A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction
| dc.contributor.author | Perry, Motty | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | |
| dc.contributor.author | Zamir, Shmuel | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-15T22:00:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-15T22:00:42Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2006-03-09 | |
| dc.date.issued | 1998-06-01 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1436-1086 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4404 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. | eng |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Auctions | eng |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 Wirtschaft | |
| dc.title | A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction | |
| dc.type | book | |
| dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060032 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3752 | |
| dc.subject.dnb | 17 Wirtschaft | |
| local.edoc.pages | 11 | |
| local.edoc.type-name | Buch | |
| local.edoc.container-type | series | |
| local.edoc.container-type-name | Schriftenreihe | |
| local.edoc.container-year | 1998 | |
| dc.identifier.zdb | 2135319-0 | |
| bua.series.name | Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes | |
| bua.series.issuenumber | 1998,63 |
