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2023-08-28Zeitschriftenartikel DOI: 10.18452/28527
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
dc.contributor.authorFan, Cuihong
dc.contributor.authorJun, Byoung Heon
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmar G.
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-17T17:00:40Z
dc.date.available2024-04-17T17:00:40Z
dc.date.issued2023-08-28none
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/29155
dc.description.abstractWe analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder’s bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only an imperfect signal. Whereas leadership with perfect commitment exclusively benefits the follower, imperfect commitment yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the leader may revise his bid is arbitrarily small. This collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also payoff dominant.eng
dc.language.isoengnone
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin
dc.rights(CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 Internationalger
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectAuctionseng
dc.subjectTacit collusioneng
dc.subjectEspionageeng
dc.subjectSecond-mover advantageeng
dc.subjectSignalingeng
dc.subjectIncomplete informationeng
dc.subject.ddc300 Sozialwissenschaftennone
dc.titleSpying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusionnone
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/29155-9
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/28527
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionnone
local.edoc.pages21none
local.edoc.type-nameZeitschriftenartikel
local.edoc.container-typeperiodical
local.edoc.container-type-nameZeitschrift
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewednone
dc.identifier.eissn2196-1093
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleEconomic theory bulletinnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume11none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue2none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSpringer Internat. Publ.none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceChamnone
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart255none
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend275none
bua.departmentWirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultätnone

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