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1997-06-19Buch DOI: 10.18452/3830
Using Private Job Agencies
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorothea
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T22:16:43Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T22:16:43Z
dc.date.created2006-06-07
dc.date.issued1997-06-19
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4482
dc.description.abstractIn a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best contracts. This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch. A bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is inefficient and the employer chooses not to use the private agency.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectprincipal agenteng
dc.subjectscreening contractseng
dc.subjectemployment serviceseng
dc.subject.ddc340 Recht
dc.titleUsing Private Job Agencies
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleOptimal Screening or Cream Skimming?
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064334
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3830
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages23
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1997
local.edoc.container-issue53
local.edoc.container-year1997
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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