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2000-05-11Buch DOI: 10.18452/3360
Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wieland
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theo
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:44:20Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:44:20Z
dc.date.created2005-09-23
dc.date.issued2000-05-11
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4012
dc.description.abstractIn this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are giveneng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectexperimental economicseng
dc.subjectstrategic delegationeng
dc.subjectmanagerial incentiveseng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleStrategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047484
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3360
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages18
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2000
local.edoc.container-issue39
local.edoc.container-year2000
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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