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1998-04-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/3733
Do Banks Crowd in or out Business Ethics?
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T21:57:01Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T21:57:01Z
dc.date.created2006-01-27
dc.date.issued1998-04-01
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4385
dc.description.abstractThe evolution of trustworthiness as a major aspect of business ethics depends crucially on whether it can be signaled. If this is impossible, only opportunistic traders will survive. Whereas previous studies have analysed detection agencies (Güth and Kliemt, 1994 and 1998) or have substituted signaling by ex post-punishment, e.g. in the form of courts (Brennan, Güth, Kliemt, 1997a and b), we here introduce the institution of banks which can guarantee payment. It is shown that this can crowd in trustworthiness, i.e. trustworthy traders can survive in the evolutionary race. Compared to detection agencies the result may, however, be both, crowding out and crowding in of business ethics. The crucial feature is the bank’s ability to discriminate between trustworthy and unreliable debtors which, in our model, is formally captured by the probability difference of accepting their respective credit applications.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleDo Banks Crowd in or out Business Ethics?
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10056837
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3733
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.pages28
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year1998
dc.title.subtitleAn Indirect Evolutionary Analysis
dc.identifier.zdb2135319-0
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
bua.series.issuenumber1998,40

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