Show simple item record

2006-06-02Buch DOI: 10.18452/3823
Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better
dc.contributor.authorBrennan, Geoffrey
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.contributor.authorKliemt, Hartmut
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T22:14:12Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T22:14:12Z
dc.date.created2006-06-02
dc.date.issued2006-06-02
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4475
dc.description.abstractCan a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than "the rest of us"? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound "rational choice" answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation the complex interactions between "moral" intrinsic motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic "formal" controls of opportunism are analysed. Under the assumption that judges are no better than ordinary citizens it is shown that introducing a court system can nevertheless prevent that the more trustworthy are driven out. It cannot be excluded, though, that courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectTrust relationshipseng
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryeng
dc.subjectIntrinsic motivationeng
dc.subjectCourt systemeng
dc.subjectLegal litigationeng
dc.subjectHobbesian problem of social ordereng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleTrust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064253
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3823
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages53
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1997
local.edoc.container-issue44
local.edoc.container-year1997
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

Show simple item record