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Browsing by Author "Heinemann, Frank"
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2016-12-07DiskussionspapierCentral Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment Duffy, John; Heinemann, FrankWe implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium ...
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2010-01-21DiskussionspapierCharacterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities Basteck, Christian; Daniëls, Tijmen R.; Heinemann, FrankGlobal games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with strategic complementarities. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that it is ...
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2013-01-16DiskussionspapierCrossing Network versus Dealer Market Dönges, Jutta; Heinemann, Frank; Daniëls, Tijmen R.The allocation of order flow to alternative trading systems can be understood as a game with strategic substitutes between buyers on the same side of the market, as well as one of positive network externalities. We consider ...
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2013-08-29DiskussionspapierLimited higher order belieft and the welfare effects of public information Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, FrankIn games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative ...
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2013-05-16DiskussionspapierThe 'Celtic Crisis' König, Philipp; Anand, Kartik; Heinemann, FrankBank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, ...
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2011-10-26DiskussionspapierThe Power of Sunspots Fehr, Dietmar; Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, AniolWe present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria ...