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2000-12-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3449
Fairness versus Efficiency
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKliemt, Hartmut
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axel
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:01:47Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:01:47Z
dc.date.created2005-10-07
dc.date.issued2000-12-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4101
dc.description.abstractFairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving at the cost of reducing their own monetary payoff. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. The overall conclusion from our results is that striving for efficiency is constrained by equity concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in onesided gift-relationships.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleFairness versus Efficiency
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleAn Experimental Study of (Mutual) Gift Giving
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048591
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3449
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages16
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2001
local.edoc.container-issue6
local.edoc.container-year2000
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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