Uniting the Divided Continent
The Estonian National Committee of the European Movement

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Summary
The article examines the exiled Estonian politicians in the European Movement in the early Cold War period. The ultimate goal of exiled Estonians was to restore their state’s independence. In order to promote this, Estonian leaders sought connections with Western leaders. The European Movement was the only organisation involving actors from both the East and the West, and this corresponded to the Estonian discourse on Europe as a whole. Therefore, the European Movement was appreciated, although its limited opportunities for decisive actions were also recognised. East and West European interest in the European Movement declined as West European integration rapidly intensified through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and particularly after the January 1952 Eastern European Conference in London. By 1957, disappointment in the inability of European unification to help regain Estonian independence became evident.

Zusammenfassung

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On 23rd October 1957, Estonian politician in exile, Aleksander Warma gave a lecture in Stockholm with the title “Movement for European unification and emigrants within it”. After specifying that his topic covered the Estonian point of view, he modestly began: “It is complex to answer this.”\(^1\) Despite these words of warning, I will attempt a task very similar to Warma’s lecture: to investigate the Estonian activities and attitudes in the European unification process and especially the European Movement during the early Cold War years. My first aim is to demonstrate that the main focus of the Estonian exile’s foreign affairs efforts concerned European unification: in what actions did the Estonians participate and what was the meaning of their membership in this organisation? Second, I aim to show that Estonian leaders were disappointed with unification efforts by the time of Warma’s lecture, which is the year when the treaty of Rome was generally considered to have started that integration.

The article looks at two themes of the latter half of 20th century Europe: European integration and the Cold War. The scholarship on these major phenomena has developed into sub-fields of its own, but few inquiries combine these approaches. However, both sub-fields are gradually moving away from their statist character\(^2\), shedding light on previously marginalised groups, such as emigrants from the Eastern bloc. So far, this research has been dominated by the work of the emigrants themselves, but critical studies are now discovering the field. The Estonians were undeniably a small group, but their activities provide an interesting perspective for both approaches.

Estonia eventually joined the European Union in 2004 – and adopted the Euro in 2011. Although Europe is politically united, it desires cultural unity, a project which would benefit from a common history. Thus, there is a clear danger of presenting emigrants as pioneers of the present post-Eastern enlargement of the European Union. I will try to avoid this danger by arguing that European unification was valuable to Estonians only as a means of achieving their primary goal; that of the 1951 Estonian “guidelines for a foreign political battle” that declared that the goal remained “the liberation of the occupied homeland.” Exceptions or vacillations were not allowed, but the methods and

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sources of foreign assistance could be changed according to general tendencies.\(^3\) Although liberation meant, first and foremost, the breakup of the Soviet Union, it also included establishing a new international system, one that would guarantee Estonian national security.

Fundamentally, this is not far from the idea put forward by Alan Milward\(^4\) in that the ECSC integration that began in Western Europe began in order to secure and rescue the nation state by surrendering some of each state’s sovereignty to the joint organisation. European and national goals were not mutually exclusive. The difference is that it worked in the West but not in the East, causing Estonians to turn away from the European issue. In studies of promoting national interests in an international organisation it is crucially important to look at this relationship from the perspectives of both parties in order to put their national aspirations and influence in the context of the organisation. The material of the European Movement is stored at the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence, Italy. Individual collections of leading Estonian politicians are included in the Baltic Archives (BA), which are located at the Swedish National Archives in Stockholm, Sweden.\(^5\) On the other hand, emphasizing the national angle reveals the danger of a martyr-like image of a common front. However, in recent years, critical views on the importance and influence of the exiled governments have emerged.\(^6\)

Just as how previous studies on the history of European integration stressed the impact of

\(^3\) “Meie välispoliitilise võitluse sihtjooni”. In: Eesti Teataja. 28\(^{th}\) April 1951, 2; also Eesti Rahvusfondi Teated. (1951:12), 11 and for the next year: “Mis teha, kuidas teha”. In: Eesti Teataja. 18\(^{th}\) October 1952, 3.


\(^5\) The archives of the Estonian National Council have been brought to the Estonian State Archives in Tallinn. They have not been consulted for this article, because their foreign correspondence was dealt mostly personally by August Rei and Aleksander Warma.

resistance movements, nowadays such views of the exile governments are also dismissed as teleological and idealist. Scholarship on Baltic emigration has, until now, concentrated on social issues and is only now addressing political activities. Due to the initial nature of the research on exile politics, comparisons between different emigrant groups (or National Committees of the European Movement) will have to wait for further research.

To avoid this trap, it is necessary to present a wider range of opinions from the Estonian exile community. To achieve this, I have read the two largest Estonian newspapers in Stockholm (Teataja/Eesti Teataja and Välis-Eesti) in order to take into account alternative opinions on the issue. The former cooperated closely with ruling politicians, whereas the latter provided space to the opposition. Both newspapers were nonetheless edited independently. The newspapers reveal the context and content of Europeanism in Estonian exile politics. This article presents the activities of the Estonians in the European Movement in a chronological manner: it starts from its troublesome first steps and then goes on to Estonian ambitions in the European Movement in general and especially in the Central and Eastern European Commissions before their retreat from European unification issues.

Creating Contacts with the European Movement

The formation of the Estonian exile community and its political organisations are well documented in previous studies. Questions of legitimacy, continuity, and importance

7 Furthermore, the research on Baltic exile politicians has mostly considered the pressure on the American and Canadian authorities, for example: Janauskas, Giedrius: Kongresinė ak-sija. JAV ir Kanados lietuvių politinę lobizmas. Vilnius 2008; Danytė, Milda: „The Baltic Evening in Parliament. How Canadian Lithuanians and other Balts Lobbied for their Homelands During the Cold War Period”. In: Dalia Kuizinienė (ed.): Beginnings and Ends of Emigration. Life without Borders in the Contemporary World. Vilnius 2005.

8 The newspapers are available online at http://dea.nlib.ee, 10th February 2011.

Uniting the Divided Continent

persisted in this community throughout the Cold War period. Nevertheless, the Estonian National Council (ENC) was the main exile centre for Estonians in Sweden. It was a sort of exiled parliament, where the parties of pre-1934 democratic Estonia were represented.\(^\text{10}\) The leaders of the Council remained the same throughout the entire period. The main leader, August Rei (1886–1963), had been the State Elder and Foreign Minister in independent Estonia. Aleksander Warma (1890–1970) had drafted a plan for the European federation during World War II (2009) and was now the most important foreign affairs commentator and actor of the ENC.

The ENC had a domestic policy of educating refugees and maintaining contact with the Swedish authorities, but its main focus was abroad. There, the method remained the same: to inform the West about the suffering of the Estonian people. This information would somehow indirectly create international pressure on the Soviet Union, which would then be compelled to adopt a more lenient policy towards Estonia. Emphasis on the information policy is evident in the name of the Estonian National Fund (ERF), which worked in close co-operation with the ENC. Under this Estonian name, it collected funds. However, the English name (the Estonian Information Centre) reveals the purpose of the organisation. It published journals for the Western world, *Newsletter from Behind the Iron Curtain* being the most widely circulated.\(^\text{11}\)

The forums where this information was to be delivered changed. The most important forums were the remaining foreign legations, in that they enabled exiles to preserve the continuity of their states. The connections between political parties were almost equally significant. Right after these, before the United Nations, was the European Movement.\(^\text{12}\)


\(^\text{11}\) Krepp, Endel (ed.): *Eesti Rahvusfond 1946–51.* Stockholm 1952, 5–8; *Estonian information centre ten years,* as footnote 10, 3; *Eesti Rahvusfondi Teated (1951:12), 11.

\(^\text{12}\) “Meie välispoliitilise võitluse sihtjooni” 1951, as footnote 3, 2; “Mis teha, kuidas teha” 1952, as footnote 3, 3.
The European Movement (EM) was the manifestation of the increased ideology of unification in Western Europe after World War II. It was a joint initiative by six private organisations and its major achievement in the propagation of unification was the Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948. Although Arvo Horm (1913–1996) is not mentioned in the list of participants, he attended the congress as the Estonian representative. The decisions made in The Hague contributed largely to the foundation of the Council of Europe a year later.

The same spirit of unification had already inspired the ENC. Allegedly, its working problem in 1947 had a similar goal: “In foreign political co-operation we must pursue a European confederation.” The ENC statute that was adopted was presented as objective 2.3: “to pursue informative activities with the object of promoting European collaboration and unity.” It is not clear whether this aim or formulation was present in the original statute on 26th January 1948 or amended later on 5th February 1950.

Despite their enthusiasm, the Estonians were ignored by the central European powers. British diplomat Hugh Montgomery Knatchbull visited Scandinavia in October 1948, and was contacted by businessman Heldur Tõnisson (1912–), but did not support the Baltic politicians in taking action. Only the Dane Karl Bøgholm became involved and began co-operating with them. Bøgholm contacted the former Finnish Foreign Minister, Hjalmar Procopê, who had been involved in the unification effort since the 1920s.

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16 Estonian National Council 1947–1957 1957, as footnote 10, 11. The statute was also amended on 29th June 1954 and 11th March 1956.
17 Historical Archives of the European Union [henceforth HAEU]. ME 650; Hughe Knatchbull Hugessen to Duncan Sandys 16th October 1948.
and was living in Stockholm at the time. He provided Bøgholm with some names from the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{18}

With the help of Procopé, the Baltic emigrants met with the Secretary General of the EM, Joseph H. Retinger, who visited Stockholm in January 1949. Estonians Rei, Warma, and another former foreign minister, Hans Rebane (1881–1961), proposed the establishment of a European club for exiles. Retinger replied that “the Balts cannot be taken into the European Movement with the way things are now.” According to Procopé, Warma was “extremely dissatisfied” to hear what sounded like a plan to divide Europeans into two groups.\textsuperscript{19}

According to his report, Retinger “welcomed this idea, but explained that no official recognition could be given, since such a club would be outside the general plan of the European Movement.”\textsuperscript{20} Despite disagreements during their first meetings, Retinger continued to co-operate via correspondence. In the following month, the ENC wrote directly to the executive committee of the EM and asked for membership or to assist the EM in fulfilling its aim of uniting the whole of Europe.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the Estonians visited London twice before Retinger returned to Stockholm in November.\textsuperscript{22}

In May 1949, Procopé conveyed greetings from Duncan Sandys, Chairman of the International Executive Committee of the EM, to the Baltic emigrants. Sandys proposed the formation of a joint Baltic European group that could join the EM.\textsuperscript{23} He visited Stockholm soon afterwards with the same message, and both the Baltic Council and the separate national committees, including the Estonian National Committee of the European Movement (ENCEM), were founded within the next few months.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{18} Finnish National Archives, Helsinki [henceforth KA] Procopé KAY 6636 Procopé to Bøgholm 20\textsuperscript{th} November 1948.
\textsuperscript{19} KA Procopé 24. Diary 12\textsuperscript{th} January 1949; also HAEU. ME 348 Retinger to Rei 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1948.
\textsuperscript{20} HAEU. ME 270. Report on a visit by Dr. J. H. Retinger to Stockholm, January 1949; and Retinger to Rei 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1949.
\textsuperscript{21} Baltic Archives [henceforth BA.] Varma 32. A.M.kava. Eesti Rahvusnõukogult European Movement Executive Committee’le 13\textsuperscript{th} February 1949.
\textsuperscript{22} Eesti Teataja. 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1950, 1f.; Tunnustus Eesti iseseisvuse taastamise voitlusele; HAEU. ME 807. Retinger to Warma 2\textsuperscript{nd} May 1949.
\textsuperscript{23} KA Procopé 24. Diary 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1949.
\textsuperscript{24} “Euroopa kui terviku vabastamiseks ja ühendamiseks”. In: Eesti Teataja. 4\textsuperscript{th} February 1950, 6.
The official application was sent on 2nd June 1949. The Baltic Council of the European Movement asked for representation from the three Baltic states, Estonia (signed by Rei and Warma), Latvia (Mintauts Čakste and Mikelis Bukss), and Lithuania (Stasys Žymantas and Vladas Žilinskas). Since politicians in their occupied countries were unable to participate, the exiled democratic politicians asked to represent them in the EM. The signatories solemnly consented to the aims and methods of the EM, and referred in the end to the EM’s own declaration of Europe as a whole, without borders. “We hope that these borders will not be a barrier to the admission of the Baltic into the European Movement.”25 The EM replied soon afterwards that the executive council would make the decision at the next meeting.26

There may have been problems with the application, and the Baltic Council again contacted Retinger in October 1949 asking for assistance.27 The International Executive Committee approved membership of the Baltic Committees on 19th January 1950: “the Baltic states should be jointly entitled to representation in the European Movement on the same footing as the countries of Eastern Europe and Spain.”28 Rei compared the acceptance of ENCEM to the de jure recognition of Estonian independence by the Western powers, which had occurred 29 years earlier.29

The EM organisation consisted of the Council and the International Executive Committee. The former originally included 160 members, and the national committees had different numbers of seats: Sweden had four and Estonia had one. The International Executive Committee had 50 members, and the Baltic states were given only one seat. After changes were made in July 1950, the Council had 65 members and the Commit-

26 HAEU. ME 807. Curtis to Baltic council 27 June 1949; Retinger to Rei 11th July 1949.
29 “Tunnustus Eesti iseseisvuse taastamise voitlusele”. In: Eesti Teataja. 4th February 1950, 1f.; Varma, Al[eksander]: “Euroopa uuendatud tunnustus Eestile”. In: Eesti Teataja. 4th February 1950, 2.
tee had 18 members. The Baltic representative was elected “in alphabetical order”; thus, the seat was first given to Estonians, who selected Rei to take the position.

As an organisation, the ENCEM was subject to the ENC, or in other words, the ENC “collaborates closely with the Estonian National Committee of the European Movement, where all political parties are equally represented.” The ENCEM arranged its first meeting on 5th April 1950, for which Rei was elected chairman and Warma was selected as a foreign representative. In the beginning, the organisation summoned 113 members. The ENCEM held an annual meeting, where it approved its leadership and Warma gave a lecture. For example, in December 1951, he talked about the EM and Central Europe to an audience of 38 people. At that time, ENCEM membership had reached 185.

After the ENCEM became a member, all references to the Baltic Council disappeared. The statute of the ENCEM was changed without delay in April 1950. However, this did not mean the end of the Baltic Council, not to mention co-operation: Latvian and Lithuanian exile centres and politicians remained the most important partners in foreign enterprises. The ENCEM was ready to admit Baltic and Finnish assistance in gaining membership. Lithuanian Stasys Bačkis worked intensively for unification.

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30 Varma 1950, as footnote 29; “Euroopa kui terviku vabastamiseks ja ühendamiseks”. In: Eesti Teataja. 4th February 1950, 6; “Euroopa peab oma jõud ühendama”. In: Eesti Teataja. 19th August 1950, 1; “Sõda Euroopas ebatõenäolik”. In: Välis-Eesti. 20th August 1950, 10; “Okupeeritud maade vabad esindajad tihedamas kontaktis Euroopa liikumisega”. In: Eesti Teataja. 17th April 1951, 3.
31 “Abi nõutamine Eesti ülesehitamiseks”. In: Eesti Teataja. 12th January 1952, 1.
33 BA. Varma 20. ELERK 31st March 1950 (invitation); “Euroopa kui terviku vabastamiseks ja ühendamiseks” 1950, as footnote 30; “Balti küsimused Euroopa liikumise foorumile”. In: Eesti Teataja. 15th April 1950, 3.
36 BA. Varma 20. ELERK Statuut.
37 “Mis teha, kuidas teha” 1952, as footnote 3.
38 “Balti küsimused Euroopa liikumise foorumile” 1950, as footnote 33; Warma 1958, as footnote 1, 15; Teataja. 21st March 1954, 3; Hjalmar Procopé sunud; BA. Warma 19. Varma to Torma 23rd March 1954.
Little correspondence between him and the Estonians has survived, but these letters indicate a much stronger co-operation.  

In addition, other kinds of regional imagination remained among the Estonians. Journalist Evald Uustalu (1912–1982) envisioned a “future European political organisation” that would begin with regional agreements. The three Baltic states were too small, so he decided to build a bridge across the Baltic Sea and proposed a defence union of the Nordic states. Furthermore, unions like this would play “their own part in the organisation of united Europe based on the balance of power.” Proposals like this were also typical in other exile groups in the early 1950s.

Activity within the European Movement

After World War One, Estonians had already begun to combine their striving for national independence with the new, firmer European system. While in the EM, the Estonians remembered their national goals as well. Warma stated clearly that a “united Europe is not the objective itself, but a tool which, amongst other things, must contribute to the security of the peoples who belong to a united Europe.” He later emphasised that Estonians had “the right, but also the obligation, on behalf of the


43 A.V. [Varma, Aleksander]: “Välispoliitilisi marginaale”. In: Eesti Teataja. 30th June 1948, 2.
rights of their people to talk about the European issues” because “(t)he fate of our nation depends on the fate of the peoples of Europe in general.”44

Like all emigrant groups, Estonians wanted to foster their democratic initiatives by joining Western organisations.45 The ENC justified their application to the EM: “this fact helps to preserve self-confidence and promote other necessary psychological preconditions for the peoples of Europe under totalitarian pressure, in this case, Estonians, at their home, as well as their large community of political refugees.”46 Warma tirelessly emphasized the democratic traditions and procedures in Estonian politics, defining them as European. The fact that the Päts regime had basically given the state to the Soviet Union in 1940 was proof that only democracy could protect the independence of the Estonian state.47 There was, however, a contradiction between the fundamental democratic undertone of unification and certain elitist methods used to strive towards it. Only a small elite of the Estonian exile community participated in the European discussion and all of them stressed the importance of unification, since the best political minds, including Winston Churchill or Paul-Henri Spaak, were involved in it.48 In addition, Rei once defended his frequent travels to conferences abroad: “Europe’s fate is not decided by the public in football matches and gymnastics, but by European and American statesmen.”49

Warma pondered the content and form of the forthcoming European Union. He aspired towards a Europe “in confederative form, in which participating states would retain the rights of a proud independent state.” Even the customs union with a common currency “would respect the natural facilities and characteristics for economic production.” The confederation would consist of independent and equal states that, on the other hand,

44 Varma 1950, as footnote 29.
45 Lane 2008, as footnote 41, 302f.
48 For example Varma 1949, as footnote 47; Välis-Eesti 20th August 1950, 10. “Sõda Euroopas ebatõenäolik” 1950, as footnote 30; Observer: “Ida-Euroopa konverents”. In: Eesti Teataja. 19th January 1952, 2.
49 “Euroopa peab oma jõud ühendama” 1950, as footnote 30.
would enjoy greater security, thanks to the common defence system and a higher standard of living by virtue of a co-ordinated economic policy.\footnote{BA. Varma 28. Köne Euroopa ühtsusest (European Unity). Dateerimata; also BA. Rei 19. Warma: European problems from the Viewpoint of a European 31st October 1952. BA. Varma 10. Seisukohti Londoni konverentsi materjalide kohta. Majanduse alakomitee aruanne.} Independence should be restricted as little as possible concerning European “general interests”. As an Estonian, he underlined that “only in a European confederation will a small state be able to achieve normal self-realisation which will enrich both its own nation and the whole of humanity.”\footnote{Eesti Teataja. 17th May 1952, 3; Varma 1952, as footnote 15; Uuendatud start; BA. Varma 27. Euroopa probleeme Strassburgis. Ettekanne Lib.Dem koondises 24th October 1952.}

Once the Estonians were involved in the EM, they participated passionately in its actions. According to historical reviews, Estonians attended approximately 70 international European events in less than ten years; nearly half (32) of them were organised by the EM.\footnote{Krepp 1952, as footnote 11, 22–24; Peets, Arnold (ed.): Eesti vabaduse eest II. Eesti Rahvusfond 1946–1956. Stockholm 1956, 36–39.} The EM organized 16 conferences during its first ten years. Estonians attended seven of them: the Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948 (Arvo Horm), “Germany and Europe” in Hamburg in September 1951 (Rei), the Central and Eastern Conference in London in January 1952 (16 Estonians), the Congress of The Hague in October 1953 (Rei), second Economic Conference in London in January 1954 (Eduard Poom and August Torma), the International Council in Versailles in June 1955 (Aleksander Aspel and Kaarel Robert Pusta) and, finally, the Second Congress of Europe in Rome in June 1957 (Warma).\footnote{HAEU. ME 80. Liste des participants aux congresses, conferences et reunions internationales du Mouvement European. NB! The list contains obvious mistakes.}

The London Conference on Central and Eastern Europe, which took place on 21st to 24th January 1952, was particularly important for the Estonians. Their delegation of 16 individuals comprised one tenth of all participants: for comparison there were five Latvians and four Lithuanians. The ENC had prepared a total of 64 pages of material in English to present on exile activity in Sweden and the situation in occupied Est-
nia. Half of the material was the “rehabilitation plan of Estonia’s economy after liberation”. It focused on agriculture and, first and foremost, de-collectivisation, which would strengthen Western society as well as Estonian society. Due to Baltic cooperation, the final resolution of the agrarian committee mentioned de-collectivisation as the primary general policy concerning the liberated countries.

During the conference, the Estonians worked towards developing a common economic plan based on separate calculations, which was already supported by their own work. In his opening speech, Rei urged the delegates to “consider that the drawing up of such a plan for each country is of some practical value, though the date of realisation is uncertain, and the circumstances keep changing.” These individual plans would then be summed up. “An overall rehabilitation plan for the entire liberated territory can be compiled without undue delay when the need arises, only the separate National Committee concerned can closely and consistently follow developments in the home country.”


56 BA. Varma 10. ENCEM Kokkuvõte Londoni konverentsist 20th February 1952; “Eesti delegatsiooni seisukohad”. In: Eesti Teataja. 19th January 1952, 1; “Uut lootust ikestatud rahvastele” 1952, as footnote 54.

These calculations would be useful when the Marshall Plan continued to the East, which was “emphasised particularly” in Estonian papers: “The Western world must give generous financial and technical aid towards the economic reconstruction of these countries”. The request was later repeated by, among others, the Council of Europe in October 1952, and again by Warma in the Estonian press. Moreover, during the second Economic Conference of the EM in 1954, the Estonian participant, economist Eduard Poom (1902–1986) stressed the need to follow developments in the West because Estonia would have to adjust to them after liberation. Protective measures could not be the method for reconstruction if a unified Europe abandoned mutual customs and tariffs.

For Estonians, unification meant not only material reconstruction but, in the words of the ENC foreign commission, “a major task, the re-building of Eastern countries and their inclusion in Western civilisation, mentally, politically and financially”. The delegation to London underlined the “respect for the characteristically European, Christian-humanitarian ethical principles that constitutes the spiritual and moral strength of United Europe and is its most vital condition of existence”.

Warma saw the reality of the modern world in the “political and economic units in continental dimensions.” It was ill-advised to rely on national self-sufficiency. The idea of unification had indeed won support but “official politics still spasmodically trudge by habit on the road of today’s policy of appeasement.” A united Europe was the only way to guarantee freedom and a better future for European nations and “to give them back their heritage and share in the larger community of the peoples of the

59 “Selgeid sõnu raudeesriidetagustele rahvastele”. In: Eesti Teataja. 11th October 1952, 3.
60 “Uus Euroopa ilma tollipiirideta”. In: Eesti Teataja. 7th March 1954, 1; ME 965. Rebattet to Rei 22nd December 1953; Rei to Rebattet 14th January 1954; Thibault to Rei 16th January 1954.
61 „Mis teha, kuidas teha” 1952, as footnote 3.
Warma talked about “the ideology of sovereignty based on egocentrism”, which the Estonians had tried to oppose at the League of Nations in 1931. However, the effort had failed then and by now the “idea of an authoritarian state with autarkic tendencies and drift for expansion” prevailed.\(^{64}\)

The actual work of the EM was undertaken by the Economic and Cultural Commissions, which were followed in autumn of 1949 by the Central and East European Commission (CEEC)\(^{65}\), and Retinger asked Baltic representatives “to join the Eastern European Study Group which we are forming now” and attached some confidential plans in his letter before they were even revealed at the EM.\(^{66}\)

Harold MacMillan became the chairman of the CEEC, and his memorandum in 1950 created the guidelines for the commission. It aimed at “constantly reaffirming, as a matter of principle, that these countries will not be given up forever.” Accordingly, progress for unification in the West should always take these countries into consideration as well. By continuously invoking the idea of Europe as a whole, the actions of the EM would strengthen the individual efforts of the emigrants. When the division of Europe eventually came to an end, this work would pay off, as the plans for “political, moral, cultural, and psychological” reconstruction would be ready.\(^{67}\)

The Baltic committees joined the CEEC in March 1950. During the first meeting held in June, there was confusion about publications, which still lacked any mention of the CEEC’s newest members. As a solution, “a slip” correcting the issue was attached to subsequent printings.\(^{68}\)

\(^{63}\) Varma 1952, as footnote 15; Also BA. Varma 27. Ettekanne E.K. Asemikekogu koosolekul 21st May 1950.


\(^{65}\) Łaptos 2008, as footnote 54, 332–339; Hick 1990, as footnote 14, 323; Varma 1950, as footnote 29; ”Euroopa kui terviku vabastamiseks ja ühendamiseks” 1950, as footnote 30; ”Okupeeritud maade vabad esindajad tihedam as kontaktis Euroopa liikumisega” 1951, as footnote 30; “Sõda Euroopas ebatõenäolik” 1950, as footnote 30.

\(^{66}\) HAEU. ME 807. Retinger to Rei 11th July 1949.

\(^{67}\) HAEU. ME 643. Eastern and Central European Section 25th January 1951.

\(^{68}\) HAEU. ME 642. Reunion de la Commission de l'Europe centrale et orientale, 30th March 1950, 27th June 1950.
Within the CEEC Council, each national committee included two representatives. The Estonian envoy in London, August Torma (1895–1971)\textsuperscript{69}, before being officially nominated, acted as the Estonian representative, and would also represent Estonia afterwards whenever the meetings took place in London. Because Aleksander Aspel (1908–1975) was teaching literature at French universities\textsuperscript{70}, he attended meetings in Paris. Occasionally, Rei or Warma would travel from Stockholm to the location.\textsuperscript{71} On the other hand, this could make it appear that the Baltic committees had only one representative, since the Baltic committee also received a representative, and Torma planned a rotation cycle with Bačkis and others. Each country was to have a seat for two years, with another seat that would change annually. Torma preferred to have three Baltic representatives and promised to work towards that goal.\textsuperscript{72}

The Estonians had some co-operation with the Swedish committee\textsuperscript{73} that invited Macmillan to Stockholm. Macmillan also paid a visit to the ENC on 6\textsuperscript{th} March 1951, when the Latvian and Lithuanian representatives were also present. This gave Rei an opportunity to underline the CEEC as the protector of “the interests of currently oppressed countries in the European Movement, and it keeps their issues on the agenda.”\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, the ENC acknowledged the CEEC as the most important

\textsuperscript{69} Torma’s European activities had started already in 1930, when he had been in charge of drafting the Estonian reply to the Briand memorandum. Heikkilä, Pauli: “Northern Replies to the Briand Memorandum in 1930: The European Federal Union in Estonia, Finland and Sweden”. In: Scandinavian Journal of History. 32 (2007:3), 215–236, here: 228.


\textsuperscript{71} HAEU. ME 642. Reunion de la Commission de l’Europe centrale et orientale, 8\textsuperscript{th} May 1950, 27\textsuperscript{th} June 1950, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1950, 25\textsuperscript{th} September 1951, 25\textsuperscript{th} November 1951, 7\textsuperscript{th} January 1952; Eesti Teataja. 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1950, 3; “Hea tahe Saksamaa suhtes”. In: Eesti Teataja. 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1951, 1.

\textsuperscript{72} BA. Rei 9. Torma to Rei 30\textsuperscript{th} June 1951; Torma to Rei 24\textsuperscript{th} September 1952; ME 642. Reunion de la Commission de l’Europe centrale et orientale, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1950.

\textsuperscript{73} For example “Balti küsimused Euroopa liikumise foorumile” 1950, as footnote 33; “Kontakt Euroopa Liikumise Rootsi Rahvuskomitseega”. In: Eesti Teataja. 1\textsuperscript{st} March 1952, 6; “Euroopa Nõukogu toetab Eesti vabadustaotlusi”. In: Eesti Teataja. 26\textsuperscript{th} June 1954, 1 and 8; BA. Rei 3. Horm to Rei 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1953.

\textsuperscript{74} Macmillan, Harold: “Eesti rahvusnõukogus”. In: Eesti Teataja. 10th April 1951, 1; also “Okupeeritud maade vabad esindajad tihedamas kontaktis Euroopa liikumisega” 1951, as footnote 30.
Uniting the Divided Continent

partner for the Estonians, especially by publicising the situation in the occupied countries.\(^75\)

Building opposition against the Communist Soviet Union was the common aim of emigrants.\(^76\) The ultimate goal was nothing less than the partial dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Estonians looked for like-minded company with the same or a similar goal. “It goes without saying that the centre has to present Estonian problems on a larger scale, not separately, but in connection with Baltic and Eastern European problems and while preserving a non-Communist way of life.” This was also in line with the underlying democratic values being pursued.\(^77\) Another example of juxtaposition between the EM and the Soviet Union was the way that their criticism was used as evidence of the effective actions of the EM.\(^78\)

Strong words were rare due to domestic factors, since Sweden had recognised the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. Rei, therefore, referred to the “danger threatening the whole free world” or the “totalitarian thief state.”\(^79\) Periphrasis was not used during private occasions, such as ENCEM meetings, where the goal “of liberation from the burden of violent forces of the Soviet Union” could be expressed freely.\(^80\) The ENC also did not mince words in a memorandum to the London Conference where he stated that “among the most essential prerequisites for the creation of the feeling of security and stability in East and Central Europe is...the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In our opinion, the conference should summon up the courage to state this fact plainly and unambiguously.”\(^81\) The actual declaration, however, was much milder.

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\(^75\) “Euroopa kui terviku vabastamiseks ja ühendamiseks” 1950, as footnote 30.
\(^76\) Lane 2008, as footnote 41, 307–312.
\(^77\) Estonian information centre ten years, as footnote 10, 3; Krepp 1952, as footnote 11, 8f.
\(^78\) For example BA. Varma 10. ENCEM Kokkuvõte Londoni konverentsist 20th February 1952; “Euroopa liikumise kesk-ja Ida-Euroopa komisjon tuleb ümberkujundamisele”. In: Eesti Teataja. 13th December 1952, 3; Mihkelsson, Johannes: “Väike-Euroopa sünd”. In: Eesti Teataja. 6th April 1957, 2; also Warma, A[leksander].: “Mis edasi...? ”. In: Eesti Teataja. 16th February 1957, 2f.
\(^79\) “Euroopa peab oma jöud ühendama” 1950, as footnote 30.
\(^81\) BA. Varma 20. Considerations of Estonian Commitee 11th October 1950.
The intensification of action towards the Soviet Bloc appeared to contradict the broader aim of uniting the divided continent. Rei felt it necessary to remind the EM that “it would be most undesirable to establish two parallel unions, one for the West and another for Eastern and Central Europe, as both these parts of our continent are the natural complements of each other, economically, culturally, as well as politically.” The division was dangerous to the West alone, since its security remained vague. Warma searched for economic justification, and he could not promote a separate customs union in Eastern Europe because the area “does not constitute an economic autarky as a whole, but is a necessary component of the European economic sphere.” On the other hand, these goals were not contradictory, since “(t)he struggle for the uniting of Europe is also the struggle for the liberation of the Central and Eastern European nations.”

Disappointment and re-orientation

The London Conference was immediately hailed as a success in Estonian reports. However, by the time the London Conference was held, the unification process was already moving away from the EM and the Council of Europe after the Schuman Declaration and the emerging Coal and Steel Community. This was noticed by Warma, who recognised how the commitment to the Council of Europe had caused the EM to fall into stagnation. The author writing under the pen name Observer was convinced that although the EM was “currently going through certain signs of a crisis”, this could not affect the activity of the CEEC. His article predicted confidently that “the London
Uniting the Divided Continent

Conference will become both the first and last great summit of East European politicians during the exile days”88. He turned out to be right.

A year later, Warma regretted that, after London, “we have heard little about that commission.” He used changes in the organisation to explain the lack of action.89 The Western concentration on the Defence Community was another good excuse for delays in the CEEC.90 Warma also privately expressed his faith in a forthcoming new start to Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883–1963), former Foreign Minister and grand old man of Estonian diplomacy: “they are beginning to (...) overcome the stagnation that has characterised the commission during the last half year.”91

Warma did not lie about there being organisational changes. One part of the re-organisation was to increase the autonomy of the CEEC from the EM. The new statute, which separated the statutes of the CEEC from other commissions, was formulated and approved in November 1952. There were both geographical and political justifications for this, as the CEEC was described as an anti-communist exile organ. Estonian comments indicated that they believed that the new arrangement would increase the efficiency of the commission.92 However, their greatest fear – Europe divided into two parallel unions – had in fact materialised.

With its new autonomy, the CEEC made efforts towards new initiatives the following spring, and the vice-chairman, the Hungarian Paul Auer, drafted a new organisational chart including new committees. In general, the ENC welcomed the proposal in its comments. It was concerned about exiles on other continents outside of Europe and proposed a chance for them to join the co-operation.93 The representatives for economic, agricultural, moral and church committees were elected in June.94

88 Observer 1952, as footnote 48; the same formulation included Eesti Rahvusfondi Teated. (1952:13), 7f.
89 Eesti Teataja. 21st March 1953, 3.
91 BA. Varma 17. Warma to Pusta 11th March 1953.
92 “Kontakt Euroopa Liikumise Rootsi Rahvuskomiteega” 1952, as footnote 73.
94 BA. Rei 3. Horm to Rei 7th November 1953.
The Estonians also took their own initiative and in August 1953 Warma demanded new proposals and joint action by the exiles to solve European problems. Otherwise, the CEEC would lose its authority and become outdated. Warma desired a clear and concrete programme to be sent on behalf of all exiles to the governments of the great Western powers. His draft included the now familiar prerequisites for the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe to protect human rights and promote national self-determination. Warma accused the CEEC of being preoccupied with technical details and forgetting its actual mission. The draft is mentioned in a historical review in 1965, but the archives contain no evidence of Warma further editing or sending the draft, as with the aforementioned committees.  

Demands for joint declaration were a desperate call, since Warma already knew about the disagreements in London. Gradually, disagreements started to influence the actions of the CEEC. By February 1952, Torma had already attended a meeting of the council of the CEEC, which he described as “exquisitely embarrassing”. The Poles, who dominated the CEEC, had threatened to leave the entire organisation altogether. As such, the meeting was not able to come to a consensus on the themes or time for an additional conference, despite broad agreement concerning its necessity.

Harold MacMillan left the CEEC in September 1952, and was succeeded by his fellow conservative Richard Law. Quite soon afterwards, he voluntarily resigned after internal disputes. The Belgian member Étienne de la Vallée-Poussin became the new chairman in March 1954. The rapid changes revealed difficulties in the CEEC and decreasing funding had already disrupted its work. Torma was afraid the CEEC would move away from London and work only from Paris. He despondently saw the “commission (as) currently in the state of ‘suspended animation’”. Thus, the special commission gave the Estonians the first indicator that the European project was failing.

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98 BA. Rei 9. AT to AR 10th September 1952; “Selgeid sõnu raudeesriidetagustele rahvastele” 1952, as footnote 59.
Over the course of the next year, they also gradually became disappointed with the EM in general.

After Stalin’s death in March 1953, the new Soviet leadership tried to restrain the Cold War. The Estonians, among other emigrants, tried on their behalf to warn Western politicians against “smiling diplomacy”. As part of this initiative, Estonians demanded new action from the CEEC “in order to avoid an eventual standstill or differing attitudes in the activities of the National Committees.” Shortly afterwards, the EM organised a meeting in Strasbourg in June 1953 to agree on a common response to intensified Soviet diplomacy. Rei was invited, since the question obviously interested him. The meeting was going to accept a German proposal for the resolution for a partial and phased liberation of Central and Eastern Europe. Rei, Auer, and the Romanian Grigore Gafencu managed to prevent this. For them, that would not have led to a halfway point, but to a dead-end. Furthermore, the Second Economic Conference that was held in London in January 1954 drafted a resolution without mentioning the countries behind the Iron Curtain. “Nevertheless, Torma’s energetic and fast action soon gave results in this issue”, as related the event.

As early as 1950, the ENCEM proposed a questionnaire among the national committees in order to discover the abilities and preferences for systematic operations and satisfying results for all member organisations. The questionnaire finally materialised in August 1954. The ENCEM’s response did not attempt to hide its criticism, but underlined the contradiction between the aims and actions of the EM. Unsurprisingly, the primary criticism focused on forgetting the Eastern part of Europe and focusing on the work that, during the last three years, had been concentrated only in “Little Europe” and had not borne any fruit. Instead of increasing enthusiasm about Europe, the EM was bound to follow the Council of Europe. Consequently, the idea of unity

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100 For example “Vene ‘rahupoliitika’ ja Eesti probleem”. In: Eesti Teataja. 10th May 1953, 1.
102 BA. Rei 6. Rebattet to Rei 30th May 1953; Rei to Rebattet 3rd June 1953; Rebattet to Rei 12th June 1953; Rebattet to Rei 22nd June 1953; Rebattet to Rei 7th July 1953; Rei to Rebattet 9th June 1953; HAEU. ME 2155. Rei to Rebattet 9th July 1953.
103 “Ida-Lääne läbirääkimised ja okupeeritud rahvad”. In: Eesti Teataja. 12th July 1953, 1; HAEU. ME 475. Réunion du Bureau exécutif international à Strasbourg.
104 “Uus Euroopa ilma tollipiirideta” 1954, as footnote 60.
was “more confused and vague”, and on the contrary, the original zeal was “decreasing and turning into the weariness of disillusion.” The ENCEM proposed more drastic methods of directly influencing teachers and other educators when the “wide masses adopt this idea”, which was a prerequisite for final unification.\(^{106}\)

For Warma, the failure of the European Defence Community in August 1954 had been another sign of growing difficulties concerning “the co-operation of the European framework”. Post-Second World War development in this area had been one long “political bustle back and forth.” More importantly, it showed a lack of spirit, of an “internal conviction of the necessity of co-operation.” Without it, the co-operation became nothing more than mechanical.\(^{107}\) Warma’s pessimism was justified, as the re-armament of Western Germany consequently created two German states, thus fostering the general European division, which also left Estonia more permanently behind the Iron Curtain.\(^{108}\)

Reports from the EM meetings got shorter. The International Council of the EM was summoned to Versailles in June 1955, which Aspel and K. R. Pusta attended, although they did not contribute anything to the meeting documents. Even Teataja published only the final resolution of the conference.\(^{109}\) Estonian enthusiasm towards the EM was probably not evoked either when Rei was referred to as a Latvian during the meeting of the executive commission in Paris in June 1956.\(^{110}\)

In early 1957, Warma confessed to Torma that he had also lost faith in the possible resurrection of the CEEC. The member committees were riddled with internal conflicts, a common vision for Eastern Europe was missing, and the CEEC was short on money.\(^{111}\) Although the CEEC continued to operate, its significance quickly faded.\(^{112}\)

\(^{106}\) HAEU. ME 2271 ENCEM to Rebattet. September 1954.
\(^{107}\) Varma, Alf[eksander]: “Euroopa Ahhillesekand”. In: Eesti Teataja. 18th September 1954, 2.
\(^{108}\) Messenger 2006, as footnote 86.
\(^{111}\) BA. Varma 19. Varma to Torma 28th February 1957.
\(^{112}\) Laptos 2008, as footnote 54, 334.
The EM organised “the 2nd Congress of Europe” in Rome on 10th to 13th June 1957. Rei was invited, but after his refusal and persuasion by the EM, Warma attended the conference but was not very active there. The only comment he made on the papers of the congress concerned a tribute to the “heroic Hungarian fighters” of the previous year.

The Rome Congress was the end of Estonian activities in the EM. After this, Estonians lost interest in the EM and their membership became nearly entirely routine. As late as 1960, the ERF was planning to co-operate with the EM’s European Youth Campaign, although it had disbanded two years earlier. Arvo Horm wrote the history of the ENC in 1982, in which he referred to the “newly activated” ENCEM in 1962–1968. However, the archived material in Stockholm includes only Warma's fierce opposition to alter the statute of the EM in early 1960s and in Florence there are only two ENCEM replies to surveys of the EM in August 1967 and April 1970. Publicly, the ENCEM and the politicians within it failed to criticise the EM for a long period of time – they simply did not say anything about it. Teataja organised a questionnaire for foreign policy in May 1953, and only Warma mentioned the EM.

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113 HAEU. ME 2153. van Schendel to Varma 15th May 1957.
114 BA. Varma 10. Movimento Europeo, Congresso d’Europa; Also HAEU. ME 830 Congrès de l’Europe; Varma, A[leksander]: “Euroopa end sirgu ajamas...?”. In: Eesti Teataja. 67th July 1957, 2; idem: “Euroopa Kongress Roomas”. In: Eesti Teataja. 6th July 1957, 3. Warma’s collection at the Baltic Archives contains protocols also from five consequent EM conferences, but they are without any comments.
118 HAEU. ME 2153. Varma to van Schendel 9th August 1967 and Horm to van Schendel April 1970.
briefly. Foreign reviews of the ENC in 1954 and 1955 only briefly mentioned the EM. The short publications and introductions rewrote recent history, erasing any previous activity regarding unification and focusing attention solely on general anti-communist activities.

Finally, in January 1955, Tõnis Kint (1896–1991), the expert on agriculture who had attended numerous European Confederation of Agriculture conferences (instead of the EM), commented on the poor state of European affairs in Teataja. International development was pushing Central European and Estonian questions to the side, and Kint demanded new methods to promote their national cause. Two years later, Johannes Mihkelson (1907–1992) referred to the dualism of pretty words and few results, mostly notably in his descriptive statement of how “(t)he European Movement started with a great fuss…(and)…is withering away like the Amu-Darya River to desert sand before reaching the Caspian Sea (sic!).”

Although they had been involved in the ENCEM, Agrarian Kint and Social Democrat Mihkelson had other preferences. In October 1957, Warma, who had been in charge of foreign policy, finally announced his disappointment in the public lecture mentioned in the beginning of the article. He briefly reviewed the history of the CEEC, focusing on the London Conference, and concluded: “Its management has subsequently gone from hand to hand, but its initiatives have been more than restrained.”

119 “Vene ‘rahupoliitika’” 1953, as footnote 100; “Võitlus peab jatkuma”. In: Eesti Teataja. 25th May 1953, 1 and 5.
120 “Aktivne välispoliitilise tegevuse aasta”. In: Eesti Teataja. 11th July 1954, 1; Teataja. 19th June 1955, 5.
122 Kint, Tõnis: “Koostöö ja sisepoliitiline ühtlus”. In: Eesti Teataja. 24th April 1955, 2.
123 Mihkelsson 1957, as footnote 78; Amu-Darya naturally empties into the Lake Aral, which would make the metaphor even stronger.
124 Teataja. 12th October 1957, 1; Warma 1958, as footnote 1, 25; Teataja. 18th May 1957, 3.
The ENC’s foreign activity became increasingly more concentrated across the Atlantic, which the authors of *Välis-Eesti* had previously supported. There were many private organisations in the USA that promoted the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, such as the National Committees for Free Europe. The Americans convened their activities in the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) in September 1954. At first, Warma was dubious of these organisations and insisted that “European policy can still be made only in Europe.” It did not take a long time for the ACEN to contact the ENC – ACEN contacted the ENC at the end of 1954 – at which point co-operation increased. Warma was one of six Estonian delegates at the ACEN conference in Strasbourg in May of 1957 with, among others, Heinrich Laretei (1892–1973), who considered its main focus of the liberation of Eastern Europe essential to “integration, i.e. to create some kind of United Europe,” which was not possible “before solving the question of captured nations.” That was the first and only time Laretei used the new watchword.

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129 “Suurenendud välispoliitiline aktiivsus”. In: *Eesti Teataja*. 19th June 1955, 5.
130 Laretei, H[einrich]: “EIRE konverentsi kokkuvõte”. In: *Välis-Eesti*. 12th May 1957, 2; “EIRE kolmas erakorraline kokkutulek Strassburgis”. In: *Eesti Teataja*. 18th May 1957, 1; Varma, Aleksander: “Vaheriideta Euroopa Strassburgis”. In: *Eesti Teataja*. 18th May 1957, 3; Stråth, Bo: “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other”. In: Idem (ed.): *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*. Bruxelles 2000 (= Series Multiple Europes; 10), 385–420, here: 385.
Conclusion: More divisions instead of unification

The Estonian National Committee of the European Movement was established in 1949 with great enthusiasm, and with high hopes it joined the European Movement in January 1950. Immediately afterwards, Estonians contributed a significant amount of effort to ensure the realisation of the conference in London two years later, which was hailed as a success. EM members were receptive to Estonian aspiration for a free, democratic, secure, and prosperous Europe. Aleksander Warma envisioned a full-scale economic union where the member state would nevertheless maintain a great deal of political independence, which is practically impossible. Due to their lack of power, the exiled politicians could demand more than they could be held accountable for, and promise more than they could ever deliver. On the other hand, especially for Warma, EM membership was partly bound up with the idealism from World War II—which, from the Estonian viewpoint, was still ongoing—where a European federation was an essential element of post-war planning. Continental unification and national liberation were complementary alternatives.

This European idealism faded, but did not completely disappear, among the Estonians. Overall, they were swimming against the current, as the European Movement had begun its downfall together with the Council of Europe when the Estonian National Committee was granted membership; the Schuman Declaration was just over four months away. In general, the case of ENCEM shows the failure of the federalist approach in unifying the continent. For contemporary Estonians, this was not a clear prospect, and the intensified activities of the new Central and Eastern European Commission seemed to be separate from the difficulties of the main Movement and of unification in general.

However, this was not the case. When Western unification began with the European Coal and Steel Community and subsequent organisations, their interest in the EM and in Central Europe diminished. At that time, Europe was not divided into two, but rather three parts. The greatest Estonian fear, the creation of two parallel unions in a liberal Europe, had materialised. This is also when the aims of a general unification process and the national effort for re-independence collided. Therefore, the common European history of unification remains unwritten. Although the Estonians discussed the matter amongst themselves and took part in mutual conferences, co-operation remained unreachable.
Other emigrant groups were also not receptive to Estonian aspirations, despite their occasional co-operation. The wish for separate economic calculations in order to complete a joint programme for reconstruction was apparently never realised. The failure of using European unification as a tool for independence was evident, and the leaders changed their focus to American anti-communist organisations. Before, the ENC had reacted to Russian, instead of European, initiatives and thus the failure of ENCEM also highlights how Europe was being squeezed between the American and Soviet superpowers in the early Cold War. There was only light interest in European unification in the Estonian community beyond its supporters, but the change in orientation was also needed to maintain their authority throughout the refugee community. Similarly, activities in European organisations were published to support the political legitimacy of the ENC and the ENCEM. However, more generally, they must also have signified sincere efforts to keep morale and spirits among the refugees high: despite the poor political results of the liberation movement, Estonia has not been forgotten as a European nation.