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2023-07-05Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/28509
Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing
dc.contributor.authorJahn, Marcel
dc.contributor.authorBeck, Lukas
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-17T12:19:53Z
dc.date.available2024-04-17T12:19:53Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-05none
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/29144
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying those dispositions. In the first part of the paper, we introduce the distinction in proper detail and show that the accounts have different implications regarding the valuings of agents. In the second part, we situate the accounts within the extant philosophical literature. First, we relate them to the recent debate between so-called dispositionalists and representationalists about the nature of beliefs and point out that this debate can help anticipate some of the main dialectical fault lines to be expected between surface- and layer-theorists. Second, we examine the contemporary meta-ethical debate on conceptualizing valuing, indicate that scholars have largely ignored the distinction introduced here, and outline that this oversight has substantial theoretical costs: as we show, key arguments within the meta-ethical debate require thorough re-evaluation in light of the proposed distinction. The third part of the paper illustrates the theoretical leverage of the distinction for practical research by exploring its implications for behavioral welfare economics.eng
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights(CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 Internationalger
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectValuingeng
dc.subjectMeta-ethicseng
dc.subjectBehavioral welfare economicseng
dc.subjectRepresentationalismeng
dc.subjectDispositionalismeng
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophie, Parapsychologie und Okkultismus, Psychologienone
dc.titleDo you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuingnone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/29144-7
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/28509
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.pages27none
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
dc.identifier.eissn1573-0964
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1007/s11229-023-04221-3
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleSynthesenone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume202none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue1none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber16none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSpringer Science+Business Medianone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceDordrecht [u.a.]none
bua.departmentPhilosophische Fakultätnone

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