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1997-11-07Buch DOI: 10.18452/3860
Specific Institutional Aspects of International Cooperation
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T22:22:32Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T22:22:32Z
dc.date.created2006-06-09
dc.date.issued1997-11-07
dc.identifier.issn1436-1086
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4512
dc.description.abstractIf one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative) bargaining power, it is simply a field of application in view of game theory. Our discussion tries to elaborate the specific institutional aspects of international bargaining with interacting parties from different countries. Especially, we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from international bargaining are unenforceable.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleSpecific Institutional Aspects of International Cooperation
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleA GAME Theoretic Account
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064811
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3860
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
local.edoc.pages17
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume1997
local.edoc.container-issue104
local.edoc.container-year1997
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2135319-0

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