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2000-01-13Buch DOI: 10.18452/3325
Merger in Contests
dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffen
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wieland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:37:28Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:37:28Z
dc.date.created2005-09-15
dc.date.issued2000-01-13
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/3977
dc.description.abstractCompetition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestantseng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcontestseng
dc.subjectmergereng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleMerger in Contests
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047063
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3325
local.edoc.pages15
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2000
dc.identifier.zdb2135319-0
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
bua.series.issuenumber2000,3

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