that resulted from historical experiences, and that composed a perception of national identity and also influenced the political culture in the two countries.⁴⁹ This approach will help me to locate West Germany and Norway more accurately in the context of international relations and European integration policy at the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, it will provide a basis for describing their respective foreign policy priorities, and finally it will help to explain how the bilateral relations were conducted under these conditions (historical determinants, political culture, external and internal factors).⁵⁰

In addition to describing West-German-Norwegian relations after WW II and more specifically in the period from 1966 to 1973, I will in this part of the study try to give a clearer understanding of what is meant by "bilateral relations". From an institutional point of view, the focus will be on the representative and governmental level as well as on diplomatic, cultural and corporate contacts. Thematically, the most important fields of bilateral co-operation seem to be questions of trade, security policy (mostly arms trade), cultural exchange and lifting of psychological barriers stemming from the war.

Part two: The FRG and Norway and Europe – europeanisation in the perspective of historical institutionalism and co-operation on a multilateral level

In the second part – discussing the multilateral level – I will rely on a microanalytical approach, looking more closely at the structures and processes of Norway and West Germany's European policies and their co-operation on this level. As in the first part, I will start by a comparative analysis, this time comparing the organisation of the two states' respective European policy.⁵¹ In a historical institutionalist perspective, I will have a look at how Germany and Norway adapted their national governments to the Europeanisation of politics and policies. By doing this, I have to keep in mind the different circumstances under which the two countries were involved in the integration. As a founding member of the Communities, Germany had gained its sovereignty through the integration process. In 1958 it had finally adapted its central government structures to this process.⁵² Norway had from the beginning stayed outside the integration process, without making any comprehensive effort to adapt its government structures to the European integration process. The main questions that I will ask here are:

1. How were bilateral matters (meaning German-Norwegian) and multilateral matters (meaning matters regarding EEC and EFTA) organised within the concerned ministries?
2. How was co-operation regarding these questions between the concerned ministries and the missions abroad (again, bilateral and multilateral, meaning: Oslo, Bonn and Brussels) organised?
3. How was co-operation on these issues co-ordinated between the

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concerned ministries (including the office of the head of government)?

I will then take a look at how West Germany and Norway co-operated on the multilateral level. While Norway in 1967 and from 1970 negotiated with the EEC for full membership, Germany was already one of the European Community's central powers and actually a driving force behind the enlargement process. Germany was not only a bilateral partner for Norway, but also part of a collective actor – the EEC – with whom the Kingdom negotiated, first for full membership, and then for a free trade agreement.⁵³ Here I have to consider different aspects. How established was the European community as an international actor? And how influential was the role of the “European bureaucracy” at the time?⁵⁴ Could Germany use its influence inside the EEC to work for favourable terms for Norway? Was this engagement solicited?

It is important to notice in this context that also the national and supranational bureaucracies in Oslo, Bonn and Brussels were, to a certain degree, affected by political or even ideological preferences and, not least, by personal relations. Introducing a compilation of studies on the emergence of a European administration, the editors acknowledge the fact,

daß sich Verwaltungsfragen zunehmend in Fragen politischer Natur verdingen [...]. Beachtung verdienen ferner [...] die Auswirkungen informeller Netzwerke persönlicher Beziehungen, deren Grundlage sehr oft, aber nicht nur, nationale oder ideologische Gemeinsamkeiten bildeten.⁵⁵

Part three: Party-politics and personal affinity – a factor of bilateral and multilateral co-operation?

In the third part, I will examine a third and fourth level of co-operation between Norway and Germany. The influence of political parties on foreign policy seems to be of great interest, both in the case of the Norwegian Labour-Party (DNA)⁵⁶ and the German Social Democrats (SPD).⁵⁷ The foreign policy activities of these parties, organised in special committees or sections under the direction of the party leadership, were, of course, not mainly concerned with European policies or with the bilateral relations. Activities in the “Socialist International” and relations to Third World countries were important in the 1960s and became even more so in the 1970s.⁵⁸ Yet given the imminent importance of the European question for political life in Norway at the end of the 1960s and the fact that co-operation with Western European sister-parties had become a day-to-day reality for the German social democrats, there was a good deal of exchange between the DNA and the SPD on this subject too.⁵⁹ Even more so, since the leaders of these parties were staunch supporters of the integration idea.⁶⁰

This leads us to a fourth level of co-operation, which is closely linked to the level of party co-operation: the question of personal affinity, personal relations and their influence on foreign policy.⁶¹ This is a highly problematic field of research, that nevertheless cannot be ignored, and which in the case of the German Foreign Minister and Chancellor at the time, Willy Brandt, is of particular interest. Nearly everybody who has written something on German-Norwegian relations has pointed to the fact that political

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normalisation and psychological amelioration between the two countries were closely linked to Brandt's coming to power in 1966 and 1969.⁶² Yet nobody has so far examined by which means these changes took place, and if they had any influence on the practical co-operation between the two states. Some evidence indicates that if Brandt's affinity for Norway had any practical consequences on the political level, this became visible in questions linked to the enlargement of the EEC.⁶³ It is difficult, of course, to distinguish clearly between Brandt's general commitment for the enlargement process and his special sympathy for the Norwegian case. Moreover, the importance of a small state like Norway for Germany shouldn't be overweighted, especially in a period when Ostpolitik, currency crisis and internal reforms stood above all on the political agenda. However, Brandt's special relationship with Norway, which had influenced his political education and stayed present through personal and political friendship, provides an interesting case that stands out from the political routine. Finally, it is important to note that neither the official German-Norwegian relations nor Brandt's personal relationship relied exclusively on the relations with the labour party. Even if the contacts between the two sister-parties were much closer and more frequent, Brandt established a good relationship, too, with the non-socialist government that was in office from 1965 to 1970.

To conclude this section, one might ask again, what interest we have in distinguishing between these different analytical levels? The interest lies in the fact that the formulation and execution of foreign policy takes place in different institutions and on different levels. Vertically seen, it seems clear that the Franco-German relations, for example, reside on the top-level of decision-making, whereas relations with Norway are normally treated on a lower bureaucratic level. The interesting thing to examine is what happens when – as was actually the case between 1966 and 1973 – a country like Norway can rely on a special connection with the top-level of decision-making in Germany. Does this have any effect on the lower levels – responsible for the execution of the policy? Or are they circumvented? If the leaders have established a personal relation, does the influence from the top make its way down to the working level? Here we come to the necessity of a horizontal analysis. It is a commonplace that foreign policy is no longer an affair between heads of government. Nor do the foreign ministries any longer have the main responsibility in this field. The ongoing process of multilateralisation and Europeanisation has contributed to this. On the one hand, more and more departments and institutions are involved in the external affairs of a country. On the other hand, the role of supranational institutions, like the Commission of the EC, is becoming more important. In addition, we have to consider the role of political parties, which again often co-operate on a multilateral basis.

For my study I have decided to single out the different levels of co-operation, aiming at a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the foreign policy process. This doesn't make sense, however, if the linkages between the levels are not pointed out. In fact, this is where the most interesting part of the analysis begins. Nonetheless, it has to be acknowledged that these interactions are extremely difficult to follow up. It is difficult to find evidence in the files of the respective diplomatic archives on the informal relations between Brandt and high placed Social Democrats in Norway, for example.

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The same is true for the contacts between the German Chancellor, his services and the multilateral services in Brussels actually responsible for the negotiations with Norway. However – as underlined above – if you want to trace the informal interactions, the point of departure is a better knowledge of the political culture, the organisational structures and the individuals involved in the broad range of bilateral and multilateral relations. After having explained the different levels of analysis, I will now comment on the different complexes of evidence that I am going to use for my research.

Literature and Sources

The problem of methods and theoretical approaches is closely linked to the problem of evidence. Four questions have to be considered:⁶⁴

1. What has been written on the subject so far?
2. How complete and reliable is this basis of secondary sources?
3. How can the evidence be completed in order to respond to the analytical and empirical aims of the study?
4. How reliable and, given the study's partially comparative character, how even-handed is the primary evidence that one intends to add?

I will discuss my own material under these aspects.

Secondary sources

Since I have already mentioned a great number of works during this presentation, I will try to regroup and characterise the different types of literature. There has not been done too much research on German-Norwegian relations so far – at least not on the recent period and certainly not with reference to European integration. The only period that has drawn considerable attention on both sides of the North Sea was World War II and the occupation of Norway by Nazi-Germany.⁶⁵ The post-war period, however, has not been particularly well researched.⁶⁶ Most of the literature has concentrated on security issues, an explainable fact given the importance of this field in the first two decades of the Cold War.⁶⁷

The bibliographical material therefore needs to be completed. According to the different levels of research, four complexes of literature provide the basis for my research. The first one is the literature on German and Norwegian foreign policy. Since in both countries this field of study represents a long tradition, I can rely on a generally well-documented, though not always methodologically inspired, mass of publications including all possible aspects.⁶⁸

The second complex consists of literature on European integration. Here I have to distinguish between the historical writings which, due to the limited access to diplomatic sources, only now start to reach the chosen time period⁶⁹, and the political science literature discussing theories, structures and processes of integration from a day to day point of view.⁷⁰ Important sources of information are the analyses contributed by contemporary researchers and actors that can be found in the relevant periodicals and newspapers.⁷¹ Other important sources, though problematic, are memoirs of diplomats and politicians.⁷² The third complex consists of literature on the political parties in the two countries and of biographical material, mainly on

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Willy Brandt.

One characteristic of the literature used for this project is to be seen in the fact that a combination of historical writings and political science literature is necessary. Some historians have written useful contributions on the theoretical aspects of integration and worked closely on decision-making structures or the cultural aspects of foreign policy. The more stimulating answers come, in many cases, from the field of social science. On the other hand, the historical dimension of foreign policy and European integration is all too often neglected in political science literature. The solid contributions made by historians can not only elucidate the past, but are in most cases also necessary to understand the present. Although, as Hans Branner (a political scientist) has pointed out, there can be observed

in the area of international relations a certain tendency to fill the gap between the two disciplines of history and political science [...] especially on the part of historians who increasingly show a willingness to relate their work to research belonging to the theoretical discipline.⁷³

Eckart Conze (a historian) has referred to a number of studies written by political scientists,

die – gewollt oder ungewollt – exzellente Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte sind und damit einmal mehr die nicht sonderlich fruchtbaren Diskussionen zwischen aktengläubigen Historikern und theorieversessenen Politologen ad absurdum führen.⁷⁴

He observes a tendency away from the traditional diplomatic-history approach. Since not only political relations motivate the research, a widening of perspectives has become necessary that automatically leads to more interdisciplinary research methods.⁷⁵

Primary sources

However important the use of differentiated approaches to the study of international relations may be, this does not mean that the use of diplomatic archives should be forgotten. In fact, diplomatic history, defined as thorough empirical research of the accessible archive material, will continue to constitute a main part of the historical writing on international relations.

My thesis will be written on “the frontier of declassification” – to use an expression of Eckart Conze⁷⁶ - meaning that the access to all the relevant archive material is not guaranteed, due to the 30-years rule.⁷⁷ I have, indeed, to confront a situation that somewhat endangers an even-handed analysis of the German-Norwegian relations. Whereas in Norway diplomatic sources are accessible through 1973⁷⁸, the relevant archives in Germany are much more restrictive.⁷⁹ This situation is partly eased by the party archive of the German labour party. A large amount of documents belonging to Willy Brandt provide documentation on his activities as Foreign Minister and Chancellor as well as Chairman of the SPD. In addition other important social democrats (as Helmut Schmidt, Egon Bahr or Katharina Focke) have given their documents to the archive.⁸⁰ This situation enables historians to

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provide serious analyses of the Brandt-era⁸¹, comparable to the numerous studies on Adenauer, Erhard or Kiesinger based on their personal archives.⁸² In Norway, the archives of the Labour party ensure that at least the level of party co-operation can be even-handedly documented.⁸³

Since this study will also investigate the “European context”, a look at the situation in other countries, as well as the multilateral archives is necessary. However, since the material in the national archives is already rather extensive, I am not sure yet to what extent I am going to rely on additional sources. The point of view of other countries on the questions discussed in my thesis will surely be analysed through secondary sources, i.e. well-documented literature. As for the supranational archives, the problem of the 30-year rule is the same as in Germany (except for some special cases, e.g. Bjarne Lie’s study on EFTA⁸⁴).⁸⁵ I will have to examine how far supranational views can be covered through national archives.

Conclusion

In this article I have concentrated on how the bilateral relations between Germany and Norway were affected by the process of European integration. To conclude, I would like to make some observations (or rather assumptions) as to the impact of the changes in the bilateral relationship on the question whether or not Norway should join the EC in 1972. This question – as everybody knows – had to be decided by the Norwegian people and not by the political elite. It seems to me that the amelioration of the bilateral relations during the 1960s had a significant impact on the attitudes towards membership of parts of the political elite in Norway – especially in the Labour party. However, this impact has not been the same for the majority of voters, which was resistant to membership. In addition to geographical, cultural and ideological cleavages that separated this majority from those in favour of membership, the fear to lose independence and the fear for foreign influence continued to be a very strong factor. Seen in this light, the changes in West German politics after 1966, the amelioration of bilateral relations between Norway and West Germany, the commitment of German politicians to the enlargement of the EEC and their support to Norway in its struggle for favourable terms, didn’t weigh strong enough. 25 years after World War II, Germany may have had regained some of its acceptability as an ally and partner in an interdependent form of co-operation. But it was far from being perceived as the main supporter of Norwegian causes or even as a potential candidate for a special relationship inside the Community. Under these circumstances, the influence of an outstanding personality like Willy Brandt has to be regarded as limited. Brandt was certainly the best representative for the “different” Germany and due to his strong and lasting relations to Norway he could serve as a “bridgebuilder” between the two countries. In the final days before the referendum in September 1972, Brandt was invited to speak in Oslo in favour of membership. Without success as he remarked bitterly in his memoirs.⁸⁶ Three factors have – in my opinion – limited Brandt’s positive influence in the membership question. Firstly, his range of contacts in Norway was, after all, limited to circles – mainly in the leadership of the labour movement – that were to a great extent pro-European already. Secondly, his special Status in Norway’s public opinion was mainly due to his “being one of us”, being somehow Norwegian, and not due to his being a

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German with great sympathy and understanding for Norway. Thirdly, Brandt's status as an important foreign statesman was mainly a result of his „Ostpolitik“ and not of his European policy.

1 Research project for a doctoral thesis in history at the Jean Monnet Lehrstuhl für Europäische Integrationsgeschichte und Europastudien, University of Hamburg; supported by the German Academic Exchange Council (DAAD) and the ARENA-Program at the University of Oslo. This article was drafted as a research report presented at the ARENA Research Seminar, 7 november 2000. It represents only a preliminary outline of thoughts and results.

2 Throughout this article, I will alternate between the terms Germany, West Germany or Federal Republic of Germany, meaning always the latter. Also, will I talk about “Norway” and not use the full name “Kingdom of Norway”.

3 Conze, Eckart: „Abschied von der Diplomatiegeschichte? Neuere Forschungen zur Rolle der BRD in den internationalen Beziehungen 1949–1969“. In: Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres Gesellschaft. 116 (1996), 137–154, here 138. See also the recent collection of international contributions to this methodological challenge in: Loth, Wilfried and Jürgen Osterhammel (Eds.): Internationale Geschichte. München 2000.

4 Thiemeyer, Guido: „Supranationalität als Novum in der Geschichte der internationalen Politik der fünfziger Jahre“. In: Journal of European Integration History (JEHI). 4 (1998) 2, 5–21.

5 Conze 1996, see footnote 3, 139. Cf. Schwarz, Hans-Peter: „Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Welt“. In: Herbst, Ludolf, Werner Bühler u. Hanno Sowade (Eds.): Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Welt. München 1990, 593–612, here 606.

6 Cf. Czempiel, Ernst-Otto: „Deutsche Außenpolitik von 1871–1945“. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft. 22 (1996), 243–256, here 244. On the need to use theories or approaches of decision-making in the historical analysis of international relations, see e.g. Steinert, Marlies: „La décision en matière de politique étrangère: un essai sur l'utilisation des théories pour l'étude des relations internationales“. In: Enjeux et puissances; pour une histoire des relations internationales au XXe siècle (Mélanges en l'honneur de J.B. Duroselle). 1986, 69–82, esp. 70ff.

7 For a review of this debate among American Historians and Political Scientists see Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman: “Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory. Respecting Differences and Crossing Boundaries”. In: International Security. 22 (1997) 1, 5–21. See also the contributions of scholars from both disciplines in the same issue.

8 Cf. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich: „'Moderne Politikgeschichte'? Oder: Willkommen im Kreis der Neorankeaner“. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft. 22 (1996), 257–266, here 257; Conze 1996, see footnote

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3, 137; See also Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm (Ed.): Adenauerzeit. Stand, Perspektiven und methodische Aufgaben der Zeitgeschichtsforschung (1945–1967). Bonn 1993 [= Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 13]; Hillgruber, Andreas: „Politische Geschichte in moderner Sicht“. In: HZ. 216 (1973), 529–552.

9 Hildebrand, Klaus: Das vergangene Reich. Deutschlands Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler, 1871–1945. Stuttgart 1995. Czempiel and Wehler criticized Hildebrand's study as being a step back to historicism before 1914. Cf. Wehler 1996, see footnote 8; Czempiel 1996, see footnote 6.

10 Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, 6 Vol., Oslo 1995–97. Reviewed by Førland, Tor Egil: “En empirisk bauta, et intellektuelt gjesp. Kritisk blikk på Norsk utenrikspolitikk's historie 1–6”. In: Historisk Tidsskrift. 2 (1999), 214–236; Neumann, Iver B.: Norsk utenrikspolitikk's historie – en kritikk. Nupi Notat nr. 596, Februar 1999. For a more favourable review see Lundestad, Geir: “Lange linjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk”. In: Internasjonal politikk. 52 (1999) 2, 271–293.

11 Førland 1999, see footnote 10, 114 and 116. See also Førland's general review of Norwegian diplomatic history: Førland, Tor Egil: “Far Out: International History in Norway”. In: SJH. 20 (1995) 1, 167–183. For an answer to Førland's characterisation of the Norwegian diplomatic history field as “far out” and a defence of the traditional approach focusing on bureaucracies and governmental actors, see: Pharo, Helge Ø., Anders Jølstad and Kjetil Skogrand: “Ekspansjon i isolasjon? Studiet av internasjonal og utenrikspolitisk historie i Norge”. In: Historisk Tidsskrift. 75 (1996) 1/2, 239–263, esp. 259–261.

12 Cf. Ziebura, Gilbert: „Die Rolle der Sozialwissenschaften in der westdeutschen Historiographie der internationalen Beziehungen“. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft. 16 (1990) 1, 79–103.; Myhre, Jan Eivind: “Historikeren og sosiologe – en nervøs romanse?”. In: Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift. 4 (1999), 321–335. See also Elman / Elman 1997, see footnote 7, 5.

13 In fact, the history of international relations often claims to represent an independent field of study. Cf. Czempiel 1996, see footnote 6, 247. On the study of international relations as a sub-field in the political sciences see Rittberger, Volker (Ed.): Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven. Opladen 1990. (= PSV-Sonderheft, 21).

14 Cf. Conze 1996, see footnote 3, 142. See also Steinert 1986, see footnote 6, 70.

15 Branner, Hans: “The Study of Danish European Policy –Perspectives for a Comparative Approach”. In: Branner, Hans and Morten Kelstrup (Eds.): Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options. Odense 2000, 41.

16 Ibid., 41–44.

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17 See Steinert 1986, see footnote 6, 70. See also Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste: *Tout empire périra. Une Vision théorique des relations internationales*. Paris 1992. In my master thesis I have applied this approach to discuss French and US foreign policy towards the Middle East. See Allers, Robin M.: *Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außenpolitik. Die Nahostdiplomatie Frankreichs und der USA 1958–1968*. Magisterarbeit Universität Hamburg 1998, esp. 7–19.

18 Elman / Elman 1997, see footnote 7, 13.

19 Tischrede bei einem Abendessen mit dem norwegischen Ministerpräsidenten Per Borten am 23. April 1970 in der Festung Akershus. In: Bundeskanzler Brandt. *Reden und Interviews*. Bonn 1971, 190. In fact, the nine pages summary of their talks on political issues do not contain one single remark on bilateral questions. Cf. Archive of the Norwegian foreign ministry (UD), 34.4/113-V, Referat, UD Politisk avdeling, 5.5.1970, Samtale 24.4.1970 mellom Statsministeren og andre medlemmer av den norske regjeringen og forbundskansler Willy Brandt. *Sammendrag av drøftingene om politiske spørsmål*. In the summary of Brandt's talks with Foreign Minister Lyng in 1968, we can read on the last of six pages that Brandt wanted to discuss one bilateral question: Taxproblems at two German cultural institutions in Norway ...! Cf. UD 25.4/113-72, UD, Utenriksministerens Sekretariat (Thorvald Stoltenberg), 6. august 1968, Utenriksministerens samtale med utenriksminister Willy Brandt lørdag 3. august 1968.

20 Schmidt, Helmut: *Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn*. Berlin 1990, 375.

21 Cf. the latest overviews on German foreign policy: Hacke, Christian: *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Weltmacht wider Willen? Aktualisierte u. erw. Neuausg.*, Frankfurt a. M. 1997; Schöllgen, Gregor: *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. München 1999. There is a chapter on Nordic cooperation in an older handbook on German foreign policy: Schwarz, Hans-Peter (Ed.): *Handbuch der deutschen Außenpolitik*. München/Zürich 1976. Documents on Norway are also an exception in the very detailed edition of West-German foreign policy documents until 1969. Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Ed.): *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. (Hg. im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes. Haupthg. H.-P. Schwarz.) München 1989ff.

22 In conversations in Oslo and Cologne. Arnulf Baring is the author of *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie*. Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (München/Wien 1969) and *Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel* (Stuttgart 1982).

23 Tamnes, Rolf: „Oljealder 1965–1995“. I: *Norsk utenrikspolitikk historie*, Bd 6, Oslo 1997, 101.

24 See Frøland's article: "Misstrauische Freundschaft" in this issue of NORDEUROPAforum.

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25 Contrary to earlier foreign policy debates, the German question was not a major argument in the discussions around EEC-membership in 1967 and 1970–72. See Bjørklund, Tor: *Mot strømmen. Kampen om EF 1961–1972*. Oslo 1982, 22 and 101f. For a detailed analysis of arguments and attitudes under the EEC-campaigns in 1967 and 1972, see Ørvik, Nils (Ed.): *Fears and Expectations. Norwegian attitudes toward European integration*. Oslo 1972; and Kite, Cynthia: *Scandinavia Faces EU. Debates and decisions on membership 1961–1994*. Umeå University, Department of Political Science 1996, 104–112 (on parliamentary debates), 157–162 (on public opinion).

26 Gilberg, Trond and Jens Drews: “Norway and Germany: ‘Changing Relations between Europe’s Periphery and Center’”. In: Verheyen, Dirk and Christian Sjøe (Eds.): *The Germans and Their Neighbours*. Boulder, Col. 1993, 137–157, here 149f.; Pharo, Helge Ø.: “Ingen vei utenom? Norge i integrasjonsprosessene i Europa 1946–1994”. In: Claes, Dag Harald and Bent Sofus Tranøy (Eds.): *Utenfor, annerledes og suveren? Norge under EØS-avtalen*. Bergen 1999, 15–38, here: 22. This shift was also characteristic for the Danish attitude towards the FRG. Cf. Lammers, Karl Christian: “Denmark’s Relations with Germany Since 1945”. In: Branner / Kelstrup 2000, see footnote 15, 260–281, here 261.

27 In an interview with the main-news of the first German tv-station “ARD-Tagesschau”, 30.8.1966.

28 Lyng, John: *Mellom øst og vest. Erindringer 1965–68*. Oslo 1976, 125; quoted by Tamnes 1997, see footnote 23, 102 (my translation).

29 *Morgenbladet*, quoted in: *Die Welt*, 29.8.1966: „Presse-Echo. Erhard in Norwegen“.

30 Cf. Prime Minister Per Borten during his visit to Bonn, quoted in: *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung*, 23.10.1968.

31 On Franco-German relations see e.g. Ziebura, Gilbert: *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945*. Verm. und verb. Auflage, Stuttgart 1997. Philippe de Shoutheete has defined the Franco-German relationship as a subsystem in the European whole – a status no other bilateral relationship inside the European integration has achieved: “The European Community and its sub-systems”. In: Wallace, William (Ed.) *The Dynamics of European Integration*. London 1990, 106–123, here 111–113.

32 „Heath to Brandt“, 8.4.1971. In: *Willy-Brandt-Archiv (WBA) im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD)*. Bonn Bestand Bundeskanzler, Vol. 52.

33 By the end of the 1950s, Germany had settled most of the questions of reparation and restitution through multilateral or bilateral agreements. The Luxembourg agreement with Israel in 1952 was followed by the London agreement with 20, and later 12 more states. A restitution treaty between the FRG and Norway was concluded in 1960. Cf. Gilberg / Drews 1993, see footnote 26, 146; On the long and complicated

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negotiations see Levsen, Dirk: „Eine schwierige Partnerschaft“: Ausgewählte Kapitel zur Entwicklung der politischen, militärischen und rüstungstechnischen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Königreich Norwegen von 1949–1966. Diss. Univ. Kiel 1993, 121–147.

34 Erhard in an interview with the German Radio-Station SWF, 30.8.1966.

35 See Arnold, Hans: „Die deutsch-niederländischen Beziehungen in ihrer Bedeutung für die europäische Politik“. In: Europa Archiv. 28 (1973) 11, 382–390. Cf. Griffiths, Richard T. (Ed.): The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945–1957. Amsterdam 1990.

36 Hans Arnold, the then-director of the section for Cultural Affairs in the Auswärtiges Amt and former Ambassador to The Hague, wrote in a contribution to Europa Archiv in 1973: „Rund fünfzehn Jahre der Gemeinsamkeit und Zusammenarbeit innerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaft haben zu einem hohen Grad der ‚Europäisierung‘ oder gar der ‚Vergemeinschaftung‘ nicht nur der in den Organen der Gemeinschaft zu behandelnden Fragen, sondern auch derjenigen Probleme geführt, die sich im bilateralen Verhältnis der Partner untereinander und im gemeinsamen Verhältnis zu Dritten stellen.“ See Arnold 1973, see footnote 35, 382.

37 See again Arnold (ibid.), who admits that national identity is, and will continue to be, a hindrance to full Europeanization of political co-operation: „Bis auf weiteres bleibt es somit erforderlich, die nationale Identität, d.h. die besondere nationale Situation und Motivation, die jedem EG-Partner individuell eigen ist, in alle Überlegungen einzubeziehen. Und insofern bleiben, trotz des bereits erreichten hohen Grades von Europäisierung aller Beziehungen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft, die bilateralen Verhältnisse der Partner untereinander von nicht zu übersehender Bedeutung.“

38 See Vaïsse, Maurice: La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969. Paris 1998, 191ff. (on the first British application), 529ff. (on the second application and the Soames-affair). See also Bell, P.M.: France and Britain, 1940–1994. The Long separation. London/N.Y. 1997, 204–233.

39 Cf. Schertz, Adrian W.: Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons: Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung. Köln u.a. 1992; Mackintosh, John P.: „Gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik“. In: Europa Archiv. 27 (1972) 11, 365–376, here 371f. (for an assessment written at the time).

40 Conze 1996, see footnote 3, 151.

41 For a definition of a “small state”, see for example Bjøl, Erling: “The Small States in International Politics“. In: Schou, August and Arne Olaf Brundtland, (Eds.): Small States in International Relations. Stockholm 1971. For an extensive discussion of the literature on small

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states and European integration see Griffiths, Richard T. and Helge Ø. Pharo: *Small States and European Integration: Literature Survey and Evaluation*, Oslo 1995 [ARENA Working paper 19].

42 On the “Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy” see e.g. Olav Riste’s article In: Holst, Johan Jørgen (Ed.): *Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s*. Oslo 1985, 12–25; and Lundestad 1999, see footnote 10. On Norway’s attitude towards European integration see (as the most recent contributions) Frøland, Hans Otto: “The Second Norwegian EEC-Application, 1967: Was There a Policy at all?” In: Loth, Wilfried (Ed.): *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969*. Forthcoming, 437–458; idem: “Choosing the Periphery: The Political Economy of Norway’s Relation to European Integration 1948–1973”. In: JEIH. 13 (2001); Pharo 1999, see footnote 26; Archer, Clive and Ingrid Sogner: *Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Alliance*. London 1998, 14–80.

43 On the determinants of West German foreign policy after 1945 see e.g. Pfetsch, Frank R.: *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 1949–1992*. München 1993, 11–21; Hacke 1997, see footnote 21, 335–351; Schwarz 1976, see footnote 21. For an overview on Germany’s West-integration see Herbst, Ludolf: *Option für den Westen, Vom Marshallplan zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag*. München 1990; Müller-Roschach, Herbert: *Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949–1977. Eine politische Chronik*. Bonn 1980.

44 Cf. Tamnes 1997, see footnote 23, 183.

45 Frøland, Hans Otto: „Deutsch-norwegische Beziehungen nach 1945. Wirtschaft und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen westlicher Kooperationsstrukturen“. In: Simensen, Jarle (Ed.): *Deutschland-Norwegen. Die lange Geschichte*. Oslo 1999, 198–213, here 209.

46 Lyng 1976, see footnote 28, 309.

47 Andreas Wilkens observes, that the significance of the so called “Machtwechsel” as a “turning point” in the history of the German Federal Republic, had already distinctively been noticed by contemporaries: “Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union. Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969–1974)”. In: JEIH. 5 (1999) 1, 73–102, here 73. For a broader perspective see Schönhoven, Klaus: „Aufbruch in die sozialliberale Ära. Zur Bedeutung der 60er Jahre in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik“. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*. 25 (1999) 1, 123–145. See also Schildt, Axel: „Entwicklungsphasen der Bundesrepublik nach 1949“. In: Ellwein, Thomas and Eberhard Holtmann (Eds.): *50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rahmenbedingungen-Entwicklungen-Perspektiven*. Opladen 1999. (= PVS Sonderheft 1999), 21–36, esp. 30f.

48 On constructivism see Checkel, Jeffrey T.: “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”. In: *World Politics*. 50 (January 1998), 324–48. See also the account on Post-Cold War Germany by Duffield, John S.: “Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds

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Neorealism". In: *International Organization*. 53 (1999) 3, 765–803.

49 See on Norway Matlary, Janne Haaland: "'And Never the Twain Shall Meet'. Reflections on Norway, Europe and Integration". In: Tiilikainen, Teija and Ib Damgaard Petersen (Eds.): *The Nordic Countries and the EC*. Copenhagen 1993, 43–63, esp. 44f., 47–53. The concept of "Foreign policy tradition" is discussed by Branner, Hans: "Danish Foreign Policy Tradition". In: Branner / Kelstrup 2000, see footnote 15, 185. For a definition of „political culture“ see Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Jakob Schüssler (Eds.): *Politische Kultur in Deutschland*. Opladen 1987 (PVS-Sonderheft). The influence of "political culture" on foreign policy is discussed by a growing number of scholars. See e.g. Jürgen Bellers: *Politische Kultur und Außenpolitik im Vergleich*. München 1999; Hylland Eriksen, Thomas and Iver B. Neumann: "International Relations as a Cultural System: An Agenda for Research". In: *Cooperation and Conflict*. 28 (1993), 233–264.

50 Cf. Frøland: "Misstrauische Freundschaft", in this issue of NORDEUROPAforum.

51 The underlying idea here is that there are significant differences in the way different countries respond organisationally to the challenge of interdependence and integration in foreign and especially European policy. See for ex. East's observations on the characteristics of foreign ministries of smaller industrialised nations – like Norway. East, Maurice: "Coordinating Foreign Policy: The Changing Role of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry". In: *Cooperation and Conflict*. 19 (1984) 2, 121–134, here 122. See also Bulmer, Simon and Martin Burch: *The „Europeanisation“ of central Government: The UK and Germany in Historical Institutional Perspective*. October 1999. (ARENA-Working Paper 30).

52 Cf. Bulmer / Burch 1999, see footnote 51, 15f.; Koerfer, Daniel: „Zankapfel Europapolitik: Der Kompetenzstreit zwischen Auswärtigem Amt und Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 1957/58“. In: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. 29 (1988), 553–568; Küsters, Hanns-Jürgen: „Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik 1949–1958“. In: Herbst, Ludolf, Werner Bühner and Hanno Sowade (Eds.): *Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Welt*. München 1990, 335–370.

53 Whereas Norway was part of the EFTA. But the EFTA countries had decided in December 1966 to seek individually for membership in the EEC or another sort of association abandoning a common approach. The possibility of a Nordic or Scandinavian coordination of the negotiations proved impossible. On the multilateral relation between EEC and EFTA see a M.A. thesis, based on archive material from the Brandt-Archive: Karres, Detlef: *Die Beziehungen zwischen der EWG und der EFTA (1960–1973)*. Magisterarbeit, Siegburg 1992. See also a Norwegian M.A thesis by Lie, Bjarne: *A Gulliver among Lilliputians: a History of the European Free Trade Association 1960–1972*. Hovedoppgave i historie, Universitetet i Oslo 1995.

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54 On the evolution of a European bureaucracy see Herbst, Ludolf: „Zur Entstehungsgeschichte einer europäischen Bürokratie. Das Beispiel der Montanunion“. In: Trausch, Gilbert (Ed.): Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom. Pläne und Initiativen, Enttäuschungen und Misserfolge. Baden-Baden 1993, 163–188. See also Wessels, Wolfgang: “Administrative interaction”. In: Wallace, William (Ed.): The Dynamics of European Integration. London 1990, 229–241.

55 Heyen, Erk Volkmar and Vincent Wright: Editorial to: „Anfänge der Verwaltung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft“. In: Jahrbuch für Europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte. 4 (1992), VII–X, here: VIII f.

56 See Frøland, Hans Otto: „DNA og Vest-Europa 1945–1995: kontakter, samarbeid og utsyn“. In: Heidar, Knut and Lars Svåsand (Eds.): Partier uten grenser? Oslo 1997; and Pharo, Helge Ø.: “The Norwegian Labour Party”. In: Griffiths, Richard T. (Ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s. Leiden 1993, 201–220.

57 See Rudolf Hrbek and Jürgen Bellers on the German Social Democratic Party, In: Griffiths 1993, see footnote 57, 63-89. More evidence can be found in the party archives at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. See part III of this paper.

58 Cf. Griffiths, Richard T.: “European Utopia or Capitalist Trap? The Socialist International and the Question of Europe”. In: Idem 1993, see footnote 57, 9–24.

59 Cf. Lorenz, Einhart O.: „'Moralische Kalorien' für deutsche Demokraten. Norwegische Ansichten über Deutschland am Beispiel der Arbeiterbewegung“. In: Bohn, Robert and Jürgen Elvert (Eds.): Kriegsende im Norden: Vom heißen zum kalten Krieg. Stuttgart 1995.

60 Without going into details here, I simply point to the memoirs of some of the most exposed leaders in both countries, Willy Brandt, Trygve Bratteli, Haakon Lie, Reiulf Steen. Cf. Pharo 1999, see footnote 26, 28f.; Tamnes 1997, see footnote 23, 156 and 160; Wilkens 1999, see footnote 47, 73f.

61 For a discussion of the place of individual actors in history see a rather old but still interesting study: Bosch, Michael (Ed.): Persönlichkeit und Struktur in der Geschichte. Historische Bestandsaufnahme und didaktische Implikationen. Düsseldorf 1977. For a discussion of more recent contributions to this debate, mainly in the US-literature, see Allers 1998, see footnote 17, 16 and 104.

62 See Tamnes 1997, see footnote 23, 28; Gilberg / Drews 1993, see footnote 26, 146f.; Levsen 1993, see footnote 33, 285; Frøland 1999, see footnote 45, 198.

63 Note for example the absence in Brandt's memoirs of comments on German-Norwegian relations after 1945 and the place given (in both political memoirs) to his commitment to Norwegian EEC-membership. Cf. Brandt, Willy: Begegnungen und Einsichten: die Jahre 1960–1975.

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Hamburg 1976, 207 and 332f.; Brandt, Willy: *Erinnerungen*. Frankfurt a.M. 1989, 458. More evidence can be found in Brandt's personal files in the archives of the SPD and in the UD-archives, where the frequent conversations between Brandt and Norwegian Ministers and diplomats are documented. See the comments on sources in part III of this paper. See also Frøland forthcoming, see footnote 42, 456ff.

64 Larry Watts provides a very useful discussion of the following questions in his extensive chapter on "Methodology and Theory". Cf. Watts, Larry L.: *Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance Behavior in Wartime*. Umeå University, Department of Political Science 1998, 5ff.

65 For a recent study see Bohn, Robert: *Reichskommissariat Norwegen: „Nationalsozialistische Neuordnung“ und Kriegswirtschaft*. München 2000 (also Kiel Univ., Habil.-Schrift, 1994).

66 Hans Otto Frøland gives a survey of the existing literature in his article in this issue.

67 See specially Levsen 1993, see footnote 33, and Jølstad, Anders: *Norsk sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid med Vest-Tyskland fra 1955 til 1965. Hovedoppgave i historie, Universitetet i Oslo 1995*.

68 Cf. the critical reviews of recent writings in diplomatic history by Frøland, Pharo et al., Lundestad, Conze, Czempiel, Wehler, as cited in the introduction.

69 Especially the publications of the group of historians at the European commission, the latest being *Crises* (see footnote 42). An extensive bibliography on European integration history can be found in Pharo / Griffiths 1995, see footnote 41, and – more updated – in: Wilkens, Andreas (Ed.): *Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Bonn 1999. The actual state of research is best to be followed in the *Journal of European Integration History*.

70 It is difficult to make a choice in the broad range of literature here. But I would like to point to the interesting studies on decision-making processes in the FRG and Norway, written by political scientists as Reinhold Roth, Helga Haftendorn, Nils Ørvik and others at the beginning of the 1970s.

71 On the German side, the Europa Archive provides not only contributions from actors and analysts from all kinds of disciplines but also monthly collections of the most important documents. A comparable periodical is *Außenpolitik*. The excellent press-archives of the HWWA (Hamburg), Otto-Suhr-Institut (Berlin) and Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bonn and Berlin) as well as the Documentation service at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, provide for a detailed account of contemporary material on themes, structures and personalities. On the Norwegian side the periodicals *Nytt Norsk tidsskrift*, *Internasjonal politikk*, *Scandinavian Political Studies* etc. give a good account on the state of

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debate in Norway. Regarding press-documentation I have so far checked systematically the relevant files in the Aftenposten archives. Other Newspapers will follow.

72 On Norwegian political biographies see Tamnes, Rolf: „Den politiske biografi og trollet med tre hoder“. In: Internasjonal politikk. 39 (1986) 1, 19–47. More generally on the problem of biographies see Riesenberger, Dieter: „Biographie als historiographisches Problem“. In: Bosch, Michael (Ed.): Persönlichkeit und Struktur in der Geschichte. Historische Bestandsaufnahme und didaktische Implikationen. Düsseldorf 1977.

73 Branner 2000, see footnote 15,43.

74 Conze 1996, see footnote 3, 150.

75 Ibid., 152.

76 Ibid., 151.

77 On the general situation of diplomatic sources and archive access, cf. the report-note by Ilse Dorothee Pautsch and Rainer A. Blasius: “Die 5. Internationale Konferenz der Herausgeber diplomatischer Akten“. In: VfZ. 47 (1999), 137–144.

78 On the archive situation in Norway see Kjetil Skogrand and Iver B. Neumann: “Mining for Sources on Diplomacy – Norway“. The best overview on the accessible evidence is given by the last two of the six volumes on Norway’s foreign policy. Tamnes 1997, see footnote 23.

79 For information on the German archives see the websites of the Foreign Office (AA) and the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz.

80 Katharina Focke was parliamentary state secretary in the Bundeskanzleramt from 1969 to 1972 with responsibility for European Affairs. On Helmut Schmidt and Egon Bahr there are two recent publications that rely on material from the AdsD. See Schneider, Andrea H.: Die Kunst des Kompromisses: Helmut Schmidt und die Große Koalition 1966–1969. Paderborn u.a. 1999, also Univ. Diss., Frankfurt a. M. 1996; Vogtmeier, Andreas: Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung. Bonn 1996. Cf. Bahr, Egon: Zu meiner Zeit. München 1996.

81 Cf. Wilkens 1999, see footnote 47; Karres 1992, see footnote 53. An edition of documents on the political life of Willy Brandt in ten volumes (Berliner Ausgabe) is appearing since last year. Whereas the volume on foreign policy will contain the most important documents on Brandt’s European initiatives, there will be few to none on Norway. On the other hand, volume three is dedicated to Brandt’s emigration years in Norway and Sweden, edited by Einhart Lorenz.

82 The biggest share of studies is still – and will probably remain – on Konrad Adenauer. But also the foreign policy of Erhard and Kiesinger have been researched now: Osterheld, Horst: Außenpolitik unter

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Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963–1966: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt. Düsseldorf 1992; Kroegel, Dirk: Einen Anfang finden! Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition. München 1997; Schwarz, Hans-Peter: „Die Regierung Kiesinger und die Krise in der CSSR 1968“. In VfZ. 47 (1999) 2, 159–186.

83 For a study based on material from this archive see Frøland 1997, see footnote 56.

84 As an assistant to the research project of Richard Griffith, Lie was allowed to consult EFTA's archives in Geneva through 1972. Cf. Lie 1995, see footnote 53, 23.

85 On multilateral archives see for example: Palayret, Jean Marie: “Les archives historiques des Communautés européennes à Florence“. In: JEV. 4 (1992), 159–163. For information on access to the Commission and Council archives in Brussels see the very useful guide provided by the website of the Leiden University History Department under the direction of Richard T. Griffith (www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/belgium.html).

86 Brandt 1989, see footnote 63, 458.