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2000-12-20Buch DOI: 10.18452/3434
Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Sandra
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wieland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T20:58:50Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T20:58:50Z
dc.date.created2005-10-05
dc.date.issued2000-12-20
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4086
dc.description.abstractOn a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectevolutioneng
dc.subjectoligopolyeng
dc.subjectmarket researcheng
dc.subjectprivate informationeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titlePrivate information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048397
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3434
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages16
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2000
local.edoc.container-issue113
local.edoc.container-year2000
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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