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1999-09-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3297
Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axel
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:31:59Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:31:59Z
dc.date.created2005-09-09
dc.date.issued1999-09-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3949
dc.description.abstractApplying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of ‘truly’ trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleEvolutionary Norm Enforcement
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046711
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3297
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages17
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1999
local.edoc.container-issue84
local.edoc.container-year1999
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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