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Browsing by Author "Müller, Wieland"
Now showing items 1-18 of 18
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2000-06-20BuchAbsent–minded drivers in the lab Huck, Steffen; Müller, WielandThis note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control ...
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1999-05-11BuchCombining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland
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2000-01-31BuchDivisionalization in Contests Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, WielandTo be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest
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1999-08-25BuchDynamic Decision Structure and Risk Taking Eichberger, Jürgen; Güth, Werner; Müller, WielandThis paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage ...
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2000-01-13BuchMerger in Contests Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, WielandCompetition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the ...
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2000-04-17BuchOn the Profitability of Collusion in LocationGames Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicki; Müller, WielandIn this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains ...
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2000-12-20BuchPrivate information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, WielandOn a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to ...
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2000-04-25BuchProfitable horizontal mergers Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, WielandWe propose a model in which mergers exert a more pronounced effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare–improving ...
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2001-09-18BuchSimultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: Experimental evidence Kübler, Dorothea; Müller, WielandWe investigate simultaneous and sequential price competition in duopoly markets with differentiated products. In both markets symmetric firms are repeatedly and randomly matched. The strategy method is used to elicit ...
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1999-04-13BuchStackelberg beats Cournot Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-TheoWe report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. For each market we implement both a random matching and fixed-pairs version. Stackelberg markets yield, ...
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2000-05-11BuchStrategic Delegation in Experimental Markets Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-TheoIn this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize ...
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1999-08-20BuchStrategies, Heuristics and the Relevance of Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Decision Problem Müller, Wieland
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2000-01-20BuchTax Liability Side Equivalence in ExperimentalPosted-Offer Markets Borck, Rainald; Engelmann, Dirk; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-TheoIn theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of which side of the market it is levied on. This principle of liability side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, ...
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2000-04-17BuchThe East End, the West End, and King’s Cross Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J.We study experimentally a standard four–player Hotelling game, with a uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium configuration consists of two firms located at one quarter of the ...
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1998-01-23BuchThe relevance of equal splits Güth, Werner; Huck, Steffen; Müller, WielandThe findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in ...
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1999-05-11BuchTo commit or not to commit Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo
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2000-12-12BuchWhy firms should care for customers Königstein, Manfred; Müller, WielandAdopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers’ welfare.
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2006-01-20BuchWhy the rich are nastier than the poor Huck, Steffen; Müller, WielandStudying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in ...