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2005-10-12Buch DOI: 10.18452/3520
A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
dc.contributor.authorDecker, Torsten
dc.contributor.authorStiehler, Andreas
dc.contributor.authorStrobel, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:15:37Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:15:37Z
dc.date.created2005-10-12
dc.date.issued2005-10-12
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4172
dc.description.abstractIn this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcooperationeng
dc.subjectexperimenteng
dc.subjectpublic goodeng
dc.subjectfree-ridingeng
dc.subjectpunishment institutioneng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleA Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleAn Experimental Study
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049365
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3520
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages33
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2002
local.edoc.container-issue71
local.edoc.container-year2002
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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