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2004-01-01Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/9361
Hotelling Games with Three, Four, and MorePlayers
dc.contributor.authorBrenner, Steffen
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-17T00:50:06Z
dc.date.available2017-06-17T00:50:06Z
dc.date.created2008-01-30
dc.date.issued2004-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/10013
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n−player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation - as in the duopoly model - nor minimize differentiation - as in the multi-firm game with linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players are characterized by a U-shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations. Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentiation from the social perspective if n > 3, while adding firms leads to a level of differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.subjectspatial competitioneng
dc.subjectmulti-player gameseng
dc.subjectinterval modeleng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleHotelling Games with Three, Four, and MorePlayers
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10083846
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/9361
local.edoc.container-titleJournal of Regional Science
local.edoc.anmerkungDie hier eingestellte Version ist die Rohversion des Autors. "The definitive Version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com"
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.institutionHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
local.edoc.container-urlhttp://www.blackwell-synergy.com/
local.edoc.container-volume45
local.edoc.container-issue5
local.edoc.container-year2004/2005
local.edoc.container-firstpage851
local.edoc.container-lastpage864
dc.description.versionNot Reviewed

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