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2021-08-18Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/26558
Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions
dc.contributor.authorTaieb, Hamid
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-16T14:18:58Z
dc.date.available2023-05-16T14:18:58Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-18none
dc.date.updated2023-03-25T09:07:31Z
dc.identifier.issn0167-7411
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/27257
dc.description.abstractBrentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” (intentionale Inexistenz)—and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” (intentionale Beziehung) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” (tendere in) of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions (intentio prima and intentio secunda), which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions.eng
dc.description.sponsorshipHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin (1034)
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights(CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 Internationalger
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectFranz Brentanoeng
dc.subjectFirst and second intentionseng
dc.subjectIntentionalityeng
dc.subjectImmanent objectseng
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophie, Parapsychologie und Okkultismus, Psychologienone
dc.titleBrentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentionsnone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/27257-0
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/26558
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.pages16none
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8749
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1007/s11245-021-09757-ynone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleTopoinone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume41none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue1none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSpringer Science + Business Media B.V.none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceDordrecht [u.a.]none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart143none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend158none
bua.departmentPhilosophische Fakultätnone

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