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2005-10-12Buch DOI: 10.18452/3547
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Veronika
dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Frank
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmar
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:20:53Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:20:53Z
dc.date.created2005-10-12
dc.date.issued2005-10-12
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4199
dc.description.abstractThe second–generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending–bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectmulti–unit auctionseng
dc.subjectspectrum auctionseng
dc.subjecttelecommunicationseng
dc.subjectindustrial organizationeng
dc.subjectgame theoryeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleLow Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3547
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages18
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2001
local.edoc.container-issue31
local.edoc.container-year2001
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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