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1997-03-14Buch DOI: 10.18452/3812
Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation
dc.contributor.authorDufwenberg, Martin
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T22:12:03Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T22:12:03Z
dc.date.created2006-06-01
dc.date.issued1997-03-14
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4464
dc.description.abstractThe two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. Whereas strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand suffices to demonstrate the difference between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleIndirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleA Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064149
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3812
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages18
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1997
local.edoc.container-issue28
local.edoc.container-year1997
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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