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2005-09-08Buch DOI: 10.18452/3268
Prior Dispositions and Actual Behavior in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
dc.contributor.authorBrandstätter, Hermann
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorHimmelbauer, Judith
dc.contributor.authorKriz, Willy
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:26:17Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:26:17Z
dc.date.created2005-09-08
dc.date.issued2005-09-08
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3920
dc.description.abstractIndividuals differ in behavior since neither their ethical constraints, their attitudes towards risk, nor their analytical talents are the same. In an experimental prephase we tried to elicit such differences by confronting participants with suitable one-person-decision problems. In the main phase they played successively the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and finally the combination of the former two, originally studied by Güth and van Damme (1998). A final personality questionnaire elicits self-evaluations concerning ethical constraints, attitude towards risk, and analytic capability in addition to more general personality traits. We mainly investigate the consistency of prior dispositions (inferred from individual decision behavior in the prephase and from the self-reports) and actual behavior (in the main phase).What is reported in this paper is a part of a more complex set of results. The focus here is on the effects of three individual difference variables (benevolence, intelligence, and reciprocity orientation) on behavior in the role of an ‘active’ player (the giver) and in the role of a ‘passive’ player (the receiver). Benevolence (as personality trait of the active player) facilitates equity considerations in his/her offers to the powerless, but not to the powerful receiver. Reciprocity orientation makes male (not female) participants in the role of powerful receivers (powerful, because, if they decline the offer, none of the players gets anything) to set higher minimal demands (higher acceptance thresholds). Intelligence had no significant effects on bargaining behavior.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titlePrior Dispositions and Actual Behavior in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046418
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3268
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages11
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1999
local.edoc.container-issue52
local.edoc.container-year1999
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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