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2000-05-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3361
Auctions and Corruption
dc.contributor.authorLengwiler, Yvan
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmar
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:44:33Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:44:33Z
dc.date.created2005-09-23
dc.date.issued2000-05-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4013
dc.description.abstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houseseng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectauctionseng
dc.subjectprocurementeng
dc.subjectcorruptioneng
dc.subjectcollusioneng
dc.subjectcoalitionseng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleAuctions and Corruption
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047498
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3361
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages20
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2000
local.edoc.container-issue40
local.edoc.container-year2000
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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