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2000-10-18Buch DOI: 10.18452/3431
Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Gamewith Indirect Reward
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKönigstein, Manfred
dc.contributor.authorMarchand, Nadège
dc.contributor.authorNehring, Klaus
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:58:15Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:58:15Z
dc.date.created2005-10-05
dc.date.issued2000-10-18
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4083
dc.description.abstractExperimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the investor. This is a direct reward game. Similar to Dufwenberg et al. (2000) it is investigated to what extent trust and reward are still observable when reward is indirect; i.e., when the investor may only be rewarded by a third person who did not receive his investment. Furthermore we investigate the influence of social comparison (information about other players’ investments). Our main finding is that mainly indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleTrust and Reciprocity in the Investment Gamewith Indirect Reward
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048367
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3431
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages32
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2000
local.edoc.container-issue110
local.edoc.container-year2000
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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