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2001-02-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3460
Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets
dc.contributor.authorAnderhub, Vital
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKamecke, Ulrich
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theo
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:03:56Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:03:56Z
dc.date.created2005-10-07
dc.date.issued2001-02-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4112
dc.description.abstractIn the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the experimental data, given capacities, observed price setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Capacities converge above the Cournot level. Sellers rarely manage to cooperate.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCapacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048702
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3460
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages27
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2001
local.edoc.container-issue10
local.edoc.container-year2001
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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