2002-12-31Teil eines Buches DOI: 10.18452/9410
From within and from without
two perspectives on analytic sentences
Müller, Olaf L.
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both perspectives on analytic sentences do not mutually exclude but supplement and illuminate each other. In "Two Dogmas", Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction comes from within, whereas in Word and Object, Quine repeats his earlier criticism from without. His criticism is directed against Carnap's views on our understanding of theoretical terms. I challenge Quine's criticism in both of its versions and provide two definitions for analyticity that are immune to Quine's arguments. Using the first of these definitions (the one from without) I try to show how it is possible to distinguish (genuine) belief revision from linguistic change—even in case of a scientific revolution.
Dateien zu dieser Publikation
This electronic version is not entirely identical with the original version; I have corrected here two mistakes that had occurred in the definitions (D3s) and (D3c). The original was published by Hänsel-Hohenhausen (Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt, 2002), pp. 229-247.
Is Part Of Series: Belief and meaning : Essays at the interface, pp 229-247