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1999-07-08Buch DOI: 10.18452/3281
The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given
dc.contributor.authorEngelmann, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorStrobel, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:28:51Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:28:51Z
dc.date.created2005-09-09
dc.date.issued1999-07-08
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3933
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others’ behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects’ choices. There we …nd no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. The results are difficult to interpret for the rounds where we do not provide information.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleThe False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046555
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3281
local.edoc.pages27
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year1999
dc.identifier.zdb2135319-0
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
bua.series.issuenumber1999,66

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