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2005-10-05Buch DOI: 10.18452/3430
On the evolution of power indices in collectivebargaining
dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:58:03Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:58:03Z
dc.date.created2005-10-05
dc.date.issued2005-10-05
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4082
dc.description.abstractStarting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleOn the evolution of power indices in collectivebargaining
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048354
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3430
local.edoc.pages15
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2000
dc.identifier.zdb2135319-0
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
bua.series.issuenumber2000,109

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