1997-11-07Buch DOI: 10.18452/3860
Specific Institutional Aspects of International Cooperation
A GAME Theoretic Account
If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative) bargaining power, it is simply a field of application in view of game theory. Our discussion tries to elaborate the specific institutional aspects of international bargaining with interacting parties from different countries. Especially, we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from international bargaining are unenforceable.
Dateien zu dieser Publikation
Is Part Of Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes - 104, SFB 373 Papers, ISSN:1436-1086