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2005-08-09Buch DOI: 10.18452/3907
Fixed-Prize Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anja
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T22:58:05Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T22:58:05Z
dc.date.created2005-09-01
dc.date.issued2005-08-09
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4559
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectqualityeng
dc.subjectinnovation contesteng
dc.subjectauctioneng
dc.subjecttournamenteng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleFixed-Prize Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10045610
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3907
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages22
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2005
local.edoc.container-issue41
local.edoc.container-year2005
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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