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2020-11-03Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/25503
Ockham on Memory and Double Intentionality
dc.contributor.authorPerler, Dominik
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-25T14:29:53Z
dc.date.available2022-11-25T14:29:53Z
dc.date.issued2020-11-03none
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/26221
dc.description.abstractOckham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory.eng
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights(CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 Internationalger
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectAbstractive cognitioneng
dc.subjectCausationeng
dc.subjectHabiteng
dc.subjectIntentionalityeng
dc.subjectIntuitive cognitioneng
dc.subjectMemoryeng
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophie, Parapsychologie und Okkultismus, Psychologienone
dc.titleOckham on Memory and Double Intentionalitynone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/26221-1
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/25503
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.pages10none
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8749
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1007/s11245-020-09728-9
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleTopoinone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume41none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue1none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSpringer Science + Business Media B.Vnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceDordrechtnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart133none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend142none
bua.departmentPhilosophische Fakultätnone

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