Show simple item record

2005-09-29Buch DOI: 10.18452/3918
Relational Contracts and Job Design
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anja
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:00:15Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:00:15Z
dc.date.created2005-10-12
dc.date.issued2005-09-29
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4570
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectjob designeng
dc.subjectmulti-taskingeng
dc.subjectrelational contractseng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleRelational Contracts and Job Design
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049236
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3918
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages35
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2005
local.edoc.container-issue52
local.edoc.container-year2005
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

Show simple item record