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1999-04-13Buch DOI: 10.18452/3251
Stackelberg beats Cournot
dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wieland
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theo
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:22:56Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:22:56Z
dc.date.created2005-08-29
dc.date.issued1999-04-13none
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3903
dc.description.abstractWe report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. For each market we implement both a random matching and fixed-pairs version. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets. Under random matching total quantities in Stackelberg markets are higher than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium while total quantities in the Cournot markets match the equilibrium prediction. Under fixed pairs aggregate output for both, Cournot and Stackelberg, is lower than under random matching, but there is less collusion on Stackelberg markets and, hence, higher efficiency.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes - 32, SFB 373 Papers, ISSN:1436-1086
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleStackelberg beats Cournot
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleOn collusion and efficiency in experimental markets
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10044728
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3251
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.container-titleSFB 373 Papers
local.edoc.container-issn1436-1086
local.edoc.pages18
local.z-edoc.journal-periodikumAusgabe32,
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1999
local.edoc.container-issue32
local.edoc.container-year1999

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