Show simple item record

2005-10-07Buch DOI: 10.18452/3456
Alternating Offer Bargaining Experiments with Varying Institutional Details
dc.contributor.authorAnderhub, Vital
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorMarchand, Nadège
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:03:08Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:03:08Z
dc.date.created2005-10-07
dc.date.issued2005-10-07
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4108
dc.description.abstractThe game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one what defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleAlternating Offer Bargaining Experiments with Varying Institutional Details
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048665
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3456
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages21
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2001
local.edoc.container-issue9
local.edoc.container-year2001
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

Show simple item record