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2022-04-29Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.855074
Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference
dc.contributor.authorHipólito, Inês
dc.contributor.authorvan Es, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-17T10:24:28Z
dc.date.available2022-08-17T10:24:28Z
dc.date.issued2022-04-29none
dc.date.updated2022-05-18T00:44:52Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/25846
dc.description.abstractThis aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.eng
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights(CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 Internationalger
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectsocial cognitioneng
dc.subjectniche constructioneng
dc.subjectactive inferenceeng
dc.subjecttheory of mindeng
dc.subjectenactivismeng
dc.subjectdynamical systems theoryeng
dc.subject.ddc150 Psychologienone
dc.titleEnactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inferencenone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/25846-1
dc.identifier.doi10.3389/fpsyg.2022.855074none
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/25154
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.container-titleFrontiers in psychologynone
local.edoc.pages15none
local.edoc.anmerkungThis article was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Open Access Publication Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.institutionCluster im Rahmen der Exzellenzinitiativenone
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
local.edoc.container-publisher-nameFrontiers Research Foundationnone
local.edoc.container-publisher-placeLausannenone
local.edoc.container-volume13none
local.edoc.container-year2022none
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
local.edoc.container-articlenumber855074none
dc.identifier.eissn1664-1078

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