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2014-06-09Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/23891
Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems
dc.contributor.authorCutler, Josh
dc.contributor.authorDe Marchi, Scott
dc.contributor.authorGallop, Max
dc.contributor.authorHollenbach, Florian M.
dc.contributor.authorLaver, Michael
dc.contributor.authorOrlowski, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-28T09:52:24Z
dc.date.available2022-12-28T09:52:24Z
dc.date.issued2014-06-09none
dc.identifier.issn0007-1234
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/26406
dc.descriptionThis publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.none
dc.description.abstractGovernment formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.eng
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc320 Politikwissenschaft (Politik und Regierung)none
dc.titleCabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systemsnone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/26406-1
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/23891
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.pages13none
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
dc.identifier.eissn1469-2112
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1017/S0007123414000180
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleBritish Journal of Political Sciencenone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume46none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue1none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameCambridge Univ. Pressnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceLondonnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart31none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend43none
bua.departmentKultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftliche Fakultätnone

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