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1999-09-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3302
Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKeser, Claudia
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:32:57Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:32:57Z
dc.date.created2005-09-14
dc.date.issued1999-09-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3954
dc.description.abstractWe present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectBargainingeng
dc.subjectJoint Ventureeng
dc.subjectMergereng
dc.subjectExperimentseng
dc.subjectEquilibrium Selectioneng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleDecentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046770
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3302
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages20
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1999
local.edoc.container-issue90
local.edoc.container-year1999
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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